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When Italy became a fully united country in 1870, Britain was an enthusiastic               
supporter of the new state. This feeling was reciprocated, with Italy regarding Britain as 
her most sincere friend in Europe. In February 1887 Britain joined Italy, Germany and 
Austria-Hungary in the Mediterranean Agreements, by which Britain guaranteed support 
for Italy in the event of attack upon her. However, by then circumstances had changed. 
The British occupation of Egypt and the Mahdist uprising had led to Britain becoming a 
significant Power in North-East Africa. During the same period, Italy had started 
establishing colonial settlements on the Red Sea. This led to a conflict in the region 
between Italian and British interests. In addition, Franco-Italian friction increased as 
Crispi, the Italian Premier since August 1887, continually provoked France, culminating 
in a crisis which nearly tipped Europe into a full-scale war in 1888. At the same time, 
Italy was trying to establish a colony on the Benadir coast of Zanzibar, which also 
disturbed British authority in East Africa. The combination of Italian challenges to 
British interests, and her provocation of France, led to an erosion of British trust in Italy 
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                                               INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Theories abound as to why European countries - especially Britain, indisputably the most 
successful of all - came to develop Empires during the late nineteenth century. Inter Alia, 
as early as 1885 Seeley expressed a belief that the British Empire grew, like a fungus, as 
an extension of the country’s underlying social, economic and political integration:1 
Hobson’s opinion was that they grew out of a conspiracy of capitalists who might be 
expected to gain from its creation, such as armaments manufacturers;2 Hilferding typified 
the Marxist view that they were an effort to utilise surplus capital by exporting it;3 
Schumpeter believed that they resulted from the atavistic urges of the European ruling 
classes to conquer, regardless of the cost;4 Robinson and Gallagher’s thesis - broadly 
speaking - is that ‘informal Empire’ (resulting from commercial expansion abroad 
without the connivance of Government) generally led indirectly to the spread of Imperial 
power, which only became ‘formal’ when changing circumstances, such as rival Empires 
or indigenous resistance, made life difficult for informal practitioners and forced the 
intervention of governmental agency;5 while more recently, the views of  Cain and 
Hopkins, whose theory of ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism’ - basically that Hobson’s rising 
                                                 
1 See D. Wormell, Sir John Seeley and the Uses of History (Cambridge: University Press, 1980). 
2 J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (NewYork: James Potts & Co., 1902)   
3 R. Hilferding, Das Finanzkapital (Vienna: Volksbuchhandlung, 1910) 
4 J. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1951 - English translation) 
5 Gallagher & Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, pp.1-15; for Africa specifically see their Africa 
and the Victorians.  For a brief critique of Cain & Hopkins’ argument, see A. Webster, ‘Business and 
Empire: A Reassessment of the British Conquest of Burma in 1885’, The Historical Journal, 43: 4 
(December 2000), pp.1003-25, especially pp.1004-5 & 1006-8. 
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industrialist bourgeoisie rode on the coat-tails of Schumpeter’s atavistic aristocrats - has 
gained much traction.6  
      Whatever the reason, the percentage of the world’s land surface occupied or 
controlled by Europeans rose from 35% in 1800 to 84.4% by 1914.7 Much of this 
occurred during the ‘Scramble for Africa’ in the last quarter of the century. Britain’s 
Imperial acquisitions were, however, greater during the 1815-1914 period than those of 
any other world power. Between 1871 and 1900 Britain added four and a quarter million 
square miles and sixty-six million people to her Empire,8 two and a half million miles and 
forty-four million people of those during the premierships of Lord Salisbury.9  
      Yet Britain, for all her naval and imperial might, was not so strong in terms of land 
forces as to be immune from attack from Europe. Though choosing to avoid formal 
alliance with European Powers after 1815,10 and thereby avoid being dragged into 
European conflicts, British statesmen of every hue were aware of Britain’s vulnerability 
to invasion from Europe. Thus, when Salisbury finally decided to become loosely 
associated with the Powers of the Triple Alliance via the Mediterranean Agreements of 
1887, it was in large part due to the friendship which had grown between Britain and 
Italy since the end of the Napoleonic era.11  
                                                 
6 P.J. Cain & A.G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: The New 
Imperialism’, Economic History Review (2nd series) XL: 1 (1987), pp. 1-26. And see their British 
Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914 (London: Longmans, 1993 - 3rd edition, 2016). For a 
fuller discussion of the nature of Imperial expansion, including Fieldhouse’s (see note 7 below) Theory of 
Peripheral Expansion, see Chapter 3. 
7 D.K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1830-1914 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p.3. 
8 P.M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Penguin, 1976), p.181. 
9 Sir Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 3rd Marquis of Salisbury (1830-1903), Secretary for India 1866-67 and 1874-
78, Foreign Secretary 1878-1881, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 1885-February 1886, Prime 
Minister August 1886-1892 and 1895-1902 (Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 1895-1900). And see A. 
Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1999), p.844. 
10 The Crimean War being the very temporary exception proving the rule. 
11 Italy having joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance of 1882. 
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      The creation of a united Italian nation state, and its admission into the “comity of 
nations” in 1870 was greeted in Britain with almost universal enthusiasm.12 Since the end 
of the Napoleonic Wars, Italy had held a special place in the hearts and minds of the 
English.13 Byron14 had been involved with the Carbonari,15 and with the evolution of the 
‘Grand Tour’,16 Italy became the most favoured destination of English travellers. 
Gladstone17 had always been a fervent supporter of Italian independence18 - indeed, it 
was practically the only subject upon which Gladstone and Palmerston saw eye-to-eye19 - 
and by 1887 Salisbury was speaking no more than the truth when he wrote that ‘there was 
no nation with whom common action would be more agreeable to the people of this 
country than with Italy’.20 The Italians, for their part, reciprocated the feeling, with 
                                                 
12 A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe (Oxford: OUP, 1954), p.124. ‘Unofficial opinion in 
England… was wildly enthusiastic over the achievement of Italian independence, and half a million 
Londoners lined the streets to cheer Garibaldi when (he) paid a visit in 1864…’; D. Mack Smith, Italy: A 
Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959), p.118. 
13 D. Beales, England and Italy 1859-60 (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1961), p.xi. See also K. 
Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England 1830-1902 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), p.98 
14 George Gordon Byron, 6th Baron Byron (1788-1824), poet. 
15 The Carbonari (lit. “Charcoal Burners”) were an association of revolutionary Italian secret societies 
active from c.1800, and established as a republican, anti-Monarchical, liberal nationalistic movement after 
the Bourbon restoration of 1815. They were absorbed into Mazzini’s (q.v.) Young Italy movement in 1831; 
A.W. Palmer, A Dictionary of Modern History, 1789-1945 (Harmondsworth: Cresset Press, 1962 (Penguin 
edition, 1964)). See also R. Lansdown, ‘Byron and the Carbonari’ History Today 41:5 (May 1991), pp.18-
26. 
16 ‘The classic Grand Tour usually covered Florence, Venice, Paris and Rome’. A. Roberts, Salisbury: 
Victorian Titan (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1996), p.15. 
17 William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898), Prime Minister 1868-1874, 1880-1885, February-August 1886, 
1892-1894. 
18 P. Magnus, Gladstone (London: John Murray, 1954), pp.138-39; J Morley, The Life of William Ewart 
Gladstone (London: Macmillan & Co, 1911) (3 vols), vol.1 pp.289-292; R. Shannon, Gladstone: God and 
Politics (London: Continuum, 2007), pp.133-34; D.M. Schreuder, ‘Gladstone and Italian Unification 1848-
70: The Making of a Liberal?’, English Historical Review Vol.85: 336 ( July 1970), pp.475-501. 
19 P. Knaplund, Gladstone’s Foreign Policy (London: Frank Cass & Co.Ltd, 1935), pp.3-4; R. Shannon, 
The Crisis of Imperialism 1865-1915 (St. Albans: Granada, 1974), p.47. It is notable, however, that this 
enthusiasm applied mainly to the creation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861. The final reunification of 1870, 
which incorporated the Papal States, was received, for a variety of reasons, with far more muted praise; O. 
Wright, ‘British Foreign Policy and the Italian Occupation of Rome, 1870’, International History Review, 
34: 1 (March 2012), pp.161-76. 
20 Salisbury, letter to the Queen 2nd February 1887, in C.J. Lowe, Salisbury and the Mediterranean 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p.17. 
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England being held to be ‘the most sincere friend we have in Europe’.21 From 1870 
onwards, Italy and Britain supported each other where possible in diplomatic matters.22  
      With the Triple Alliance of 1882 effectively augmented by the accession of Britain to 
the Agreements of 1887, it seemed that a satisfactory political and strategic wedge had 
been driven between the two countries, France and Russia, long regarded as posing, in 
combination, the most serious threat since Napoleon’s First Empire to British security 
and overseas interests.   
      Yet behind the façade of amity there was, from at least 1880 onwards, growing 
evidence of a conflict of interest between British and Italian aims and objectives, a 
conflict which continued to grow without resolution until amity between the two 
countries had effectively disappeared by 1896. Much of this conflict resulted from 
friction between the two countries in the Red Sea during 1880-1891. 
                                                 
21 Tommaso Catalani (Ambassadort to London December 1888-October 1889) to Robilant (Carlo Felice 
Nicolis, Conte di Robilant (1826-1888), soldier and diplomat: Ambassador in Vienna 1871-85, Foreign 
Minister  June 1885 - February 1887, Ambassador to London 1888), 26th September 1886, quoted in Lowe, 
ibid., p.11. 
22 Count Lodovico Corti (1823-88), Italian Minister at Washington 1870-75, Commissioner for British 
Claims in the Alabama arbitration under the Treaty of Washington 1871-72, and Foreign Minister 1878, 
was very supportive of Britain in the Alabama affair. Gladstone noted that the result of the arbitration, 
which favoured America, was ‘... harsh in its extent and unjust in its basis’ (quoted in R. Shannon, 
Gladstone: Heroic Minister 1865-1898, (London: Allen Lane, 1999) p.113), but that Corti’s actions led to 
an initial proposal which was ‘a very fair one’, while Granville (Granville George Leveson-Gower, 2nd Earl 
Granville (1815-91), inter alia Foreign Secretary 1870-74 & 1880-85) opined that Corti did ‘very well 
indeed for us’; Granville - Gladstone, 20 July 1871, in A. Ramm(ed), The Gladstone-Granville 
Correspondence, (Cambridge: University Press, 1998 - combined volume of 2-volume work first published 
in 1952 and covering 1868-1876) p.252.  
      However, the anomalous relationship of the Italian State with the Papacy after 1870 sometimes made 
Anglo-Italian relations a tricky proposition for Britain. Gladstone could not afford to offend the sizeable 
British/Irish Catholic constituency by being seen to support the Italian government in actions appearing 
inimical to Papal welfare, hence his and Granville’s temporising when asked for support by the Italians. 
See Granville - Gladstone, 10 October 1870 and (particularly) Granville - Gladstone, 6 April 1871 in 
Ramm, Correspondence, pp. 142 & 234-5; and Cadorna -Venosta (Marquis Emilio Visconti-Venosta 
(1829-1914), Foreign Minister 1870-76, 1896-98 & 1899-1901), 27 & 28 September 1870, in I Documenti 
Diplomatici Italiani (2nd Series: 1870-1896, Vol. 1 (DDI 2/I) (21 September - 31 December 1870)), pp. 74 
& 88. 
 5
      Relatively little has been done in terms of research and scholarship on the subject of 
Anglo-Italian relations in the Red Sea during the late nineteenth century. This is, I 
believe, because it has been regarded as an insignificant side-show to main events 
unfolding during the Empire-building period of European activity from the Berlin 
conference of 1884 (when the ‘Scramble for Africa’ is traditionally thought to have 
begun in earnest) to the end of that phase around 1900, by which time European spheres 
of influence had been more or less settled. Indeed, Lord Salisbury himself  
 
                 was sceptical of the strategic interests involved on the Red Sea  
                 coast which, he thought, ‘require a magnifying glass of military  
                 theory to be visible at all’.23 
 
What activity that did occur between the two powers during 1880-1888, in Zanzibar as 
well as in the Red Sea, has heretofore been thought of as resulting largely from friction 
between the ‘men-on-the-spot’24 who, representing either their own interests or those of 
their countries, occasionally came into confrontation over matters of purely local 
importance which had little to do with the wider geo-political aims of their respective 
metropolitan governments. Such brushfire issues were common among all the local 
agents of the Empire-building European states in areas in which they came into contact, 
and generally speaking have not been regarded as indicating anything other than the 
                                                 
23 Text and quote in C.J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists: British Foreign Policy 1878-1902, volume 1 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), p. 142. 
24 See Chapter 3 for a definition and discussion of these entities and their role in Empire-building. 
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inevitable friction resulting from contiguous areas of possession, or spheres of interest, 
rubbing up against each other before the formal delineation of Imperial frontiers.25 
      However, my research has indicated that, while British and Italian (and, for that 
matter, French, German and Russian) ‘men-on-the-spot’ in Africa did indeed oftentimes 
act upon their own initiative, there existed on the Italian side a concerted policy of 
Imperial expansion, initially on the Benadir coast of Zanzibar but also later on the Red 
Sea coast and in the Sudan. The existence of this policy, which I believe commenced at 
least as early as 1884 (and possibly, though not very probably, as early as 1882), has not 
heretofore been recognized, mainly because the materials indicating its genesis have been 
buried in largely unexplored Italian primary documents from the period, principally in 
those of the L’Italia in Africa series covering the years 1859-1889.  
      It seems unlikely that the Italians would have followed an avowedly Imperial policy 
on the Benadir coast on the one hand while following a different policy, or no policy at 
all, of Imperial activity in the Red Sea area on the other. What does seem likely, however, 
is that, while their policy was more or less openly Imperial regarding their activity on the 
Benadir coast, it was Imperial but covert in the Red Sea and Sudan. This was because, 
while they could in theory establish an Imperial presence on the Benadir coast without 
upsetting either Britain or Germany, their major allies,26 they could not do the same in the 
Red Sea/Sudan because this would involve direct confrontation with Britain; thus, her 
activities in this area were hidden under the cloak of ‘men-on-the-spot’ spontaneity.    
                                                 
25 As Stoler states, ‘Imperial architectures are not wholly visible or wholly opaque. Oscillation between the 
visible, secreted, and opaque structures of sovereignty are common features’; A.L. Stoler, ‘On Degrees of 
Imperial Sovereignty’, Public Culture, 18: 1 (2006), pp.125-143 (p.141). 
26 Their main target, the port of Kismayu, was well to the North of either British or German spheres of 
interest in Zanzibar. See Chapter 3. 
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      However, the Italian practice of intruding upon the British sphere of influence in the 
Red Sea was not compatible with the maintenance of amity between the two countries, no 
matter how hard the Italians tried to cloak their actions under avowals of friendship for 
Britain. This activity was aggravated by at least two other factors: the Italian habit of 
claiming British support for provocative actions in both Africa and Europe, when in fact 
no such support had been offered (examples of which can be found throughout my 
thesis); and the often irrational and volatile behaviour of the Italian Premier, Francesco 
Crispi27 which, combined with his virulent Francophobia, often created diplomatic crises, 
especially with France, and which on one particular occasion in 1888 nearly triggered a 
European war (see Chapter 2).  
      My principal primary sources for each side have been the records of the India Office 
(Aden) in the British Library and the published volumes of documents in L’Italia in 
Africa (Red Sea and Indian Ocean volumes). I have also drawn extensively on published 
Italian diplomatic sources in I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, the Salisbury Papers at 
Hatfield House, Foreign Office and Cabinet records in the National Archives at Kew, the 
published Gladstone-Granville correspondence, Hansard (archived at the University of 
Birmingham library) and French and German printed diplomatic primary sources 
archived at the library of Cardiff University. 
      In the first of my three chapters, I will touch upon Britain’s role as first a European, 
then an Imperial, Power during the latter part of the nineteenth century, and how under 
Salisbury’s leadership she was induced to enter the Mediterranean Agreements of 
February 1887. Thereafter I will explore Italy’s social, economic and political 
                                                 
27Francesco Crispi (1819-1901), radical activist in the Risorgimento under Mazzini and Garibaldi, Italian 
Premier and Foreign Minister 1887-91 and Prime Minister 1893-96.  
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background, and illustrate how these factors made her unfit to follow any course leading 
to attempts at Imperial aggrandizement. I will also examine the effect upon Italy’s 
fortunes following the succession of  Crispi to power after the death of the Italian 
Premier, Agostino Depretis,28 in August 1887. 
      In Chapter two I will look at the effect upon Anglo-Italian relations of Crispi’s 
volatile behaviour. My research will show that, in July-August 1888, Crispi’s actions 
over a Franco-Italian dispute in Massawa nearly sparked a European war with France 
(and possibly Russia) on one side and Germany, Britain, Austria and Italy on the other, 
an event that has gone almost completely unnoticed in any historical publications on the 
period. The discovery of this event has led me to conclude that Duggan’s theory that 
Crispi, during the late 1880’s, was actively trying to engineer a war with France,29 is 
correct, and would have dragged all the major Powers into a conflagration equivalent to 
that which occurred in 1914. Anglo-Italian relations during Crispi’s reign of 1887-1891 
had been increasingly strained due to Italian actions in the Red Sea area; the Massawa 
crisis effectively marked the beginning of the end of the Anglo-Italian alignment of 
interests which had led to the Mediterranean Agreements barely a year before. The close 
relationship between Russia and Greece, and the assumed alignment of interests of 
Russia, Greece and Abyssinia against Italy, were also germane to the eruption of the 
Massawa crisis, and these will also be examined in the overall context of the issue. 
      In Chapter three I will examine matters from the Italian point of view and expand 
upon events in the Red Sea and, particularly, Zanzibar, which have led to my belief that 
                                                 
28 Agostino Depretis (1813-1887), Prime Minister 1876-78 and 1879-1887. 
29 See C. Duggan, Francesco Crispi 1818-1901: From Nation to Nationalism (Oxford: OUP, 2002), and 
‘Francesco Crispi and Italy’s Pursuit of War against France, 1887-1889’, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, 50: 3 (2004), pp.315-23. 
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there was a concerted and coherent plan of Italian Imperial expansion aimed ultimately at 
dominating all of the North-East of Africa, a plan that was originated in Rome and 
directed from there. 
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As we have seen, in 1887 Lord Salisbury aligned Britain, by way of the Mediterranean 
Agreements, with Italy, Austria-Hungary30 and Germany. Those countries had formed a 
Triple Alliance in 1882, aimed at providing mutual security against France and Russia. 
These latter two powers were perceived by Britain as the greatest threat to her interests, 
both in Europe and the East. Britain and Austria had long been de facto allies, due to 
Austrian fears of Russian activity destabilizing Austrian and Turkish control in the 
Balkans, and to British concerns about Russia’s ability to cause disturbance in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and India. It was, thus, little more than an extension of existing strategic 
considerations for Britain to join with the powers of the Triple Alliance.  
      This chapter will argue that Italian geo-political aspirations were incompatible with 
British interests, and were in fact to lead the two countries to the brink of armed conflict 
on the Red Sea littoral by 1887, the very year in which they appeared to cement their 
friendship. It will also examine the reasons for the apparent reluctance of the British 
governments of the 1880-1887 period to recognize that friction in the Red Sea between 
British and Italian nationals on the spot even existed, let alone that it presaged a much 
greater conflict of interest for both countries in the years to come. 
                                                 
30 Hereinafter referred to as Austria. 
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      It will do so by first examining the history of Anglo-Italian relations, especially in the 
Mediterranean context, and then proceed, through the utilization of British and Indian 
Government records, to show that the outward semblance of an amicable friendship was 
belied by developments in the Red Sea area. 
 
                           
                             Part 1. The Comity of Nations 
 
 
            The countries with which we are most liable to go to war are  
France and  Russia, and the worst combination we have any  
reason to dread is an alliance of France and Russia against us.31  
 
The Crimean War had been the last major military effort of Britain in Europe, and had 
done little but show that she was no longer to be taken seriously as a significant military 
contender on the European stage. After 1870 the British army was designed for service in 
India or for colonial expeditions and not for service on the continent;32 it was deployed in 
penny packets across the empire, engaged in what Bismarck33 contemptuously referred to 
as “Gentlemen’s wars.”34 
                                                 
31 Director of Military Intelligence (D.M.I.), April 1887, in C.J. Lowe, The Reluctant Imperialists: British 
Foreign Policy 1878-1902 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967) (2 vols); vol. I, p.94. ‘The growing 
jealousy of (Russia and France) against Prussia is natural... But to us there is... rather a gain (in) the 
interposition of a solid barrier between the two great aggressive powers of the Continent’; Edward Smith- 
Stanley, 15th Earl of Derby (1799-1869), Prime Minister February-December 1852, 1858-1859 and 1866-
68, Foreign Secretary 1874-8, quoted in P. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-
1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980) p. 18. 
32 J. Joll, Europe since 1870: An International History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1973), p.15. 
33 Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince of Bismarck, Duke of Lauenburg, (1815-98), Minister-President of Prussia 
1862-1871, Chancellor of Germany, 1871-1890. 
34 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.180. 
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      Indeed, the home army was hard put to raise sufficient drafts for service overseas, 
such as in the Looshai and Ashanti campaigns of 1871-2 and 1873-4 respectively,35 and 
found that even relatively minor affairs could provoke major surprises, as Lord 




      The Royal Navy, however, reigned supreme – ‘If there was any period in British 
history when Britannia… ruled the waves, then it was in the sixty or so years following 
the final defeat of Napoleon’.38 But there was a limit to how useful the Royal Navy could 
be in terms of European power politics.  Palmerston’s defeat by Bismarck over 
Schleswig-Holstein in 1864 had demonstrated that sea power alone often possessed but a 
limited effectiveness in European politics.39 As Lord Salisbury conceded to the Queen in 
August 1886  
 
           As land forces go in these days, we have no army capable of meeting  
           even a second-class Continental Power… The result is that…  
          our diplomatists can only exhort, they cannot threaten; and this  
          circumstance often deprives their words of any weight.40 
                                                 
35 Shannon, Crisis, p.85. 
36 D. Morris, The Washing of the Spears (London: Jonathan Cape, 1966). 
37 T. Pakenham, The Scramble for Africa (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991), pp. 101-106. 
38 Kennedy, op.cit., p.149. ‘The soldiers who painted the globe the colour of their coats did so under the 
navy’s protecting wing’; R. Holmes, Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket, 
(London: HarperCollins, 2001 (2002 ed.)), p.20. 
39 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.181.  
40 Lowe, Reluctant I, p.104. Gladstone was aware of British weakness when it came to intervention in 
Europe. In 1864, during the Danish crisis, he further reduced the military budget, making it clear that no 
action on behalf of the Danes would be countenanced, either by himself or the electorate; even if naval 
power might have been used to sway the issue, the Royal Navy was already too committed elsewhere to be 
able to aid the Danes. As Clarendon (George William Frederick Villiers, 4th earl of Clarendon (1800-1870), 
Foreign Secretary 1853-58, 1865-66 & 1868-70) said, “We are willing to do anything for the maintenance 
 13
                                                     
Yet for Britain to remain a world power, it had to maintain the avoirdupois necessary for 
a great power that would make any other major European power (or alliances thereof) 
leery of attacking her.  
      There were two ways to attain this end. The first was to maintain and, when 
expeditious, expand the Empire. There was also an economic imperative for Britain. As 
Joll noted, by the 1870s Britain was the world’s leading trading nation, with London the 
international centre for finance and the world’s biggest merchant fleet ,41 while Kennedy 
points out that Britain’s return on investment had multiplied eightfold between 1847 and 
1887 with, by 1890, more registered tonnage than the rest of the world put together.42 
      With commercial expansion had come territorial acquisition, as noted in the 
introduction. Necessarily, such a far-flung Empire had to rely upon naval strength, so 
British defence spending after the Crimean war concentrated on naval resources. Defeat 
in a maritime war, thought Selborne, would mean ‘a disaster of unparalleled magnitude in 
(British) history’.43 Whether trade followed the flag or vice versa,44 ’…the mutually-
supporting triangle of trade, colonies and navy had worked to Britain’s benefit’.45 
                                                                                                                                                 
of peace except (commit) to a policy of action”; Kennedy, Anglo-German, pp.10-22 ( p.16). For an account 
of how different the situation was in Prussia regarding the population’s preparedness for war, see F.L. 
Muller, ‘The Spectre of a people in Arms: The Prussian Government and the Militarisation of German  
Nationalism, 1859-1864’, English Historical Review, 122: 495 (February 2007): pp.82-104.  
41 Joll,, Europe, p.15.  
42 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.151. ‘A writer in the Annual Register (1867) (wrote that) “England owes... her 
great influence, not to military successes, but to her commanding position in the area of industry and 
commerce. If she forgets this, she is lost...”’ Quoted in A. Briggs, The Age of Improvement 1783-1867 ( 
Burnt Mill; Longmans, 1959 (1979 ed)), p.523. 
43 William Palmer, 2nd Lord Selborne (1859-1942), First Lord of the Admiralty 1900-1905, quoted in 
Lowe, Reluctant I, p.5. 
44 A subject that will be examined in Chapter 3. For detailed analysis of the Trade/Flag conundrum, see R. 
Robinson  & J. Gallagher, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review 6: 1 (1953), pp.1-15, 
and J. Darwin, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians: The Dynamics of Territorial Expansion’, English 
Historical Review 112: 447 (June 1997), pp. 614-642. Also Fieldhouse, Economics, pp.10-37; J. Gallagher 
& R. Robinson, with Alice Denny, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London: 
Macmillan Publishers Ltd., 1961 - 1981 2nd ed.), chapters IX, X & XII; B.R. Tomlinson, Economics and 
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      However, much of Britain’s Imperial power and prestige depended upon her 
possessions in the Far East, particularly India.46 The loss of India would, it was widely 
felt, render Britain ‘insignificant in the eyes of Europe and the World’.47 
       India’s importance was not merely economic. Though by 1870 India held one-fifth of 
British overseas investments and received nearly a tenth of total British exports,48 it had 
also come to embody, for Britain, everything that was great about the Empire. It was, 
truly, “The Jewel in the Crown”,49  and enabled Britain ‘... to control an entire 
hemisphere, stretching from Malta... to Hong Kong.’50 
      There were two routes from Britain to the Far East and India - the sea voyage round 
the Cape of Good Hope, which took from five to eight months and, since 1845, the route 
via Suez from London to Bombay. This reduced the travelling time between London and 
India to thirty days.51  
                                                                                                                                                 
Empire: The Periphery and the Imperial Economy, and M. Lynn, British Policy, Trade, and Informal 
Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, in A. Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: 
Volume III, The Nineteenth Century, (Oxford: University Press, 1999), pp. 53-75 & 101-121 respectively. 
45 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.155. 
46 Fieldhouse, Economics, p.156. 
47 V.T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire 1763-1793 (London: Longmans, 1964) (vol.2), 
p.140. 
48 Shannon, Crisis, p.320; Fieldhouse, Economics, p.152. 
49 First so described by Benjamin Disraeli (18-7-81) created Earl of Beaconsfield in 1876; inter alia, Prime 
Minister 1868 and 1874-80. In 1875 he personally engineered the purchase of 40% of shares in the Suez 
Canal company; Crystal Palace speech, 24 June 1872, in R.C.K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1936), p.31. 
50 N. Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2003 (2012 ed)), p. 163. 
51 A time which was further reduced in 1857 by the opening of a rail link from Cairo to Suez; P. Brendon, 
The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997 (London: Jonathan Cape, 2007), p.142;  M. 
Barthorp, Blood-Red Desert Sand: The British Invasions of Egypt and the Sudan 1882-1898 (London: 
Cassell & Co, 1984 - 2002 ed.), pp.17-18; A. d’Avray, Lords of the Red Sea: The History of a Red Sea 
Society from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1996), p. 107.  
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      Clearly, the importance of securing the fastest route to India was, for political, 
military and economic reasons, a paramount consideration, especially after the opening of 
the Suez Canal in 1869.52 
      The security of the Mediterranean route to India explains the apparent obsession of 
successive British governments with having both a strong British presence in the 
Mediterranean, and robust support for the Ottoman Empire, at least up until the 1890s.53 
As Grenville says, ‘... the independence of the Sultan and the maintenance of Turkish 
sovereignty over the Straits had been a prime objective of British foreign policy’.54 Egypt 
and the Levantine lands through which the route to India ran were still, if only nominally 
in the case of Egypt, Ottoman fiefdoms.55 
      Then there was France. Anglo-French relations, always volatile, remained variable 
throughout the nineteenth century, and were subject to sudden fluctuations during times 
of European tension or Imperial frictions, such as during the Fashoda crisis of 1898.56 
      So, the acquisition of a friendly power in the Mediterranean was, diplomatically 
speaking, a Godsend. At last, in Italy there was an ally - with a friendly coastline, friendly 
                                                 
52 Which made it seem to some that the French were reasserting their position in Egypt; Brendon, op.cit., 
pp.42-43. See also J. Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt (London: Elek Books, 1970), pp. 7-8. Britain seemed 
constantly to be having to catch up with leads set by the French; the first British ironclad, H.M.S Warrior, 
was built in 1858 in response to the appearance of the first ever seagoing ironclad, the French La Gloire, 
launched earlier the same year: Ferguson, op.cit., p.166; Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.173. 
53 See, for instance, Taylor, Struggle, p.60; Kennedy, op.cit., pp. 13-34. 
54 J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century, (London: 
Athlone Press, 1964), p.81. ‘It was, said Palmerston, of ‘utmost importance’ to Britain to keep the Ottoman 
Empire an independent state’; Lord Palmerston, 11 July 1833, quoted in Lynn, Informal Empire, in Porter, 
Oxford, p.111. There was also another, covert but profound, reason for Britain to support Turkey against 
Russia. As the sapient von Holstein of the German Foreign Ministry noted on September 14th 1886, ‘the 
English, unless they are mad, cannot allow the Sultan, who as Caliph wields authority over eighty five 
million Indian Mohamodans, to become a vassal of Russia, or else her rule in India will be over’. Quoted in 
Roberts, Salisbury, p.399. For the tensions between Christian rulers and Moslem ruled in India, see R. 
Ghose, ‘Islamic Law and Imperial Space: British India as “Domain of Islam” circa 1803-1870’, Journal of 
Colonialism and Colonial History, 15: 1 (Spring 2014), pp. un-numbered. 
55 See Appendix 4. 
56 See Appendix 1 for a profile of differing views regarding Anglo-French relations during 1815-1914. 
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navy and friendly ports, and a northern border secured by Austria - which could both 
dilute the threat from France and offer safe harbour to British ships in the event of war.  
      The Mediterranean Agreements did not, in truth, commit Britain to very much in 
terms of obligation to military or naval action in support of Italy. They were couched in 
the vaguest terms possible consistent with remaining bone fide diplomatic documents, 
and amounted to little more than an expressed desire to see the status quo maintained in 
the Mediterranean and its bordering areas: 
               
In the interests of peace, and of the independence of the territories  
adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea, (H.M.G.) wish to act in the closest  
concert and agreement with that of Italy. Both powers desire that (all  
lands in the Mediterranean littoral) shall remain in the same hands as now.  
If (things change for the worse), both Powers desire that there shall be no 
Extension of the domination of any other great power over any portion  
of those coasts.57 
 
Earlier, in preparation for this, Salisbury had written to the Queen, reassuring her that on 
no account would Britain be committed to going to war on behalf of Italy unless Italy was 
subjected to an attack for which she bore no blame, and that even in the event of the 
Italians making a pre-emptive attack to forestall French aggression, he did not ‘... hold 
out any hope of English sympathy and aid.58 
                                                 
57 Salisbury - Corti, 12 February 1887, in Lowe, Reluctant (vol.2), pp.56-57. 
58 Salisbury to Queen Victoria 2 February, 1887, in Lowe, op.cit., pp.54-55. 
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      It is important to realize that Salisbury’s actions had not committed Britain to a treaty, 
but amounted only to an “exchange of notes” which bound Britain to very little in terms 
of obligation or action, ‘… a method which would enable him to deny to Parliament that 
he had signed anything’.59  
      Salisbury was adept at such wordplay, and at taking evasive action when pressed for 
details. For instance, in March 1887 he was asked in the House of Lords if Britain had 
been associated with an alliance between Germany and Italy. He replied that ‘...An 
alliance is so vague and general a phrase that I don’t feel it is possible, under any 
circumstances, to give any answer...’.60 Remarking on the Afghan Border question, the 
German ambassador to Britain, Count Hatzfeldt,61 told Bismarck that Salisbury was a 
master of the ‘round-about phrase, thus leaving the other party to guess his drift.’62 
      This was not just because Constitutional considerations prevented Britain from 
concluding concrete alliances with Continental powers;63 it was because Salisbury did not 
wish to antagonize either France or Russia by concluding an open Treaty with the Triple 
Alliance. Equally, he did not wish to stand so aloof from the Powers of the Triple 
Alliance that they would end up aligning themselves against Britain with either France or 
                                                 
59. Lowe, Salisbury, pp.16-17.  
60 Hansard, Series 3 (3), House of Lords (HL) 3 March 1887, Volume (v) 313, pages (cc) 37-8. 
61 Melchior Hubert Paul Gustav Graf von Hatzfeldt zu Trachenberg (1831-1901), Ambassador to 
Constantinople (1878-81), Foreign Secretary (1881-85), Ambassador to London (1885-1901). 
62 Hatzfeldt - Bismarck, 3 August 1887, German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. 1 (GDD 1), Bismarck: 
Relations with England, 1871-1890, pp. 308-09. 
63 The Agreements ‘were as close an alliance as the Parliamentary character of our institutions will permit.’ 
Letter, Salisbury to the Queen 10 February 1887; Lowe, Reluctant II, pp.55-56. When asked by the 
honourable Member for Northampton if Salisbury intended to play a great or a little part in European 
politics, Salisbury replied that he intended to play no part at all if he could help it; Hansard, 3, House of 
Commons (HC), 3 February 1887, v.310 cc.562. 
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Russia, or both. Hence the nebulous - and very secret - nature of the Agreements, which 
effectively allowed Salisbury to have his cake and eat it.64   
      The Germans, too, viewed Britain’s association with the Triple Alliance with favour. 
It was widely believed in Germany that the next European war would be between Britain 
and France,65 so that her alignment with Italy and, through her, with the Central Powers, 
would benefit everyone involved.66  Hatzfeldt told the German Foreign Office that 
Salisbury recognized the identification of British with Italian interests in the 
Mediterranean, and that Corti had assured Salisbury that Italy, despite the existence of 
recurring irredentism, only had Austria’s best interests at heart. Bismarck exhorted 
Hatzfeldt to  
 
                      ... please inform Lord Salisbury... that we rejoice (in any)  
                      rapprochement   (between) England and Italy as  
                                                 
64 Lowe, Salisbury, pp.16-18; Lowe, Reluctant I, pp.110-12. Press speculation about a new alliance was 
quelled ‘…by stating in the House of  Commons  that no engagements had been made with any other 
Powers which was as literally accurate as it was intentionally misleading… (In the Lords, Salisbury) when 
asked … whether there was an alliance between Italy and the German Powers… answered that he was 
“wholly unaware”… The fact that only days earlier Britain, Austria and Italy had formed an entente… he 
felt under no obligation to divulge’. Salisbury was no stranger to making clandestine agreements of this 
sort, having secretly negotiated with Ignatiev over Turkey in March 1877 and having made secret 
conventions with Turkey, Austria and Russia prior to the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. As Roberts said, 
Salisbury’s bent for secrecy allowed him ‘to keep all the strings of his complex global policy securely in 
his own hands’; he ‘delighted in giving as little information as possible to the House of Commons’ and was 
‘perfectly prepared to conduct his own foreign policy’; Roberts, Salisbury, pp.170, 193-96, 433 & 509. See 
L.M. Penson, ‘The Principles and Methods of Lord Salisbury’s Foreign Policy’ Cambridge Historical 
Review 5:1 (January 1935), pp.87-106, for an interesting appraisal of the convolutions and sometime 
contradictions inherent in Salisbury’s practice of Foreign Policy. 
      ‘Disraeli’s (Foreign) policy was not always consistent. Foreign policy seldom is. He took opportunities 
as they came. He sometimes contradicted himself. He sometimes veered with changing winds’. So with 
Disraeli (under whom Salisbury learnt much of his trade), so for Salisbury and so, probably, for every 
Foreign Secretary that ever lived; R. Blake, Disraeli, (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1967 (University 
Paperback edition, 1969)), p.658. 
65 Bismarck felt that ‘France is the most bellicose State in Europe, and (that) isolating her would assure 
European peace... even reasonable Frenchmen (look) forward to a Russo-German war in order to attack 
Germany...’; Bismarck - Hatzfeldt, 8 August 1887, in GDD I, p. 313. 
66 Count Herbert Bismarck, Memorandum, December 27 1886, ibid. 
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                      (both countries are so friendly towards us)67 
 
Bismarck felt that Salisbury recognized the quid quo pro offered him; namely, that 
without tacit British support of Germany against France and Russia via the Mediterranean 
Agreements, there would be no reason for Germany to support Britain against France in 
Egypt or to oppose Russian action against Constantinople, Afghanistan or India.68 
Without a doubt, 
                   
                        Italy’s friendship would (lessen the inequality between 
                        Russia and Austria) and strengthen Austria’s confidence 
                        in herself, while (the) Italian passion for acquisition can  
                        always be used in countering the schemes of conquest 
                        of other Powers69 
 
      As Herbert Bismarck70 wittily put it, ‘... for Austria and Italy to stay together British 
cement is necessary’.71 However, Hatzfeldt also noted that Salisbury felt some anxiety 
that the Italians hadn’t yet forgotten Tunis and that this could cause problems in the 
future, especially as Corti (despite his protestations of undying love for Austria) had 
                                                 
67 Hatzfeldt - Foreign Office, Berlin, 2 February 1887, ibid.  
68 Salisbury recognized that, whatever happened, there was no hope of German support against France in 
the Far East, but that, closer to home, an understanding with the Triple Alliance would bolster German 
support for Britain’s position over Constantinople; Hatzfeldt - Bismarck, 13 February 1887, ibid. 
69 Bismarck - Hatzfeldt, 3 February 1887; see also Hatzfeldt - Bismarck, 6 February1887, ibid.  
70 Nicolaus Heinrich Ferdinand Herbert von Bismarck (1849 – 1904), German Foreign Minister 1886-90. 
Son of Otto von Bismarck.. 
71 Herbert Bismarck - Hatzfeldt, 8 November 1887; GDD 1, p.335. 
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asked Salisbury not to reveal to Austria the clauses of the Agreements regarding any 
Anglo-Italian response to future French actions in the Mediterranean.72  
      Irredentism remained a prominent factor in Italian politics, whatever Corti might say. 
As Haines noted, before the Near Eastern Crisis of 1875-78, Italian irredentism was 
somnolent and factional and of no great import; but after 1878 it grew to be a significant 
force, with its exponents advocating violent struggle to free the Italian provinces. Further, 
most prominent Italians of the era sympathized with the movement.73 With considerable 
prescience, Salisbury confided to Hatzfeldt that future Italian potential for instability 
concerned him 
 
                 ... since there is always the chance that Count Robilant 
                 might be followed at some future date by a less competent 
                 and trustworthy statesman74 
 
Given the volatile state of Italian domestic politics, it was more likely than not that 
Salisbury’s caveat about Robilant’s successors would come to pass.  
As indeed it did. 
       Nevertheless, the very fact that Salisbury had been persuaded to go as far as enter an 
alignment, however nebulous and non-commital, as the Mediterranean Agreements was a 
source of self-congratulation on the part of the Germans.75 
                                                 
72 Hatzfeldt - Foreign Office, Berlin, 3 February 1887, ibid.. with 
73 C.G. Haines, ‘Italian Irredentism and the Near Eastern Crisis, 1875-78’, Journal of Modern History, 9: 1 
(March 1937), pp. 23-47. Visconti-Venosta, Menabrea (Luigi Federico Menabrea (1809-1896), Prime 
Minister of Italy 1867-69, Ambassador to London 1875-82), Crispi, Cairoli (Benedetto Cairoli (1825-
1889), inter alia Prime Minister March-December 1878, both Prime Minister - in joint office with Depretis 
- and Minister for Foreign Affairs 1879-1881), Depretis and even King Victor Emmanuel II (1820-78; King 
of Sardinia-Piedmont 1849-61, King of Italy 1861-78) all identified, or were identified with, irredentism. 
74 Hatzfeldt - Bismarck, 6 February 1887, GDD I. 
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      Salisbury, unlike Gladstone, was no believer in sentiment or morality in foreign 
policy.76 ‘National interest rather than moral ethics’ should be the touchstone of all policy 
decisions.77    
      However, in terms of Italian domestic politics, Salisbury could probably not have 
chosen a better time to conclude such an understanding. In the capable hands of Depretis, 
Italy had approached the nearest thing to stability that it had so far been able to do. 
      The entente with Italy meant an indirect strengthening of relations with Austria and, 
via Austria, with Germany. Count Andrassy78 had as early as 1871 bruited the idea of 
incorporating Britain into a four-power alliance with Austria, Germany and Italy ‘… to 
reinforce Austria-Hungary as a bastion of the status quo… and to keep the restless 
powers, France and Russia, “on their good behaviour”’.79 Baron Haymerle,80 who 
succeeded Andrassy as foreign minister, thought as late as February 1880 that while 
Austrian interests were still ‘…so closely parallel to those of the English we should be 
unwise to abandon England’.81 For his part, Salisbury regarded Austria as ‘England’s 
ancient and true ally, and bound to her by the only bond of union that endures, the 
absence of all clashing interests’.82 Even after Austria fell into the diplomatic orbit of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
75 ‘It is no mean feat, our having induced England to engage herself so far as we have’; Ct. Herbert 
Bismarck - Reuss (German Ambassador to Vienna), 16 February 1887, ibid. 
76 ‘...Salisbury had identified himself with the Victorian tradition of entering into no alliances in time of 
peace... and of retaining a ‘free hand’ for British diplomacy’; Grenville, Lord Salisbury, p. 3. ‘Salisbury’s 
realism in dealing with problems as they emerged was (his hallmark. The) image of him as a keen lawyer 
protecting the interests of his client and determined to get the best bargain... in the market place of 
international politics is apt’; D. Gillard, Salisbury, in K.M. Wilson (ed.), British Foreign Secretaries and 
Foreign Policy: From Crimean War to First World War (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp.119-37 (p. 134). 
77 Roberts Salisbury p. 610. 
78 Gyula Andrassy de Csikszentkiraly et Krasnahorka (1823-1890), Hungarian Minister-President 1869-71, 
Austrian Foreign Minister 1871-79. 
79 F.R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914 (London: 
Rouitledge & Kegan Paul, 1972), p.62; quote from Lytton to Granville, 27 December 1871. 
80 Heinrich Karl von Haymerle (1828-1881), Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs 1879-81.  
81 Lowe, Reluctant I, pp. 24-25; Bridge, op.cit., pp.111-15. 
82 Quoted in Roberts, Salisbury, p.431. 
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newly Anglophobe Germany after the accession of Kaiser Willhelm II in 1888, as late as 
1902 the Emperor Franz Joseph II was known to express his affection for England.83 
      Good relations with the Central Powers remained key to British efforts to keep France 
and Russia at bay. Salisbury gave a clear exposition of the strategic view to the Duke of 
Edinburgh in March 1888 
 
           Germany (is playing) a double game in being friendly with Russia while    
           (encouraging) the antagonism (to Russia) of Austria, Italy and England.  
           (But I believe) that Austria is (essential to Germany, hence Bismarck’s)  
           efforts...  to provide Austria with (Italy and England as allies)... If there was  
           war between France and Germany, Italy (might) join in, and France (would)  
           defeat her at sea... (if Russia attacked Austria) the sole chance of Italy being  
           able to help Austria...  would be that the coast should be protected by us from  
           a French naval attack. Without our naval alliance, the Germans (hold) that  
           Italy would count for nothing and be paralysed.84 
                                                 
83 ‘At a court ball, (Franz Joseph) had declared in the presence of foreign diplomats, that with regard to (the 
Boer War) he was completely English. King Edward felt himself ever in the Emperor’s debt as a result.’ J. 
Van der Kiste, Emperor Franz Joseph: Life, Death and the Fall of the Habsburg Empire (London: Sutton 
Publishing, 2005), p.183. 
84 SP A/46/87 Salisbury - HRH Admiral the Duke of Edinburgh, 27 March 1888; and see Kennedy, Rise 
and Fall, p.189. Salisbury’s opinion of Bismarck was always based first and foremost on distrust - ‘He had 
no illusions (about Bismarck). “(Bismarck’s) plan of speaking through different channels is very perplexing 
and by no means reassuring. He means evidently to hoodwink somebody or he would not conceal so much. 
Is it Russia or England that is to be hoodwinked?”’; Salisbury - Queen Victoria, 11 December 1885, quoted 
in Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1931, 4 
Volumes; vol. III (1880-1886)), p.253. His ‘... deep and long-lasting distrust of Bismarck... remained 
unaltered... despite the tactical necessity of leaning towards Berlin on many occasions’, because he was 
convinced that Bismarck’s ultimate aim was to crush France after having embroiled the rest of Europe in 
war; Kennedy, op.cit., p.193. ‘(Experience) shows that friendship with Germany is a more uncertain staff to 
lean upon than friendship with France’; Salisbury to Sir Edward Baldwin Malet (1837-1908), agent and 
Consul-general to Egypt 1879-83, Minister to Belgium 1883-84, Ambassador to Germany 1884-1895, 11 
April 1888, quoted in Cecil, Marquis, (vol. IV (1887-1892), 1932), p.100. If he could say this in the face of 
France’s ‘... unreasonable (and) incurable hatred of England’ (quoted in Marlowe, Cromer, p.136), then 
clearly he placed no faith in Bismarck’s Germany. 
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In this context, then, the arrival of Italy as an ally of both Germany and Austria in 1882 
(an alliance which was the central prop of Italian foreign policy until 1914)85 was seen 
from London as a welcome addition to an already sound concert of interests and powers. 
From 1884 successive Italian foreign ministers86 had tried to align themselves with 
Britain, offering help with the relief of Khartoum during 1884-1885 (which was 
refused)87 and generally indulging in ‘…the almost frantic search for a British alliance’.88 
This Italian desire was based, inter alia, upon a fear of French expansionism in North 
Africa and a fear of abandonment by Germany.89 Since Salisbury had actively sought an 
understanding with some Mediterranean power since the Bulgarian crisis of 1885,90 the 
Mediterranean Agreements were in most ways a logical conclusion to these British and 
Italian manouevrings. And, though publically reserved about any alliance with Italy, in 
private he was enthusiastic 
 
                 There is no state with whom we could work more heartily. Our  
                 political objectives seldom clash and we have the enormous 
                 advantage (of) no accumulation of grudges in the past  
                                                 
85 M. Clark., Modern Italy 1871-1982 (Burnt Hill: Longman, 1984), p.46. 
86 Pasquale Stanislao Mancini, 7th Marquess of Fusignano (1826-1888), Foreign Minister, May 1881 - June 
1885;  Robilant, 1885-87.  
87 Cabinet note February 9 1885: “On the acceptance of Italian aid. Disapproved as tending to impair moral 
effect & exhibit weakness. Must bear on our own shoulders alone… any military exigencies arising out of 
fall of Khartoum”; H.C.G. Matthews (ed), The Gladstone Diaries (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986, 2 Volumes) 
(vol. II, July 1883-December 1886), p.293.  
88 C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy 1870-1940 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), 
p.37. 
89 Lowe & Marzari, ibid., pp.32-34; Lowe, Reluctant I, pp. 9-12. 
90 Lowe, ibid., p.94. 
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                 to smother kindly feeling in the present91... there has never  
                 been a period at which it has been more cordial... on both sides  
                 than it is now.92 
                                                    
 
      But as early as 1880 there were clear signs that Italian activity, as regards its desire to 
establish its place in the world as a Power of international standing, was destined to come 
into conflict with British interests, especially in the Red Sea and Sudan.  
       
Trasformismo; making a country, undoing a government 
 
The drive led by Mazzini93 towards Italy’s independence throughout the years of the 
Risorgimento had both generated, and been fuelled by, a renewed belief in Italy’s destiny. 
The liberation of Rome in 1870 was not only a symbolic act but was to function as the 
catalyst which would lead the new state not merely to the status of a Great Power, but to 
that Holy Grail of all Italian nationalist longing - ‘…the revival of the Empire of Ancient 
Rome’.94 
      But the road to the Grail was beset with difficulties. As it was, quite how the New 
Roman Empire was to be brought about was hard to see. It was riven by divisions social, 
                                                 
91 Salisbury - Sir Savile Lumley (British Ambassador at Rome), 21 January 1887, quoted in Cecil, Marquis 
IV, p.20. 
92 Salisbury, Hansard, 3, HL, 29 July 1887, v.318 cc. 511-14. 
93 Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), revolutionary, journalist, republican nationalist, founder of the Young 
Italy movement and principal figure of the Risorgimento. 
94 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, pp.8-10. 
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geographic, economic and political, and stricken by poverty. It was its own little powder-
keg, ready to explode at a moment’s notice.95 
      Yet Depretis managed to hold it all together. A man of the moderate left, he proved 
‘expert at forming…. Parliamentary majorities, drawing support from both centre left and 
centre right…(he) was prepared to accept and even invite men of conflicting opinion into 
the government… he would stress what they had in common and play down their 
differences’.96   
      For instance, Minghetti;97 a capable and experienced Piedmontese politician of the 
Right, he was in favour of a federated Italian state and not above fighting a duel with a 
fellow parliamentarian in 1863 after an argument over fiscal matters.98 Something of a 
political gadfly, he was fonder of the sound of his own voice than of actually dealing with 
parliamentary matters. In 1881, during a debate in the Chamber, he demanded an 
“interpellation” of the fiscal ramifications of a point of foreign policy. Mancini said that 
the matter was one for the cabinet and not a subject of “vague and general questions”. 
Minghetti insisted on his right to have the matter debated, upon which Mancini 
 
                                                 
95 For a detailed description of conditions in Italy, see Appendix 6. 
96  M. Robson, Italy: Liberalism and Fascism, 1870-1945, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1992), pp.21-23. 
Depretis, despite his skill at manipulating parliament, still had to deal with unending turmoil in parliament. 
For instance, in July 1885 he had to deal with a Chamber that both accused him of not being vigorous 
enough in promoting colonial policy - even though he, Crispi and Mancini had been vocal opponents of an 
Imperial strategy - and of concluding a secret treaty with Britain (which at this time was untrue). At the 
same time he was unable to give the post of Foreign Minster to Mancini, his original choice for the post, 
because of the opposition to the idea in the Chamber, and because of Manicini’s reluctance to take up the 
post in the face of the Chamber’s behaviour. His second choice was Tornielli (Giuseppe, conte Tormielli-
Brusati di Vergano (1836-1908), inter alia Minister for Foreign Affairs 1867 & 1878-79, Ambassador to 
Bucharest 1879, Belgrade 1879, Madrid 1887, London 1889, Paris 1895 ), but he was so anti-Austrian that 
such a thought was impracticable. Robilant eventually secured the post; SP A/38/28, Savile - Salisbury, 2 
July 1885. Tornielli’s later Ambassadorship to London was to have significant consequences for Anglo-
Italian relations. 
97 Marco Minghetti (1818-1886), Finance Minister of Piedmont 1859-63, Prime Minister 1873-76. 
98 Mack Smith, Italy, pp. 64-65. 
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              ...asked  whether Minghetti thought it opportune to place before 
              the budget debate a question of foreign policy which could have no  
              result beyond demonstrating his own brilliant genius.99 
 
But Depretis rose above it all; ‘so long as liberals stuck together, the regime would be 
safe from republicans and radicals of the left and reactionary catholics on the right’.100  
      So to Salisbury, seeking above all a stable and biddable partner, Italy under Depretis 
(and his foreign minister Robilant)101 must have seemed to fit the bill; a country whose 
main declared aim, on joining the Alliance in 1882, was to secure ‘... a period of internal 
tranquility which she could use... to develop her resources and raise herself to the rank of 
the great powers’.102 Visconti-Venosta, Italy’s Foreign Minister for much of the 1870s, 
had for the same reasons the very trasformismo-sounding aim of ‘hastening the moment 
when (Italy) would finally succeed in making itself little talked about’.103 But ironically, 
the very success of Depretis’s measures and methods led to his downfall, and to the 
unleashing of his volatile and highly unbiddable successor, Crispi. 
      This was because the Depretis method of diplomacy - to avoid confrontation, to make 
Italy a submissive quasi-Power quaking in the shadows of the real Powers – made a 
                                                 
99 FO45/430, Sir Augustus Paget (1823-1896), Ambasador to Rome 1867-1883, Ambassador to Vienna 
1884-1893 - Granville, 1 July 1881. 
100 Robson, op. cit., p.22. Though as time went on, political expediency saw to it that extremists were also 
co-opted into government; also see Mack Smith, Italy, pp.107-10. 
101 Without whom Salisbury might never have been persuaded to enter the Agreements. ‘Robilant’s forceful 
diplomacy... completely transformed Italy’s diplomatic position. By the agreement with England... he 
obtained what had eluded Mancini, a British guarantee of the status quo in the Mediterranean... As Robilant 
said on resignation (in 1887), he left his country ‘in an iron cask’’. Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.40. This is 
an overstatement of the strength of Italy’s position vis-à-vis British “guarantees” of support, given 
Salisbury’s talent for diplomatic sleight-of-hand, but under the circumstances was probably the best that 
any Italian could have done. 
102 Umberto 1, King of Italy 1878-1900, quoted in Lowe & Marzari, ibid., p.27.  
103 F. Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy: The Statecraft of the Founders, 1870-1896 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1951: 1996 ed.), p.439. 
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growing number of Italians ashamed of their patrimony. On the International stage, he 
kept a low profile; ‘Whenever I see an international crisis on the horizon I open my 
umbrella and wait till it passes’.104 Yet Italy’s abstension from Imperial adventures did 
not seem to garner any rewards; she had come away empty-handed from the Berlin 
Congess of 1878 while a free Bulgaria was consolidated, Rumania, Serbia and 
Montenegro made gains, Britain had Cyprus and Austria took Bosnia-Hercegovina from 
the Turks.105 Yet nothing disturbed Depretis’s serenity. Southern Italian rage at the 
French occupation of Tunis in 1881 did not affect his attitude to France,106 and his 
ministers supported his views; Mancini, having declined to join the British in occupying 
Egypt in 1882,107 had averred as late as May 1884 that it was downright dangerous for a 
young nation like Italy to ‘launch out in perilous and expensive adventures in distant 
lands’,108 while Depretis regarded the occupation of Massawa in 1885 as a waste of 
scarce resources and may have planned to abandon it as soon as possible.109 Yet could 
Italy hold her head up with such behaviour as a Power amongst nations?  
       
                                                 
104 Quoted in R.J.B. Bosworth, Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian foreign policy before the First 
World War, (Cambridge: Universtity Press, 1979), p.3. 
105 A.W. Palmer, A Dictionary of Modern History, 1789-1945 (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962), p.46. ‘At 
(the Congress) Italy had been ignored... Only the Italian representatives returned... with their hands clean - 
and empty’. Taylor, Struggle, p.272. 
106 ‘As Morocco belongs to the Iberian peninsula, and Algeria to France, Tunis, the key to the central 
Mediterranean... belongs visibly to Italy’; Mazzini, Politica Internazionale (1871), quoted in Chabod, 
Statecraft, p.159. 
107 Lowe, Reluctant I, p.140. British views on the advisability of Italy joining Britain in the occupation of 
Egypt were mixed; for instance, Sir Charles Dilke (1843-1911), Under-Secretary of  State for Foreign 
Affairs 1880-82, was in favour of the idea and on 18 July 1882 told Lord Dufferin (ambassador to Italy at 
the time) to propose that Italy should join the enterprise in concert with France - see S. Gwynn & G.M. 
Tuckwell, The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Dilke, Bart., M.P. (London: John Murray, 1917, 2 vols 
(vol.1)), p.471. However, following Italian perfidy over the annexation of Assab Bay the previous March, 
Granville was hotly opposed to the idea (see note 238 below). 
108 Quoted in Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.37. 
109 Ibid., p.11. Surprisingly, Crispi also regarded the occupation of Massawa as a waste of resources at this 
stage, though of course he later changed his mind; ibid., p.37, and see M. Choate, ‘From Territorial to 
Ethnographic Colonies and back again: The Politics of Italian Expansion 1890-1912’, Modern Italy, 8: 1 
(2003), pp.65-75 (p.67). 
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                                      Part 2. The Importunate Gadfly 
        
For years, the Italians expressed their resentment against France over Tunis at every 
opportunity. For instance over the French military action at Sfax in July 1881 and the 
French ban on “contraband” needed by legitimate Italian mining operations there;110 over 
complaints that the change of government from Gambetta to Freycinet made no 
difference to the plight of Italians in Tunis,111 and that the French were unable to restore 
order in the regency;112 that an outbreak of violence between French and Italian workers 
at the Salindres mining district (resulting in Italian deaths) was due to the jealousy of 
French workers for their Italian counterparts who worked much harder and thus got paid 
higher wages;113 that the Franco-Italian protocols of 1884 were being abused by France; 
that the French were trying to organize a coup in Morocco in 1884 (see below, p.27-28), 
and that the administration of justice by the French in Tunisia was inequitable.114 In 
almost every case the Italians appealed to Britain for assistance or sympathy, but in the 
main without success.115  
      The truth was that no-one but the Italians saw anything wrong with France’s 
occupation of Tunis. Britain had not been in the least concerned when France moved into 
Algeria in 1830,116 and regarded the French extension into Tunis benevolently 
 
                                                 
110 FO45/430, Paget-Granville, July 5 1881 and FO45/452 Paget-Granville, 4 January 1882. 
111 FO45/452, Paget-Granville, February 23 1882. 
112 FO45/636, article by Popolo Romano reported by Paget to Granville, 27 March 1882. 
113 FO45/636, Paget - Granville, 21 March 1882. 
114 FO45/636, Catalani - Salisbury, 1 February 1889 and memo by Catalani of July 1889. 
115 Though Salisbury did sanction support for an Italian appeal against French tribunal procedures in 
January 1889; FO45/636, Catalani - Salisbury, 7 & 15 January 1889. 
116 Britain regarded Algeria as a quagmire into which France had blundered and which would not be 
injurious to British interests; A. Middleton, ‘French Algeria in British Imperial Thought, 1830-1870’, 
Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, 16: 1 (Spring 2015), pp. un-numbered. 
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               ‘... M. Waddington117 remembered with entire accuracy... the  
               pleasure with which England looked upon a legitimate extension  
               of the highly civilizing influence of France (into Tunis), and the  
               entire absence of any pretension on our part to dispose of the destinies  
               of the portions of (Africa) contiguous to (French) territories’.118 
 
      The French, as Count von Bulow119 had noted, made it clear at the Berlin Conference 
that they sought to take Tunis as their own,120 and the Germans, like the British, regarded 
their ambition with insouciance.121 When Italian frustration with France became too 
much of an irritant to the other Powers, they reacted with anger.  
      This was amply illustrated by events in Morocco in 1884. Fearing that French 
activities there would lead to yet another occupation in North Africa and further 
humiliation for Italy, the Italians tried to stir Britain and Germany into supporting them in 
censuring the French over the actions of Joseph Ordega,122 their unruly and provocative 
Ambassador to Morocco, whom they feared was trying to engineer a coup. Bismarck 
responded testily by telling them to mind their own business. Mancini, when asked by the 
                                                 
117 William Henry Waddington (1826-94), French Foreign Minister 1877-79, Prime Minister February-
December 1879, Ambassador to London 1883-93. He was instrumental in gaining Salisbury’s agreement 
for France to occupy Tunis. 
118 CAB37/5/11, Salisbury - Lyons (HM Ambassador to Paris), 12 May 1881. 
119 Count Bernhard von Bulow (1849-1929), German Attaché and Secretary at Paris 1876-84, Ambassador 
to St. Petersburg 1885- 1893, Ambassador to Rome 1893-97, Foreign Secretary 1897-1900, Chancellor 
1900-09.  
120 Bulow - Hohenlohe (German Ambassador at Paris), 17 March 1878; GDD 1, pp. 81-94 
121 ‘France’s objective is Tunis, as it is considered essential to the consolidation of their power in Algeria... 
This will be a much lesser cause of anxiety to Britain than for Italy’; Count Georg Herbert Munster 
(German Ambassador to London 1873-85 and to Paris 1885-1900) - Bismarck, 20 April 1878, GDD 1, p. 
94. 
122 Ladislas-Symphorien-Joseph Ordega (properly spelt ‘Ordenga”) had been French consul to Trieste 
before, in 1882, being posted to Tangiers, where he immediately started to cause uproar by his heavy-
handed, egotistical and blatantly self-serving activities; F.V. Parsons, ‘The “Morocco Question” in 1884: 
An Early Crisis’, English Historical Review, 77: 305 (October 1962), pp.659-683 (pp.660-62). 
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Chamber what he was going to do about this latest French affront to Italian prestige, 
stated that Jules Ferry,123 the French premier, had promised to make satisfactory 
explanations. Ferry responded by saying that he had promised no such thing and opined, 
like Bismarck, that it was none of Italy’s concern anyway.124 Turning to Britain the 
Italians had Granville simply brush them off, declining to even bring the matter to the 
attention of cabinet or parliament.125 Italy had clearly been told to leave such matters to 
the big boys. 
    She was even criticized, in April 1885, for trying to convene and host a conference on 
Cholera, a laudable attempt at humanitarianism which was pilloried as nothing more than 
a vanity project. The Germans condemned it as “premature and unnecessary” and said 
that the matter should instead be discussed at the Suez Canal conference, then in session 
in Paris. The Italians objected, quite rightly, that this had nothing to do with health 
matters (but everything to do with the Suez Canal), whereas the proposed Rome 
conference would deal purely with scientific and sanitary issues of vital importance to all 
nations. The British condescendingly regarded the idea as something that could be 
allowed to occur as “a favour to Italy”, while Lumley, the British Ambassador at Rome, 
described the idea as “thoroughly unsatisfactory” and an “absurd “notion.126 
      No-one took Italy seriously as a genuine Power. Even Gladstone, once the champion 
of Italian aspirations, wrote as early as October 1870 that  ‘To put Italy forward, & this 
                                                 
123 Jules Ferry (1832-93), French premier 1881-81 and 1883-85. 
124 Attempts to place words into the mouths of other statesmen, as with Ferry, resulted from their feelings 
of powerlessness - Bismarck, Salisbury, Kalnocky, Ferry and Giers, to mention but a few, never did such 
things - and accumulated over time to their detriment, as will be shown as such episodes occur. 
125 Parsons, op.cit., pp.671-79. 
126 British criticism was oddly at variance with the experience of her merchant marine, as the previous year 
the steamer Brighouse had been stoned by locals, who suspected it of bringing cholera from Naples, when 
it tried to land at Gioia; FO45/528, Paget-Granville 29 January & 10 April 1885, and Lumley-Granville 1 & 
7 May 1885. 
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too as the Power which can best support its diplomacy by arms, is little short of 
ridiculous’.127 Bismarck, always contemptuous of Italy,128 referred to her as the ‘sixth 
wheel of the chariot’,129 Salisbury as ‘the quantite negligeable’,130 while the German 
Chief of Staff, Helmuth Von Moltke, called the Italians ‘a gang of thieves and 
beggars’.131 Such comments show the ‘characteristic mixture of irritation and scorn’ with 
which other governments viewed the new kingdom.132 
      The humiliation to which Italy found herself repeatedly subjected was typified in the 
responses of the other Powers to her attempts to find a place among them. Italy, as we 
have seen, came away from the Congress of Berlin in 1878 with nothing but a ‘burning 
sensation of failure’, which even the Russians felt bound to comment upon.133 
Furthermore, the Italians knew that, because of their ceaseless and desperate search for 
security, which manifested itself in approaching first one Power then another, so that 
none of them could be sure of her real intentions, they were not trusted. An example of 
this occurred in March 1880. Menabrea called on Granville and read out a letter from 
Cairoli regarding Italian Foreign Policy. Meant to reassure Britain that Italy would 
                                                 
127 Letter to Lord Granville October 14 1870 in Ramm, Correspondence, p.146. 
128 Bismarck compared Italy to the hyena ‘who timid and with furtive eyes creeps about the battlefields 
seeking to devour greedily the remains which the beasts of prey have left’ (quoted in M.P. Hornik, ‘Italy 
and the Soudan’, The Contemporary Review, 156 (July1938): pp.334-43). When trying to find a way of 
insulting the Belgian King Leopold’s pretensions to Empire in the Congo, he could find no better 
comparison than with an Italian, saying “his Majesty displays the pretensions  and naïve selfishness of an 
Italian who considers that his charm and good looks will enable him to get away with anything”; quoted in 
A. Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa (London: 
Macmillan, 1999, p.83), and opined that ‘Italy is not a serious state; she should make painters, musicians, 
singers and dancers, that is her real role’; Quoted in Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.20. 
129 Ibid., pp. 4 & 33. 
130 Bosworth, Italy, p.7. 
131 Ibid., p.7; Taylor, Struggle, p.283. 
132 W.L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931; 
1966 edition), p.220. 
133 ‘The Russian ambassador, Uxkull, said (to) Mancini one day (that) Italy ought not to think of itself as a 
great power(sic); if the great powers had admitted Italy to their councils, that had been done out of 
courtesy, not because they believed its consensus was indispensable’; Chabod, Italian Foreign Policy, 
p.455. Yet another mixed message to confuse the Italians. 
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always support her, Granville responded by saying that ‘I expressed great satisfaction (at 
language) which dissipated suspicions (of Italy) which we ourselves have never 
entertained, but which undoubtedly had been widely disseminated’.134 
      As we have seen, the occupation of Tunis in 1881 drove the Italians to seek British 
support. This was not just to bolster their position regarding Tunis, but to bring Italy and 
Britain closer together at the expense of France. Yet these initiatives failed 
ignominiously. Italian attempts to imply that France was an untrustworthy ally for Britain 
over Egypt rebounded. Paget reported to Granville in February 1882 that his 
conversations with Blanc showed that the Italians were trying to imply that France had 
prodded Britain to intervene in Egypt, and that France was an untrustworthy ally over 
Egypt, arrangements with which country would end in “catastrophe” for Britain. Blanc’s 
statements made it clear that Italy wanted Britain to sunder her relations with France, and 
that Italy would support her as ‘all Europe knew that Britain was not an aggressive 
power’ and was entitled to protect her interests in Egypt. Paget responded by telling 
Blanc that Britain’s actions had been made on her own initiative without any urging from 
France, and that HMG regarded France as a loyal and trustworthy ally. Paget was 
sufficiently disturbed by what he perceived as Italian perfidy to tell Granville that ‘... I 
think it was my duty to lose no time in reporting (this conversation) to Your 
Excellency’.135  
       Rebuffed by Britain, Italy turned, after a last attempt by the Italian press to cajole 
Britain into an alliance with Italy,136 to Austria and Germany. This proved even more 
                                                 
134 FO45/400, Granville - Paget, 25 March 1880 (my italics). 
135; FO45/452, Paget - Granville, 9 February 1882. My italics. 
136 Popolo Romano, ‘the mouthpiece of Depretis’, opined that despite Italy assisting Britain to avert a 
Greco-Turkish war, Britain had done nothing to help Italy over Tunis, with the result that Italy would be 
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humiliating; the Italians had to go cap-in-hand to the German Powers, and even then 
ended up with membership of an alliance which, while it demanded little, gave even less.  
As Scott points out, ‘... believing himself to be the head of an important power, but 
nonetheless excluded from the councils of the great, (King Umberto) recognized that he 
was unacceptable to the German sovereigns... (Bismarck) brushed aside (Italian 
overtures), leaving the picture of an importunate Italy begging for crumbs at his 
diplomatic table (while) Mancini’s reserve with regard to Russia would make Italy a 
worthless ally in Austria’s eyes’.137 Taylor has it that ‘The Triple Alliance... bolstered the 
myth of Italian greatness (and gave them recognition as a Great Power), and therefore 
staved off internal discontent for almost a generation’.138 Nothing - apart from the use of 
the term ‘myth of Italian greatness’ - could be further from the truth. The Triple Alliance 
accentuated Italy’s weakness rather than hid it.139 
      Thus, to many Italians, hungry for recognition and respect on the international stage, 
the trasformismo years meant ‘the grey era…of parliamentary intrigues and corruption, 
and of timidity in foreign affairs’,140 of an Italy cowering in the shadows of the real 
Powers surrounding her, the ‘ridiculous imitation of a Great Power, impressive only to 
professional diplomats and literary visitors’.141 As a result, ‘... the baptism of blood theme 
was present long before (D’Annunzio and) the art of irrational politics made their 
                                                                                                                                                 
forced to seek an alliance with her so-called ‘natural ally’, Germany; FO45/430, MacDonald (temporary 
Ambassador to Rome) - Granville, 3 August 1881. 
137 I. Scott, ‘The Making of the Triple Alliance in 1882’, East European Quarterly, 12: 4 (Winter 1978), 
pp.400-21 (pp.408-09). 
138 Struggle, p.276. 
139 Bridge, Sadowa, pp.130-32.  
140 Clark, Modern Italy, p.92. 
141 A.J.P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809-1918: A History of the Austrian Empire and Austria-
Hungary (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948 ((Peregrine Edition, 1964)), p.237. 
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appearance... It remained for a new generation (to fuel) the... fires of national 
redemption’.142 
      But how were these fires to be brought about? The figures speak for themselves.  
                                                
                          Industrial Output143 
 
                                 Coal                                  Iron                                   Steel 
 
                         1870       1914                     1870     1914                      1870    1914 
 
G.B.                 112.0       292.0                     6.0        11.0                       0.7       6.5 
 
Germany           34.0       227.0                      1.3        14.7                       0.3       140 
 
France               13.3         40.0                      1.2          4.6                       0.3        3.5 
 
Italy                   0.05         0.75                    0.05          0.5                       0.0        0.9  
 
                           Defence estimates144 
 
                           1870       1914 
 
G.B.                     23.4       76.8 
 
Germany             10.8       110.8 
 
France                 22.0        57.4 
 
Italy                      7.8         28.2                                                          
 
                                                 
142 J.A. Thayer, Risorgimento Achievements and Post-Risorgimento Problems, in A.W. Salomone (ed.), 
Italy from the Risorgimento to Fascism: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Totalitarian State (Newton 
Abbot: David Charles, 1970), pp.89-100 (p.97). There were also elements of Italian nationalism that looked 
back to a period of relatively recent history unconnected with the stimulus of Ancient Rome. The triumphs 
of city-states such as Venice, Pisa and Genoa, over Ottonian and Hohenstaufen Germans and Ottoman 
Turks, during the medieval and renaissance periods provided micro-models of what the new, unified Italian 
nation-state could achieve if properly led. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 added stimulus to this 
idea, turning the Mediterranean - and by inference Italy - once again into a major factor in international 
trade and diplomacy: G. Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962 
(2nd ed)); Chabod, Italian Foreign, pp.243-45. 
143 Taylor, Struggle, pp. xxix-xxx; figures denote millions of tons. 
144 Ibid., pxxviii; figures denote millions sterling.  
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G.B.                      38              62 
 
Germany               11             12 
 
France                   19              36 
 
Italy                        7              12                 
                                                        
            
 
      Clearly Italy was, in comparison to its European neighbours, militarily weak, 
economically underdeveloped, and scarcely worthy of the title of a European Great 
Power, even though she had, in theory, been admitted to that exclusive club in 1870.146 
      Perhaps worst of all, the sheer poverty of the Italian state held it up to constant 
humiliation on the International stage. There were ‘... many sceptics... who thought that 
the vessel of Italy was destined for wreckage on the shoals of finance from the moment it 
was launched on its voyage’.147 With an economy propped up in large part by ‘invisible 
assets’ such as tourism and emigrants’ remittances,148 in 1870 Italy inherited a shambolic 
financial situation, with seven different systems of tax collection and six regional note-
                                                 
145 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.209. These three sets of figures are sourced from tables that also give 
statistics for Austria, Japan, the U.S.A. and Russia, but for reasons of comparative consistency and 
geopolitical relevance I have included only the figures for Britain, France, Germany and Italy. 
146 ‘... Italy would be confronted by a constant gap between appearance and reality... (history ) alone 
defended Italy’s title as a Great Power... or, at least, the history of that “geographical expression”, Italy. By 
any other criteria, Italy’s role from 1860 to 1914 had more in common with that of a small Balkan state... 
than a Great Power’; Bosworth, Italy, p.2. 
147 Chabod, Italian Foreign, p.408. 
148 Bosworth, op.cit., p.4 
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issuing banks, a staggering trade deficit and an economy so unstable that Italian investors 
usually invested abroad rather than risk their capital by keeping it in Italy.149  
      Yet Italy needed a large military and naval establishment to be both recognised as a 
Power and to be enabled to behave as one. But attempts to establish credible armed forces 
invariably incurred the censure of foreign commentators. Bismarck, speaking to Venosta 
in Berlin during September 1873, stated that ‘You only have one enemy you must 
conquer at all costs, and that is the deficit’. Throughout the 1870-90 period, efforts to 
finance military activity met with a barrage of denunciation in the Press of the world, and 
from the financial institutions abroad which financed the Italian deficit.150 It was 
seriously suggested that Italian finances should be placed under International control, so 
that she would ‘... sink to the level of Egypt, a country under the financial control of 
others and thus a colony, not a free nation’.151 
      How, then, was Italy to re-establish her longed-for Roman Empire? The lands of 
Europe that had once been part of the Roman Empire were no longer available for 
                                                 
149 Chabod, op.cit., pp. 403-09; J. Cohen & G. Federico, The Growth of the Italian Economy, 1820-1960  
(Cambridge: University Press, 2001), pp. 70-72. 
150 In 1870, of the 8 billion lire that constituted the total Italian public debt, 2 billion was held abroad, while 
foreign investment in Italian capital projects, mainly the railways, amounted to over 1 billion lire. The 
British, German and American Press were most vociferous in their condemnation of Italian military 
expenditure. ‘(The Times stated that) no other country had less room for (profligate military spending)... the 
Standard wanted the Italians to work more and spend less. The Pall Mall Gazette dwelt on the lack of 
courage (of) Cavour’s successors in failing to deal vigorously with their financial situation. In sum, the 
English press was unanimous (while American, German and French commentators chimed in agreement 
that ) Italy was synonymous with deficit’; Chabod, op.cit., pp.411-13. 
151 Chabod, op.cit., p.413. In July 1881 Paget reported to Granville that the Chamber had voted an 
allotment of 214,736,426 Francs to the army and 46,134,660 to the navy, at the same time as it had floated 
a loan to which the Duchess of Cambridge (with the support of the Queen) had donated 1million sterling 
(the subsidies from London alone covered by more than twice the amount required by the loan). In January 
1882 he reported a further “extraordinary military expenditure” of 144,180,000 lire (about 5.8 million 
sterling) for 1882-86. Such action might be viewed as wildly profligate, but in an (especially pre-Triple 
Alliance) world in which Italy could not be sure of her safety from attack, and long before she had decided 
to embark upon an Imperial course, it could also be viewed as a necessity; FO45/430, Paget - Granville, 
July 1 and 15-16 July 1881; and FO45/452, Paget-Granville, January 15 1882. Given, despite the shambolic 
state of Ottoman finances, the willingness of the other Powers to underwrite Turkey’s ruinous economy on 
a continuous basis, such criticism of Italy seems unduly harsh (and see Chapter 3).  
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colonization. The nominal Turkish fiefdoms of North Africa were a possible source of 
Imperial acquisitions. Since 1870 Italians - principally landless Sicilian peasants - had 
made up the largest part of the European population of Tunis, while Tripoli was also a 
possible target for Italian expansion.152 However, before 1881 there was little appetite for 
annexing any of the North African territories - such an enterprise was regarded as being 
too expensive for the young, poor state, while interest in Tripoli was practically non-
existent,153 though later developments were to change Italian views on the desirability of 
obtaining such territories from the Porte. 
The apparent solution came almost by accident.  
      In 1869 the Rubattino shipping company had purchased Assab Bay from the Sultan of 
Raheita and, from 1873, had run a government-subsidised monthly steamer service from 
Genoa to Bombay via the Suez Canal, thus establishing an Italian presence in the Red 
Sea.154 In addition to this, since 1880 Italian traders and explorers had penetrated to the 
heart of the Arabian peninsula and established trading links with Arabia Felix,155 and at 
the very beginning of that year a chain of events began which pointed to the course of 
future Italian aims and objectives in the Red Sea coast and North-East Africa. 
 
 
                                                 
152 At least  9,000 in 1881, compared to 200 French; Clark, Modern Italy, pp.46-48. And see Pakenham, 
Scramble, p.581. One of the reasons for the outburst of fury which followed the French annexation of Tunis 
in 1881, apart from the preponderance of Italians over French in a territory that had once been part of the 
Roman Empire and which lay just across the sea from Sicily, was that France already possessed Algeria 
and did not suffering from chronic over-population pressure; Langer, European Alliances, p.218. 
153 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.21. 
154 R. Ben-Ghiat & M. Fuller (eds), Italian Colonialism (Houndsmill: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pxiv. 
Clark, Modern Italy, p.47; M. Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East 1922-1940 (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2010), p.12.   
155 Fiore, op.cit., p.12. 
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Whose Colony is it anyway? 
       
The first colonists in modern times of the Red Sea coast were the Ottomans, who 
expanded during the sixteenth century into Mesopotamia, the Arabian peninsula and the 
Red Sea and Persian Gulf during the reign of Suleiman 1 (1520-66), establishing 
provinces in Basra, Lahsa and Yemen, as well as a presence in ports such as Aden, 
Suakin and other minor coastal sites East to Mogadishu, but doing little beyond 
maintaining a symbolic presence in the least important sites.156 Then, in the nineteenth 
century Egypt, still subject to her Ottoman suzerain but for most purposes by this time an 
independent country, began to flex her muscles, first under Muhammed Ali, 157 and later 
under Ismail (Khedive of Egypt 1863-79).158  
      As we have seen, by the 1870s the African side of the Red Sea coast as far East as 
Mogadishu was a direct dependency of the Ottoman Empire.159 Even at the height of 
                                                 
156 Many of the Ottoman settlements of the coastal ports of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea were made in 
response to power struggles with Persia, and as a result of strategic and commercial rivalry with the 
Portuguese, who had established a dominant position in the spice trade with India during the early-to-mid 
sixteenth century; see R. Matthee, The Portuguese Presence in the Persian Gulf: An Overview, in J.R. 
Macris & S. Kelly, Imperial Crossroads: The Great Powers and the Persian Gulf (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2012), pp. 1-13. Detente with Persia and the decline of Portuguese power led to a fairly 
minimal Ottoman presence in such places - the Ottomans were aware that, in trying to establish themselves 
in such places as lands east of the Euphrates, and in the Red Sea, they were overextending their power, so 
that they contented themselves with holding onto small but strategically important places such as Baghdad, 
Aden and Massawa: C. Finkel, Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300-1923 (London: 
John Murray, 2005), pp. xxii, 128-37 & 561. ‘... the (Ottoman) emphasis was not on settler colonization 
(but) establishment of minimum governmental order maintained amongst the aboriginal population...’; M. 
Minawi, The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: Empire and Diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz (Stanford: 
University Press, 2016), p.48. See also G. Wyman Bury, Arabia Infelix; or, the Turks in Yamen (London: 
Macmillan & Co., 1915), pp.11-14; S.N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1959), pp.225-56; and F.F. Anscombe, The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.12-14.  
157 Who sent an expedition into Sudan in 1820 (see Appendix 4 for biographical details) and who by 1842 
had been recognized as Governor-General of Sudan by the Sultan; Fisher, op.cit., p.292. And see Appendix 
4 for details of Egyptian history and background. 
158 Fisher, op.cit., pp.286-87. 
159 South of Mogadishu the Somali coast remained until 1889 a dependency of Zanzibar; G.N. Sanderson,  
The Nile Basin and the eastern Horn, in R. Oliver &  G.N. Sanderson (eds.), The Cambridge History of 
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Ottoman power in the sixteenth century, the Red Sea littoral had been relatively low on 
the Imperial agenda and had been fairly lightly garrisoned, due not only to a paucity of 
resources but also to the fact that the Red Sea coast had fairly few useful harbours or 
anchorages.160 However, Ismail had Imperial dreams of his own, wishing to build an 
Egyptian Empire stretching South from Egypt down to the Lakes of Central Africa and 
East to the Indian Ocean.161 Modernising his army and building a navy, he started, with 
the willing approval of an Ottoman Firman,162 by extending Egyptian power along the 
Red Sea coast, taking Suakin and Massowa in 1866.163 With the opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869, and with the ultimate aim of conquering Ethiopia, he went on to occupy 
Keren (1872),164 Zeila and Darfur (1874),165 Berbera and Harar (1875)166 and extended 
his reach to Ras Hafun, on the Indian Ocean, by 1877.167  These actions were to have a 
profound effect on the course of developments in the Red Sea during the 1880-1888 
period. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Africa, vol. 6: from 1870 to 1905 (Cambridge: University Press, 1985), pp.592-679 (p.669). And see 
Chapter 3. 
160 Finkel, op.cit., pp. 120-21 & 155-56. For a fuller description of the Ottoman strategic position in the Red 
Sea and Arabian Gulf, see Appendix 4. 
161 Isma’il’s push south extended to Lake Victoria and Lake Tana, the sources of the two Niles, and in 1869 
he commissioned Sir Samuel Baker, the British explorer who had discovered Lake Albert, to establish a 
province in the far South called Equatoria: Pakenham, Scramble, p. 77.  
162 The balance of power between Turkey and Egypt was never clear-cut in these matters. The toppling of 
Isma’il was facilitated by the Sultan and the Egyptians were always mindful of not offending the Porte 
unnecessarily, (vide Baring’s concerns, Chapter 2, p.55) but the Egyptians could be quite forceful where 
their direct interests were concerned - ‘During the... 1840s, sovereignty over (Massawa) was exchanged 
between Ottomans and Egyptians three times’; J. Miran, Red Sea Citizens: Cosmopolitan Society and 
Cultural Change in Massawa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), p.60. 
163 K.V. Ram, Anglo-Ethiopian Relations 1869-1906: A Study in British Policy in Ethiopia (New Delhi: 
Concept Press, 2009), pp.11-12. And see Appendix 4.  
164 R. Caulk, “Between the Jaws of Hyenas”: A Diplomatic History of Ethiopia (1876-1896) (Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002), p.131; see also R.J. Reid, Frontiers of Violence in North-East Africa: 
Genealogies of Conflict since c. 1800 (Oxford: University Press, 2011), pp.66-73, and T. Natsoulis & T. 
Natsoulas, ‘Arthur Rimbaud: Trade and Politics in Northeast Africa 1880-1891: Part 1’, Northeast African 
Studies, 3: 2 (1981), pp. 49-68 (pp.49-50). 
165 See note 184, below. 
166 Caulk, op.cit., p.18; see also Natsoulis & Natsoulas, Rimbaud, pp.49-52.. 
167‘Until the 1870s northern Somalia was nominally a direct dependency of the Ottoman Empire. The 
Benadir (Indian Ocean) coast as far north as Mogadishu remained until 1889 a dependency of Zanzibar.’ 
Sanderson, Nile, p.669.  
 40
Aden and the Red Sea route to India       
Direct British/Indian interests in the Red Sea coast dated from 1839, when Aden was 
annexed.168 Once a key part of ancient India’s trading empire, it had declined into 
desuetude by the nineteenth century, when the rise of steam power made it a desirable 
base, with its sheltered deep-water harbour, for a coaling station between Suez and 
Bombay. By 1839 it had proved so successful that it was seized in January and made part 
of the Bombay presidency.169 As it was somewhat isolated and surrounded by Ottoman 
territory, the Indian government made a series of treaties with the local tribes in the 
Arabian hinterland,170 treaties aimed both at protecting Aden from attack and neutralizing 
the possibility of any other European powers forming agreements with those same tribes 
without prior British consent. As Aden depended on food exports from Somali ports, 
                                                 
168 J. Blyth, Empire of the Raj:India, Eastern Africa and the Middle East,1858-1947 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), pp.2-5; Brendon, Decline, p.95; Lynn, Informal Empire,  pp.108-9, in Porter, Oxford. 
‘Aden was the best coaling station on the new steamship route from Egypt to India. This route... was 
already important, and its importance was likely to increase with the rapid improvement of (maritime steam 
transport)’; E.L. Woodward, The Age of Reform, 1815-1870 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), p.226. ‘The 
acquisition of Aden... had followed naturally from Palmerston’s conception of the importance of the short 
route (to India). A high regard for its prosperity marked British policy (from 1837). It provided the motive 
for Britain’s anxiety to maintain... peace and order along the Somali coast; for through the ports of the coast 
Aden’s garrison drew its supplies of fresh meat and her native population drove the trade upon which it 
largely depended’; A. Ramm, ‘Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power in the Red Sea 1868-1885’, 
English Historical Review, 59: 234 (May 1944), pp.211-36 (p.212). Control of the Red Sea was part of a 
wider strategic imperative which also affected the Persian Gulf - ‘In the first half of the nineteenth century 
(the) British penned a series of peace treaties with ... local Arab sheikhs (in the Persian gulf) to cement 
Britain as the ultimate arbiter of security, and to prevent the encroachment there of other great powers 
(hence the conclusion of) an agreement with the Sultan of Oman in 1798 in response to (the French) 
occupation of Egypt. A chief aim of British policy in the nineteenth century (became) preventing other 
great powers from drawing close to India.’ Macris  & Kelly, Crossroads, p.xii; see also A.Giannini,, 
L’Ultima fase della Questione Orientale (1913-1939) (Milano: Istituto per gli Studia di Politica 
Internationale, 1941), pp.234-40, and E. Rossi (ed), Documenti Sull’Origine e gli Sviluppi della Questione 
Araba (1875-1944) (Roma: Istituto per L’Oriente, 1944), pp. XV-XIII.  
169 It remained part of the Bombay Presidency until 1932; the matter of who was responsible for 
expenditure in the Red Sea was a matter of contention between London and Bombay for that entire period 
(and see notes 175 & 185, below) ; H.J. Liebesny, ‘International Relations of Arabia: the Dependent areas’, 
Middle Eastern Journal 1: 2 (April 1947), pp.148-168 (p.150). 
170 The nine Cantons, or “Nine Tribes” - including the Subayhi, Aqrabi, Abdali, Howbashi, Alawi, Yafii, 
Fadli and Awlaqi - were the principal political Yemeni groups involved in treaties with the Aden 
government: J.E. Peterson, ‘South West Arabia and the British during World War 1’, Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 11: 4 (Summer 1979), pp.18-38. 
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similar treaties were made by the Indian government with the Somali tribes surrounding 
those ports, such as Berbera. Inevitably, a vital strategic role also developed for Aden, 
particularly after 1869, dominating as it did the Straits of Bab-el-Mandab, from which the 
Red Sea opened out into the Indian Ocean. Although the Indian government did not want 
to use its political foothold in Somalia and Aden for expansionist purposes, it kept an 
Imperial eye on potential threats to its position and dealt with them promptly when they 
appeared. When the French tried in 1856 to occupy the strategically important island of 
Perim, which sat between the two pincer-like arms of Bab-el-Mandab, they were pre-
empted by an Indian expedition which seized the island. A similar reaction happened 
when the Italians and Austrians showed an interest in Socotra, an island group in the 
Arabian Sea about halfway between Aden and the Horn of Africa.171 
      Though at first hostile to the superimposition of Egyptian power on the littoral 
opposite to Aden (hence the 1839 annexation), Britain by 1875 was reconciled (due to the 
pliability of Khedive Isma’il) to its presence as a safeguard against occupation by a rival 
                                                 
171 Blyth, Raj, p.66. The British/Indian authorities had ambivalent views about Perim; some thought that 
whoever held it had ‘the key’ to the Red Sea, others that, because of its lack of water supply and other 
resources, holding it was pointless for any power unless that power already controlled the Red Sea. The 
Indian government objected to the cost of fortifying it on the latter grounds, though commercial interests 
promoted its value as a better port than Aden, and during 1855-56 it was agreed that India would pay for a 
lighthouse to be built on it: see, inter alia, IOR L/MIL/7/6506, Malet-Spalding, 5 August 1882; IOR 
L/MIL/7/6507, Hartington (HM Secretary of State for India) -  Salisbury, 9 October 1882, Earl of 
Kimberley (HM Secretary of State for India) - Salisbury, 25 March 1883; IOR L/MIL/7/6508, Kimberley - 
Governor-General, India in Council, 15 May 1886. Perim played a minor but recurring part, both direct and 
indirect, in Anglo-Italian relations, as will be seen in Chapter 3. 
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European power172, and recognized Egyptian authority as far as Ras Hafun on condition 
that Egypt should never alienate any of these territories to another power.173  
      So, by 1875 there were two layers of authority, first Ottoman and then Egyptian, the 
latter still subject to the former, over the Red Sea littoral. However, a third layer of power 
came to be added shortly after, that of Britain. In 1876, Ismail’s attempts to occupy 
Abyssinia after the successes of the mid-1870s came to an abrupt and bloody halt, when 
the forces of Yohannes, the Negus Negast of Abyssinia’s forces, led by a then-unknown 
Ras Alula,174 decisively defeated an Egyptian expeditionary force at Gura in March 
1876.175 The deposition of Ismail in 1879, arguably the result as much of his defeat at 
Gura as by the disastrous enterprises which had bankrupted Egypt in 1875-6,176 was 
                                                 
172 i.e. France, which had bought the enclave of Obokh in 1862 and during 1884-85 extended its reach to 
include the whole of the Gulf of Tajourra;  H. Brunschwig, French Exploration and conquest in tropical 
Africa from 1865 to 1898, in L.H. Gann & P. Duignan, Colonialism in Africa 1870-1906 (3 volumes), 
Volume 1: The History and Politics of Colonialism, 1870-1914 (Cambridge: University Press, 1969 (1977 
ed)), pp. 132-164 (pp.140 & 156). 
173 Most of the opposition to Egyptian expansion along the Red Sea coast came not from Britain but from 
India, where fears about the independence from Egyptian control of local Somali tribes, with which the 
Indian government had treaty obligations, the security of Aden (which depended upon imports from Somali 
ports - particularly Berbera - falling under Egyptian control) and the safety of British shipping in the Red 
Sea dominated Bombay’s response to Isma’il’s campaign. However, London regarded Egypt as an 
important client state whose co-operation in the drive against the slavery trade was essential, and Isma’il’s 
activities were viewed with circumspect tolerance; Blyth, Raj, pp. 68-69. In addition, Isma’il comforted 
Gladstone by claiming he would use the occupation of Massawa and Suakin to stop the slave trade between 
Arabia and Sudan: Pakenham, Scramble, p.77; Woodward, Age, pp. 354-55. 
174 Yohannes’ chief general and engineer of the defeats of the Italians at Dogali (1887) and Adowa (1896); 
see H. Erlich, ‘Alula, ‘The Son of Qubi’: A ‘King’s Man’ in Ethiopia, 1875-1897’, Journal of African 
History, 15: 2 (1974), pp.261-274, and R. Jonas, The Battle of Adwa: African Victory in the Age of Empire 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2011), pp. 18-46 & 173-207. See Appendices 4 & 5 for a background 
description of Abyssinia’s role in the region. 
175 Caulk, Jaws, pp.18-19; Jonas, op.cit., pp.18-19. What most textbooks don’t mention is that the 
Egyptians sustained an equally serious defeat by the Abyssinians prior to Gura, at Gundet, in November 
1875 (FO881/3058, Stanton - Derby, 27 November 1875). Given the long history of conflict between Egypt 
and Abyssinia a solitary, if major, defeat at Gura probably would not of itself have brought Ismail to such a 
crisis; but two massive defeats, close together, would. 
176 Ismail was deposed , with the connivance of the Sultan, as a result of action from the European powers, 
spurred on by the massive amounts of debt owed by Ismail to European bondholders; Barthorp, Blood-Red, 
pp.22-23; A.L. Al-Sayyid-Marsot, The British Occupation of Egypt from 1882, in Porter, Oxford, pp.652-
64 (pp.652-53); Pakenham, Scramble, pp.75-85. But defeat at Gura had ‘shattered Ismail’s dream of an 
African Empire for Egypt (and) solidified (the Abyssinian) claim on what would become Eritrea’; Jonas, 
Adwa, p.19. 
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followed by the accession of the Ottoman-nominated Tewfik.177 Unfortunately, Tewfik 
was seen by Egyptian nationalists as a tool of the foreign powers that, since 1876, had 
effectively run Egypt on their own behalf, which led to the nationalist Urabi uprising of 
1881 and its ultimate defeat, by British forces under Wolseley, at Tel-el-Kebir in 1882.178 
This left the British, who had been left to deal with the revolt alone, as the de facto 
imperial power running Egypt.179 As Porter says, ‘This system, whereby the Egyptians 
supposedly ruled their own country, but were manipulated by British advisers responsible 
to no-one save Baring,180 came to be known as the “Veiled  Protectorate”’.181 Thus, a 
third layer of power was superimposed on the governance of the Red Sea - a British, or, 
strictly speaking, an Anglo-Egyptian,182 authority which overlaid or intermingled with the 
existing Ottoman and Egyptian ones.  
      From 1882 onwards the main controlling power in the Red Sea was undoubtedly 
Britain. But for her to pay mere lip service to Ottoman suzerainty and Egyptian control 
was not enough. Though controlling Egyptian purse-strings, Britain had to be careful not 
to challenge or undermine Ottoman suzerainty, and had to be seen to be allowing Egypt 
to physically rule the African littoral. However, further subdivisions of power on the 
                                                 
177 Ismail Pasha, ‘one of the shrewdest, though perhaps not one of the best men that ever lived’ (had said of 
his son Tewfik) that “He had neither heart, nor head nor courage” - a pretty good opinion for a father to 
have of a son’; Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Hansard, 3, HC, 14 February 1884, v.284 cc. 896-979. 
178 M.A. Al-Hajj, The Nile Valley: Egypt and the Sudan in the Nineteenth Century, in J.C. Anene & G. 
Brown,  Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, for the 
University of Ibadan Press, 1966), pp. 161-180 (pp. 173-75); Brendon, Decline, pp. 167-69; Al-Sayyid-
Marsot, Occupation, in Porter, Oxford, pp. 653-54. 
179 Since the Ottoman and French governments, who might reasonably have been expected to display an 
active interest in the matter due to their fiscal and political interests in Egypt, refused to have any part in the 
quelling of the revolt. As an Austrian commentator remarked at the time, Gladstone inaugurated a ‘silent 
annexation a la Bosnia’ (quoted in Shannon, Heroic, p.305). And see Appendix 4.  
180 Sir Evelyn Baring, (1841-1907), 1st Earl of Cromer, Controller-General of Egypt 1879 and Consul 
General 1883-1907. 
181 Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op.cit., p.655. 
182 “Anglo-Egyptian” meaning, as Porter described the situation in Sudan at the end of the century, “a 
condominium government in which ostensibly Egypt and Britain ruled jointly, but where in practice Britain 
ruled and Egypt paid”; Al-Sayyid-Marsot, op.cit., p.655. And see Appendix 4.  
 44
British side had the potential for adding complications to the mix - the view from London 
(particularly during Salisbury’s times as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary), 
regarding the best way to handle events in Sudan, the Nile Valley and the Red Sea, often 
conflicted with the view from Cairo (especially during the Baring/Cromer years), while 
the rivalry between the India Office and the Foreign Office over who should rule - and 
pay for the cost of running - the Red Sea also had the potential to cause friction.183  Aden 
alone generated a complex inter-departmental turf war involving several British and 
Indian governmental departments over a long period.184 The situation in the Ottoman Red 
Sea’s African littoral was much more complicated, and offered plentiful opportunity for 
confusion, misunderstanding, strife, chaos and disorder. Even without Italian exploitation 
of these confused layers of power (which, as we shall see, developed soon after the 
beginning of 1880) and sporadic French interference,185 the situation was muddled; 
despite British insistence, and French acquiescence in the idea, that the Red Sea littoral 
belonged to Turkey via Egypt, there was often confusion about the details, e.g., did local 
Sultans independent of the Egyptians prior to their expansion to Cape Guardafui now 
                                                 
183 The 1885 expedition to reinforce Suakin, and its maintenance thereafter until 1887, when it was 
withdrawn, caused a prolonged argument between London and Bombay. The Indian government felt that it 
should not have had to pay for the expedition in the first place, as the situation in Suakin was one “in which 
India had no direct interest” (unlike the 1882 expedition to Suez, in which Indian interests were definitely 
involved), particularly at a time when India had to deal with the Burmese emergency (see Webster, Burma), 
while the Garrison’s upkeep after its objective - the (apparent) defeat of Osman Digna -  had been met 
should have been the responsibility of either London or Cairo according to a precedent set by Salisbury in 
June 1876 (whereby HMG should bear all expenses of Indian troops sent to places where Indian interests 
were not at stake): IOR L/MIL/7/6937, inter alia Dufferin - Kimberley, 17 February 1885; Dufferin - 
Cross, 26 October 1886; Cross - Governor General of India, 3 February 1887. 
184 Blyth, Raj, pp.66-75. 
185 In 1869 the French made an abortive attempt to establish a presence on the African coast opposite 
Perim, buying land from a local Sheikh. The Turks claimed sovereignty and forbade the sale, supported by 
the British and Indian authorities at Aden and Perim. The Sheikh concerned declared that he owned the 
land outright and owed no allegiance to the Porte. The French responded by saying they would “admit the 
validity of the (Porte’s opposition re suzerainty, but) maintained that it was no less incontestable that the 
(Sheikh’s claim) could not be disputed”. M. Aubert , of the French Embassy at Constantinople, and Lord 
Lyons had a prolonged and circuitous discussion on this esoteric matter; see D.Hamilton, ‘Imperialism 
Ancient and Modern: a study of British attitudes to the claims to Sovereignty to the Northern Somali 
coastline’, Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 5: 2 (July 1967), pp. 9-35 (p.23). 
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owe obeisance to Egypt as well as Turkey, or just to Turkey, or just to Egypt, or 
effectively to neither?186  
      This confusion bedeviled relations, not just between Britain and Italy but also among 
Britain, Italy, India, Turkey, Egypt, Abyssinia, France, Russia and even Greece,187 and 
affected not only the Red Sea littoral but also its extensive hinterland, from the Somali 
coast in the East to the Egyptian border in the West, and from the Red Sea coast in the 
North to the borders with British East Africa and the Belgian Congo in the South.188 
      Experience - evident, in retrospect, since January 1880 - was to show that the blurred 
spheres of authority created by the existence of such an ambiguous situation was to give 
the Italians a golden opportunity to insinuate themselves into positions of influence and 
power in the Red Sea that they might not otherwise have enjoyed. 
 
“So much for secrecy!”: Assab, The De Amezaga letter and Operation 
“Messina” 
It is clear that, in 1872, some Italians at least genuinely believed that the Egyptians did 
not have power over Assab. As far as they were concerned, Egyptian power stopped at 
Massawa, a good 30 miles north-west.189 Nevertheless, surviving documents pertaining to 
                                                 
186 see Natsoulis & Natsoulas, Rimbaud, pp.49-50, and Hertslet’s Memorandum of May 1882, FO881/4590  
187 See Chapter 2, ‘The Massawa Incident’. 
188 Once the Mahdiya was underway, ‘In Egypt, the reforms initiated by the British... had only just begun. 
The authority of the old ruling classes had been profoundly shaken... the Egyptian government did not even 
know how far it was free to act independently... the British (were in) physical occupation but loudly 
disclaiming any intention to stay, or (shoulder) any direct responsibilities. On the other side was the 
Sultan... powerful to obstruct, but unwilling to assist... it was not surprising that the Egyptian government 
(floundered in indecision)...’; A.B. Theobald, The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-
1899 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1951), pp.67-68. 
189 ‘... a Massawa sull’estremo territorio egiziano’; Strambio - Venosta, 28 May 1872, L’Italia in Africa, 
Vol. I, Tomo II (1859-1882) (I/II), (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico Dello Stato, 1959), pp.13-14. In the same 
letter, Zeila was referred to as ‘... poco lontana, sulla frontiera del littorale del Mar Rosso nel territorio 
abissinese (further down the coast, at the point where the Red Sea meets Abyssinian territory)’, thus, from 
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Italian interest in Assab remained, by and large, only concerned with the commercial 
possibilities of obtaining a presence there at least until several years later.190 In one of 
them, the explorer Giulietti even wrote to Depretis how the Sultan of the Danakil had 
upbraided Rubattino for the Italians’ lack of courage in asserting their power over Assab, 
the want of which meant they had lost the chance to become equal partners with the 
Danakil in exploiting trade opportunities there and to challenge the Egyptian customs 
monopoly at Zeila.191        
      Lowe and Marzari imply that the shift in emphasis from commercial to political in 
Italian polity towards Assab came from Matteucci’s influence over Cairoli, during or 
after 1880.192 However, it seems much more likely that a letter from Captain Carlo De 
Amezaga, commander of the Italian Man O’War Esploratore, to the Ministry of Maritime 
Affairs, written in September 1879, was the catalyst for the change in Italian intent 
towards Assab, and very possibly for their realization that they could exploit the fault-
lines of power in the Red Sea to their own advantage. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the context of the letter, also clearly not regarded as an Egyptian possession. Interestingly, though, Negri 
(Secretary-General at the Foreign Office at this time) wrote that ‘... la loro superiorita (dalla i Turchi egli 
Egiziani) nel mar Rosso era incontrastata (the superiority of the Turks and Egyptians in the Red Sea was 
undisputed)’  (Negri - Artom, 2 July 1872, , ibid., p.16), while the explorer Giulietti mentioned the ‘much-
vaunted’ Egyptian sovereignty over the Bay of Assab and their ‘customs post’ at Zeila as late as 1879 
(Giulietti - Depretis, 23 February 1879, ibid., p.23). Clearly, a lack of willingness among some Italians to 
recognize Egyptian authority over the Red Sea littoral did not preclude a recognition of their presence by 
others. 
190 See letters, passim, ibid., pp.13-32, containing documents up to mid-1879. Despite the assumption that 
the Italians at this time were more concerned with developing trade with Yohannes and Tigray, many of the 
documents, especially those from Antonelli during 1879-1883, accentuate the possibility of developing 
trade routes with Menelik’s Shoa; Lowe & Marzari Italian, p.36; S. Bompiani, Italian Explorers in Africa 
(London: The Religious Tract Society 1892; translated from the Italian), pp.157-61. 
191 Giulietti-Depretis, 23 February 1879, L’Italia I/II, p.23. 
192 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.35. However, Matteucci only receives the briefest of mentions in published 
Italian African documents, none of them indicating any communication with Cairoli (see L’Italia I/II, pp. 
48, 56, 59 & 86). He seems, while accompanying the Borghese - Massari expedition to central Africa in 
Spring 1880, only to have gone from Cairo, via Suez, as far down the Red Sea coast as Suakin before 
striking inland, thus making his assessment of that coast beyond Suakin nugatory, while his activity in the 
Red Sea area postdates De Amezaga’s letter; Bompiani, op.cit., pp. 47-49. 
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      In this letter,193 De Amezaga exalts the importance and potential of Assab, claiming 
(wrongly) that it was the riches of the Somali region that attracted the British to Aden, 
and that with good management the Italians could channel those riches through Assab to 
the world beyond. The economic woes of Italy could be cured by such a development, 
and if Italy did not enact it, either some other Power would, or it would be strangled by 
the development of similar ports elsewhere on the Red Sea coast. Since everybody knew 
that the Rubattino Company had owned the Bay for ten years, there should be no problem 
in gaining recognition of the Italian right to develop it to Italy’s advantage.   
      However, where his words diverge from similar missives in the past is in their 
insistence that state aid in the form of a political and military presence would be essential 
to such development. The Rubattino Company had done well in developing trade from 
Italy along the Red Sea route to India; but the hazards and travails faced by the 
contemporary Antinori expedition194 to Shoa, showed how vulnerable to hostile 
indigenous forces any undefended commercial settlement would be. This, combined with 
the jealousy from foreign Powers, especially from the English, which was sure to follow 
Assab’s success, made it essential that the new colony of Assab be protected by the Italian 
Government.195  
                                                 
193 In an earlier one, of June 1879, he had extolled not just the economic, political and geographical 
advantages of Assab - its potential as a conduit from Shoa, the idea that Italian occupation would not upset 
the other Powers of the region but would be mutually advantageous to Egypt, Abyssinia and Italy, its 
proximity to other important sites such as Bab-el-Mandeb, Aden and Berbera - but also the notion that 
Italian success there would embolden them to confront France on the ground in Tunis and stop them 
expanding into Tripoli; De Amezaga - Bonelli, 19 June 1879, in L’Italia I/II, pp.28-32. 
194 See Caulk, Jaws, pp.21-28, and Correnti (President of the Italian Royal Geographical Society)-Cairoli, 8 
April 1878, in L’Italia I/II, pp.18-21. 
195 ‘La nuova colonia di Assab, di fronte all’inevitabile gelosia, che essa destera negli stranieri in genere, e 
negli’inglese in particolore, deve assolutamente trovarsi coperta dall’autorita morale e materiale del 
governo italiano’; De Amezaga - Ministero della Marina, 16 September 1879, L’Italia I/II, pp.34-36. All 
italics mine. 
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      Furthermore (he continued), the Italian government should not, through the habit of 
subservience to an arrogant Britain - terrified at the thought of humiliation at the hands of 
Italy - give in to the covert pressure that would be exerted from London and Aden to 
desist from such a course of action. Nor should they take notice of British attempts to 
encourage the Egyptians, as vassals of the Porte, to assert their “so-called rights” to the 
African coast, since they held the coast on warrant from the Porte. The Turkish Sultan 
who, as Caliph of all Islam, was undoubtedly the Religious leader of the (mainly 
Moslem) region, should not be assumed - as he was by the British, as well as by both 
Turks and Egyptians - also to be the Political leader. This, De Amezaga implied, did not 
follow.196 Thus, the Italians could feasibly regard as invalid any Turco-Egyptian claim to 
temporal power over any of the Red Sea coast south of Massawa and, in the absence of 
any other claim to legitimate power by any other country, assert their own right to 
colonise Assab.  
      Though De Amezaga held no political power, his letter must have had considerable 
impact, for it was from this point that Italian commercial and political entities started to 
describe Assab as a potential acquisition, and in effect a colony. By December 1879, 
Cairoli and Maffei were exchanging letters with Rubattino and De Amezaga on the 
matter, and the intent to start colonizing Assab, under the guise of a purely commercial 
operation, had begun, under the name of Operation Messina.197 
                                                 
196 Ibid. 
197 ‘Ricevuto dispaccio. Assistito Assab operazioni Messina’; De Amezaga - Cairoli, 31 December 1879, in 
L’Italia I/II, p.57. De Amezaga had been placed in command of the whole operation from November 1879 
(see Cairoli - Menabrea, 13 November 1879, ibid., p.50). The Operation (or, strictly speaking, operations - 
operazioni is plural), which began on 26 December 1879 may have been named after the steamer Messina, 
which had already moved a lot of material (particularly coal) to Assab, and was escorted by Esploratore 
from that date on until several days later when the operation - to stock and establish a permanent trading 
post, complete with residential facilities and a military presence - was complete; De Amezaga - Cairoli, 3 
January 1880, ibid., pp.58-59. The precise date of the inception of Messina is hard to pin down, but on 11 
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     Not that Messina proceeded without a hitch, arousing anxiety among some Italians 
who feared the reaction of Britain. In November 1879 the Italian paper Popolo Romano 
published a report of the heretofore secret ‘affare di Assab’, which greatly alarmed 
Rubattino.198 Menabrea, Ambassador to London at this time, noted with relief that, 
although other Italian papers had subsequently picked up on the matter, in Britain only 
The Times had made any reference to it, and that Salisbury, when he last saw him, had 
not mentioned the matter.199 However, the issue had not gone completely unobserved by 
English eyes. Cairoli cautioned Menabrea to be careful how he phrased his words when 
discussing the matter, should it arise, with the British,200 and he also informed De 
Amezaga that the British Ambassador had told him that London was content for the 
commercial operation to go ahead provided there was no military occupation.201 De 
Amezaga also noted that Gordon Pasha202 had expressed vehement opposition to Italian 
activity of any sort in Assab - but that, in compensation, while the natives were extremely 
anti-English and -Egyptian, they were highly pro-Italian, and that in any case Italy could 
not fail to get rich from her activities there.203 
      By this time the Esploratore affair had blown up, and all pretence at, or need for, 
secrecy had gone. 
                                                                                                                                                 
November Rubattino wrote to Castagneto (role  unknown) of ‘L’affare di Assab (che Voi conoscete meglio 
de mi, perche in parte e opera vostra) - ‘The Assab affair (of which you know better than me, because it is 
in part your work)’, implying strongly that it had been underway already for some considerable time, 
perhaps since not long after De Amezaga’s letter of 16 September; Rubattino - Castagneto, 11 November 
1879, ibid., pp. 49-50. 
198 He noted that the papers Il Diritto and La Gazzetta d’Italia did what they could to undo the damage, but 
as he commented to Malvano, ‘Ma addio segreto!’ - ‘so much for secrecy!’; Rubattino - Malvano, 13 
November 1879, ibid., p.50.  
199 La Capitale and Liberta had also mentioned the matter, in addition to more reportage by Popolo 
Romano, but ‘L’ultima volta ch’io vidi Lord Salisbury, egli non me disse parola di quell’incidente’; 
Menabrea - Cairoli, 20 November 1879, ibid., p.51-52. 
200 Cairoli - Menabrea, 13 November 1879, op.cit. 
201 Cairoli - De Amezaga, 17 December 1879; L’Italia I/II, p.54. 
202 General Charles George Gordon, Governor-General of the Sudan 1877-1880. 
203 Amezaga - Cairoli, 3 January 1880, ibid., pp.58-63. 
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                             Part 3. The Esploratore Affair 
 
On 1 January 1880 General Francis Loch, the Political Agent in Aden, sent a 
Memorandum to the Chief Secretary of the Government of Bombay, detailing his 
encounter with the Captain of an Italian Man O’ War. The Esploratore had sailed from 
Massawa to Aden, with the intention of proceeding to Assab Bay and landing a 
‘Scientific’ expedition, led by Sapeto,204 after taking on board supplies and artisans 
destined for the Italian settlement at Assab. Gen. Loch had been informed by De 
Amezaga,205 that the landing at Assab Bay was unconnected with the purchase, ten years 
before, of the Bay by the Rubattino company. However, General Loch was concerned 
that, though the Rubattino company had taken no further action since its purchase of the 
Bay, 
 
… now that European nations are looking for new countries to  
colonise (and are) turning their attention (to) Africa … the Italian  
Government have determined on assistance to the Rubattino company,  
to carry into execution their former plans in reference to Assab Bay  
(and that) it is the intention… to have… steamers constantly running  
between the principal ports of the Red Sea, especially Massowah,  
Assab Bay, Tajourra, Hodeida and Jeddah… so that they may open out  
                                                 
204 Giuseppe Sapeto (1811-1895), cleric, explorer and author, had been involved in trying to organize 
European penetration of Africa since 1837, when as a young monk he had been the first Italian to go as a 
missionary into Abyssinia; Ramm, Planting, p.214. In 1869 he was the emissary of the Rubattino company. 
205 De Amezaga had commanded the ship that surveyed Assab Bay for the Rubattino company in 1869;  
IOR/20/A/529. 
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the trade both on the African and Arabian coasts.206 
 
The intention to take workers and supplies207 seemed strongly to imply that the Italians 
meant to expand their presence at Assab. Added to this, the French reported that the 
Italians intended to raise their flag in the new settlement, despite the fact that the 
coastline still lay under jurisdiction of the Egyptians, represented by Gordon,208 while the 
Russian Consul in Aden reported that a fleet of Italian troopships were en route to Assab 
and would land within days. General Loch protested the legality of Italian actions to the 
Italian Consul in Aden, Sr. Giuseppe Bienenfeld-Rolph,209 who responded vigorously. 
The British, he claimed, had no business interfering in purely commercial dealings 
undertaken by the Italians amongst themselves and would in so doing be in violation of 
the 1867 treaty regarding trade between Britain and Italy.210  
      During the 5-8th, General Loch felt sufficiently alarmed by the escalating crisis to 
both cable London regarding the matter and to order the gunboat H.M.S. Seagull, 
scheduled to leave the Red Sea Station, to stand by in case the Esploratore tried to leave 
Aden for Assab, General Loch having in the meantime made it quite clear to the Italians 
                                                 
206 IOR/20/A/529. 
207 ‘...a large number of gunny bags of coal and provisions for coolies... have been purchased (by the 
Italians)...’, Goodfellow to Loch, 3 January 1880, IOR/20/A/529; ‘The Italians are inviting Aden traders 
(namely  4 carpenters, 2 blacksmiths and 20 labourers) to settle Assab Bay...’, Loch to Secretary of State 
for India, 4 January 1880, IOR/20/A/529.   
208 According to a report received from the French, the Italian action was forestalled by an Egyptian 
warship which reached Assab first and raised the Egyptian flag; IOR/20/A/529. See also Hamilton, 
‘Imperialism Ancient’, p.24. 
209 Italian Consul at Aden until 3 May 1880, when he was succeeded in that position by his son, Victor. 
IOR/20/A/531. Victor was up to this time a business competitor of several French merchants, Arthur 
Rimbaud among them, who were endeavouring to develop the coffee trade between France and Abyssinia;  
Natsoulis & Natsoulas, ‘Rimbaud’, p.52. 
210 The Treaty of London, 11 May 1867; Bourne, Foreign Policy, pp.117-19. Bienenfeld-Rolph assured 
Loch that ‘... the mission of (Sapeto) is purely commercial , and not in any way connected with politics...’, 
though Sapeto’s mission had been described as “Scientific” by De Amezaga; Bienenfeld-Rolph to Loch, 5 
January 1880, IOR/20/A/529. 
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that he would not allow the Esploratore to leave Aden without further guidance from 
London. Luckily, by the 9th the matter seems to have been settled, London having assured 
Loch that his actions had been correct, a cable from the Secretary of State for India 
assuring him that the Italians had decided to conform to British desires in the matter.211 
      Whether or not a fleet of Italian troopships had actually been en route to Assab was 
never established (India Office and Foreign Office documents from this time abound in 
rumours, many of which proved to be unfounded),212 though it seems that the Italians had 
managed to satisfy Salisbury213 that there never was such a fleet, since Paget in Rome, in 
a note dated 10 January 1880, thanked Maffei214 for his (believed to be truthful) ‘denial 
of (a report)... that the Esploratore and some troop ships were about to proceed to Assab 
Bay’.215 Perhaps word from London to Rome had had them diverted; perhaps they were 
only ever a rumour. But the fact that the rumour, if rumour it was, had been given 
credence at all - even by the Russians, who at this time had scarcely any involvement 
with the Africans of the Red Sea - would seem to indicate that already there were strong 
suspicions of Italian assurances of goodwill to Britain being not all that they might seem. 
And, indeed, the Esploratore affair proved to be the thin end of the wedge. 
      Despite assurances that they had no intention of doing anything other than setting up 
a trading post at Assab, there were clear signs that the Italians were preparing to 
                                                 
211Continued observation by HMS Seagull appeared to confirm that the Italians were doing no more, 
following the crisis, than erecting a minor trading post; IOR/20/A/529. Most of the correspondence relating 
to this episode is printed in L’Italia, I/II, pp.66-71. 
212 At least three other Italian ships - the Garigliano and the Ischia (i piroscafi - steamships) and the Varese 
(a Corazzata - battleship) are mentioned in Italian documents as being involved in Operation Messina, so 
the rumours were not so far from the truth; see, for instance, Bonelli - De Amezaga, 6 November 1879, 
L’Italia I/II, pp.45-46. Their presence belies the sincerity and truthfulness of Maffei’s statement to Paget of 
10 January (below). 
213 Disraeli’s foreign secretary April 1878-April 1880.  
214 Marquis Carlo Alberto Ferdinando Maffei di Boglia (1834-1897), Secretary-General to the Consulta 
1878-92, First Secretary at the Italian Embassy to London in 1880. 
215 FO45/400, Salisbury - Paget, January 9 1880: Paget - Maffei, 10 January 1880, in L’Italia I/II, p70. My 
italics.   
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challenge the validity of Britain’s claim that Assab was a bone fide  Egyptian possession, 
and to thereby exploit the division of power in the Red Sea to their advantage.216  
      As we have seen, the turbulent first week of January 1880 ended with a defusing of 
the confrontation between Britain and Italy, the latter power having managed to reassure 
the former that they had no intention of extending their Imperial reach. However, during 
the incident, Loch had felt constrained to point out to De Amezaga and Bienenfeld-Rolph 
that any landing of Italian troops, even if only a small number intended purely for the 
defence of the projected commercial post at Assab, would be in contravention of the 1877 
convention entered into between the governments of Egypt and Britain (on 7  January, 
Loch had told Amezaga that he would at once provide his “hearty co-operation” for the 
expedition ‘... If you can show me any authority conveying the sanction of the Egyptian 
government... as I deprecate any unfriendly feeling to (Italy from Britain)’.217 On the 
same day, 7 January, Mr. Paget, of the Foreign Office, informed Salisbury that Maffei 
‘denies that Assab Bay belongs to the Italian government, but contests Egyptian 
ownership’. Next day the Secretary of State for India cabled both Aden and London that 
he had been assured by the Italian government ‘that no interest exists of annexing Assab 
or interfering with the sovereignty of the Egyptian government’.218    
                                                 
216 It is interesting that the Italians alone felt so confident in asserting that neither Egyptians nor Turks had 
any claim to this area, since both the British and the French readily acknowledged their rights, and always 
had; see Sir Francis Hertslet, ‘Memorandum: French and Italian designs in the Red Sea’, May 1882, 
FO881/4590. 
217 Loch to Goodfellow, 6 January 1880; Paget to Salisbury, 7 January 1880; Loch to Amezaga, 7 January 
1880, in IOR/20/A/529.  ‘The 1877 Convention’ was the Somali Coast Convention of 7 September 1877, 
which recognized Khedival jurisdiction over the Somali coast up to Ras Hafun, under the suzerainty of the 
Ottoman Sultan; Ramm, ‘Planting’, p.218. Ram, in Anglo-Ethiopian Relations, incorrectly gives the 
Convention date as 1874. Ram’s book is very useful but is full of misprints, so must be used with caution. 
218 It is interesting that the Italians mentioned the term annexation, since no-one else had used it in 
connection with Assab Bay; perhaps they had unknowingly revealed their true purpose, as they annexed 
Assab in 1882; ‘The Sultan protested, but generally the Powers saw no cause for alarm in the act’ (A. 
d’Avray, Lords of the Red Sea: The History of a Red Sea Society from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth 
Centuries, (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 1996), p.108. 
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      However, on  9 January, Maffei, having been challenged on his apparent denial of 
Egyptian sovereignty, ‘clarified’ his meaning by saying that he had meant that the Turks 
had ultimate ownership, since Egypt was a vassal state of the Ottomans. Then, on the 
same day, he further ‘clarified’ that ‘What I meant to say (is) that (though Italy made no 
territorial claim to Assab) in our opinion neither the Porte nor Egypt have any right to 
claim it’ - clearly the implications of De Amezaga’s definition of what constituted 
sovereignty over Assab219 had not been fully digested or clearly thought through in 
Rome, hence Maffei’s garbled responses.220 On 12 January 1880 Maffei221 wrote to Paget 
that 
 
            ... I (want) to express the... regret (I) felt in receiving your (note)... 
            By which you inform me that (Salisbury) considers (that Assab)  
            belongs to Egypt... 
            We think it is rather hard to believe that what was white before and  
                                                 
219 During the abortive attempts in 1882 to formulate the ‘Assab Bay convention’ (see note 244 below), the 
Italians continued to insist that the Sultan of Raheita was independent of the Porte and could conclude any 
treaty he liked with any foreign power he chose, and that the same condition applied to various other 
independent Sultans along the Red Sea coast that Italy might want to ‘protect’. Britain then pointed out that 
the logical conclusion of this train of thought was that, if any  “Independent” Sultan of the region could 
align themselves with any power he liked, these might include such potentially unfriendly powers as France 
and Russia. Mancini was forced to rapidly backpeddle on the matter as the meaning of this point percolated 
through, and stated that ‘This was a matter ... upon which the Italian government entirely shared the view 
of HMG’, even though it undid the logic of Italian claims to the region as not belonging to the Porte or 
Egypt; FO45/452, Paget - Granville, 1 February 1882. 
220 Paget- Salisbury, 9 January 1880, IOR/20/A/529. The political position of the Sultan of Raheita is 
unclear; according to d’Avray ‘The owner of the region.... was the Sultan of Lake Aussa (‘a long way off in 
the interior’ - presumably the Danakil district)’, an independent and fierce entity who was ‘the only ruler of 
substance in those regions (who) in no way sought to restrain his Danakils, and the Negus or Emperor had 
neither interest nor influence in the area’ and who, if he offered no tribute to the Abyssinian monarchs 
nearby, was unlikely to do so to the Ottomans on the coast. This Sultan, Hamfei, was thought to have been 
responsible for the deaths of Munziger (Werner Munziger (1832 -November 1875), diplomat, explorer and 
soldier) in 1875 and the Giulietti expedition of 1881 (see pp. 68-9, below). However, since Assab lay in a 
stretch of coast recognized as being under Khedival control by the 1877 Convention , it would seem there 
was no doubt that Assab fell within the Ottoman/Egyptian demesne.   
221 In Rome, in his role as Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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            up to 1870 has suddenly and without any tangible fact become black 
            ... But even admitting (Salisbury’s) version... that (Assab) belongs to  
           Egypt, we have too great an opinion of (his) fairness and good feeling 
           towards us, to suppose for one moment he would interfere in a matter 
           concerning Egypt and Italy alone... we do not want to trespass on  
           (any Egyptian claims of sovereignty) but at the same time we also intend 
            to reserve as a government any right arising according to the law of nations 
            from the purchase of Assab Bay by an Italian firm.222 
             
 This is a quite astonishing letter, implying as it does that Assab did not belong to 
Egypt,223 though it was only the Italians that contested Egyptian (or Turkish) ownership 
of the territory; that a purely commercial agreement implied a right of Italy to claim 
sovereignty over territory the possession of which had never been revoked by Egypt, and 
which the Italians had given assurances would never be claimed as Italian; and that 
Salisbury had somehow suddenly made a volte face on the issue of Egyptian possession 
of the territory, when in fact he had done nothing of the sort (quite apart from any other 
fact, he had not been in power in 1870 - Gladstone and Granville were Prime and Foreign 
Ministers respectively at this time).  
                                                 
222 Maffei - Paget, 12 January 1880, in L’Italia I/II, p.71. On 9th January, however, Salisbury had cabled 
Paget regarding the matter as reflected in Maffei’s comments of the 12th - “Thank Ct. Maffei (for his 
intelligence that the Italian fleet did not exist, but) inform him that whatever opinion may have been 
expressed before 1870 about the effects of which I am not (in a position to effect a) judgement, the case 
(shows from HMG’s point of view) that Assab Bay belongs to Egypt”. Clearly, Salisbury already knew 
about Maffei’s baffling and gnomic  “1870” views. However, he wanted everyone else to know his own on 
the Assab matter too, as he requested that copies of his 9 January cable be sent to Egypt, Paris, the India 
Office and the Admiralty. He also advised Paget to “express (his views re Assab) in writing (but) in a letter 
not in formal diplomatic note”; FO45/400, Salisbury - Paget, 9 January 1880. All italics in text and notes 
mine. 
223 The Egyptians took possession of it, part and parcel with the rest of the Red Sea coast, during their 
expansion of the 1866-77 period. 
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      As we have seen, Britain, though not initially pleased about the Egyptian occupation 
of the Red Sea coast, soon accepted it as a fait accompli favourable to British interests. 
Neither Gladstone nor Granville had raised any concerns over the Egyptian expansion 
into the Red Sea, let alone objected to it,224 and Salisbury had certainly never cast doubt 
upon Egypt’s right to sovereignty over Assab. 1870 was a meaningless date, apparently 
plucked out of the air by Maffei.225  
      Admittedly, Maffei’s action occurred fully two years before Britain started the 
process leading to Egypt becoming effectively a Condominium of Britain, but still it 
seems a remarkably hostile missive for Italy, so far still without allies in an explosive and 
unpredictable world, to make to a country for whose support she was desperate. 
However, antecedent behaviour on the part of the Italians show, as we have seen, how 
their apparently sudden assertiveness regarding Assab had in fact been brewing for some 
time. 
 
The Accidental Imperialists 
Shortly after the Esploratore affair, on 17 January 1880, Salisbury cabled Paget that he 
had spoken to the Italian Charge d’Affairs (M. Ressman) on the 15th regarding Assab, 
who reassured him that Italy had absolutely no political, military or naval objective in 
that area. However, Salisbury had restated the British position that, while wishing Italy 
                                                 
224 Their only references to matters pertaining to the Red Sea during 1869 - there were none in 1870 - had 
been to express a desire that Turkey would not interfere unduly in Egyptian affairs; see Gladstone - 
Granville, 26 August, 2 & 18 October 1869, in Ramm, Correspondence, pp.49, 63 & 68. 
225 The only possible construction that can be placed upon Maffei’s selection of this year as somehow 
significant is that it followed 1869, when the Rubattino Company purchased (whether legally or not) Assab 
Bay from the Sultan of Raheita. The fact that by 1870 no-one had objected  - or maybe even noticed - the 
purchase may somehow have conferred in Maffei’s mind the Italian right to start regarding it as Italian 
territory rather than just land hired, or bought for strictly commercial purposes, from the Porte. 
 57
success in any commercial venture, ultimate authority over the area remained with the 
Khedive ‘in whose territory the Bay lies’, and that ‘I reminded him more than once that 
England was particularly sensitive as to all that concerned the shores of the Red Sea’.226 
Maffei had been assured (probably as a result of the Esploratore affair and Salisbury’s 
subsequent warnings) by Lord Tenterden227 in February 1880 that ‘Nothing was more 
likely to raise Parliament and the entire nation against Italy than the attempt to create an 
Italian possession in the Red Sea’.228  
      However, by this time Cairoli had decided that Rubattino should purchase Assab with 
a secret guarantee of reimbursement once the territory was declared Italian sovereign 
territory,229  though he was still able, in March 1880, to deny to Salisbury that Italy had 
‘any idea of conquest on the coasts of the Red Sea’.230 In January 1881 Granville wrote to 
the Italian Charge d’Affairs, Sr. Constantino Ressman, stating that 
 
                                                 
226 FO45/400, Salisbury - Paget, January 17 1880. 
227 Charles Stuart Aubrey Abbott, third Lord Tenterden, Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office 
1873-1882. Tenterden, though only a junior member of government, was listened to by Disraeli and, later, 
by Salisbury. He had a deep-seated distrust of Italian actions and motivations. He was ‘mainly concerned 
(to maintain) Britain’s ability to act unilaterally. He was, therefore, not enamoured with Disraeli’s... project 
of a Mediterranean League with Italy (and) soon grew doubtful about the scheme...(and) Italian pretensions 
in the Red Sea... “what a serious matter it is to have an Italian colony placed on the Red Sea”. (He) had no 
illusions (about Italy’s weakness), but warned that her aim was “to get something out of any war as a bribe 
to be quiet”’; K. Neilson & T.G. Otte, The Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1854-1946 
(London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), pp.54-58. He told his Italian counterpart in February 
1880 that ‘England could never (allow) any part of (the Red Sea Coast) to be transferred to another Power... 
We could never tolerate it, never...’, and went on to advocate (to both Granville and Salisbury) naval and 
military action against the Italians in Assab on the grounds that control of Assab by any other Power  
‘would be fatal to our control of the Red Sea’ and thereby to our route to India; quoted in Ramm, 
‘Planting’, p.226. See also Lowe & Marzari, op.cit., pp.35 & 422. 
228 Quoted in Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.422. 
229 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.35. According to Mrazkova, Assab was bought from the Rubattino company 
on the death of Rubattino in 1882, so whether such an arrangement predated his decease is open to 
question; J. Mrazkova, ‘The Colonial War in Ethiopia, 1885-1896,’ Archiv Orientalni, 48 (1980), pp. 195-
216. However, Bosworth has it that the Rubattino company had been amalgamated with the Florio 
company in 1881 to create the Societa di Navigazione Generale Italia (SNGI) which in turn was heavily 
linked to the ship-building Orlando concern in Liguria; Bosworth, Least, p.25. This meant that Assab in 
fact belonged to the SNGI and not the Rubattino company. 
230 Lowe & Marzari, op.cit., p.35. 
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              Assab Bay lies within the territory of Egypt (It) is now my  
              duty to assure you that (HMG are) unable to arrive at  any  
              other conclusion than that (Assab belongs) to the Porte directly... 
             and to the Khedive, under the Porte’s suzerainty (and that) I have  
            (to) request that you will inform Your Government that they take  
             note of the categorical and peremptory declaration of Signor  
             Cairoli... that no Italian (military establishment) will ever be formed  
             at (either the islands or mainland of Assab Bay)231 
 
      However, a complication arose in May 1881, with the massacre of the Giulietti 
expedition by the Afars near Beilul. The outraged Italians demanded that the killers, 
thought to have been responsible also for the murder of Munziger and hiding out in the 
territory of the Sultan of Aussa,232 be brought to book by the Egyptians; they also asked 
Granville if the British could help if, as had happened with Munziger, the Egyptians did 
nothing.233 
      The Italians noted that their anger had raised suspicions among the British at Aden 
that they were using the Giulietti disaster as a cover for sending a military expedition to 
the Red Sea coast. Clearly the British at Aden had been sensitized to the possibility of 
                                                 
231 Granville - Ressman, 26 January 1881, in L’Italia, I/II, pp.170-71. In September 1881, an Italian Green 
Book recorded that the sovereignty of Assab had been ceded to Italy by Egypt and Turkey, and that Lord 
Granville had proposed a convention among the countries concerned, to be negotiated under British 
auspices; Hansard, 3, HC, June 19 1882, v.270, cc.1610-11. 
232 d’Avray, Lords, pp. 88-89. 
233 Menabrea - Mancini, 13 & 17 June 1881, and Martini (Italian Ambassador to Cairo) - Mancini, DDI 
2/XIV, pp. 26 & 38-39, and pp.34-36. At the time of his death, Munziger had been leading an Egyptian 
expedition against Abyssinia; Giulietti was leading a scientific exploratory mission. The Sultan Hamfei, of 
Aussa, suspected of being responsible for both killings, was supposedly a subject of the Egyptians (see 
p.59, note 221, above). 
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Italian expansionism at Assab and possibly elsewhere by the activities of 1879-80, and 
Aden’s concerns made their way to London via Rome.234  
      Granville recognized the Rubattino company’s acquisition of Assab in February 
1882, on the understanding that the base remained purely commercial and unfortified, 
and that it remained the territory of the Porte - this was merely a continuation of what had 
been decided in 1879. But on 10 March, Italy’s government took over the port from the 
Rubattino company, thus making it an official Italian colony. Granville was annoyed by 
Italy’s sleight-of-hand but too pre-occupied with Egypt to do anything about it.235     
      Three days after the official colonization of Assab by the Italian government on 10 
March they were again negotiating with the Sultan of Raheita,236 this time for the 
purchase of a group of islands in Assab Bay, an enterprise of which the British authorities 
took a very dim view.237 Furthermore, the negotiations were being undertaken by Sapeto, 
                                                 
234 Mancini informed Menabrea (in London) that the attitude of a few Englishmen at Aden showed a 
persistent distrust of Italy which could further hamper the establishment of a modus vivendi between Assab 
and Aden, and that Menabrea, by explaining things to Granville, might greatly contribute to a ‘cordial 
understanding’, as could measures such as having an English agent from Aden accredited to Assab and vice 
versa; Mancini - Menabrea, 8 June 1881, ibid., p. 14. There is no hint, in the ‘Giulietti correspondence’ of 
the DDI, that anything underhanded was being contemplated. 
235 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.36. There is no mention of the matter in the Gladstone-Granville 
Correspondence for February-March 1882; A. Ramm (ed.), Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and 
Lord Granville 1876-1886 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962) (vol.1: 1876-1882), pp. 339-352.  
     However, the affair made its mark on Granville. During Autumn 1882, in correspondence with Paget, he 
rejoiced at the Italian refusal to join Britain in the pacification of Egypt. They had (he wrote), “behaved 
abominably” since 1881 because of Tunis, constantly trying to gain “petty advantages over the French” and 
giving false assurances to the Porte. But now, receipt of Menabrea’s refusal to join in the action ‘... delights 
me. We have done the right thing; we have shown our readiness to admit others; and we have not the 
inconvenience of a partner’. He concluded that ‘I am afraid the Italians have been at the bottom of much of 
the Egyptian mischief...’; letters, July 28 and 11 August 1882, quoted in Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, The 
Life of Granville George Leveson of Gower, Second Earl Granville K.G., 1815-1891 (vol. II)(London: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1905; 2 vols.), pp.270-71. 
236 Described by Commander Berners (see below) as ‘Sultan Boorham’ - in fact Abu Bakr ibn Burhan 
(Caulk, Jaws, p. 223). Berners’ letter referring to these negotiations (see below, note 231) was dated 13 
March, so the Italians had started negotiating with the Sultan of Raheita more or less immediately after 
their official announcement. 
237 ‘... in my opinion the possession of these islands by a foreign power would be extremely 
disadvantageous to (Britain) in time of war as (they would) afford a coaling station within 50 miles of the 
Persian Straits and an anchorage for the largest vessels, which might easily be defended (and would be a far 
greater asset than Aden)’; Commander Berners, R.N. of HMS Philomel, to Loch, 13 March 1880, 
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who was only supposed to be pursuing very limited scientific or commercial 
objectives.238 Despite having been warned off trying to establish a sovereign presence in 
the area, and having promised not to do so, the Italians were making a concerted effort to 
do exactly that. 
      It is possible that by this time they had realized that they could exploit the fault-lines 
in power over the region to their advantage; hence their decision to press ahead with 
negotiations over the Islands of Assab Bay - negotiations that they must have known 
would annoy Britain. It is equally possible that significant elements of the Italian 
government, and those involved with the colonization venture, still genuinely believed 
that the Ottomans and Egyptians really had no say in the matter, and that it was no 
business of the British. However, what is clear is that at this time the Italians were 
completely new to the game of Imperialism, and maybe only just starting to realize the 
potential that the divisions of power in the region could bring. Maffei’s confusion over 
what he meant regarding Ottoman sovereignty in the region is one indication of this. 
                                                                                                                                                 
IOR/20/A/529; see also De Amezaga-Cairoli, 18 March 1880, L’Italia I/II, pp.94-96. In March 1880 
Captain, later Major, Hunter of the Aden Residency staff bribed the Sultan of Raheita not to sell any more 
land or islands to the Italians; Ramm, ‘Planting’, p.220. According to Hamilton (op.cit., pp.24-25), the 
Italians succeeded in buying one of the islands of Assab bay; Hunter was convinced that the Italians had a 
hidden agenda, as ‘... the development of trade is but a flimsy excuse’ and that ‘.. it is hard to believe that 
(Amezaga and Sapeto) had as their sole object (possession of) a coaling station’, since ‘... the place is so 
well-suited to warlike and so ill adapted for peaceful purposes’ that strategic reasoning must have 
underpinned their actions. However, it seems that Hunter’s worries were groundless; apart from the one 
island his bribe worked, as the Italians never developed Assab as a naval base and it did indeed prove 
useless for commercial purposes, despite De Amezaga’s exhortatory letters to the contrary.   
      A letter from Antonelli to Mancini in March 1884 shows that the Italians were by then alive to the 
reality of Assab’s commercial inutility; although Antonelli dismisses the descriptions he records of  
Assab’s problems as being figments of French imagination and malice, he cannot hide his concerns that all 
the inducements in the world will not make it a place to which native traders would wish voluntarily to go; 
Antonelli - Mancini, 19 March 1884, in L’Italia I/III (1883-1885), pp. 44-46. 
238 Five islands - Arabia, Damakia, Jamirat, Fatima and Halib - were under discussion; Loch to Secretary of 
State for India, 10th March 1880, IOR/20/A/529. Presumably Hunter’s bribe put an end to this project. 
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Another is the Italian failure to capitalize on the British invitation to them to join the 
occupation of Egypt in July 1882.239 
      In April 1882, Popolo Romano published an article on Egypt and Assab, in which it 
excoriated Arabi Bey for attempting to negotiate with the Rubattino company on 
sovereignty rights over Assab, rather than with the Italian government - 
 
                 M. Mancini would do well to (assist) Arabi Bey in the struggle 
                 for independence (and in Egypt’s rejection of British attempts 
                 to impose limits on her sovereignty in the region, since he has),  
                 with an ingenuity which surpasses the grossest knavery, declared  
                 himself ready to negotiate with M. Rubattino... as though the friendly  
                 intervention of the English for the regulation of the question were not  
                 the most explicit confirmation of (Italy’s sovereign rights to the  
                 territory). We... do not attach much importance to this Bey, but it does  
                (seem) curious... that (he) should set up a claim to rights which the  
                Sultan himself... had never claimed...  
                     (though) Our possession of Assab Bay has (in reality only been of)  
                a commercial character (Arabi) pushes (Egyptian) independence to  
                the extremes of thrusting the Italian government aside (in favour of)  
                a private individual (but) Italy has no intention of giving the ambitious and  
                fanatical colonel the chance of drawing his scimitar...240 
                                                 
239 For the full Italian explanation of why they felt unable to join Britain in the pacification of Egypt in 
1882, see the letter of Alberto Blanc (1835-1904), Ambassador to Spain 1870-71 & 1883-87(?), to The 
U.S.A 1875-80, to the Porte 1880-82 & 1886(?)-91, Minister for Foreign Affairs 1893-96, in Gwynn & 
Tuckwell, Dilke, pp.477-80. 
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This entertaining article clearly illustrates that some Italians at least retained the idea that 
neither the Ottomans nor the Egyptians had any legitimate claim to the Assab region, and 
that the interests represented by this article wanted to see Britain kept out of Egyptian 
(and, by extension, Italian) affairs in the Red Sea.241  
      More importantly for future developments, however, if one ignores the assumption 
that Britain’s involvement with the ill-fated Assab Bay Convention could be described as 
a ‘friendly intervention’,242 and if one ignores also the apparent purposelessness in 
claiming Italian sovereignty over an area that was bought by a private Italian individual 




If the Italians had joined Britain in occupying Egypt less than three months later, it would 
have obviated the need on the part of Granville and Tenterden to object to their assertion 
of sovereignty over Assab. What moral right or necessity would Britain have had to 
                                                                                                                                                 
240 FO45/636, Popolo Romano, ‘Egypt and Assab’, 11 April 1882. See also Corti (at Constantinople)-
Mancini, 29 March 1882, DDI 2/XIV, regarding the refutation by Egypt of the Assab Bay Convention (see 
below, note 282) in favour of an agreement with the Rubattino company (p.661). 
241 In his communications with Corti (Constantinople) and Martino (Cairo) of 27 March 1882, Mancini  
informed them that the physical occupation of Assab presented the world with a fait accompli ‘... 
irrespective of the Assab Bay Convention’. Regarding his conversations on the subject with Granville, 
Menabrea makes it perfectly clear to Mancini, in his cable of 30 March 1882, that he was successfully 
using the obfuscation of the floundering Assab Bay Convention, and the ongoing confusion over Turkish 
and/or Egyptian sovereignty over Assab, to help cement Italian claims to the Bay; DDI 2/XIV, pp. 653-54 
& 662. His cable to Mancini of 8 May 1882 shows that by this time the Convention had been hopelessly 
mired in confusion, claim and counter-claim, and that he fully expected Britain to soon ‘...put a stop to the  
game’; ibid., p.625. 
242 Intended to facilitate agreement between Britain, ItaIy, Egypt and Turkey, the British proposal  for a 
Convention among the four countries to regularize the status of Assab ‘... was declined. It fell to the 
ground, and nothing whatsoever was done’; Sir Charles Dilke, Hansard, 3, HC, 15 June 1882, v.270 
cc.1268-72. 
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object to a tiny Italian presence in Assab when she herself had effectively not only taken 
over all Egyptian lands and properties lock, stock and barrel, but allowed Italy to join the 
party too? Additionally, moving into Egypt would have been much easier, and potentially 
more economically beneficial, for Italy than her adventure in the Red Sea. It was far 
closer, offered well-developed markets and an established economic infrastructure, and 
would have employed the logistical support of the British, as well as giving her a 
geographical proximity to parts of North Africa which she already coveted and over 
which she might, in the future, have been able to challenge France. 
      But the opportunity was missed, probably for two reasons. One is already well-
documented; the Italians felt that they couldn’t afford it (though in hindsight it was a 
monumental false economy).243 The second results from the first - the Italians didn’t want 
to join in not only because of costs, but because they didn’t feel ready to become an 
Imperial Power. In terms of sentiment and strategy, they just couldn’t see that far ahead 
and, in all likelihood, probably still couldn’t see all the implications - if  Popolo Romano 
was a bellwether of Italian opinion - of a governmental takeover of Assab which 
fundamentally altered the state of things from when it had been merely a patch of 
privately-owned land bought for a coaling station. Certainly their action in making Assab 
an Italian colony was political, and done in full knowledge not only that it was against 
what had already been agreed with Britain, but also that it was possible to get away with 
because Britain had by this time become pre-occupied with Egypt. But, thus far, it was a 
                                                 
243 To salvage their amour propre, the Italians claimed that they could not join an operation, mounted only 
by Britain and France, not approved by the Concert of Europe; Mancini-Menabrea, 15 May 1882, DDI 
2/XIV, p.770. However, they were careful not to offend Britain by appearing to disapprove of the 
operation, and made their approbation clear in various high-profile diplomatic communications; see, inter 
alia, Mancini-Launay (Berlin), Corti (Constantinople), Menabrea (London), Marochetti (Paris), Nigra (St. 
Petersburg) & di Robilant (Vienna), 13 & 28 July 1882, DDI 2/XV, pp.128 & 168; see also Blanc’s letter 
of March 1888 to Dilke, in Gwynn & Tuckwell, Dilke, p.477 (and note 239 above). 
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contained action, not yet part of a grander strategy of significant expansion - otherwise 
they would likely have leapt at the chance to join Britain in Egypt, whatever the cost. 
      However, within five years their mindset had changed. By 1887 the Italians had 
found a way to further their aims in the region, a way which had not actually existed 
prior, firstly, to Egypt’s expansion along the Red Sea during the 1860-80 period and 
prior, secondly, to Egypt’s withdrawal from that region in the face of the Mahdist threat 
after 1884. As with the almost accidental beginning of Italian power in the Red Sea 
resulting from their capricious purchase of Assab bay in 1869, a feature - or a faultline - 
of the political landscape of the Red Sea was fortuitously revealed to them, over time, as 
a result of the aftermath of the Esploratore affair. 
 
 
             
 
                                                               









                                                              2  
                                    THE MASSAWA INCIDENT, 1888  
 
 “... the face of the political ocean is extraordinarily quiet, but it is a treacherous sea, and 




During July-August 1888, in Massawa, a Franco-Italian squabble over unpaid taxes 
nearly tipped Europe into full-scale war. This incident has hardly been reported in any 
published text,245 but is highly significant in that it illustrates how easily the complex 
interactions among the Powers could, through the unconsidered actions of individuals, 
spin rapidly out of control and threaten to trigger a cataclysm. 
      This chapter  will examine the background to developments in the Red Sea from the 
Italian colonization of Assab in 1882 to the Massawa Incident of 1888 (including the 
effect of the accession to power of Crispi in August 1887), what the incident was, how it 
arose, and how it reflected occult246 factors which, usually unseen or unconsidered, lay 
under the surface of normal inter-state relations but which could, unexpectedly and 
suddenly, emerge and destabilize an otherwise visible and largely comprehensible, if not 
tranquil, geo-political  landscape. I will also highlight how, despite the best efforts of 
more sober Italian minds to contain and undo the damage done, it severely strained an 
Anglo-Italian relationship which, already fraught with difficulties, was irreparably 
damaged by Crispi’s accession to power. 
                                                 
244 Salibsury Papers (SP) A/46/87, Salisbury - HRH Admiral the Duke of Edinburgh, 27 March 1888. 
245 There is one fleeting reference to it in Duggan, Francesco Crispi, p.551; none other has been located.  
246 Here I am using the term “occult” in the sense of hidden, rather than supernatural, meaning. 
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              PART 1.  THE ITALIAN OCCUPATION OF MASSAWA –  
              BRITISH TREACHERY, ANGLO-ITALIAN CONSPIRACY  
              OR GLADSTONIAN MUDDLE? 
 
In a diplomatic circular of 25 July 1888, Crispi retrospectively explained the necessity 
for, and justification of, the Italian occupation of Massawa in February 1885. The 
menacing advance of the Mahdists (he wrote) caused the Egyptians to recall their more 
distant garrisons. Massawa, lying outside of the defensive lines established by the 
Khedival government, needed to be evacuated without delay. Invited to occupy it, the 
Turks declined, thus negating all entitlement to be considered the rightful owners of this 
strategically important port on the Red Sea. Massawa, thus abandoned, was exposed to 
the double danger either of Mahdist tyranny or of falling into a state of anarchy. For the 
same reasons of general order that the Anglo-Egyptians deemed it wise to hold onto 
Suakin, the Italians found it necessary to occupy Massawa. Italy had been prepared for 
such an eventuality; she already had, not far away, an existing colonial establishment 
(Assab) which was also menaced by the Mahdists. The only question was; should Italy 
take immediate action, or wait until the last Egyptian soldier had left Massawa, and thus 
risk it becoming res nullius? The former action was deemed the wisest, to ensure a 
smooth transfer of power without leaving a vacuum. Thus, according to international law 
(‘Jus gentium’), the retreat of Egypt and the refusal of Turkey to take up occupation gave 
Italy a perfect right to sovereignty. 
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      States friendly to Italy (he concluded) thus saw, with satisfaction, the spread of order 
and civilization in the Red Sea. Turkish objections post-facto found no echo of sympathy, 
and French complaints were clearly based on nothing more than jealousy.247 
      Certainly the signs had been propitious for such an Italian move. Though before 1882 
they had been frustrated at every turn in their attempts to become a credible Power, 
the Italians significantly improved their international position by joining the Triple 
Alliance, thus securing their northern border and gaining allies against France. Also, the 
Turks, though still immoveable in the Mediterranean, were starting (independently of the 
Egyptians) to pull out of the Red Sea, ceding Zeila to Britain and Obock and Tajourra to 
France, all in 1884,248 implying that there might be room for the Italians to expand from 
their toehold in Assab. 
     Despite the lukewarm enthusiasm for Imperialist adventure in most parts of Italian 
society, Italian interest in exploration had begun as early as the 1850s,249 long before the 
‘official’ period of Italian Imperialism began in the 1880s. The Societa Geografica 
Italiana (SGI), Italy’s foremost exploratory/scientific society, was founded in Florence in 
1867. It was dominated by diplomatic, military and political interests (just 11% of its 
members were bona fide geographers),250 and sent exploratory missions to Tunisia 
                                                 
247 25th July, 1888, Crispi - Italian representatives in the Hague, Athens, Belgrade, Berlin, Berne, Brussels, 
Bucharest, Cairo, Cetinje, Copenhagen, Constantinople, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Monaco, Sofia, Paris, St. 
Peteresburg, Stockholm, Tunis, Vienna and Washington, in L’Italia 1/VII (1888-1889), pp.45-48. 
248 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.36. 
249 ‘Italy did not yet have Rome as its capital, when people began to talk about Africa, (even) before... the 
war with Austria in 1859, and before Garibaldi landed in Sicily...” F. Bandini, Gli Italiani in Africa, quoted 
in d’Avray, Lords, p.108. 
250 One of the earliest members of the SGI was none other than the (later to be) General Oreste Baratieri 
(1841-1901); as a result of his work on the military periodical Rivista Militare, and of his travels and 
military service in North Africa, he was elected during the 1880s to the governing council of the SGI – 
‘which (type of organization) in Italy, as everywhere else, was an incubator of colonialist sentiment’ - and 
which action showed the symbiotic relationship that existed between the SGI and those avid for colonial 
expansion in Africa; Jonas, Adwa, p.96. He became Governor of Eritrea in 1892 and later led Italian forces 
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(1875), Morocco (1876) and Abyssinia (from 1876 onwards). Similar societies sprang up 
in Milan, Turin and Genoa, as well as in the Southern city of Naples and in Bari,251 and 
‘Since 1879, Milan’s Society of Commercial Exploration in Africa (Societa di 
esplorazioni commerciali in Africa) had been the country’s most prestigious proponent of 
colonial investment.’252 This was because, by the 1870s, Italian industrialists had become 
alive to the possibility of the commercial advantages that Imperialism could bring. And, 
while Lombardian and Piedmontese capitalists looked  to North Africa for the possibility 
of commercial gain, the Societa Africana d’Italia of Naples (a poorer, but still significant, 
corollary of the Milanese society), together with the Ligurian and Umbrian bourgeosie, 
looked to the Red Sea. The Genovese shipping magnate Raphaele Rubattino253 had been 
roused by the opening of the Suez Canal to purchase Assab in 1869.254 In 1882, when the 
Italian government declined to join Britain in pacifying Egypt, these Ligurian shipping 
interests sharply criticised the government for missing the chance to gain a foothold in 
Africa, with the result that it bought Assab from the Rubattino company after Rubattino’s 
death in 1882.255 It is notable that Lombardy, though the most advanced industrial area of 
                                                                                                                                                 
in a successful campaign against the Mahdists during 1893-95, before presiding over their catastrophic 
defeat at Adowa in 1896; Jonas, Adowa, p.194 & passim,and Pakenham, Scramble, pp.482-84. 
251 D. Atkinson, Constructing Italian Africa: Geography and Geopolitics, in Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, Italian 
Colonialism, pp.15-27. 
252 Choate, ‘Territorial’, p.68. And see Mrazkova ‘The Colonial War’, p.196. 
253 January 1810-November 1882. Genoa is in Liguria, which is part of North-Western Italy’s 
Mediterranean littoral. Rubattino was active in the Risorgimento and, with Sapeto, was instrumental in 
facilitating the Italian purchase of Assab; L. Villari, ‘The Italian Red Sea Colonies’, Journal of the Royal 
Central Asian Society, 14: 2 (1927), p.115-29. He ‘... played a very important role in co-ordinating the 
action of national governments in northern Africa both setting up shipping lanes... and (in) the purchase of 
the Tunisi-La Goletta railway (an action considered essential by Italian diplomats to stop the French 
acquisition of it)’; G.L. Podesta, Sviluppo insutriale e colonialismo. Gli investment italiani in Africa 
orientale 1869-1897 (Giuffre: Milan, 1996), p.150. The Rubattino company went bankrupt in 1882 
following Rubattino’s death; D. Strangio, ‘Italian colonies and enterprises in Eritrea (XIX-XX Centuries)’, 
Journal of European Economic History, 39: 3 (2010), pp.599-623 (p.608) 
254 Mrazkova, op.cit., pp.195-96. 
255 The Genovese newspaper Corriere mercantile of January 15, 1879, had accused the government of 
‘ignoring national interests’, being ‘passive, overfrightened, impotent’ and being ‘heedless of the country’s 
future’ - quoted in A. Codignola, Rubattino (Bologna: Licinio Cappelli Editore, 1938), pp.300-302. On 29 
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Italy, was the centre of opposition to Imperialism in the Red Sea, as its main industrial 
activity, textiles, could not at this stage benefit from expansion into Africa.256 It was the 
shipowners, merchants, speculators and arms manufacturers of Liguria and elsewhere that 
looked to fresh markets in Africa, where the conquest even of a poor colony would 
provide impetus to existing shipping and ordnance industries, and the stimulation of new 
ones.257 At least in theory. 
 
      However, what is thought to have really galvanized Italian hopes for Imperial 
advancement was the Berlin Conference of winter 1884. As Lowe and Marzari remark:  
 
 Until October 1884 Mancini had shown no interest...in Africa... Assab  
 he… had done nothing with…(in) May 1884 he had… asserted his  
conviction that it was … dangerous for a young nation like Italy ‘to launch  
out in… perilous adventures in distant lands’… Yet by January 1885 (he)  
                                                                                                                                                 
July 1882 Crispi - still in opposition - wrote to Mancini, the Foreign Minister, saying ‘I am deeply grieved 
by your refusal of the English offer to intervene in Egypt. I wish... this step... may not still further 
compromise Italy’s position in the Mediterranean... You should have accepted the offer without hesitation’ 
- quoted in F. Crispi (ed. T. Palamenghi), Politica estera (1876-1890). Memorie e documenti (Milan: 
Fratelli Treves, 1912; 2nd.ed., 1929). The commercial faction thus aligned itself with the oppositional 
parliamentary group around Crispi; Mrazkova, ibid., p.196. 
256 Lombardian businessmen, politicians and journalists were not opposed to Imperialist expansion per se, 
but were critical of its location in the Red Sea. As the Corriere della Sera of Milan wrote on 29 January 
1885, ‘... the Red Sea cannot be our aim. We may admit the ownership of one seaport, but to strive to  
acquire a vast territory, some sort of Algeria? We have enough untilled... land in Italy... The farther we 
move from Italy and the more we waste in other countries, the weaker we shall become in the 
Mediterranean’ - quoted in Battaglia, Prima Guerra, pp.187-89. After the occupation of Massawa and in 
the face of such criticism, Mancini defended the government’s action with his mystifying statement that the 
key to the Mediterranean lay in the Red Sea. What he meant was that, if Italy helped Britain in Africa, 
Britain would defend Italy in the Mediterranean. His critics pointed out that this was all three years too late; 
Mrazkova, op.cit., p.199.  
257 The Pirelli company (of Milan) laid submarine cables from Italy to Abyssinia, while the General 
Shipping Company and the Terni company of Umbria, central Italy, equipped expeditions to Africa; 
significantly, the last two concerns emerged in 1882 and 1884 respectively. Mrazkova, op.cit., pp.196-97. 
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seemed a man transformed. The African fever generated by (the conference) had 
him in its grip.258 
 
It also led Italy onto the path of a disastrous confrontation with Abyssinia which 
ultimately led to the collapse of their hard-won Empire in 1896. 
 
A Series of Unfortunate Events: Abyssinia and the Mahdia                  
 
In 1876, an Italian Geographical expedition259 entered the southern Abyssinian kingdom 
of  Shoa in search of a route to the Nile-Congo basin. This was the start of Italy’s 
association with the Negus Menelik, King of Shoa,260 though for several years, well into 
the 1880s, the Italians concentrated their efforts on developing relations with the Negus 
Negast, Yohannes IV,261 who was still the dominant figure in Ethiopia and remained in 
control of the hinterland to the Red Sea.262  
                                                 
258 Lowe & Marzari, op.cit., p.37. But see Chapter 3 for signs that the Italians had already, by the end of 
1884 and BEFORE the Berlin conference, started on an Imperial adventure in Zanzibar. 
259 The Antinori expedition; see Caulk, Jaws, pp.21-23, and his ‘Minilik II and the Diplomacy of 
Commerce: Prelude to an Imperial Foreign Policy’, Journal of African Studies, vol.17 (November 1984), 
pp.62-87. 
260 Sahle Maryam Abeto Menelik (1844-1913), King (Negus) of Shoa 1866-1889, Emperor (Negus Negast, 
or King of Kings) of Abyssinia 1889-1913. 
261 Lij Kassay Mercha, or Yohannes IV, Negus Negast of Abyssinia 1871-1889. See Appendix 4 for the 
story of Abyssinia. 
262 The French cannily developed relations with Shoa by establishing an arms trade via Djibouti and 
Tajourra. As Menelik began to turn against the Italians after 1889, ‘... inevitably French offers of help 
became increasingly welcome to Menelik and the arms supplies swelled to a flood... When Lagarde, the 
Governor of French Somaliland (visited) Addis Ababa, his (entirely correct) idea of an acceptable gift (to 
Menelik) was 100,000 rifles and... two million rounds of ammunition’; Wright P., ‘Italy’s African 
Nightmare’, History Today Vol.23:3 (March 1973); pp.153-8 (p.156). See also Rubenson S., ‘Some 
Aspects of the Survival of Ethiopian Independence in the Period of the Scramble for Africa’, University 
College Review Vol.1:1 (Spring 1961), pp.8-24 (p.22); Natsoulas & Natsoulis, Rimbaud, pp.49-54; and 
Caulk, Jaws, pp.72-74 & 228-33 for detail on Lagarde’s activities.  
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      However, the Italian colonization of Assab in 1882 led to a search for active trading 
partners from the interior and, consequently, increased economic links with Shoa, since 
Yohannes displayed little interest in developing trade with the Italians - unlike Menelik, 
who eagerly developed trading links with both French and Italians, and especially with 
the latter after Antonelli arrived in 1881 and initiated the exchange of gold and ivory for 
modern armaments.263 
      But in 1882, the Mahdiya - a religious movement which drew on the stresses in 
Sudanese society created by the oppressive rule of Egypt – began the process of 
overthrowing Egyptian rule in Sudan.264  
      Despite the apparent success of Isma’il’s attempt to regenerate an Egyptian Empire, 
his hold upon the Sudan was ‘precarious in the extreme, dependent on the vigour of a 
handful of European officials rather than upon the superiority of the forces at their 
command’.265 Mehemet Ali’s rapacious campaign in the 1820s, the barbarous and 
inequitable Egyptian taxation system, and the putative suppression of the slave trade266 
had all left a legacy of lasting hatred for Egypt.267 So the rise of the Mahdia, sweeping the 
                                                 
263 Ibid., pp.19-25; And see Caulk, ‘Minilik’, and Appendix 4, for the desultory nature of European-
Abyssinian attempts to establish thriving trade links throughout the 1870-88 period. 
264 P.M Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan 1881-98: A Study of its Origins, Development and Overthrow 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1958), p.3. And see Appendix 4. 
265 Ibid., p.31. And see Appendix 4. 
266 The slave trade was banned in Britain in 1807 and slavery itself made illegal in 1834; moral imperatives 
lay behind much of the reasons for its banning, but economic factors, principally the introduction of large-
scale maritime steam transport - allowing the mass transport of raw materials and manufactured goods to 
and from Europe and the rest of the globe - were also a major factor; Pakenham, Scramble, p. 18. See also 
Woodward, Age, pp. 354-55. The Anglo-Egyptian Anti-Slavery Treaty was concluded in 1877; S. Serels, 
Starvation and the State: Famine, Slavery and Power in Sudan, 1883-1956 (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2013) pp.35 & 119. 
267 Al-Hajj, The Nile Valley, in  Anene & Brown, Africa, pp.177-79; G.N. Sanderson, The Nile Basin and 
the Eastern Horn, 1870-1908, pp. 592-679, in Oliver & Sanderson, Cambridge, pp. 609-13. Despite the 
1877 Treaty, many Khedival officials sympathised with Sudanese opposition to this long-established core 
of the Sudanese economy - Isma’il was a slave-owner himself and only appointed zealously anti-slavery 
officials such as Gordon to gain international respectability (Brendon, Decline, p. 169); this, combined with 
the fact that many of the enforcing officials were Christians and therefore Infidels, laid fertile ground for 
the Mahdists. And see Chapter 3 - ‘Slavery, Trade and Massawa; an Italian Perspective’.  
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hated Egyptians away in a seemingly unstoppable tide, was highly popular in Sudan and 
made it clear to both Egypt and Britain that, not only was the Mahdist threat not going to 
go away, but that it threatened the very existence of Egypt - and with it the British control 
over the Eastern Mediterranean and the Suez Canal.268  
      Between 1882 and 1885 a catalogue of disasters befell the Anglo-Egyptians, 
including the massacre of the Hicks expedition and the death of Gordon at Khartoum. 
Egyptian forces were trapped, with the Mahdists in the West and the Abyssinians in the 
East, in isolated positions including Khartoum,269 Kassala and Keren.270 The Egyptian 
army was powerless to stop the Mahdists, having been effectively (and ironically) 
disbanded in 1882 after the Urabi uprising, which itself had led to the British occupation 
of Egypt.271 The only way to rescue the trapped Egyptians and Europeans was to get them 
out. And the only way to do that was (even more ironically) with Abyssinian help. This 
resulted in the Hewitt272 treaty of 1884, whereby the Abyssinians - who heretofore had 
been treated largely with contempt by Britain273 - agreed to facilitate the Egyptian 
withdrawal in return for recognition of their claims to territories previously held, or 
disputed, by Egypt. This included a right to occupy Massawa, land-locked Abyssinia’s 
                                                 
268 See Appendix 4.  
269 Made the capital of Sudan as a result of  Muhammed Ali’s expedition of 1820. Holt, Mahdist, pp.2-3.  
270 Ram, Anglo-Ethiopian, p. 48. 
271 Ibid., pp.48-49; Owen, op.cit., pp.187-88. 
272 Rear Admiral Sir William Nathan Wrighte Hewitt (1834-1888). Hewitt is spelt both ‘Hewett’ and 
Hewitt’ in different sources. As most contemporary sources used ‘Hewitt’, I will too. 
273 See Appendix 5. However, there were sound strategic reasons for the British tendency to keep Abyssinia 
at arm’s length - the British relationship with, and interests in the stability of, Egypt from the mid-
Nineteenth century onwards meant that Britain dared not become too close to the Abyssinians for fear of a 
conflict of interest in the not-unlikely event of a major Egyptian-Abyssinian conflict; see P. Arnold, 
Prelude to Magdala: Emperor Theodore of Ethiopia and British Diplomacy (London: Bellew Publishing, 
1991), pp.47-59, and Ram, Anglo-Ethiopian, pp.11-58. 
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only route to the Red Sea, if the Egyptians withdrew altogether.274 So, Yohannes was not 
best pleased when, on 5 February1885, the Italians occupied Massawa. 
      By coincidence, Britain had been thinking about letting the Italians have Massawa 
(though it was not theirs to give, being still an Egyptian territory) from around January 
1884.275 So the possibility of the Italians taking over the Anglo-Egyptian policing role in 
at least part of the Red Sea area was passingly attractive, especially as they were seen as a 
counterbalance to emerging French influence in the region.276 As Gladstone succinctly 
put it, ‘I care more that we keep out of the Soudan than who goes in’.277 Accordingly, he 
suggested on 10 January 1884 that ‘Massowah, give it up (to Italy) to make a friend’.278 
      Of course, this remark was made before the Hewitt Treaty (June 1884) and the 
Congress of Berlin (November 1884), but it was sure to appeal to Italian ears made extra-
vigilant for the possibility of gain after ‘Imperial fever’ set in.279 On 6 October 1884 
                                                 
274 The treaty was concluded in June 1884 and was the only treaty ever concluded by Yohannes with a 
foreign power. It ostensibly brought peace with Egypt, with whom the Abyssinians had had at least 16 
battles with between 1832-76; D.H. Shinn & T.P. Ofansky, Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia (Lanham, 
Maryland; Scarecrow Press, 2013 (2nd ed.), p.214. For all the conditions of the Hewitt treaty, see d’Avray, 
Lords, pp. 104-106, and R.A. Caulk, ‘Yohannes IV, the Mahdists, and the colonial partition of north-east 
Africa’, Transafrican Journal of History, 1: 2 (July 1971), pp 23-41 (pp.28-29). 
275 Lowe, Reluctant (vol.1), p.69. 
276 See, for instance, Ramm, ‘Plantation’, pp.213-15. 
277 Gladstone to Granville 7 January 1884, in Ramm, Political Correspondence (vol.II; 1883-1886), 
pp.145-46; Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.69. And see C.L. Smith, The Embassy of Sir William White at 
Constantinople, 1886-1891 (Oxford: University Press), pp.8-9. 
278 Lowe & Marzari, op.cit., p.69. 
279 Some writers believe that ‘Imperial fever’ was triggered more by the British occupation of Egypt in 
1882 than by the 1884 Congress: see, for instance, R. Hyam, ‘The Primacy of Geopolitics: The Dynamics 
of British Imperial Policy, 1763-1963’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27: 2 (1999); 
pp.27-52. However, as Makki points out (in ‘Imperial Fantasies’, p.741), the Italian quest for Empire 
acquired ‘a sense of immediacy’  due as much to the pressures of the Southern question and the desperate 
economic crises of the 1880s as to jealousy of the other Powers, though of course such factors were far 
from negligible. Certainly Antonelli’s frequent letters from Shoa to Rome during the 1882-85 period, with 
their tales of the hardships of camel caravans trying to cross impassable terrain, the dangers of 
inadvertently wandering into wars between the Danakil and the Isa or the Galla and the Oromo, the 
constant threat of extortion or murder on any given route between Shoa and the coast, and the incessant 
interference of the French from Obokh, cannot have lit any fires of Imperial enthusiasm on their own. But 
such letters did, if nothing else, keep alive the possibility of Italian expansion into the Abyssinian 
hinterland, and may, augmented by the enthusiasm following the Berlin conference, have made the 
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Gladstone mentioned that Massawa could not after all be handed over to the Italians,280 
but the remark likely did not go beyond Cabinet. His comment about making a friend of 
Italy, however, was a gift to Mancini, who was able to represent it as a request from 
Britain for assistance.  
      Between the beginning of October 1884 and the occupation of Massawa in February 
1885 the Italians, at the highest diplomatic level, did everything to avoid treading on 
British sensibilities or interests in the region, though, crucially, by the end of October, 
Mancini had become convinced that Britain was asking for Italian aid, despite the 
absence of any evidence for this.281 At the beginning of November he told Count 
Nigra,282 Italian Ambassador to London, to ensure that proposed Italian moves to occupy 
Beilul, along the coast from Assab, would not meet with British opposition or be seen to 
infringe upon British interests.283 Granville, following consultation with the Cabinet, 
assented to this request without demur, but with a caveat regarding the desirability of also 
obtaining the Porte’s consent - ‘... I was able to assure (Nigra) that we felt no jealousy 
                                                                                                                                                 
acquisition of Massawa as a commercial alternative to Assab seem essential; see L’Italia, I/ II,  the 
Antonelli letters, no.246 (5 March 1882) & passim. 
280 ‘Massowah - we cannot hand to the Italians’. Cabinet note 6 October 1884; Matthews, Diaries (vol.11), 
p220. Whether or not this comment was made in view of the Hewitt Treaty of the previous month is hard to 
ascertain; it might have been helpful to ensure that the Italians knew of this view, but so far as can be 
ascertained it remained within Cabinet. 
281 See document 344, Nigra-Mancini, 20 October 1884, and document 345, Mancini-Nigra, 29 October 
1884, in L’Italia I/III (1883-1885), pp.70-72. 
282 Count Costantino Nigra (1828-1907), ambassador to London. Nigra was highly regarded by the Italian 
authorities, having accompanied Cavour and Victor Emannuelle to Paris and London during 1855-56, was 
Italian plenipotentiary to Paris in 1855 and 1861-76, to St.Petersburg 1876-1882 and to London, 1882-85. 
See letter from Venosta to Nigra at Paris, 20 June 1871, in DDI II/II, p.592-94, for an idea of the high 
esteem in which he was held by the Italian authorities.  
283 ‘The events occurring in the Valley of the Nile... have called forth (the possibility of Italy establishing 
itself) between Massowah and Assab if that coast was abandoned (by Egypt)... we must assume that 
England would look without jealousy upon a moderate extension of our (little) Colony of Assab... and 
should prefer (that the authority of) Italy, for whom friendly relations with England are a constant political 
tradition, might be established in whatever form it was found convenient... We want, first of all, to be sure 
of a perfect understanding with (London and) abstain, therefore, from any definite resolution until we know 
their advice’; No.88, Mancini - Nigra, (copy to Granville), 3 November 1884, in  Correspondence 
Respecting Ports in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and the Province of Harrar (Egypt No.14, 1885).  
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over the extension of Italian influence... and should, on the contrary, be prepared to 
welcome it (though H.M.G.) could not consent to give away that which did not belong to 
them (and recommends) coming to an arrangement with the Porte on the matter’.284 
Granville, following Gladstone’s cue from 6 October, had perforce told Nigra285 on 13 
November 1884 that there was ‘no question of Italy doing England a service’,286 since the 
Italians remained convinced that Britain secretly wanted their help in the shape of an 
Italian presence in the Red Sea ports287 - but by then it was too late. Mancini declared that 
‘in response to a British invitation we consented to guard with our protection the coasts 
of the Red Sea’.288 Hence the arrival of the Bersaglieri in Massawa the following 
February.  
      A battalion sailed from Naples, to a crescendo of enthusiasm not seen since the 
sailing of Garibaldi for Sicily a quarter of a century before.289 The ostensible catalyst for 
this event was the murder of some Italian travelers,290 but clearly such an operation could 
not be mounted at the drop of a hat and must have been planned well in advance.291 It 
                                                 
284 No.90, Granville - Lumley, 5 November 1884, ibid. 
285 Costantino Nigra (1828-1907), Italian Ambassador to London 1881-85. 
286 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.38. Granville’s remarks to Nigra, at least as reported by the latter, were  
highly ambiguous: ‘Granville m’a fait observer a ce sujet que l’occupation de cette localite par l’Italie... ne 
devait pas etre, selon la pensee du Gouvernement Anglais, un service que l’Italie rendrait a l’Angleterre, 
mais une marquee d’amite de l’Angleterre envers l’Italie.’ - i.e., any such Italian action shouldn’t be 
regarded by the British government as a help to Britain but, on the contrary, as a favour by Britain to Italy. 
Nigra concluded by writing that this was the most that he had been able to extract from Granville, and that 
any further pressure upon him would not lead anywhere; Nigra - Mancini, 13 November 1884, in L’Italia 
I/III, p.77 (my italics); and see FO45/540, Nigra - Rome (translation of conversation with Granville and 
Nigra’s commentary upon same), 11 February 1885 - “(England) shows that the (offer of Italian help) is 
appreciated, but that they could not (currently) ask for (help) from anyone, no matter how friendly, without 
weakening the moral effect of (measures decided upon)”. One can see why Nigra might easily have taken 
all this as diplomatic-speak for a “nod and a wink” from Granville in tacit approval of an Italian advance. 
287 See documents 349 (7 November 1884), 352 (12 November 1884) & 353 (13 November 1884) between 
Mancini and Nigra in L’Italia in Africa I/III, pp.74-77. 
288 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.37. 
289 d’Avray, Lords, p. 108. 
290 Theobald, Mahdiya,  p.138. 
291 In a letter dated 9 January 1885, Mancini told Cecchi, who was in Spezzia awaiting the launch of an 
expedition to the Congo, that the mission would be postponed as two ships apparently earmarked for his 
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was a deliberate imitation of the landing of ‘The Thousand’ (who were transported by 
ships of the Rubattino company) to show that Italy was, in ‘liberating’ Massawa from the 
tyrannous Egyptians and the threat of the Mahdists, adhering to the laudable aims of the 
Risorgimento - ‘... a poor people’s mission of peace among other poor folks ruled by 
foreign despots’. The opposition also invoked the Risorgimento to oppose the occupation, 
but Depretis, ever the opportunist, chose to enlist the support of the Imperialists by 
backing them, so Imperialism won.292 
      When the Italians occupied Massawa, Yohannes was naturally incensed, both at the 
Italian action - which he believed, correctly, prefigured Italian expansionist action 
thereafter - and what he believed to be British perfidy in encouraging the Italian move, 
since his understanding of the Hewitt Treaty was that an Egyptian evacuation of 
Massawa would leave it in Abyssinian hands.293 Clearly, and perfectly understandably, he 
mistook muddle and preoccupation for treachery; though many British people on the spot 
thought that the Abyssinians couldn’t be trusted to run a port like Massawa,294 and that if 
the Italians hadn’t moved in then the French would have, there was, as we have seen, no 
deliberate treachery on the part of either Gladstone or Granville. As no Abyssinian 
occupation of Massawa in the event of an Egyptian withdrawal had been written into the 
Hewitt treaty, it is more than likely that both were unaware that such an expectation 
                                                                                                                                                 
expedition, the Amerigo Vespucci and Garibaldi, had in the meantime been diverted for a “special mission” 
in the Red Sea. This can only have been for the occupation of Massawa, showing that at least one month 
(and probably more, since the decision to divert the ships would have been taken before Mancini’s letter of 
9 January) lay between the operation’s conception and its execution; Mancini - Cecchi, 9 January 1885, in 
L’Italia, vol. II, Oceano Indiano, Tomo II, Documenti Relativi a Zanzibar e al Benadir (1884-1891), pp. 9-
10.  
292 Triulzi, ‘Adwa’, p.100. As Edward Said observed, ‘Every single empire... has said that it is not like all 
the others... that it has a mission to (enlighten and) bring order and democracy, and that it uses force only as 
a last resort’; E. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 2003), p.xxi. 
293 ‘A... conviction (that the British had brought the Italians to Massawa and would aid them because they 
were acting for Britain) at the Imperial court kindled Yohannes’ anger at his betrayal by the signatories of 
the Hewett (sic) treaty’; Caulk, Between, p.61.   
294 Neither did Yohannes (see Appendix 4, and Jonas, Battle, p. 39.) 
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existed in the mind of Yohannes.  Nevertheless, Yohannes watched the Italians expand 
outwards into territory that was indisputably Abyssinian.295 Following the occupation of 
Massawa, the Italians continued to probe outwards, occupying Arafali  and Arkiki 
(coastal settlements North-West and South of Massawa respectively) and Sahati (inland 
towards Sudan) by June 1885.296 At first, once Yohannes’ initial hostility to the Italian 
actions had died down, he began (as early as 19 February 1885, a mere fortnight after the 
Italian occupation) to see advantages to the situation, such as in the fact that the Italian 
presence lent greater security to caravans travelling from Sahati to Massawa, and that 
Yohannes openly declared that he didn’t feel able to hold Massawa himself; so that, if 
anyone else was to hold it against the Mahdists, it might as well be the Italians, provided 
they acted under British tutelage.  
      However, this confidence didn’t last - Yohannes grew suspicious that the Italians 
were getting too friendly with the Habab (one of the dominant tribes around Massawa 
and Suakin that were being influenced by Osman Digna from his base in Tokar - see 
Chapter 3), and that, though Massawa looked to be remaining in Italian hands for the 
foreseeable future, he felt that Arkika, Sahati and other places adjacent to Massawa 
should, as ex-Egyptian/Turkish possessions, revert to him under the terms of the Hewitt 
Treaty.297 Ras Alula made several fruitless attempts to dislodge the Italians from Sahati in 
January 1887 before managing to turn the tables on them with a victory at Dogali later in 
                                                 
295 But see Caulk, Jaws, p.49, for an alternative view of this matter. 
296 By November 1888 they had added Raheita and Beilul; Ram, Anglo, p. 63. 
297 ‘Now that (Yohannes) understands that the Italians occupy Massawa with the sanction of England, he 
acquiesces (and) does not desire the port for himself, as he is aware (he) could not hold it, but he looks to 
England to protect his interests (there), no matter who may hold the town. As regards (places adjacent to) 
Massawa, (he) considers... every other place in the countries of the Habab, Shoho and Danakil (as his own, 
since they) belonged to Abyssinia till the Turks took them (and should thus now) revert to him, as they do 
not form part and parcel of Massowah’. All information from letters written between 19 February and 20 
May 1886 by Harrison-Smith to Baring and quoted in d’Avray, Lords, pp.112-17. 
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the month. Yohannes protested to Queen Victoria that Dogali would not have happened if 
the Italians hadn’t violated the Hewitt Treaty.298 
 
      To be fair to the Italians, Granville and Gladstone had long taken a somewhat 
aleatoric approach to relations with Italy, sending mixed messages to Rome regarding the 
position on the Red Sea throughout 1884.299 In January 1884 Gladstone had made his 
comment about giving Massawa to the Italians and, although in November 1884 
Granville told Nigra that Britain did not need Italian help, by December 1884 he was 
again writing to Gladstone to the effect that, if the Turks didn’t mind the Italians taking 
some of their Red Sea possessions, then Britain - including  Baring, in Cairo - wouldn’t 
either, and that he would tell Nigra so.300 If the Italians had stuck to their positions in 
Assab and Massawa, then Britain would probably have turned a blind eye to their 
presence in the Red Sea, Tenterden’s comments notwithstanding.  After all, most of the 
countries of Europe were after a slice of the African cake; why should Italy be any 
exception, especially as she had so little to start with, and such a lot to prove? As 
Salisbury said, ‘Italy, it is true, is eminently a hungry Power: but the objects of her 
                                                 
298 Jonas, Battle, pp.39-43. 
299 And earlier. In June 1880, following the Esploratore affair, Granville wrote to Paget saying that the 
Italian ambassador (Menabrea) had stated that Italy was applying for authority over Assab under the 
Exequator rule. Though he had repeated the British line that Assab was Egyptian territory and thus not 
amenable to being placed under Italian sovereignty, he told the Italian ambassador that ‘... however, I could 
look into the matter and let him have a positive answer’. What were the Italians to think when they 
constantly  received such mixed messages? FO45/400, Granville - Paget, 8 June 1880. 
300 ‘Nigra comes... today. I send a draft (of) the questions he is about to (put to me regarding the Red Sea 
ports) and some despatches from Baring on the same question ... I will immediately press the Turks (on 
whether or not they intend to take possession of their Red Sea ports, and if they don’t)... it will not be our 
business to object to Italy taking Beiloul, Zulla and Massowah...’ Granville to Gladstone December 20th 
1884, in Ramm, Political Correspondence, (vol.II) p.298. Ramm also mentions a confidential note of 
November 3rd 1884, in which Gladstone and Granville discuss British and Egyptian policy regarding the 
Red Sea and recommend acquiescence in an Italian occupation. 
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hunger are no great matter to us’.301 With luck ‘… they might be looked upon as proxy 
Brits without any claim on the public purse’,302 helping to keep order like Special 
Constables, as Gladstone had surmised they might when he pondered giving them 
Massawa. However, having gained Massawa, the Italians decided to push the envelope as 
far as they could. 
      British Intelligence had, throughout the mid-1880s, started to become increasingly 
concerned about international activity on every part of the African littoral. 
Brackenbury303 noted the increasing French presence in the Mediterranean and East and 
West Africa, as well as their presence in the Red Sea since 1884, potentially threatening 
British routes to Suez, the Cape and India.304 Yet it was the Italian attempt to expand into 
Abyssinia from Assab and Massawa that Brackenbury was most concerned to bring to the 
attention of the Foreign Office from 1886 onwards. Though he knew that ‘Our object is 
to remain on the most friendly terms possible’305 with Italy, Italian actions were causing 
grave concerns among those dealing with both the local population and with the Italians 
themselves.306 
     The British authorities were often baffled by what the Italians did or did not want. 
Salisbury (while Foreign Secretary) wrote to Wolff in Constantinople, asking him to  
 
          Find out... if you can exactly what the Turks wish for (re the Italian  
          occupation of Massawa). The whole scheme (i.e. the occupation) was  
                                                 
301 Quoted in Roberts, Salisbury, p.440. By 1887 he had started to change his tune. 
302 Beaver, Under, p.199. 
303 Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Brackenbury (1837-1914), Director of Military Intelligence January 1886-
December 1890; ibid., pp.136-92 & 328. 
304 Beaver, op.cit., pp.198-99. 
305 TNA FO 78/3975 Brackenbury H., ‘Italy, Egypt and the Red Sea’ 21 December 1886. 
306 Beaver, op.cit., pp.198-99. 
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          so insane that I am not surprised that the Italians claim that (Granville) 
         forced them to do it, and that they want to get out. But they want some- 
         thing for their pains, and I can’t quite make out what it is.307 
 
Also, there seems to have been genuine confusion in London regarding what lay behind 
the occupation of Massawa, and concern about its implications for British Imperial 
policy. As Salisbury wrote to Lumley in September 1885 
 
             Lord Granville told me that England had had no share in inducing  
             Italy to (occupy Massawa). M. de Nigra told me that it was (done) 
             at the instigation and by the instruction of England. I do not know 
             which (of them) was guilty of a mistake. I suppose that... communications 
             took place (by) hints and suggestions... and that (Granville) 
             imagined he was absolutely passive (while Nigra) imagined that  
             Granville was pushing him on. But the result is a situation of  
             considerable complexity. The Italians are at Massawa in defiance  
             of the Treaty of Paris. They might reply that we are in the same position  
             (in Egypt) for neither of us have the consent of the Porte.308 (But the )  
             advance into Egypt was forced upon us (by events) while the Italian  
             invasion... is absolutely spontaneous.309  
                                                 
307 SP A/44/33, Salisbury - Wolff, 18 August 1885. 
308 The Treaty of Paris, 30 March 1856, was concluded by the allies, following the Crimean War, to 
guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire against external aggression. Aimed mainly at keeping Russia 
out of Ottoman territories, the Black Sea and the Balkans, it was followed on 15 April by a further treaty 
formed by Austria, France and Britain to further guarantee the Ottoman Empire against any threat, from 
whatever source, to its independence and integrity; Bourne, Victorian, pp.79-80.  
309 But see Crispi’s comments of  July 1888 regarding the occupation of Massawa, above. 
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             The Turks are very sore about it, and it is a difficulty in our present  
             negotiations. We do not want to throw Italy over. She has been a very  
             good friend to us. (But) it is very difficult to defend her action to the Porte...310 
 
There was considerable confusion, too, in the British Parliament about whether or not 
Italy had acted upon instructions from, or with the permission of, Britain, a matter which 
Granville’s vagueness didn’t much help to clarify. Earl de la Warr, in a general debate in 
the House of Commons on the matter of Italian activity in the Red Sea, commented that  
preoccupation with developments in Egypt and Sudan had engendered silence over what 
would otherwise have attracted significant comment (i.e. the occupation of Massawa).311 
In part of the same debate Granville did little to clarify matters, stating that 
             
            ...(When) the Italian Ambassador enquired whether HMG was  
            opposed to an extension of Italian jurisdiction (from Assab to  
            Raheita and Beilul and thence to Massawa and possibly Zeila) 
            I assured him that HMG felt no jealousy (towards Italy over such 
            Matters) but would, on the contrary, welcome it.312 
 
Such comments merely reinforced the impression in some British parliamentary circles 
that the occupation had resulted from active British connivance. Sir Michael Hicks-
                                                 
310 SP A/44/20, Salisbury - Lumley, 14 September 1885. Salisbury noted in the letter that ‘(Nigra, before 
leaving London) asked us point blank whether we wished Italy to stay in the Red Sea or not... it (is a 
question which is) difficult to answer. We should prefer Italy to any other European power... But until the 
position is regularized, we can hardly (approve) of it.’ 
311 Gilbert George Reginald Sackville, 8th Earl de la Warr (1869-1915), politician and soldier, Hansard, 3, 
HC, 23 February 1885, v.294 cc.1004-07. 
312 Granville, ibid. My italics.  
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Beach,313 in the discussion over whether or not the Italians should be asked to help 
relieve Kassala, revealed that it was 
 
            ‘...(HMG) who first suggested that Massawa should be occupied 
            by Italy (with or without the assent of the Sultan) and that by the  
            same token (should allow them) to help in the relief of Kassala.’314  
 
Granville and Hicks Beach’s comments could hardly fail to be seen by anyone as 
anything but an active encouragement of Italian expansion in the area; the fact that he 
concluded his comments by saying that HMG could not give away what it didn’t possess, 
and that the Turks should have followed British advice and occupied the ports 
themselves, made no difference to the impression he created of British complaisance in 
the matter. In this atmosphere it is not surprising that Gladstone’s assertion that ‘Italy 
(has) most cordial relations with this country; but (there) is no alliance or plan of military 
co-operation between the two countries’ was largely forgotten.315 
 
             It is not difficult, whichever way one looks at it, to see why the Italians thought 
Britain was actively encouraging her to expand her presence in the Red Sea, despite 
Tenterden’s warnings of 1880 - witness Savile’s comment to Salisbury 
 
             (there is) no doubt that (the occupation was) the spontaneous  
                                                 
313 Michael Edward Hicks Beach (1837-1916), 1st Earl of Aldwyn, Chancellor of the Exchequer 1885-86 & 
1895-1902. 
314 Hicks-Beach, Hansard, 3, HC, 2 March 1885, v.294 cc.1784-803. Gladstone had declined the offer as 
inimical to British prestige; see note 52, p.13. 
315 Gladstone, Hansard, 3, HC, 26 February 1885, v.294, c.1416. 
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             Act of the (Italians). Negotiations were done principally at  
             Constantinople but (Granville) said as it didn’t belong to (Britain)  
             he couldn’t dispose of it, though he would rather see Italy there  
             than any other power... 316 
 
       The disparity between British and Italian views over what really happened regarding 
Massawa set the tone for Anglo-Italian relations over the next decade, as the activities of 
Italian ‘men on the spot’ began to cause serious friction between British and Italian 
authorities in the region, however much the Italians tried to assuage British concerns at 
the highest diplomatic level. Such actions also began to cause problems with Egypt - in 
August 1883 the Egyptians visited Raheita and raised their flag, only to have Italians 
from Assab pull it down.317 In October the Egyptians retaliated by evicting an Italian 
party trying to make a trading post at Samawanag, between Zeila and Berbera.318 Nothing 
daunted, Antonelli himself visited Zeila in the Italian corvette Castel Fidardo in June 
1884 to demonstrate that the Italians would support and befriend those who sought their 
aid, and to show the Rasheida of Zeila the ‘inadvisability of interfering with Italian traded 
with Shoa’.319 
      With the political imprint of Italy being firmly established in the Red Sea, Italian 
trade (much of it illicit) was by this time burgeoning, and also breaking the tacit 
agreements among the Powers to inhibit the importation of munitions to the coastal 
                                                 
316 SP A/38/29, Savile - Salisbury, 9 October 1885. My italics. 
317 IO L/PS/9/55, Blair - Chief Secretary, Bombay, 20 August 1883. 
318 IO L/PS/9/55, C.N.M. Sealy (acting Consul for Somali coast) - Baring, 30 October 1883. 
319 IO L/PS/9/55, Hunter - Baring, 5 June 1884. The Rasheida, an Arabian tribe, were notorious for causing 
trouble, and it is unlikely that they would have been particularly bothered by Italian bluster. And see 
Appendix 5. 
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hinterland. In October 1884, six cases labeled ‘worked iron’ were consigned for shipment 
to Assab on the initiative of Bienenfeld-Rolph. They were found to contain 150 guns, and 
were followed shortly by another shipment, this time correctly labelled but without an 
import license. In order not to disturb Anglo-Italian relations these arms were allowed 
through, but, as Blair pointed out, 
 
              It is needless to point out the very great danger (of) allowing arms 
              to circulate freely in the Danakil country and (from there to) Galla and  
              Somali (territories). Political considerations alone would (justify)  
              HMG in remonstrating against unrestricted (arms imports) into Assab 
              ... for disposal to native tribes. (Also the import of arms to Assab is)  
              detrimental) to British interests in that the slave trade will be immensely 
              aided by (an influx of firearms into these lands) - further, the safety of 
              the Gulf of Aden ports will be imperilled with travelers and trade routes 
              subjected to (increased dangers).320  
 
Again, it must be emphasized that British reports implicated the French quite as much as 
the Italians in the pursuit of illegal arms imports to these territories,321 but increasingly 
both Powers were being mentioned as being jointly responsible for such activities, and 
while the French made no secret of their Imperial and commercial aims in the area, or of 
                                                 
320 IO L/PS/9/55, Blair - General Secretary, Bombay, 10 October 1884. 
321 For instance, Hogg sent  letter, dated 19 February 1886, to the French Vice-Consul at Aden, concerning 
the ‘very large’ import of arms- 2,100 rifles, 30,000 remington cartridges, 12 pistols and 1 can of powder - 
imported by French merchants via Obokh or Tajourra, none of them properly documented, between 14 
February 1885 and 1 February 1886; IO L/PS/9/56, Hogg - Political Department, Bombay, 22 February 
1886. 
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their indifference to British objections, the Italians were supposed to be the devoted 
friends and allies of Britain, and thus might reasonably be expected to co-operate more in 
such activities.322 On 6 May 1886, for instance, Baring reported to Lord Iddesleigh323 that 
Italian boats ‘which were recently captured whilst trading with the rebels’ had also 
attempted to raise the Italian flag at Taklai (Mersa Teklay, halfway between Massawa 
and Port Sudan). In what was to become a familiar pattern of behaviour, the Italians at 
first denied all knowledge of the incident, then eventually admitted it, opining that 
perhaps the authorities at Massawa had been ‘somewhat indiscreet’ in sending out boats 
which at once broke trading rules and tried to raise a flag in territory which didn’t belong 
to them. On 6 December 1886, Baring again had to report to Iddesleigh that Italian boats 
were engaging in illegal trade with natives hostile to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities 
North of Massawa, and once again had tried to hoist the Italian flag at Taklai. 
      The boats had been seized under the authority of Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchener,324 
though (in what was to become a familiar pattern of behaviour) the Italians denied all 
knowledge of any impropriety on the part of their subjects and demanded the release  ‘… 
in somewhat imperious terms’325 of the seized boats. Speaking to Sir J.S. Lawley326 later 
in the month, the Italian diplomat Giacomo Malvano327 said that he 
 
                                                 
322 As Hunter pointed out, while in terms of commercial strength and influence ‘... neither France nor Italy 
are in a position to compare with (Britain) at present (the) arms traffic can only affect us injuriously 
without affording any.... commercial advantages to (either France or Italy), while ‘... when the Somali are 
in possession of an unlimited supply of guns it will be (practically) impossible to administer the Somali 
coast ports’; IO L/PS/9/55, Hunter - Baring, 20 November 1884. 
323 Stafford Henry Northcote, First Earl of Iddesleigh (1818-1887), Chancellor of the Exchequer 1874-80, 
Foreign Secretary August 1886 - January 1887. 
324 Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916), Governor of East Sudan and the Red Sea Littoral from 
September 1886. 
325IOR/20/A/1171.  
326 British Ambassador at Rome. 
327 Secretary-General at the Consulta 1896-1907; exact office at this time unknown. Lowe & Marzari, 
Italian, p.473. 
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… regretted that the feeling of suspicion of the designs of Italy exists  
in the minds of the Egyptian authorities (but that the Italians) would  
prove that the policy of Italy is not activated by aggressive aims, but  
by the desire to be allowed to develop in tranquility the trade…  
               of Massowah.328  
 
Despite such silken assurances, over the following months the Italians continued to flout 
the rules, still trading illegally, and also allowing Italian merchants to trade tax-free at 
Massawa, while taxing everybody else. In April 1887 another Italian boat was seized by 
HMS Albacore running contraband, shortly before the ‘lead’ incident. In all three 
incidents, the Italian government denied all knowledge of the incident before temporizing 
and then tacitly admitting foreknowledge.329 
      Running contraband was one thing - no doubt the Italians were not the only ones 
guilty of such activity, and no doubt such localised, individual enterprise was not always 
known to or approved of by the Italian authorities. However, they also consistently 
interfered with the functioning of normal rules of trade, laying down one set of rules 
regarding import-export customs for Italians, and another for non-Italians. Wartime 
exigencies were used as the excuse for this more systematized form of commercial abuse. 
On 3 March 1887 Lawley reported that ‘Italian trade (was) wholly free from duties at 
Massowah while others (were) taxed’. Challenged on the topic, M. Malvano said that this 
action ‘was due to disruption of trade caused by fighting with the Abyssinians’ and that 




otherwise the high duties being levied on non-Italian imports would have gone down.330 
But as late as October 1887 the same strictures were still being imposed by the Italians, 
who weren’t the only ones at war but who were alone in showing such blatantly 
unbalanced trading practices. On 10 October, Baring informed Salisbury that Kitchener 
had obtained a set of Italian excise regulations whereby ‘no customs duties will be levied 
along the coast under Italian supervision’, meaning that all other ports along the Red Sea 
coast, e.g, Agig, an Egyptian port, would lose all trade to the Italians (as indeed would 
Zeila, Berbera, and Obokh). Baring pointed out - in yet another example of how good the 
Italians were becoming at exploiting the confusion of governance in the Red Sea littoral - 
that the Egyptians could scarcely be seen to be objecting to this practice, since to do so 
would alert their Turkish masters and get them into trouble for having allowed the 
Italians to behave in such a way in the first place. Salisbury reported to Baring, on the 17 
March, that the Italians had dropped this action on HMG’s request; but it didn’t mean that 
they had given up on trying to rig the local market.331  
                                                 
330 IOR/20/A/1171. 
331 It is interesting to note that, despite Crispi’s claim that ‘this bourgeois habit of always counting the cost’ 
in “francs and centimes” of Imperial enterprise was unpatriotic and unbecoming an Imperial power (see 
note 439 below), the Italians were always very keen on counting everyone else’s money when they found 
they could tax it, and not at all fussy about how they got it. Though all colonial powers used force to extract 
revenues from the indigenous inhabitants, the Italians, as witnessed by their treatment of Indian merchants 
(see note 332 below) and non-Italian subjects in Massawa (see ‘The Massawa Incident’, below), and the 
readiness of tribesmen once friendly to the Italians to flee their ‘protection’ in favour of shelter from even 
the hated Egyptians, indicates that they were unusually ruthless in their treatment of subjected peoples. As 
Labanca notes, ‘The propensity of Italians to use a heavy hand in matters of colonial order (indicated that) 
Italian colonialism manifested authoritarian inclinations from its inception... the autonomy Rome conceded 
to the colonies; the strong role the armed forces played there; the undisputed recourse to military tribunals 
and summary executions (and other abuses of power) is attested to by... a Commission of Inquiry in 1891, 
whose (examination of military and civilian activities in Massawa) led to an important criminal 
proceeding’’; N. Labanca, Italian Colonial Internment, in Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, Italian Colonialism, pp. 27-
36 (p.29); and see S.C. Bruner, Press and Parliament, Liberalism and Colonialism: Italy’s 1891 Livraghi 
Affair and the Waning Influence of the Civilising Mission, (Chicago: Loyola University, PhD Thesis, 
December 2011). However, there were hidden reasons that might explain this apparently excessive rapacity 
- see ‘Slavery, Trade and Massawa - an Italian perspective’, Chapter 3). 
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      On 20 March 1887, Baring once again had to inform Salisbury of Italian 
irregularities; he had received petitions from ‘numerous British-Indian subjects resident 
at Massowah’ that, while under the Ottomans and Egyptians these traders had been happy 
and prosperous, under the Italians they were very unhappy. The Italians had imposed 
punitively heavy duties on Gold,332 high charges for wharfage, refused all compensation 
for goods damaged while in Italian warehouses, set the value of goods as they pleased 
and arrested and imprisoned anyone who didn’t register properly as an alien. 
      Additionally, the British in Aden were becoming uneasy at the amount of cattle being 
exported by the Italians from Berbera, since Aden and its hinterland depended on cattle 
exports from Berbera for its meat.333 Furthermore, it appeared that the Italians were 
trying to use their preparation for war against the Abyssinians as a cover for expanding 
their territorial gains on the Red Sea littoral at Anglo-Egyptian expense. Kitchener, in a 
letter to Baring of 20 May 1887, pointed out that all the signs were that they meant to 
occupy Kassala and even advance into Sudan via territory ceded by Abyssinia to 
Egypt.334 As Kitchener said in May 1887, the results of this kind of activity were that 
                                                 
332 ‘This is unique in the world and harmful to Indians who only send gold home as silver is not accepted in 
India’. Later, the Italians alienated their allies in the Eritrea-Sudan region, especially the Habab and Beni-
Amer tribes, by similarly rapacious methods of taxation. But see Chapter 3. 
333 ‘Hunter is getting rather uneasy at the quantity of cattle exported by the Italians from Berbera, on which 
Aden depends... It might be well to warn the Italian government that difficulties may arise if they depend 
too exclusively on the Berbera supply’; IOR/20/A/1171, Baring- Salisbury, 9 October 1887. 
334 ‘I am... sorry to hear (about the planned Italian campaign against Abyssinia, and) that they intend 
(using) the Lebla river, which is in our territory... I cannot help thinking (that) they want to drive us... 150 
miles north by persuasion (and turn) the proposed expedition into one of conquest of a position in the 
Soudan between us and Abyssinia, and then acquire a road to Kassala through the province recently 
delegated to Egypt by Abyssinia... it behoves us to be very cautious in allowing their demands (and that we 
need) to have a clear guarantee of (their future actions and frontiers) In Abyssinia, Soudan is looked upon 
as Egyptian, and we have had help from the Abyssinians and have very friendly relations with them...’ 
IOR/20/A/1171, Kitchener-Baring, 20 May 1887. 
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‘Italy has a very bad name in the Soudan’,335 and that they weren’t winning themselves 
any friends. 
      They also (particularly Bienenfeld-Rolph, in Aden) practiced the import of lead and 
other materials useful as munitions to Abyssinia (which could, and frequently did, fall 
into the hands of the Mahdists), despite the danger that this posed to all European 
colonists along the Red Sea littoral and its hinterland, and despite the fact that the British 
and French had mutually agreed to ban all such trade owing to the dangers entailed by 
such actions. And, worst of all from a Gladstonian moral standpoint, they (apparently) 
continued to turn a blind eye to the slave trading going on under their noses.336 
      In 1887, Bienenfeld-Rolph’s successor (his son,Victor),337 also featured on the 
diplomatic landscape, this time having granted, some time during April 1887, a license to 
export seven tons of lead from Aden to Assab. Concern was raised by Baring to Salisbury 
about this on 28 April 1887, since lead was a principal constituent of ammunition 
manufacture, and it was feared that any such import could end up being used by the 
Mahdists against any of the colonizing powers.338   
      This particular episode resulted, on 29 April 1887, in the British and French 
announcing a blockade on the Red Sea coast, from Tajourra to Suakin, of any materials 
                                                 
335 Ibid, IOR/20/A/1171. 
336 Britain regarded itself as being the moral pioneer in the fight against slavery. ‘Pride in British morality 
reinforced the arrogance of British Power. The British sense of superiority as the World’s leader in liberty... 
accorded with their view of themselves as uniquely benevolent among nations. This self-regarding aura of 
exceptionalism became stronger after 1815 when the coincidence of power (the defeat of Napoleon) and 
virtue (the ending of the slave trade) suggested... that the two were linked’; D. Pavlakis, ‘The development 
of British Overseas Humanitarianism and the Congo Reform Campaign’, Journal of Colonialism and 
Colonial History, 11: 1 (Spring 2010), pp. un-numbered. In the first decades of the nineteenth century the 
British government, in its concerted drive against slavery, had paid other countries to stop partaking of the 
trade - Portugal received 300,000 pounds in 1815 and Spain 400,000 in 1820 (Woodward, Age, pp. 354-
55). One wonders, considering the parlous state of Italian finances in Eritrea (see Chapter 3) what effect 





that might be used for waging war against the colonial powers. On 30 April, Kennedy 
cabled Salisbury from Rome that, according to M. Malvano, the Italian government knew 
nothing of such actions, that such an export was as much a threat to Italian nationals as to 
anyone else, and that the Italian government would investigate the matter. Despite this, 
the export went ahead.339  
      Shortly after this, on 3 May, the Italians (with breathtaking sleight-of-hand) turned 
the announcement of the Anglo-French blockade to their advantage. Under the cover of 
appearing to join in the blockade, they proposed dividing the surveillance of the Red Sea 
coast from Massawa to Suakin between Britain and Italy, taking Ras Kasar (halfway 
between Massawa and Suakin, on the Eritrean-Sudanese border) as the point of 
demarcation. Simultaneously, they announced a blockade of the coast from Hankila340 to 
Difnan island (slightly North of Massawa), announcing their intention to blockade the 
coast from Massawa to Suakin.       
      There were good reasons, from the British point of view, for wanting to prevent the 
extension of Italian influence as far North as Ras Kasar. Local tribes owed what 
allegiance they cared to offer the colonists to the Anglo-Egyptian authorities in Suakin - 
though they had had commercial dealings with the Italians, they did not recognize their 
political authority and, if they found themselves under Italian domination, would likely 
align themselves with tribes hostile to Britain.341   
       Kitchener had suggested that the Italians should have dominion only over a stretch 
from Massawa to Ras Harb, considerably south of Ras Kasar, since the coast North of 
                                                 
339 It can hardly be a coincidence that the exporting company, to which Bienenfeld-Rolph had granted the 
license, belonged to himself; IOR/20/A/1171. 
340 Location unknown - possibly North of Assab. 
341 Ibid. 
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Ras Harb still belonged to Egypt, and any extension of Italian influence North of it would 
upset the delicate tribal balance of the district.  ‘Against this opinion M. Malvano 
remonstrated vehemently, stating… that (enforcing such a Southerly limit to the Italian 
blockade) would imply an unfriendly feeling towards Italy…’342 
      By 18 May the matter was reaching boiling point. ‘… (Malvano) was expressing 
himself (vehemently) on the expectation of the Italian Government that their action 
would be actively opposed by Great Britain (and that Kitchener) might oppose by force 
any application of the blockade (North of Ras Harb)’.343 
    Even Lord Salisbury, who so far had been complaisant about Italian activity in the 
area, was eventually moved to express concern about these peremptory actions. On 4 
August he wrote to Baring that  
 
          … the right of surveillance (if granted to the Italians) would probably  
          involve sooner or later the assertion of territorial rights… I feel sure that  
          (the Anglo-Egyptian authorities) would strongly object to Italian authority  
          being pushed so far North…344   
 
In the three months between the British accession to the Mediterranean Agreements in 
February 1887 and the dispute over the limits of the Italian blockade in May, Britain and 
                                                 
342 Kennedy (Ambassador to Rome) to Salisbury 7 May 1887; ibid. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Salisbury-Baring, IOR/20/A/1171. As he said later, ‘...the Italians will never lose anything for want of 
asking’; Salisbury - Malet , FO 343/2, January 24 1888. However, as we shall see in Chapter 3, the Italians 
had very good reasons, of which the British were unaware, for wanting to extend their sphere as far north as 
Ras Kasar.  
 92
Italy had come to the brink of armed conflict. Just as it seemed things couldn’t get any 
worse, they did; Francesco Crispi came to power in August 1887.  
 
                                 Part 2. The Crispi Era 
 
Depretis and Crispi were both Southern Italians who drew their political support from the 
South, but there the resemblance between them ended. Crispi, one of Garibaldi’s 
Thousand,345 had been active during the turbulent days of the Risorgimento. But his 
character and experiences, while making him an effective revolutionary, did not 
necessarily provide the makings of a Statesman. ‘Crispi the Foreign Minister and Crispi 
the follower of Mazzini were indistinguishable: he could never shake of the days of his 
youth (spent) as a conspirator in exile, with a love of... dramatic personal interventions... 
(his) temperament was disastrous in a Foreign Minister... a man of impulse... he lashed 
out on every issue in which Italian prestige was remotely involved’.346 He was regarded 
as a ‘wild man’ who inspired ‘alarm rather than confidence’ in foreign diplomats,347 and 
‘... treated all criticism of himself as unpatriotic’348 - hardly desirable attributes for a man 
tasked with steering the young and vulnerable Italian state through the tricky waters of 
European diplomacy. To quote Lowe, ‘The Italy of Crispi was not (that) of Robilant. 
                                                 
345 Roberts, Salisbury, p.530. Interestingly both Haymerle and Andrassy who, like Crispi, became Prime 
Ministers of their country later in life, were also revolutionaries in their youth, and were involved in the 
1848 uprisings; Andrassy had fled Austria under sentence of death for treason in 1849 and Haymerle, in 
later life regarded as uncommonly timid and pedestrian (Bismarck joked that he always ‘uttered an 
emphatic “No” three times on waking... for fear of having undertaken some commitment in his sleep’), also 
narrowly escaped execution; Bridge, Sadowa, pp.72, 90 & 108; and see Lyall, Sir Alfred, The Life of Lord 
Dufferin and Ava (London: John Murray, 1905, 2 Vols), vol.2, p.216. 
346 Lowe, Salisbury, pp.29-31. Roberts cites Salisbury’s comment about Crispi’s ‘incurable propensity for 
breaking windows’; Roberts, Salisbury, p.499. 
347 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.49. 
348 D. Mack Smith, A Prehistory of Fascism, in Salomone, Italy, pp.103-22 (p.118). 
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When Salisbury had made his initial agreement in 1887 Italian foreign policy was in safe 
hands, but... under Crispi, it became less reliable and even began to clash with British 
interests’.349  
      There were three main areas in which Crispi’s expansionist ideas came into conflict 
with British interests. Firstly, one of the main features of Crispi’s Imperialist dream was a 
violent antagonism to the Ottoman Empire, which was composed in large part of 
territories, European and African, once incorporated into the Roman Empire. Ostensibly, 
his animus was based upon the familiar Mazzinian grounds that it was an Oppressor of 
the Peoples, though there is no evidence that Crispi’s neo-Roman Empire would have 
been any more beneficent to its subjects.350 From 1887 he tried to force the Porte to 
undertake a wholesale reform of the Empire (thereby incurring the lasting hostility of the 
Sultan), and supported Cretan and Bulgarian independence efforts during 1887-89, 
threatening at one point to bombard Benghazi for some “imagined slight”.351 Salisbury 
had continually to remind him that the object of the second Mediterranean Agreement (of 
December 1887352) was to uphold the Ottoman Empire, not divide it, though Crispi’s 
undisguised aim was to prise Tripoli away from the Ottomans as a first step in the 
recreation of the Roman Empire.353 
                                                 
349 Lowe, Reluctant, p.48. 
350 Pan-Slavism, as an expression of Russian expansionist policy, Crispi regarded as inimical to Italian 
interests, since it posed a threat to Austrian security; unlike Mazzini, the only Balkan peoples whose 
liberation struggles he favoured were the Greeks (who were non-Slav) and the Bulgarians (who were anti-
Russian). Lowe & Marzari, Italian, pp.51-52. ‘Only Austria....(was) capable of opposing a stout barrier to 
the menacing expansion of Russia, against the danger of a tsarist unification of the Balkans, which would 
directly threaten Italy from the Adriatic’; Chabod, Statecraft, p.60. 
351 Ibid., p.53. 
352 See Salisbury to Karolyi and Catalani 12 December 1887, in Lowe, Reluctant II: Documents, p.61.  
353 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, pp.52-53. 
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      Secondly, there was his constant hostility towards France. Although Salisbury was 
adamant that ‘France is, and must always remain, England’s greatest danger’,354 
nevertheless the favourable political climate between France and Britain continued in a 
positive direction throughout the nineteenth century, the occasional invasion scare and 
territorial squabble notwithstanding.355 The fact that from 1887 Britain was effectively 
aligned with the Central Powers did not mean that Salisbury was prepared to seek a 
quarrel, much less war, with France: we have seen that he stoutly refused to be drawn 
into an anti-French aggression pact with an Italy led by the sober Depretis and Robilant 
in February 1887. However, Crispi spent much of the 1880s and 1890s indulging in 
behaviour that threatened to spark a war between Italy and France. He ‘felt no gratitude 
for Magenta and Solferino, only annoyance at the persistence of French moral tutelage 
over Italy’,356 continually sniped at the French over Nice, Savoy and Corsica and from 
1887 onwards goaded them at every opportunity. He made Italy’s already parlous 
economic situation immeasurably worse by escalating the Tariff war between the two 
countries - a war which had its origins during the Depretis era, but which escalated during 
1886-87 and led to a full-blown economic depression in Italy during 1887-90, a near-
collapse of the banking system and a revolution in Sicily in 1893.357 And, continuing a 
                                                 
354 Quoted in Roberts, Salisbury, p.499. ‘Deeply suspicious of France’s foreign policy, especially towards 
Italy and Mexico, he worried that her ‘unscrupulous worship of military glory’ might eventually lead to war 
with Britain’ (Ibid., p.45), and that ‘(the French were)... unreasonable and have so much incurable hatred of 
England’ (quoted in Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt, p. 136). 
355 ‘It was only (during the last third of the nineteenth century) that Russia and France came to be regarded 
as the traditional, the eternal, enemies of Great Britain (but) With France, friendship had been the rule ever 
since 1815, hostility the exception. (The fact of their colonial activities) did not necessarily make them 
enemies; it often made them partners. (Minor disputes) were dwarfed by (Anglo-French co-operation) in 
Syria, China and Mexico (and when) conflicts arose... there was enough common sentiment to ensure that 
these would be settled... by negotiation, not war.’ Taylor, Struggle, pp. 284-85. Contrast this view with 
those others expressed in Chapter 1. 
356 Lowe, Salisbury, p.9 & 31; Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.48. 
357 Clark, Modern Italy, pp.93-99 & 101-04. Lowe, Salisbury, pp.27-28; Mack Smith, Italy, pp.157-62; 
Robson, Italy, pp.24-25. As Whitfield says, ‘Crispi looked to Africa with imperial dreams, building roads 
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long line of belief among many of the Italian Left, particularly those from the South, that 
Italy’s fate was bound up with that of Germany, her “natural ally”,358 he was responsible 
for the Italo-German military convention of January 1888. This, not surprisingly, alarmed 
the French into believing that he was actively preparing for war against France, as did the 
rise in Italian naval armaments that led, briefly, to Italy having the second-largest and 
most modern fleet in Europe.359  
      The traditional view of Crispi’s intemperate activity has, until recently, been that his 
actions and rhetoric were, in fact, based more upon fear of France than upon hatred - 
‘What seemed to successive French ambassadors as deliberate bellicosity on Crispi’s part 
was simply his unfortunate manner, his normal method of doing business with 
anyone’.360 However, Duggan has convincingly argued that Crispi actually intended to 
provoke a war with France, in which the features of the Triple Alliance and the 
Mediterranean agreements would see her crushed by Germany on land and Britain at sea. 
Certainly his actions during the Massawa Crisis are highly indicative of such a wish. On 
this reading, his view was that defeat of France would remove two of his greatest fears, a 
French invasion via Italy’s long and vulnerable coastline, and the obviation of any 
                                                                                                                                                 
there when there were none in Sicily’, making the island - of which Crispi was a native - ripe for 
revolution; J.H. Whitfield, review of D.M. Smith, A History of Sicily (London: Chatto & Windus, 1968), in 
Italian Studies Vol.24:1 (1969); p. 115.  
358 For a dissection of the convoluted thought-processes that led Crispi and others of the Left to the 
“glittering mirage” of Germany as a shining beacon of liberalism and the natural ally of Italy, see Chabod, 
Statecraft, pp.1-66. 
359 Robson, Italy, p.23; see also Clark, Modern Italy, pp.26, 46-48 & 94-96. 
360 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, pp.48-49. In February 1891, as the result of a minor bankruptcy case involving 
Italian interests in Philippopolis, Bulgaria, Crispi insisted that “... no concessions could be made by the 
Italian Government, who demanded full reparations and that they were ready to proceed to any extremity”; 
Hardinge of Penshurst, Lord, Old Diplomacy: The Reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst (London: 
John Murray, 1947, pp. 43-44). A month after the Philippopolis affair, having ‘... done all in his power to 
provoke his fall by his imperious and overbearing attitude, and by a violent outburst in the Chamber against 
a party of the Right that was supporting him’, Crispi fell from power; Hardinge, ibid., p.44. 
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possible Franco-Papal plot to demolish the Italian state.361 Crispi feared a French 
conspiracy with the Vatican as part of a plan to destroy the Italian state (even when the 
rest of the Left had ceased to worry about such an eventuality).362  He feared even more a 
French seaborne invasion along Italy’s long and vulnerable coast which, large navy or 
not, it would have been practically impossible to stop. This fear was greatly magnified by 
two factors during the 1885-90 period: the emergence of the revanchist Boulanger in 
France, which made the onset of war between France and the Central Powers seem 
extremely likely; and the achievement by 1888 of French naval parity with Britain, one 
result of which was a concentration of the French fleet at Toulon, a move caused in great 
part by fear of attack by Italy;363 ‘Crispi, it was firmly believed, in contrast to Bismarck, 
was bent on war’.364 
      As if this was not bad enough, as time passed it became obvious that Italy would, in 
the event of a war with France, be a liability and not a help. The commentary in Chapter 
1 on Italy’s developmental background shows that she was behind all the other Powers in 
economic and military development. Throughout the 1880-90s she suffered a series of 
defeats at the hands of the natives of Abyssinia - at Dogali in 1887, Amba Alage in 1895, 
Mekele and Adowa in 1896365 - following which Salisbury was moved to comment that ‘I 
                                                 
361 For a full exposition of Duggan’s view, see Francesco Crispi, pp.550-69, and ‘Italy’s pursuit of War 
against France’, pp.315-29. 
362 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.49. ‘In Italy... the breach between Church and State (prevented the formation 
of a parliamentary opposition to the Left-dominated governments of the post-1870 years) so that (between 
1870 and 1919) it has been suggested (that) the working of democracy in Italy suffered from the absence of 
a responsible conservative party’. Joll, Europe, p.7. One of Crispi’s greatest nightmares was a joint Franco-
Austrian plot to join the Papacy in overthrowing the Italian state, hence his hostility to irredentism and his 
constant anxiety to keep the Triple Alliance viable and Britain onside.  
363 Lowe, Salisbury, pp.26-53. 
364 Ibid., p.48.  See Duggan, ‘Pursuit of War’, for an analysis of Crispi’s labyrinthine thought-process 
regarding France as a potential aggressor. 
365 Caulk, Jaws, pp.76-127 & 421-564; Jonas, Adowa, pp.40-43, 120-147 & 173-207. 
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(wish) our Italian friends had less capacity for being beaten’.366 The brief burst of naval 
build-up in the late 1880s made no real difference to this. The Italian navy was not fit for 
purpose. ‘The ships are good but the personnel are absolutely useless. They... pray to 
Heaven in a gale, (but) Heaven (will never) steer the ships... (Prayers) are excellent 
additions to energy and muscle, but no protection against shot and shell’,367 while in 1893 
a Royal Navy officer wrote that ‘If I had a heavy job on hand... I would rather... attempt it 
without than with Italian help’.368 Salisbury wearily commented in 1891 that 
 
         ... the Italian alliance is an unprofitable and... onerous corollary on the  
         German alliance... Germany and Austria are very useful friends (and) value  
          the Italian alliance greatly, because it means many batallions to them: and  
          for their sake we value it too.369  
 
       Admittedly, Crispi cannot be blamed for all of the ills which beset Anglo-Italian 
relations after his accession to power in August 1887. Though, as we have seen, Mancini 
and Depretis publicly abjured any Imperialist adventures before the Berlin Conference of 
1884-85,370 it is true that some Italians became obsessed with colonial expansion - 
                                                 
366 Quoted in Roberts, Salisbury, p.641. 
367 Beresford to Balfour 21 December 1891, quoted in Lowe, op.cit., p.34. 
368 Quoted in Taylor, Struggle, p.344. Historical factors, dating from the proto-union of Italy in 1861, meant 
that the Italian navy had little chance to develop in the shadow of the army (land-locked Piedmont favoured 
the army and, despite Cavour’s attempt to establish a national navy, took no notice of the seagoing 
traditions of Sardinia, to the fury of seasoned Neapolitan naval veterans  - another factor exacerbating the 
North-South divide), while crushing defeat at the hands of the Austrian navy in 1866 at Lissa meant that the 
Italian navy became even more neglected than hitherto, and learned to fear battle; Sullivan B.R., ‘A Fleet in 
Being: The Rise and Fall of Italian Sea Power, 1861-1943’, The International History Review, 
10:1(February 1988); pp. 106-124. 
369 Salisbury to Dufferin, January 1891; Roberts, Salisbury, p.554. 
370 Which was generally acknowledged to have started the “Scramble for Africa”. Chamberlain, Scramble, 
pp.55-60; Pakenham, Scramble, pp.239-42 & 251-4. Roberts notes, however, that ’The Scramble for 
Africa’ was ‘never so much a scramble as an orderly carve-up, over which no European nations ever 
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Mancini, who a few months before had disclaimed any ideas of Imperial adventure, asked 
the Chamber of Deputies in January 1885 whether ‘Italy could refuse to pay her 
contribution to the fight of civilization against ignorance and barbarism?’ and afford not 
to abandon prudence in order to do so.371  
      However, the ‘hysteria’ that is reputed to have ‘engulfed’ Italy after the Berlin 
conference is exaggerated. There is plenty of evidence that opposition to such adventures 
endured among large segments of Italian society. Lowe & Marzari  point out that ‘All the 
evidence suggests that in 1887-8 Crispi’s attitude (to Africa) was much nearer that of 
Depretis than Mancini. In January 1888 he offered to abandon Massowa to Britain in 
exchange for Zeila and (then) attempted to sell it to Bismarck, (while) his Minister for 
War, Bertole-Viale, had no enthusiasm (for an Italian campaign in Africa), an attitude 
fully shared by most Italian diplomats’.372 Most imperial enthusiasm was confined to 
those with a vested interest in the matter. As Jonas writes, 
 
               Public opinion in Italy (for Empire) had been tepid... Northern  
              newspapers (were) openly skeptical (and) The vision fared little better  
              in the south... following Ambe Alage, students... took to the streets shouting   
              “Viva Menelik!” (in) possibly Europe’s first anticolonial demonstration’.373  
 
Though the Societa Geografica Italiana was the source of much Italian colonial 
adventurism, ‘not every “geographer” rushed to the colonial cause... both the Societa di 
                                                                                                                                                 
actually went to war’; Roberts A., ‘Salisbury: The Empire Builder who never was’, History Today 
Vol.49:10: October 1999: pp.44-49.  
371 Lowe & Marzari, Italian, p.37.  
372 Ibid., p.56. 
373 Jonas, Adwa, pp.303-04. 
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studi geografici (in Florence) and the Genoa-based journal La cultura geografica ...  
articulated anticolonial sentiments and urged attention for Italy’s chronic domestic 
problems before colonial adventurism’.374 In May 1887, Kennedy (Ambassador to Rome) 
reported to Salisbury that the Italian government’s “energetic measures” to prosecute war 
with Abyssinia after the defeat at Dogali ‘serve to keep up an uneasy feeling in Italy in 
regard to the (government’s) policy towards Abyssinia’.375 Salisbury himself was no 
keener on the idea, opining that such a war would be a calamity for all Europe,376 while 
in July 1887 Count Robilant reminded the Senate of his original and unchanging 
opposition to the occupation of Assab and Massawa, though by now he accepted it as “a 
fait acompli” .377 In April 1888 it was reported from Rome that ‘The Italian public (view) 
the withdrawal of Italian troops (from Africa) with satisfaction... as the country realizes 
the present unsettled state of Europe, and considers that the presence of the Expeditionary 
force in Italy will be more satisfactory’ than if it was to remain in Africa.378   
            Salisbury was well aware that, though ‘Under Crispi’s hand Italy is running a 
little wild’,379 ‘Crispi is not Italy. The King was extremely sincere in his desire to 
maintain peace: an attitude shared by people like General Robilant’.380 However, Crispi it 
was that led Italy, and whose inflammatory words and attitudes towards France - with his 
attempts to enlist British support for the tariff war, claims for Tripoli in face of the 
                                                 
374 Atkinson, Constructing, in Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, Italian Colonialism, p.18. 
375 IOR/20/A/1171, Kennedy-Salisbury, 5 May 1887. 
376 Catalani-Crispi, 10 August 1887, DDI 2/XXI, p.19. 
377 Much as Lord Caernarvon (Henry Howard Molyneux Herbert, 4th Earl of Caernarvon, Under-Secretary 
of State for the Colonies 1858-9, Colonial Secretary 1866-7 and 1874-8) grudgingly accepted the British 
occupation of Perat in 1857(see Chapter 3); IOR/20/A/1171, Kennedy- Salisbury, 7 July 1887.  
378 IOR/20/A/1172, Slade-Savile, 18 April 1888. Their Austrian allies, given Italy’s history of irredentism, 
did not share this view. 
379 Salisbury to White, 19 August 1887, quoted in Smith, Embassy, p.90. 
380 Quoted in Lowe, Salisbury, p.49. 
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second Mediteranean Agreements and strident fears about French attack from Bizerta381 - 
made diplomatic life difficult for Salisbury. Prior to amending the Mediterranean 
Agreements in December 1887382 Salisbury referred to Crispi, in a letter of 28 October, 
as “longing for some splashy interference in Bulgarian affairs”;383 in just a few months he 
had got his measure of a man who he reviled for as long as Crispi held power. He 
regarded Crispi as an adventurer, a gambler desperate for domestic popularity and willing 
to go to any lengths to get it - not unlike his domestic bête noir Randolph Churchill.384 ‘In 
meanness, in mendacity, in treachery, in brutality, in cynical and arrogant injustice it is 
impossible to surpass Crispi’ he told Goschen in October 1888, and compared to whom 
Bismarck was ‘an angel of light’.385 And he was actively dangerous - ‘His conspirators 
temper... leads him to political gambling (that makes him) a danger to world peace’.386 It 
was, perhaps, inevitable that Salisbury’s view of Italy387 was coloured by his view of 
Crispi - in December 1888 he opined to the Queen that ‘It is the extreme 
untrustworthiness of the present ruling powers (in Rome)’that made British vigilance in 
                                                 
381 R. Taylor, Lord Salisbury (1975 London: Allen Lane), pp.139-42. The British Foreign Office tried to 
persuade Crispi that Bizerta was a chimera - at no time in history had any European power tried to establish 
a permanent strategic presence anywhere on the North African littoral, as without complete control of the 
sea such a fort, in time of war, would be isolated; cut off from supplies and reinforcements, the 
responsibility for defending its dockyard and arsenal would encumber all operations by its owner, and the 
necessity of relieving its garrison would dislocate the plans of any campaign. However, Bizerta was the 
African promontory closest to Sicily, and the Italians would not be comforted; Lyall, Dufferin, p.248. 
382 The December modification was made specifically to include Turkey, thus providing her with protection 
against Russia in the interests of maintaining the Status Quo defined in the original February documents; 
see document in Lowe, Reluctant II, pp.61-62. 
383 Salisbury to Lumley 28 October 1887, ibid., p.61.  
384 Taylor, Lord Salisbury, pp.139-40. In fact, Salisbury himself described Crispi as “the Randolph 
Churchill of Italy”; SP A/66/78, Salisbury  - Queen Victoria, 31 January 1888. 
385 Quoted in Roberts, Salisbury, p.530. 
386 Salisbury, quoted in Gailey A., The Lost Imperialist: Lord Dufferin, Memory and Mythmaking in an Age 
of Celebrity (London: John Murray, 2015), p.301. 
387 ‘Salisbury believed ... in national stereotypes... (according to him), the Italians had ‘very much the 
huffiness (you see) in the governess of a family. They are always thinking themselves slighted’; Roberts, 
op.cit., p.229. 
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all dealings with them essential.388 A consequence of this distrust led to, or resulted from, 
the third obstacle to Anglo-Italian harmony during the 1880-1891 period - Italian activity 
in the Red Sea littoral and its hinterland. 
       
The Greek Factor: “...there is no denying (the Greeks) are a most 
rascally set...”389 
Greece, like Italy, was, up to its independence in 1831, regarded with reverence and 
sympathy by all the Powers. Both countries, each the source of all the “Classics”, 
represented and provided the cultural, moral and juridical bases for all that was regarded 
as good and great about Western civilization.390 Both countries were then deprived of 
Nationhood, subjected to tyranny (by the Ottomans in Greece and assorted Habsburgs 
and Bourbons in Italy) and longing for freedom. In their struggles for liberation they were 
not alone; Byron marched with the Carbonari and died among Greeks at Missolonghi,391 
                                                 
388 Ibid.,p.524. 
389 Canning, quoted in H.W.V.  Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827: England, the Neo-
Holy Alliance, and the New World (London: Bell, 1925), p.329. 
390 ‘... the revival of... enthusiasm for ancient Greece, which began in Germany in the (late) eighteenth 
century with Winckelman and Wolf... laid the foundation of the political Philhellenism of the nineteenth 
century”: L. Gossman, ‘Philhellenism and Antisemetism: Matthew Arnold and his German Models’, 
Comparative Literature Vol. 46: 1 (Winter 1994); pp 1-39 (p. 3). The political aspect of European 
admiration for the Greeks was underlain by a racial aspect: ‘The doctrine of racial determinism (developed 
during the late 18th century) introduced into anthropological thought (the concept that) Human races were 
permanently unequal physically, in regard to beauty and strength, and culturally, in relation to their 
civilisational achievements. In all these hierarchies the Europeans, or white race, were at the top, and 
within the European category, the Greeks occupied the highest rank’; A.S. Leoussi, ‘Nationalism and 
Racial Hellenism in Nineteenth Century England and France’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20: 1 (1997); pp. 
42-68 (p.43).  
391 See D. Dakin, ‘The Political Influence of Byron’s Death on Britain’, The Byron Journal. January 1 
1977:Vol. 5; p.44, for a brief but interesting analysis of the effect of Byron’s death upon the British 
political establishment, and upon the future course of Greek history. 
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while Italians fought in their thousands for the Greeks during countless uprisings and 
insurgencies against the Turks.392 As Penn wrote, in every European country 
 
      The Romantic imagination of poets and painters was set afire; the piety of  
      the religious was stirred; the feelings of humanitarians were aroused; the  
      sympathy of liberals was awakened. The strength of reaction during these  
      years produced strong, though checked, opposition which found one good 
      outlet in the cause of Greece.393 
 
Of course, Italian irredentists and imperialists in their turn railed against Austria over the 
Veneto and Trentino, and against the Turks in the Balkans and North Africa. But, as 
Bismarck noted, “The Italians have a big appetite but poor teeth”394, were (as yet) in no 
position to take land away from Turkey or Austria, and thus (most of the time) presented 
no real threat to the stability of Europe, antagonism with France and Austria 
notwithstanding. The Greeks, on the other hand, though never a “Power”, presented a 
very real threat to the viability of the Ottoman Empire, and thus to the stability of Europe 
(see Appendix 3 for the full story of Greek influence in Russia and Europe). 
       
 
                                                 
392 See G. Salice, ‘The Greek Mirror: Philhellenism and Southern Italian Patriotism (1750-1861)’, Journal 
of Modern Italian Studies Vol.20:4; pp.491-507., and G. Pecout, ‘Philhellenism in Italy: Political 
Friendship and the Italian Volunteers in the Mediterranean in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Modern 
Italian Studies 9:4; pp. 405-27. 
393 V. Penn, ‘Philhellenism in Europe, 1821-1828’, Slavonic and East European Review, 16 (January 1, 
1937); pp. 638-653 (quote from p.638). 
394 Quoted in H.L. Wesseling, Divide and Rule: The Partition of Africa, 1880-1914 (Westport, Ct: Praeger, 
1996), p.20. 
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Capitulations: The Trigger 
Throughout the Ottoman Empire, from the sixteenth century onwards,395 wherever 
foreign powers had established a presence, ‘Capitulations’ were granted,396 which 
effectively meant that non-Ottoman subjects would be exempt from certain Ottoman 
financial, legal and religious impositions. Originally given to European merchants in 
order to encourage commerce with Christian states, capitulations indicated procedures, 
laws, regulations and responsibilities of foreign nationals residing and trading in the 
Ottoman Empire.  Of these, laws, taxes and tariffs were most important. For instance, 
foreigners had the right to be tried in their own consular courts, where laws of their own 
countries prevailed; they were exempt from local taxes, so they could trade at a financial 
advantage to their local competitors; and export tariffs were moderated by ‘most favoured 
nations’ clauses.397 Of particular significance to Massawa during the crisis of 1888 was 
the French treaty of 1740, which allowed the French government to adopt representation 
of non-French nationals whose governments possessed no treaty with the Porte.398 The 
capitulations as exercised at Massawa, combined with the latent confusion inherent in the 
                                                 
395 The first capitulations were granted in 1535 by Suleiman the Magnificent, to the French; Marlowe, 
Cromer in Egypt, p.9. 
396 ‘Originally, the Capitulations had been unilateral grants made by Ottoman Sultans to European 
Governments (enabling) European merchants to live and trade in Ottoman cities (under) the jurisdiction of 
their Consuls, and to be generally exempt from the ordinary processes of  (Islamic laws) as applied to 
Ottoman subjects... they were grants and not treaties since there was no reciprocity... (they) impinged 
hardly at all on the rights of (Ottoman subjects) and... provided for the Consul a necessary measure of 
authority over (merchants) for whose behaviour he was responsible...’; Marlowe, ibid., p.9. 
397 Fisher, Middle East, pp.299-300. 
398 Ibid., p.301. This treaty was predated by the first , of 1536 (1535 according to Marlowe - see above, note 
396) by which France obtained “a position of uncontested influence throughout the Turkish Empire”, with 
the right of appointing her own consuls who would judge cases involving French subjects, as well as 
guaranteeing the right of free Catholic worship. “Christians of all nationalities came under (French) 
protection, and though this was not specifically provided for in any treaty, it came to be accepted not only 
in Turkey but by all the Christian Powers, including the Papacy”. Peace Handbooks vol.xi no.66: France 
and the Levant (London: HMSO, 1921), quoted in Hallberg, Suez Canal, p. 35. This French monopoly was 
challenged by the Russians with the treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji of 1744, but in future it meant that both 
French and Russians in concert could pressure the Turks to do their bidding. 
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multiple layers of authority in the Red Sea, afforded the Italians a golden opportunity to 
cause mayhem. However, it seems likely that Crispi’s desire to find a pretext for 
triggering a war with France also played a major part in their behaviour. 
      On 30 May 1888 the Italian authorities at Massawa imposed a tax of between 2 and 7 
francs a month on all traders, dealers and other businessmen, irrespective of nationality, 
to cover municipal costs of lighting, roadworks , etc, and a further tax (amount 
unspecified) levied on comestibles for the same sort of reason. Twenty-three persons 
(two French, one Swiss, twenty Greeks) refused to pay these taxes on the grounds that 
they were exempted under the rules of pre-existing capitulations. They appealed to their 
diplomatic protectors, the French agents in Massawa, for representation.399  Trouble 
began to brew. 
 
Preparing the Ground 
Thus far, the growing friction between Italy and France seems to have been the result of a 
brushfire confrontation resulting from a spontaneous refusal of non-Italian subjects to pay 
a tax impudently imposed by the Italians and who, faute de mieux, had to fall back on 
French diplomatic protection. However, there is evidence from Italian documents that, 
possibly, this incident had been engineered by Crispi, with the collaboration of others, up 
to three months before July 1888. 
      As early as February 1887 Lyons (HMG Ambassador to Paris) had raised concerns 
that Boulanger’s sabre-rattling was driving Italy into an alliance with Germany, and this 
                                                 
399 Circular, 25th July 1888, Crispi - Italian representatives in Aia (The Hague), Athens, Belgrade, Berlin, 
Berne, Brussels, Bucharest, Cairo, Cetinje, Copenhagen, Constantinople,Lisbon, London, Madrid, Monaco, 
Sofia, Paris, St. Petersburg, Stockholm, Tunis, Vienna and Washington,   in L’Italia I/VII, pp.45-8. 
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with the sober Depretis still in charge.400 After Crispi’s accession, and with the 
atmosphere still charged, things became much worse. 
      Shortly after becoming both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in August 1887 
following the death of Depretis in July,401 Crispi visited Bismarck in Friedrichsruh, in 
October 1887.402 His purpose was to forge a secret Italo-German military convention 
(which was signed on 28 January 1888).403 The visit ‘... caused a diplomatic storm, 
especially in Paris, where Crispi was already viewed with grave suspicion’.404  
      Bismarck was not in favour of war with France, and neither were many in Italy.405 In 
February 1882 General Ricotti had prophesied that Italy would not be in a position to 
fight a major Power for 8-10 years,406 and many in Italy still felt such to be the case. The 
Italian Minister of War, Bertole-Viale407 (who had been critical of Crispi’s bellicosity 
from the moment he took power) was convinced that France would crush Italy in the 
event of war.408 But Crispi’s actions were driving the French to desperate measures.  
      In February 1888 Kennedy reported to Salisbury his ‘... profound mistrust of (Crispi’s 
political designs, especially regarding ‘a secret Italo-German treaty’, and that M. 
                                                 
400 CAB37/19/6, Lyons - Salisbury, 3 February 1887. 
401 Duggan, Crispi, p.494.   
402 Duggan, ‘Pursuit of War’, p.317. 
403 Ibid., p.320. 
404 Ibid., p.319. Prince Henry VII of Reuss (German Ambassador to Vienna 1878-1894) informed Bismarck 
that Kalnocky (Count Gustav Kalnocky (1832-98), soldier and diplomat; inter alia, Austrian Ambassador 
to St. Petersburg 1880-81, Minister for Foreign Affairs 1881-1895) ‘... thinks it will be no light task to keep 
the still somewhat inexperienced Italian Foreign Minister (Crispi) in a good humour and restrain him from 
ill-considered actions’; Reuss - Bismarck, 13 September 1887, GDD I, p. 321. 
405 The fiery Baron Blanc (Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, along with Abele Damiani, Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1887-89 & 1889-91) were two of the very few who held the view 
that ‘If there is to be war at all, it is in Italy’s interests to have it as quickly as possible’; Salisbury - Malet, 
1 September 1888, quoted in Duggan ‘Crispi’s Pursuit’, p.322. 
406 FO45/452, Paget - Granville, 25 January 1882. 
407 Ettore Bertole-Vitali (1829-1892), minister of war 1869-1870 & 1887-91. 
408 Duggan, ‘Crispi’s Pursuit’, p. 320. 
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Flourens (the French Foreign Minister)409 was actively involved with his colleagues and 
the French press in trying to obtain an inkling of the contents of the treaty by ‘.. inflicting 
upon Italy a series of premeditated provocations with a view to eliciting some 
remonstrance from Germany’, and thereby gaining some clue as to the nature of the 
supposed secret treaty. In response, Crispi was referring to France as ‘a bad neighbour’ 
and talked about ‘bringing her to her knees’ in the question of an impending commercial 
treaty. He was also having the Italian press publish details of French plans to invade Italy 
(obtained from the French military magazine Avenir Militaire), the massing on the Alpine 
border of troops meant for Tonkin, and the random dismissal of Italian workers.410 
      The Italians were busy making life difficult for the French in the Red Sea too. In 
September 1887 the Italians refused to accept the newly-appointed French Vice-Consul 
to Massawa, M. Mercinier. This, apparently, was because he had not given written 
evidence for his appointment, had not gone through the correct channels, and was not, 
thus, accepted by General Saletta411 as a valid diplomat.  
      Furthermore, the Italians refused to recognize the French as the representatives of the 
Greeks. Despite firmly-established historical and diplomatic precedents for French 
representation of the Greeks, the Italians claimed that the Greek government, not the 
                                                 
409 Emile Flourens (1841-1920), French Foreign Minister 1886-April 1888., 
410 FO45/601, Kennedy - Salisbury, 21 February 1888 (And see Duggan, ‘Crispi’s Pursuit’, p. 319). 
Kennedy was no fan of Crispi; in this letter he referred to him as ‘...unfitted for the post of foreign minister 
which he delights (and that) his natural rashness and impulsiveness has given rise to frequent 
misunderstandings and unpleasantness both at home and abroad’. A month before he had fulminated to 
Salisbury that Crispi ‘... exercises a virtual dictatorship’, and that ‘systemic opposition’ to him comes from 
‘... his restless avidity for self-glorification... to his want of tact and violence’, and that he ‘... arbitrarily 
thrusts himself and his country (into) postures beyond their strength, and in spite of his 30 years 
experience... has no real following... (He is someone to whom) the epithets of “humbug” and “windbag” 
are openly applied (and who only obtained power because) wearied of the colourless and feeble (Depretis) 
administration (the Italians) elected a man known (to be) at least be fearless and energetic’; FO45/601, 
Kennedy - Salisbury, 31 January 1888. 
411 Tancredi Saletta (1840-1909), soldier; led occupation of Massawa in February 1885. Replaced as 
governor there in November of 1885 by General Carlo Gene, reappointed governor April-November 1887.  
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French, represented the interests of Greeks in Massawa, and this despite the protestations 
of M. Nicolopoulo, the most prominent of Greek citizens in Massawa, that this was not 
the case. The Italians were obdurate; having France represent the Greeks undermined 
their authority in Massawa; Greek representation should come from Athens, not Paris.412  
      Then, in January 1888 the French consular agent at Massawa notified the French 
Foreign Ministry that the Italians were not, ‘under the present circumstances’, prepared  
to allow a caravan carrying provisions for the French residency to enter Massawa from 
Abyssinia, in direct contravention of an existing agreement between the two powers 
regarding such matters.413 Clearly, there was a strategic plan in place to prepare the 
ground for conflict with France, howsoever it might be brought about. 
      Finally, Crispi tried to drag Salisbury into the matter by the scruff of the neck. 
Salisbury had reluctantly agreed, in January 1888, to send the Channel Fleet to Genoa 
and Spezia in a gesture of solidarity with Italy. On 14 February an Italian newspaper 
reported that the British Admiral had declared on arrival in Genoa that ‘... If, in a conflict 
with France, England will be of little help to you on land, at sea it will show you that it 
counts for something’. The Admiral denied having said any such thing.414 The French 
were naturally alarmed by this, and by the sending of further Italian troops to Massawa 
which, combined with further demands from Crispi to Salisbury for more British naval 
reinforcements, was causing ‘legitimate apprehension’ in Paris.415 
                                                 
412 Crispi - Ressman (Italian ambassador at Paris), 6 September 1887, DDI 2/XXI, p.90. 
413 Flourens - Mouy (French Ambassador to Rome), 31 January 1888, in Documents Diplomatique 
Francais (1871-1914) Volume 1, Tome VII (1 January 1888 - 19 March 1890) (DDF 1/VII). 
414 Duggan, ‘Crispi’s Pursuit’, p.321. 
415 Waddington - Flourens, 10 February 1888, in DDF 1/VII. 
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      If  Kennedy was right about French actions being designed to provoke Italy in order 
to discover the nature of the Italo-German pact, it seems that the French were, if 
Duggan’s interpretation is correct, unwittingly playing right into Crispi’s hands.416 
      On 14 April 1888, Catalani wrote to Crispi about an encounter with Salisbury the 
previous day. Salisbury had told him that he hoped the Italians would not go against his 
wishes and abandon Massawa,417 but that if they did they must first ensure that the Turks 
would immediately reoccupy it in order to forestall an otherwise inevitable occupation by 
either France or Russia, since Britain had renounced all enterprises in Sudan and would 
thus not be in a position to stop any unfriendly foreign power taking Massawa. Then, ‘as 
delicately as possible’,418 Catalani sounded out Salisbury on the position in India in 
particular and on the situation with the Russians in Central Asia in general. Salisbury’s 
response was that he had no fears at that time of problems with the Russians in the 
region, and with that the conversation drew to a close.419 
      What is interesting about this communication (quite apart from the surprising 
revelation that Salisbury wanted the Italians in Massawa at all) is Catalani’s referral to his 
‘delicate’ questioning of Salisbury about the situation in Central Asia. Why did it have to 
be delicate, and what had it got to do with Massawa? The only possible construction on 
such circumspect wording is that Catalani was trying to see if, in the event of war 
breaking out between France and Italy, Britain would be free to come to Italy’s aid as 
expected under the terms of the Mediterranean Agreements, or whether she would be too 
                                                 
416 According to Duggan, Crispi claimed that the forces of the Triple Alliance would have the upper hand 
until 1889, but not thereafter, hence his anxiety to provoke a war before then; Duggan, op.cit., p.318. 
417 Quite a disclosure, since he had always expressed the thought that the Italian occupation of Massawa 
was insane and unsustainable. 
418 “Dans le cours de l’entretien je l’ai sonde, aussi delicatement que possible, sur l’etat de choses aux 
Indes”; my italics. 
419 14th April 1888, Catalani-Crispi, in L’Italia 1/VII (1888-1889), pp. 6-7. 
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tied down elsewhere to tender assistance. Given that such aid would only be tendered in 
the event of an unequivocally unjustified attack upon Italy by France, such a question 
could only have been made if French aggression was confidently expected. If this was the 
case, Catalani’s sounding out of Salisbury must have been because he knew that some 
kind of action resulting in war was in the offing; and the excessive delicacy with which 
he mooted the question must have been because he did not want Salisbury to twig that the 
Italians were up to something. 
      Over the following weeks Catalani tried to whip Salisbury into a Francophobic 
frenzy, though with indifferent results. On 4 June he received from Crispi a telegram 
informing him of French intrigues against Italy in Abyssinia, and on 5 June 1888 he 
informed Crispi, in a Top Secret message, that he had told Salisbury of these intrigues, 
and that His Lordship had ‘once again’ displayed disbelief as to why France should wish 
to so embarrass Italy in the region. In commiseration, Salisbury further revealed that the 
French had disbursed such large bribes to local coastal chieftains that Britain had had to 
respond with even bigger bribes to stop the erosion of British influence in the region, 
while his ignorance of French machinations in Harrar, disclosed by Catalani, led him to 
state in disgust that they were indeed no better than ‘goading wasps’.420 Two days later, 
on 7 June, Catalani told Crispi he had shown Salisbury the telegram dated 4 June, and 
that Salisbury had replied that they had to find a way to combat French intrigue and stop 
them from ‘walking all over us’ in Abyssinia. After a moment of reflection (Catalani 
wrote), Salisbury decided to telegram Baring in Cairo and ask him to find a way of 
averting the Negus from ceding Ras Amoti, Gazoti and Hasot to the French, which 
                                                 
420 Catalani - Crispi, 5th June 1888, ibid., p.19. However, given the relatively low priority that the Red Sea 
had in Salisbury’s mind at this time, and his growing distrust of the Italians, it is likely that this and his 
subsequent comments to them on this matter were just intended to humour them. 
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apparently was set fair to be one of the results of French intrigue.421 However, this action 
backfired on the Italians - on 12 June 1888, Catalani had to report to Crispi that Baring 
had replied to Salisbury, saying that there was no knowledge in Cairo of any such French 
intrigues, or for that matter in Suakin or Aden either.422 
      By 12 June however, the French for their part were starting to respond to Italian 
actions. De Mouy, French Ambassador to Rome, verbally informed Crispi that the French 
agent in Cairo had received news of the tax increases in Massawa, which drew the same 
objections from non-Italian nationals as had the tax on exported Gold in March 1887.423 
Furthermore, it was felt among the recusants that the measures adopted were not founded 
on any considerations except those of military - i.e. Italian Imperial - exigencies, since 
purely municipal matters had always been catered for by the capitulations. The French 
government vigorously contest the imposition of such new taxes.424 
      Crispi then informed General Menabrea, the Italian Ambassador at Paris, of the 
French ambassador’s complaints, and of Italian parliamentary reaction to the matter. 
Damiani remarked that he had never heard Crispi mention the necessity of imposing new 
taxes. Crispi replied, and reiterated to Menabrea, that since Ottoman law no longer 
applied at Massawa the matter of whether old or new taxes took precedence was 
irrelevant. In consequence, no hindrance to the imposition of new taxes as levied by the 
undisputed new Power could be brooked - and since the French were doing exactly the 
same in Obokh as were the Italians in Massawa, they had no right to complain.425 On 28 
                                                 
421 Catalani - Crispi, 7th June 1888, ibid., pp.19-20. Location of these places unknown. 
422 Catalani - Crispi, 12th June 1888, ibid., p.20. 
423 See note 333 above. 
424 12th June, De Mouy, French Ambassador at Rome - Crispi, ibid., pp.20-21. 
425 25th June, Crispi - Menabrea, ibid., p.26.  
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June, Crispi telegrammed Menabrea that General Baldiserra426 (Officer Commanding 
Massawa) had reported that the protest of the recalcitrant Greeks had been instigated by 
the French Consul, and vented his outrage that the Greeks, lacking their own diplomatic 
representative, had hidden behind the skirts of the French, who had taken up their cause 
as a result. The action of the French was one ‘not only of substance but of form’, and 
demonstrated a profound lack of respect for Italian authority in the matter.427 All this led 
to Crispi’s advisory note to the governments of the countries adumbrated in his circular 
of 25 July 1888, explaining why the taxes had been applied and how, in other Ottoman 
territories occupied by other countries (such as the British in Cyprus and the Austrians in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina), similar practices were followed. 
      Everything was lining up nicely to prepare for an Italian confrontation with France. 
        
                                           Part 3. War in Sight 
 
In July 1888 the Earl of Lytton428 reported to Salisbury that M. Goblet429 was ‘much 
preoccupied and exercised’ about the recent Franco-Italian arguments regarding taxes 
levied on non-Italian nationals by the government of Massawa. Goblet said that the 
Italian government had originally disclaimed all ideas of conquest or permanent 
annexation of Massawa, claiming only a temporary occupation for strictly commercial 
purposes. In theory, Massawa remained subject to Ottoman or Egyptian law, so arbitrary 
‘imposts’ were contrary to the Treaty rights, as recognized by the Ottomans, of foreign 
                                                 
426 Antonio Baldissera (1838-1917), soldier; Governor of Eritrea, November 1887-1889. 
427 28th June 1888, Crispi - Menabrea, ibid., p.27. 
428 Robert Bulwer-Lytton, HM Ambassador at Paris 1887-1891. 
429 Rene Goblet, Prime Minister of France 1886-87, Foreign Minister April 1888-1889.  
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powers. Goblet said that Crispi had assured him that General Menabrea would furnish 
explanations, but that none had been forthcoming.430 Crucially, Goblet said that he was 
quite ready to recognize the Italian annexation of Massawa, should such an event be 
openly declared and ratified, but that for a power in temporary occupation to impose 
heavy imposts in defiance of pre-existing Treaty rights was ‘a very high-handed and 
aggressive proceeding’.431  
      Some days later the matter had escalated; French citizens were having their property 
forcibly seized and sold as the result of non-payment of imposts, while Greek citizens432 
under French protection were also being harrassed for non-payment of taxes. The Italian 
actions, said Goblet, were ‘altogether illogical and unprecedented’: the French had 
respected Italian rights to their capitulations in Tunis - where the largest foreign presence 
was Italian433 - even after the permanent assumption of power by France in 1881, yet in 
Massawa, where the Italian occupation was supposed to be only ‘of a temporary and 
                                                 
430 Menabrea informed Crispi that he had repeatedly shown Goblet his (Crispi’s) correspondence on the 
matter; Menabrea- Crispi, 16 July 1888, DDI 2/XXI, p.91. 
431 Letter of 13 July 1888, Lytton to Salisbury, R/20/A/1172. 
432 By 1880 Greeks were also one of the largest and most significant groups in Abyssinia - as in other areas 
of the Middle East they had become a ‘middleman minority’, but this time aided by a history of good 
relations with their Abyssinian hosts and the sharing of a common religion. A Greek community was 
established in Gondar during the 18th century, and before the Mahdiya they were trading with Abyssinia 
from bases in Sudan, such as Kassala and Gedarif, while other Greeks had settled in Harrar via French 
Djibouti. In 1863, during the run-up to the Napier expedition, the British Consul to Abyssinia even 
suggested appointing a Greek merchant as British Vice-Consul at Massawa (Arnold, Magdala, p.68); 
Natsoulas T., ‘The Greeks as an alien minority at the outset of Ethiopia’s economic development, 1880-
1910’, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 1989:13:1:pp.219-43, and ‘The Hellenic Presence in Ethiopia. 
A Study of a European Minority in Africa (1740-1936)’, Abba Salama VIII (1977). And see Miran, Red 
Sea, pp.112-21 & passim; Fisher, Middle East, pp.243-44, 270 & 300-01, and Natsoulis & Natsoulas, 
Rimbaud, p.53, as well as Appendix 3.) However, since they had no representation, they had to rely on 
French protection. Here in Massawa, in 1888, 23 of them were refusing to pay a ‘House tax’, so found their 
eating houses and drink ships closed in forfeiture; Sir Julian Pauncefote, under-secretary of state for foreign 
affairs-Salisbury, 20 July 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. Regarding the onerous taxes levied on the Greeks, M. 
Dragounis, the Greek prime Minister, said that Greece could only submit to the superior force of a Great 
Power, but that the business would “add another item to the score against Italy”; cited in letter of 19 July 
1888 from Sir Edmund Monson, envoy to Greece, to Salisbury, IOR/20/A/1172. 
433 See Chapter 1. 
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exclusively commercial character, the Italians had arbitrarily disregarded the 
capitulations and, in spite of protests, had stated that they did so by right of conquest’.434 
      Crispi responded to British enquiries into the matter by asking what the situation was 
in British-occupied Cyprus (probably a rhetorical question, since Salisbury’s views on the 
matter were well-known; he was not in favour of capitulations),435 stating that all 
capitulations were redundant when Ottoman territory was occupied by a Christian Power. 
Goblet was not slow in pointing out to Salisbury that, where the Italians were still 
benefitting from capitulations in Tunis, there should be some reciprocity shown to the 
French, and those under their aegis, in Massawa.436  
      It was from here onwards that the Italians were able to muddy the water regarding 
sovereignty.  
      On 23 July 1888 one Edward Wingfield of the Colonial Office advised the Foreign 
Office, in response to Crispi’s enquiry about capitulations in British-run Cyprus, that 
British taxes applied across the board with no capitulations allowed, and that the British 
authorities had received ‘no complaints on the subject from the Cypriot population’.437 
Crispi, no doubt aware of Salisbury’s views on the subject of capitulations, was able to 
                                                 
434 Lytton- Salisbury, 19 July, IOR/20/A/1172. 
435 Cyprus was ceded by the Porte to Britain in the Cyprus Convention of 1878, in return for British 
protection against Russian aggression in Asiatic Turkey; Blake, Disraeli, pp. 644-45; Palmer, Dictionary, 
p. 98.  
      Salisbury’s view was that ‘We had always held the view that the capitulations were a system wholly 
inconsistent with Christian government... I reminded His Excellency (the French ambassador) that in the 
case of Tunis we have taken this view as against ourselves’; letter of 23 July 1888, Salisbury to Lytton, 
IOR/20/A/1172. Baring, though not always seeing eye-to-eye with Salisbury (see, for instance, Baring’s 
letter to Alfred Lyall of 25 January 1876, where he writes that “Salisbury’s notion of a compromise (is for) 
all the concession to be on one side. So there is nothing for it but a big fight...”; quoted in Owen, Lord 
Cromer, p. 83) was also opposed to capitulations, on the basis that that interfered with unfettered control of 
territories arrogated to, or by, Britain. In 1904 he stated, with knowing simplicity and more than a touch of 
exaggeration, that “The only reason why the British flag is flying (in Khartoum)... is to avoid the 
capitulations”; Owen, Lord Cromer, pp.178 & 303.    
436 Salisbury-Lytton,  23 July 1888, in IOR/20/A/1172.  
437 Memorandum from Wingfield to Foreign Office of 23 July, in IOR/20/A/1172. 
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point out that the Porte had been offered the opportunity to militarily occupy their Red 
Sea ports in 1884 as a part of the international response to the Mahdist threat from Sudan, 
but had declined to do so, and that the Egyptians had offered no resistance to the Italian 
occupation of Massawa in February 1885, which had been so benevolent as to allow the 
Egyptian and Italian flags to fly side-by-side for weeks thereafter - the implication being 
that there was no effective difference between temporary occupation and outright 
conquest given the exigent circumstances of the time.438 Crispi had already laid the moral 
ground for his defence and promotion of Italian expansion in the Red Sea, using the 
argument that Italian blood had been spilt in the process of advancing civilization in the 
Dark Continent, with the result that the Italian Chamber had, despite deep-seated 
reservations among the Italian population in general about the wisdom of being there at 
all, voted 302 to 40 in favour of staying in Massawa.439 
      Salisbury was trying to stay out of the matter as much as possible. On 20 July 1888, 
Catalani told Crispi that the French and Greeks had been trying to induce Salisbury to 
support their view on the matter of capitulations (if true an odd thing to do, given his 
                                                 
438 See Chapter 1 for Gladstone and Granville’s opinion, expressed in notes dated 3 November and 20 
December 1884 that, should pressure on the Turks to occupy their possessions in the Red Sea not be 
successful, the Italians should be allowed to move in. Baring reported to Salisbury in November 1888 that 
the Egyptians had indeed done nothing to oppose the Italian occupation, and that the Italian and Egyptian 
flags had flown side-by-side from 5 February, when the Italians moved in, to 6 December 1885; Baring- 
Salisbury, 8 November 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. 
439 In a summary of Italian colonial policy, Crispi had orated to the Chamber that “the idea of exploring... 
Africa was put forward by illustrious men of science, who lost their lives in the expedition (i.e. the Giulietti 
mission, massacred in May 1881 - Caulk, Between, p. 44), and after such a sacrifice it would have been 
impossible to leave their blood unavenged... We first occupied Assab; our predecessors took Massawa; it 
would not be logical to give one up and keep the other... the right of possession results from military 
occupation... Someone asks what we are doing in Massawa and what advantages may be expected in return 
for such danger and expense? I reply, that... the profit is not to be reckoned in francs and centimes. Great 
nations are compelled to affirm their position in every part of the world by propagating civilization. (In 
comparison to England) we... are only beginning today, and we must work with all our might in the open 
contest with races as bold as they are powerful”. Extract of speech sent by Savile to Salisbury, 16 May 
1888, in IOR/20/A/1172. See also Menabrea-Crispi, 16 July 1888, DDI 2/XXI, p.91. 
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avowed opposition to them), but that he had been ‘evasive’ and unwilling to ‘attribute 
any importance to their requests’.440  
      This was probably what Crispi had been waiting for.441 Now, he proceeded at full 
throttle to stir up a hornets’ nest. On 23 July he told Menabrea that Italy no longer 
recognized M. Mercinier as a valid diplomat,442 despite the fact that the French 
government had by this time (according to Menabrea) explicitly told Mercinier not to 
offer any resistance to Italian actions.443 The Italian government mouthpiece, the paper 
La Riforma, reported that  
 
      The hostility of the Greeks at Massawa has been inspired by the French  
      government... we can only regret that we find an adversary in France...444  
 
Kennedy reported to Salisbury that ‘... the (assumed indolent) attitude of France has 
caused much irritation here’ (i.e. in Rome) because the French ambassador, M.Geroud, 
had failed to deliver a Note to anyone in the Italian government regarding the matter; the 
fact that no minister had been in to receive his note cut no ice with the Italians.445 In 
retaliation for this imagined French slight, the Italians at Massawa closed the Post Office 
                                                 
440 Catalani-Crispi, DDI 2/XXI, p.97; see also FO45/636, Catalani-Rome, 8 January 1889. 
441 Crispi sent a circular to Catalani, Launay (in Berlin) and Nigra (in Vienna) announcing that he had had 
confirmation that both Britain and Austria “agreed with the Italian point of view”; 23 July 1888, DDI 
2/XXI, p.100.  
442 DDI 2/XXI, p.102. 
443 Menabrea-Crispi, 17 July 1888, DDI 2/XXI, p.93. 
444 As reported by Kennedy to Salisbury, 25 July 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. It is notable that attempts by the 
Greeks to discuss the matter with the Italian representative in Athens, Count Fe d’Ostiane, were hampered 
by the latter’s apparent imbecility - ‘I had a conversation with (d’Ostiane) in the presence of M. de Below, 
the German Charge d’Affaires... (d’Ostiane) labours under the disadvantage of being absolutely incapable 
of expressing himself intelligibly on any subject whatever, as M. de Below and I... found ourselves 
mutually obliged to confirm that, of the Count’s explanation only an infinitesimal portion (bore) any 
meaning to our ears, and that (it is fortunate for all concerned that further discussion of the matter) is to 
take place mainly in Rome’; Monson- Salisbury, 19 July 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. 
445 Kennedy- Salisbury, 25 July 1888, in IOR/20/A/1172. 
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to the French for sending encrypted telegrams, an action interpreted to Salisbury by the 
French ambassador in London as ‘a gratuitous discourtesy’, ‘high-handed and imperious’, 
likely to cause a serious breach in Franco-Italian relations, and proof that Crispi was 
‘trying to pick a quarrel’ with France; an opinion that Salisbury tried to damp down by 
reassuring the ambassador that such actions could best be ‘attributed to the excitable 
condition of Crispi himself’.446 On being questioned about this by Kennedy, Crispi 
‘declined to admit discourtesy to France and (attributed such difficulties) to the 
persistently hostile attitude of the French Consul (at Massawa) for the past 3 years’, a 
man whose predecessor had been evicted from Massawa for spying and intriguing against 
the Italians, and who had been advising all foreigners to resist payment of all taxes, by 
force if necessary.447  
      Surprisingly perhaps, Goblet still believed at this stage that Crispi’s actions were due 
to no more than his usual jealousy of France. The French had already had a mild dispute 
with Italy as to whether or not the occupation of Massawa contravened Article 34 of the 
                                                 
446 Salisbury- Kennedy, 28 July 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. Salisbury had expressed doubts to Catalani about 
the “vigour” with which the Italians were abolishing capitulations and requested that they show more 
tolerance to the French in Massawa, but this seemed to have no effect; Catalani-Crispi, 28 & 29 July 1888, 
DDI 2/XXI, pp.111 & 114. 
447 ‘Italian colonial policy... has so far been disastrous for Italy in all respects (but) the country actively 
approves Crispi’s (actions in the matter) and great indignation is expressed against France’; Kennedy- 
Salisbury, 30 July 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. Crispi informed Catalani that he had received a ‘violently-worded 
note’ from the French regarding Massawa, but that, naturally, he had not risen to the challenge but had 
instead responded “with a calm demeanour”; DDI, 2/XXI, 1 August 1888. 
      The upsurge of Italian hostility to the Greeks seems curious in light of the historically close relations 
between the two countries during the previous hundred or so years. Italians had been conspicuous in their 
support for Greek struggles against Ottoman oppression during the18th and 19th centuries, since many 
Italians regarded the Italians and Greeks as having a common and ancient cultural heritage to which 
Ottoman hegemony was inimical, while on another level the resistance of the Greeks mirrored Italian 
efforts to throw off the tyranny of the Bourbons and Habsburgs - see  Salice. ‘The Greek Mirror’, pp. 491-
507, and Pecout., ‘Philhellenism’, pp.405-27. A portion of the reason lies in Salice’s explanation that, by 
the end of the century Crispi, in common with other Italian socialists and nationalists, had wearied of the 
notion of such cultural and political solidarity, seeing it as somewhat passé in the context of late 19th 
century Power politics and as a distraction from more pressing domestic issues (Salice, ibid., pp.406 & 
416-17). There was also the fact that the Greeks held or aspired to holding territories currently belonging to 
the Turks, such as Crete, which the Italians also wanted in order to start resurrecting their Neo-Roman 
Empire. However, as we shall see, other reasons emerged. 
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1878 Treaty of Berlin (i.e. whether or not it caused damage to the fabric of the Ottoman 
Empire), but as yet they did not seem to perceive the growing seriousness of the situation. 
Goblet opined that all Europe could see that France had always acted with great 
benevolence towards Italy, that Crispi was driving the matter and that, knowing this, no-
one would take the matter seriously. Furthermore, everyone could see that the Italian 
position lacked logic. Their argument was that since Tunis was not annexed but merely 
occupied, the continuance of capitulations there was to be expected, but as Massawa had 
been annexed to the Italian state it was now subject to the rules of Christian governance, 
which did not countenance capitulations. This hardly indicated a balanced view on the 
part of Crispi, since Crispi himself was never consistent about whether or not Massawa 
had been conquered or simply occupied.448 Shortly after this, Goblet comforted himself 
by telling M. Herbette, the French ambassador at Berlin, that he (Goblet) had discussed 
the matter with M. de Schoen, the German ambassador to Paris. The latter had remained 
non-commital as he was not apprised of the details of the case, but responded with 
sympathy to Goblet’s narration of how the Italians were obstructing French movements 
in and out of Massawa and discomfiting other nationals there who came under French 
protection. de Schoen opined that Italian actions could well be due to their belief that 
France was about to annex Tunis, a belief encouraged by the presence in Paris of the 
dissolute Taieb Bay, the Regent of Tunis, who was showing no signs of returning to 
Tunis but was believed to be quite prepared to sell his inheritance in return for a 
reasonable price. de Schoen was assured that Taieb was there purely for his health, and 
not for any ulterior motive.449 Herbette shortly after reassured Goblet that Count 
                                                 
448 Goblet -Gerard (French Charge d’Affairs, Rome), 28 July 1888, in DDF I/VII, pp. 197-99. 
449 Goblet -Herbette, 31 July 1888, ibid. 
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Berchem, of the German Foreign Office, had told him that, though Germany could see no 
reason for capitulations to continue under a Christian administration, everyone knew that 
Crispi was always a little hasty in his decisions and that he was too ready to ‘faire 
grand’.450 
      So Goblet was able to carry on whistling in the dark a little longer, unaware that a 
storm was about to break over his head. 
 
The situation escalates 
By this time the Turks, heretofore fairly torpid where the Red Sea was concerned, were 
becoming interested in the matter. Kennedy reported a conversation between Crispi and 
Photiades Pasha,451 the Turkish ambassador to Rome, which demonstrated the lengths to 
which the Italians would go to exploit the confusion over ownership on the Red Sea 
coast. Crispi advised Photiades that a note regarding sovereign rights over the Red Sea 
had been circulated by the Porte to the Powers after the occupation of Massawa in 1885, 
but that the content of the note warranted an interpretation of Italian sovereign rights over 
Massawa, and that the Sultan had recognized those rights by agreeing to the Convention 
drafted in October 1885,452 particularly in article X, which - Crispi said - abrogated 
                                                 
450 Herbette -Goblet, 31 July 1888, ibid. 
451 Photiades was Greek. 
452 This referred to the Drummond-Wolff Convention of  October 24 1885, which effectively divided 
authority over Egypt between Britain and the Porte and, after a very anfractuous journey, provided the basis 
of what became the Constantinople - or Suez Canal - Convention of October 1888. However, the 
Drummond-Wolff convention was not accepted as binding by any of the other Powers and was challenged 
by France and Russia particularly, thereafter falling into desuetude; see F.A.K. Yasamee, Ottoman 
Diplomacy: Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888 (Istanbul: Isis Press,  1996), pp. 141-152; 
Hornick M.P., ‘The Mission of Sir Henry Drummond-Wolff to Constantinople, 1885-1887’, English 
Historical Review 4:4 (1940); Hallberg, Suez Canal, pp. 278-91; Lowe, Reluctant, pp.112-14; Owen, Lord 
Cromer, pp.251-19; and Roberts, Salisbury, pp.343-44 & 436-38 for the complete story of the Drummond-
Wolff negotiations and the series of failed negotiations, conventions and treaties that eventually came 
together in the Constantinople convention. 
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Ottoman authority over their Red Sea possessions.453 Photiades denied that the Sultan, as 
Caliph of all Islam, had abrogated his rights over Moslem subjects anywhere; Crispi’s 
repost was that the Italian situation in Massawa was directly analogous to that of the 
French in Tunis - though with typical disingenuousness he simultaneously denied any 
connection between the separate questions of Massawa and Tunis.454 
      Photiades responded that the Italian position in Massawa should be not like that of 
France in Tunis (which was a permanent occupation and, as such, had been opposed by 
the Porte, to no avail) but should be more like that of Britain in Egypt, which  - 
significantly - had the approval of the Sultan. The British government always recognised 
the rights of the Sultan as Suzerain of Egypt (he said), even though her troops were 
stationed there in ‘temporary’ occupation, and that the terms of the British occupation 
recognized this right. Photiades said to Kennedy that, furthermore, Italian intransigence 
was weakening their position with the Porte, especially since the French were ever alert 
for any opportunity to undermine the Italians and persuade the Sultan of their designs on 
Albania and Tripoli. Italian assertion of their rights over that of the Porte would “pain the 
Sultan”, both because it would weaken his prestige with his subjects and because he had 
TWICE been assured by the Italians that their occupation was only temporary, and that 
his rights would be respected at all times. The Sultan had been told that, firstly, the 
Italians had been forced into Massawa455 and that no Ottoman rights would be violated; 
and secondly, that Robilant had assured him (when?) that, unlike with Assab, no 
territorial acquisition was intended. Now Crispi was talking about ‘right of Conquest’, 
                                                 
453 It does no such thing. See text of Convention of October 1888 in Hallberg, Suez Canal, Appendix D, pp. 
407-11. 
454 ‘Sr. Crispi refuses to admit any connection between the two questions’; Kennedy- Salisbury, 4 August 
1888, IOR/20/A/1172. 
455 See Chapter 1 
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which hardly sounded either temporary or mindful of Ottoman rights, and also sounded 
like the juridical basis for claiming that Italy’s right to abrogate capitulations 
differentiated Massawa’s status from that of Tunis.456 This ‘painful usurpation’ of the 
Sultan’s rights meant that he might not now sign the impending Suez Canal Convention, 
which was of vital interest to all the major Powers.457 The Porte hotly refuted Crispi’s 
arguments, especially those referring to Article 34 of the Treaty of Berlin and Article X 
of the Suez Canal Convention, saying that Article 34 referred just as much to Massawa as 
to elsewhere in the Ottoman domains, and that they objected ‘... vivement contre 
l’interpretation abusive et erronnee donnee par (Crispi) a l’article X (of the Suez Canal 
Convention)’.458 
      At this, the Germans declared their interest in the matter, and in a way that left no 
doubt as to the seriousness with which the Massawa incident, and its potential impact 
upon the imminent Suez Canal Convention, was now being viewed in Berlin. On 2 
August 1888 Salisbury, obviously responding to an earlier communication from Athens 
to London, contacted Munson, saying the Greeks were mistaken in thinking that Britain 
                                                 
456 It was probably no coincidence that a year before Major Hunter had reported to Portal in Cairo that the 
Turks had opened a newly-constructed fortress at Warner Point, opposite Perim, probably as a reassertion 
of the Porte’s authority over that stretch of the Red Sea; Portal- Salisbury, 23 August 1887, IOR/20/A/1171 
(a significant event, since the Turks had tried and failed on numerous occasions to stamp their authority on 
the coasts of Arabia during the preceding years, usually by trying to build a naval presence but then finding 
that they couldn’t afford it; Anscombe, Ottoman, pp. 16-20 & 74-80). Commander Forsyth, of HMS 
Griffon, reported later that the fort was only small and built to defend the local Turks from the Yemeni 
Arabs (IO L/PS/9/56, Political resident, Aden - Chief Secretary Bombay, 8 October 1887), but nevertheless 
it was a site that could be developed into a major strategic asset. 
      Further, the Italians had stated unequivocally in July 1888 that they considered Massawa an Italian 
possession and that taxes would be “scrupulously extracted” from the Greeks, even though they knew that 
“the Greek government relied on capitulations”; Monson-Salisbury, 19 July 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. 
457 Report, dated 31 July 1888, from Kennedy to Salisbury, IOR/20/A/1172 The Constantinople/Suez Canal 
convention effectively guaranteed freedom of movement to all commercial shipping through the Suez 
Canal and Red Sea, and thus was of very great moment to all concerned, not least Germany, whose 
development of possessions in East Africa depended in large part upon her merchant fleet’s ability to pass 
unhindered through the Red Sea. 
458 Goblet - French representative, London, 14 August 1888, DDF I/VII. 
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had no interest in the matter since over 200 British Indian subjects resided in Massawa, 
subjects who (as we have seen) had expressed their great unhappiness at their treatment 
by the Italians. Monson responded by saying that the Greeks had hotly rejected the 
German view that they were causing trouble by supporting the French position, though by 
now they accepted that Britain’s views were based not on indifference to the plight of the 
Greeks but upon her opposition to all capitulations as witnessed ‘to our prejudice’ in 
Tunis.459 
      The Germans were more direct a few days later, when Mr. Scott, of the diplomatic 
staff in Berlin, reported to Salisbury that 
 
       ...Count Bismarck told me... he is very anxious that you (pressure the  
       French to drop the Massawa issue). He has told the French Charge d’Affaires  
       very frankly that (it is) not worth the risk... I am struck by the certainty with  
       which His Excellency spoke of (French isolation and helplessness),460 his  
       evident desire that she should be made to feel this, and the complacency 
       with which he viewed the diversion of Sr. Crispi’s foreign activity into that 
       direction.461  
 
M. Raindre, the French Charge d’Affaires to Berlin, reported Bismarck’s conversation  
with himself on the matter to Goblet on 3 August. Bismarck had said that everyone knew 
                                                 
459 Cables of  2 August 1888, Salisbury to Monson and Monson to Salisbury, and 3 August 1888, Monson 
to Salisbury, IOR/20/A/1172. 
460 Bismarck had no fear of an isolated France because he was sure that Russia would not, in the case of 
war, come to her aid without a binding treaty. ‘... I certainly do not believe that, if France took the 
offensive, she would receive Russian support... if France attacks us - we should be entirely forsaken by 
God, if we were unable to cope with her’’; Bismarck - Hatzfeldt, 8 August 1887, GDD I, p. 313. 
461 Scott- Salisbury, 5 August 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. 
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of the accord between Italy and Germany and that Germany would be obliged to defend 
her in the event of conflict. He urged the French to try and restore good relations with 
Italy, because the Massawa affair was essentially secondary and minor. The Italians, he 
said, had the irritability and accumulated resentment (amas de griefs) of a young Power, 
and even though it was clear that France had always been benevolent to Italy, Crispi was 
hell-bent upon seeing hostility everywhere. In short, Bismarck said, it was best just to roll 
with the punches on this occasion rather than face the very real possibility of this minor 
inconvenience turning into something far worse.462      
 
Salisbury was clearly very discomfited by this development. As he wrote to Lytton, 
 
      Both at Berlin and here I have been strongly pressured by the German  
      government to advise France to (drop the matter). In the view of the  
      German government no important French interest is at stake, and  
     the quarrel between France and Italy would be (a serious matter) for Europe...  
      the German Government has (informed) the French... that, if a state of  
      war arose between France and Italy, Germany would be forced to take the  
      Italian side. (I said) I thought I might warn the French government (as I  
      was mistaken) in the opinion I expressed with regard to the attitude of  
      Germany. I have grown now to believe that Germany is taking the side of  
      Italy somewhat earnestly in the matter, as the affair no longer has the  
                                                 
462 Raindre - Goblet, 3 August 1888, DDF I/VII. My vernacular. 
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      narrow local significance which I at first attached to it.463 
       
Goblet was taken aback to a point of despair by Crispi’s attitude and words 
 
                  Il m’est impossible de comprendre le griefs que le 
                  Government italien peut avoir amasses contre nous.464 
 
      The Austrians held themselves as aloof from the matter as they decently could, 
though manifestly they believed that Crispi’s behaviour was, as usual, unduly 
rebarbative, and their tacit sympathy was clearly with France.465 It seems that Salisbury 
was right, however, to take the ominous German response seriously; every indication was 
that they intended to act upon their threats should their ally find herself at war with 
France. An article in Norddeutsche Allgemaine Zeitung of 8 July 1888 bore  
 
                evident marks of official inspiration. It prefers against France the  
                                                 
463 Salisbury-Lytton, 7 July 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. Mr. Egerton, diplomatic attaché to Paris, told Salisbury 
that he had relayed to Goblet Salisbury’s view that “the affair was no longer of the purely local significance 
... previously attached to it”. Goblet had responded that the Germans were seeing the whole matter 
“through Italian glasses”, but, given the continental line-up, that was hardly surprising; Egerton- Salisbury, 
15 August 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. On 16 August 1888 the Porte sent a Circular round the Powers objecting 
to the Italian actions in Massawa, but M. de Radowitz, the German ambassador to the Porte, managed to 
get it “toned down”; Sir William White (HM Ambassador to the Porte) - Salisbury, IOR/20/A/1172. 
464 Goblet - Reindre, 4 August 1888, DDF I/VII. 
465 ‘Count Kalnoky remains aloof from French appeals as from Italian representations... (naturally enough) 
in view of the peculiar relations between Austria and Italy... Kalnocky’s belief is that Crispi has (behaved) 
with little tact. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs appears disinclined to be bound by any of the 
traditions of diplomacy’; Mr. Phipps, diplomatic staff in Vienna, to Salisbury, 9 &11 July 1888, 
IOR/20/A/1172. However, the Austrians were not seeking to dislodge the Italian position in Africa – 
‘Vienna recognized Italy’s need for a military victory. It was possible to fulfill this need and at the same 
time satisfy (Crispi’s) revolutionary past... by encouraging Italy to seek her outlet in Africa. What was to be 
avoided was anti-Austrian irredentism... itself a part of the revolutionary drive of the Risorgimento. 
Crispi’s radical past could be harmonized with the conservative nature of the Triple Alliance through war’;  
Thayer, ‘Risorgimento’, p. 95. 
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                serious charge of having wantonly provoked the controversy in  
                order to seek a quarrel with Italy and to lose no opportunity of  
               disturbing confidence in the maintenance of European peace.466  
 
Given that the rabidly revanchist Boulanger had taken power in France in March 1888 
(and kept it until April 1889), and - like a French Crispi - lost no time in asserting 
France’s rights over any issue where he perceived French prestige or interest to be at 
stake, the need felt by Germany to be assertive in defence of her Italian ally - despite 




In addition to all this, Britain’s relations with the Porte at this time were somewhat 
ticklish. Though still bound to actively support the Ottomans, events in the Arabian 
peninsula had put Britain in a potentially oppositional stance to the Porte in the Red Sea. 
From 1882, various Arab tribes in Yemen and Hadraumat had been asking the British at 
Aden for protection from all-comers, including the Turks.468 While things were quiet, this 
did not cause any great problem in Anglo-Turkish relations, probably because the Turks 
either never found out or because they had more pressing matters with which to contend - 
                                                 
466 Scott (Berlin)- Salisbury, 8 July 1888, IOR/20/A/1172.  
467 As Roberts observed, ‘Lytton was sending highly alarming despatches from Paris, and war rumours 
abounded’, and he quotes Salisbury as saying that “If Boulanger has anything in him, things may become 
serious at any moment”; Roberts, Salisbury, p. 487. 
468 IO L/SP/9/55, Blair - Bombay, 19 December 1885. Local tribes around Aden had, since the British 
annexation of 1839, sought British protection; see Chapter 1, note 172, above. 
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usually a lack of finances. As the Annual Report of the Council of Foreign Bondholders 
noted in its 7th General  Report of 1879: 
 
             ... the Porte has not yet learned the bitter lesson taught by adversity,  
             but still lives from hand to mouth, laying violent hands on the securities  
             solemnly pledged to its creditors (and) raising more loans at usurious  
             rates (which just compounds the problems).469  
 
For instance, in December 1880 the Ottoman Finance Minister estimated an expenditure 
of 20 million francs against an income of 16 million, accounted for partly by a plague of 
locusts but in the main by a perennial difficulty in collecting taxes, and with ‘... no idea 
how the deficit will be met’.470 Parlous for decades, Ottoman finances, facing increased 
strain with the approach of the Crimean war, had forced the Porte to take out its first 
official foreign loan in 1854. Inefficient and corrupt use of this and succeeding loans led 
to the Empire becoming bankrupt in 1875. In 1881, after the measure had been approved 
at the Berlin Congress of 1878, Sultan Abdul Hamid II issued the Muharrem decree, 
which led to the establishment of the OPDA (Ottoman Public Debt Authority), a 
consortium of foreign Powers who supplied auditors from Britain, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Austria and France.471 It made scarcely any difference to the situation: White 
reported to Salisbury in October 1885 that, ‘Dining with the Sultan he told me... that he is 
                                                 
469 Quoted in G. Conte & G. Sabatini, ‘The Ottoman External Debt and its features under European 
Financial Control (1881-1914)’, Journal of European Economic History, 43: 3 (2014), pp.69-96 (p.71). 
470 CAB37/4/80, ‘Turkish Financial Difficulties’, 4 December 1880. 
471 M. Birdal, The Political Economy of Ottoman Public Debt: Insolvency and European Financial Control 
in the Late Nineteenth Century (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), p.6; Yasamee, Abdulhamid, pp. 9, 45-6 & 49-
50. 
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very anxious about Servia(sic) and Greece and (begged Salisbury) to intervene with 
Greece to prevent (proceedings) which were not only dangerous to the Empire but a great 
burden and expense’472, the pressure from Greece being an ever-present concern that 
exacerbated the financial situation.473  
      To make things worse, by 1884 many parts of the Yemen were in open revolt against 
the Turks, partly in response to the Mahdiya.474 Despite initial rebel success, by late 1885 
the Turks had regained control of the insurgent areas; this in itself did not ‘greatly 
concern us at Aden unless it should lead to the annexation of the coastline also’,475 which 
might mean that Aden could find itself faced, not with friendly Arab tribes seeking 
alliance with Britain but with a potentially hostile Turkish presence (as we have seen, the 
turbulence in the Red Sea had already led to the Turks reinforcing Warren Point, a 
potential threat to Aden, earlier in 1885); it thus behoved the British to continue their 
support of the Arabs, but not in such a way as would turn the Turks against them or drive 
them closer to irremediable insolvency.476 The last thing Britain wanted was to find 
herself having to overtly support the Italians against the Turks and, as a possible result, 
have her covert support of the Yemeni Arabs exposed. This could conceivably have been  
the straw that broke the Porte’s back, bringing the (supposedly) tottering Empire finally 
                                                 
472 SP A/41, White - Salisbury, 20 October 1885. 
473 The accession of Thessaly to Greece in 1881 had not sated but inflamed Greek irredentism so that the 
more the Greeks got from Turkey, the more they wanted; J.S. Koliopoulis, ‘Greece and the Balkans: A 
Historical Perspective’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 2: 3 (September 2002), pp.25-38 
(p.27). 
474 The insurgents were led by Imam Sharfudan, who called himself the “Lieutenant of the Mahdi”, forcing 
the Turks to bring in 17 regiments - all to no avail, as ‘the insurgents were not amenable to negotiations and 
wanted to fight the Turks’, and were making their own ordnance; IO L/PS/9/55, Blair - Chief Secretary, 
Bombay, 29 August &  6 September 1884. The situation was exacerbated because supplies of grain from 
Berbera to Yemen were reduced, due to the Egyptian withdrawal (Blair - Bombay, 3 October 1884). 
475 IO L/SP/9/55, Blair - Chief Secretary Bombay, 19 December 1885. My italics. 
476 ‘... it certainly seems desirable to preserve the independence of the tribes on the Arabian littoral of the 
Gulf of Aden’; Blair, ibid. And see note 170 above. 
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crashing down, and leaving the Balkans and Constantinople - and, by extension, the 
Habsburg territories - exposed to a victorious Russian advance.  
      Salisbury was thus in an unenviable position, having to support Crispi despite his 
deplorable and provocative actions, and even though those very actions were likely to 
provoke a Boulangist attack on Italy, thus obliging Britain to take up arms against France 
and triggering a Russian attack on Austria - all this at a time when one of the periodic 
French “invasion scares” was in full flight in Britain, and which Salisbury would have 
been anxious to defuse and not inflame.477 As Salisbury cabled to Phipps at Vienna on 13 
August 1888 
 
            The (Austrian) Charge d’Affaires (says) Count Kalnocky thought it  
            likely that France and Russia would (object to an Italian protectorate  
            over Massawa), and although he deprecated the Italian tone... it was 
            the object of (Britain and Austria) to support Crispi. I have accordingly 
            authorized (support) of (Austria) in this matter.478 
 
      It is interesting that Salisbury specifically referred to Austria, rather than Germany, as 
the (albeit unwilling) partner of Italy in this matter, since the Austrians were clearly 
                                                 
477 For the invasion scare, see Brackenbury Memorandum of 8 June 1888 (CAB37/21/15), the Hamilton 
Memorandum of 19 June 1888 (CAB37/21/17) and the Salisbury Memoranda of 29 June 1888 
(CAB37/21/18) and 6 November 1888 (CAB37/22/32). 
478 Salisbury- Phipps, 13 August 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. It was doubly unfortunate for Salisbury that he was 
no fan of the Greeks - though once, like most enlightened Englishmen, a supporter of Greek independence 
during the Era of Disraelian Turcophilia, by 1888 he saw them in a different light; ‘Now... that European 
statesmen are labouring to extinguish every cause of (war), the policy of Greece is to threaten... to kindle a 
European war, unless she is bought off. She is the blackmailer of Europe’; Salisbury to Monson, November 
1889, quoted in Roberts, op.cit., p. 647. It must have raised his ire to find himself having to support Crispi 
while deploring his actions (especially as it affected Indian subjects) while secretly sympathizing with 
France, and thus (albeit covertly) supporting the cause of the Greeks who, for all he knew, may have 
deliberately precipitated the crisis in the first place. 
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ambivalent about, and thus less strident, on the matter than the Germans, which would 
make dealing with the French easier. Indeed, the Austrians did their part in getting the 
Porte to withdraw the threatened Circular and, though they did not succeed in getting the 
Sultan to withdraw it, possibly they softened him up enough to allow the Germans, as 
detailed above, to get it “toned down”. Kalnocky in fact suggested that Britain use her 
influence on the Porte to dissuade the Sultan from sending the circular since it was felt 
that British influence carried more weight in Constantinople than did the Austrian, 
though the Austrians had at least as much interest in defusing the matter as Britain - a war 
with Russia was the last thing Austria wanted, especially as their allies the Italians were 
as likely to join in on the side of Russia as they were to remain loyal to the Triple 
Alliance (as indeed they did in 1915), and would in either case be a hindrance to Austrian 
security.479 
      The French and Greeks could find no support whichever way they turned. On 1 
August 1888, Fe d’Ostiane informed Crispi that the Greeks had been informed that three 
of the Great Powers (presumably Germany, Austria and Britain) had given their support 
                                                 
479 Salisbury- White, 14 August 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. Later, on 31 August, the Austrians made a direct 
approach to the Porte over the Circular, requesting its withdrawal; Salisbury-Phipps, 31 August 1888, 
IOR/20/A/1172.  
      Austria was by this time not taken very seriously as a significant Power in matters appertaining to the 
Red Sea or the eastern Mediterranean. ‘... when asked by Malet whether Austria... or Germany (decided) 
questions of policy (in the Near East), (Bismarck) replied that all minor questions were left to Austria... but 
when (peace) was seriously threatened, he “took the reins into his own hands...”’; Malet  to Salisbury, 22 
September 1885, quoted in Smith, Embassy, p.19. White remarked that ‘It is surprising to hear the low 
opinion the Turks... have of Austria... Nothing can be more striking... than the entire disappearance of 
Austrian influence with the Turks. Twelve months ago, it was an important factor (but now) Austria is... 
mistrusted even more than we are... and she is less feared’; White to Iddesleigh, 20 November 1886 and 27 
December 1886, quoted in Smith, ibid., pp.65-66. Salisbury himself had by this time come to regard the 
Austrians as a negligible presence in the Near East, stating that ‘... it was impossible to include the Austrian 
ambassador to Constantinople in discussions of Near Eastern affairs, as he was so insignificant’; Herbert 
Bismarck - German Foreign Office, 24 August 1887, in GDD I, p. 318. 
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to the Italian position regarding Massawa.480 Support from Russia might have been 
expected for both countries, but none was forthcoming as the Russians, pre-occupied with 
events in Finland, were non-commital regarding the rights and wrongs of the situation 
and would wait to see how the Turks responded. Regarding whether or not Article 10 of 
the Suez Canal Convention meant that the Porte had, as the Italians speciously tried to 
make out, abrogated its right to sovereignty over their lands in the Red Sea, Giers 
professed ignorance, but commented that, even if the Turks had given up, their vassals 
the Egyptians had not.481 Clearly, the Russians were no keener to get embroiled in such a 
futile but potentially explosive argument than anyone else, especially if it meant risking a 
confrontation with Austria and Germany. In addition to this, they were not interested in 
supporting the Greeks, as by this time they were actively trying to undermine the Greek 
Orthodox church’s monopoly over Orthodox subjects in the Balkans - particularly 
Bulgaria - and elsewhere. 
      By the end of the first week of August it was clear that the French were not going to 
make any progress. On 2 August Catalani reported to Crispi that Salisbury had, after his 
half-hearted objections at Italian heavy-handedness, agreed to concur with their views,482 
                                                 
480 Fe - Crispi, 1 August 1888, L’Italia I/VII, p.53. See also Catalani - Crispi, 25 & 28 July 1888 from 
London, ibid., pp. 48 & 50, and Nigra - Crispi, 31 July 1888 from Vienna, ibid., p. 52. 
481 ‘Alla mia osservazione che l’art. X ... implicava la rinuncia della Turchia ai suoi pretesi diritti di 
sovranita sulla costa occidentale del Mar Rosso il Signor de Giers rispose ignorare che la Turchia abbia 
espressamente rinunciato... sovranita... “come non ha rinunciato all’Egitto”’; Marochetti (Italian 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg) - Crispi, 12 August 1888, ibid., p.73. See also d’Ormesson (French Charge 
d’Affaires to St. Petersburg) - Goblet, 7 August 1888, in DDF I/VII, p.213.  
      Launay reported to Crispi on 5 August that the Germans had expressed a dim view of an Italian wish to 
annex Zeila since the Porte still clearly regarded this as an Egyptian possession, and any such impulsive 
action might only result in Italy driving the Turks into the arms of France and Russia; 5 August, DDI 
2/XXI, p.134. 
482 Catalani-Crispi, DDI 2/XXI, p.125 
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and on the same day Crispi was able to tell his ambassadors that Greece had also given 
in.483  
      By the end of August things had calmed down. Bismarck had moderated his stance 
and prevailed on Crispi to refrain from any further provocation of the Porte over 
Massawa,484 and cooler Italian heads than Crispi’s were working to repair the damage 
done to Anglo-Italian relations. Robilant informed Crispi that 
 
            ... I shall try as hard as I can to see that... our relations with England  
           are put back on that special level of trust and intimacy which the  
           common interest of the two countries demands... (Catalani) told me...  
           that the present state of relations between France and Italy kept (Salisbury)  
           in a continual state of alarm and anxiety (and that) if things went on like this  
          they would end in a war...  He (said) he had no wish to be dragged into (war)  
          with France for a trifling issue such as the capitulations at Massawa. It  
          appears to me... that if there was a change in Lord  Salisbury’s attitude to us  
          this dates from the last days of July.485  
 
                                                 
483 Crispi-Catalani, Launay, Marochetti & Nigra, DDI 2/XXI, p.126. 
484 ‘(Bismarck has) succeeded in calming the Italian Prime Minister and (induced) him to abstain from... 
any further notes (on Massawa) as well as to refrain from all further military expeditions into (Abyssinia)’;  
Scott- Salisbury, 24 August 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. Given the history of Italian activity in Abyssinia, 
Bismarck’s word obviously carried less weight with Crispi than was thought in some quarters. 
485 Robilant- Crispi 17 September 1888; AMEI, seria politica 29/1448/70, in Lowe & Marzari, Italian, pp. 
377-78. Salisbury also noted that the French allowed capitulations in Tunis because it was not annexed, and 
because it continued to be administered by Moslems. Thus it followed that it was not in Italian interests to 
press for either the annexation of Massawa or the cessation of capitulations there, as such actions could 
cause the French to annex Tunis, which action would cause Italy and HMG much vexation. Salisbury- 
Egerton, 18 August 1888, IOR/20/A/1172. 
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       By September 1888 the French had conceded defeat.486 Opinion in Vienna and Berlin 
appeared to blame the French for the furore though, given their alliance with Italy, such 
opinion was only to be expected.487 It is likely that the vehemence of the Italian reaction 
to this minor matter was spurred on not only by her constant aspiration to be taken 
seriously as a Mediterranean Power, but also by the heightened friction with France that 
resulted from a combination of Crispi’s incessant hostility (and Boulanger’s response) 
and the series of political and commercial disputes that kept both countries on the verge 
of war from 1887 onwards.488  
      Duggan’s view that Crispi was intent on war with France must also be taken into 
account, as it is the single best explanation for Crispi’s unaccountably hostile actions over 
the matter. However, it is unlikely that these factors alone caused such a vitriolic reaction 
from the Italians. Another factor, not referred to in the dispute but certainly exercising the 
Italians, was the appearance of the Russians on the Red Sea coast. 
                                                 
486 ‘M. Goblet (considered) the matter closed by the formal protest of the Porte’; IOR/20/A/1172, 
Salisbury- Paget, 12 September 1888.  
487 In the letter quoted above, Salisbury recorded that ‘Count Kalnocky... feels the Italians wouldn’t have 
raised the capitulation question if France hadn’t provoked the Greeks into doing so, with the intention not 
of protecting Franco-Greek interests but of causing trouble for Italy, and it is this which caused so much 
bitterness’.  Scott in Berlin conveyed the German view that ‘the French government had notoriously been 
doing everything in its power to create difficulties for Italy in every quarter’, (though as noted above, 
Bismarck clearly did not adhere to this view) with the result that, in trying to weaken the Triple Alliance by 
undermining Italy, they had strengthened Italian resolve to adhere to their Alliance allies; IOR/20/A/1172, 
Scott- Salisbury, 28 August 1888. However, this may all have been part of what Kennedy had described as 
France’s anxiety to provoke Italy and/or Germany into revealing the contents of the Italo-German military 
convention. 
488 ‘Nowhere was this bitter hostility reflected more clearly than at Constantinople where the Italian 
ambassador, Blanc (who had been one of the few Italians to support Crispi in his endeavours to spark war 
with France - see note 409, above) was highly sensitive to any indication of a forward movement (by) 
France, and eager to sound a loud general alarm... in May 1888 (my italics), Blanc repeated his allegations 
about France and Russia to the British ambassador... at Constantinople, Blanc consulted White and 
Radowitz (the German Ambassador), who thought him guilty of “Great exaggerations”... at Rome, 
Kennedy expressed his relief that (Blanc would never become foreign minister); at St. Petersburg, Morier... 
accused him of wishing to plunge Europe into a war; and... Salisbury thought it better not to repeat 
(Blanc’s) observations to Kalnoky...’. However, Blanc’s wild accusations served a purpose for Britain; 
White, in Constantinople, who was forever trying not to ruffle the feathers of the Porte or attract the 
hostility of France and Russia, observed to Salisbury that ‘They are now directing all their shafts against 
Blanc...“’; Smith, Embassy, pp.119-20. 
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Conclusion: Italy and the Orthodox Conspiracy            
The arrival in dribs and drabs of Russians on the African Red Sea coast had been noted 
by all concerned parties since the 1860’s. Mostly they were - apart from a few 
missionaries accredited by the Russian church - a motley collection of adventurers and 
fantasists such as Aschinov,489 regarded with bemusement (by the Abyssinians),490 
irritation (by the French) or hardly at all (by the British). Only the Italians - or at least 
Crispi - regarded them at all seriously, and on reflection it is easy to see why. 
      The Aschinov affair had attracted hostile attention from the Italians, which did not 
surprise the Russians, who had been aware of Italian hostility for some years.491 One of 
the Russians who strove to establish  a meaningful link between the churches of Russia 
and Abyssinia was Porphyry Uspensky, a cleric whose mission (in a life cut short in 
                                                 
489 The Russian (or Cossack) Aschinov, characterized by the Italians as a ‘... man of small intelligence’, led 
a small group of Russians, ‘... some of whom were crooks and the rest sorry rustics urged on by dreams of 
gold’ to the abandoned Egyptian fort of Sagallo, in French territory near Djibouti, in January 1889. Their 
intention was to venture from “New Moscow” (Sagallo) into Abyssinia and help reunite the Coptic church 
of that country with the Orthodox church of Russia. Ragged and half-starved, they were evicted forcibly 
from Sagallo by the French in February 1889; C. Jesman, The Russians in Ethiopia: An Essay in Futility 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1958), pp.9-37 & 97-110. Aschinov was not taken at all seriously by the 
Russian authorities, and the French action at Sagallo (which caused fatalities among the Russian group) 
caused no waves between Paris and Moscow; Caulk, Between, pp. 183-34. See Appendix 5 for the full 
story of Aschinov, and of other Russian attempts to penetrate Abyssinia, and the resultant friction with 
Italy. 
490 Ironically, given the strong links between the Greeks and Russians, the stirring of Russian interest in 
establishing religious links with the Abyssinian church was part of a wider plan to undermine Greek 
dominance of the Orthodox church in the East and replace it with that of Russia, since many Russian clerics 
had become dissatisfied with the Greek hegemony over the church east of the Balkans; Caulk, Jaws, p.183; 
Rollins P.J., Russia’s Ethiopian Adventure, 1886-1905 (New York: Syracuse, 1967 - Ph.D Thesis),  pp.432-
36. Even more ironically, the Abyssinian church did not regard itself as having anything in common with 
the Russian church and did not seek or encourage such links as the Russians mistakenly thought would be 
welcomed (Caulk, op.cit., pp.182-86). The Abyssinian church was Coptic, and actively resisted coming 
under the influence or protection of the Russian church during the nineteenth century; Afifi M., ‘The State 
and the Church in Nineteenth century Egypt’, Die Welts des Islams, 39: 3 (1999), pp.273-88. Interestingly, 
Tewdoros had sent a plenipotentiary to Russia in 1862 as part of an attempt to generate European interest in 
Abyssinia. As far as is known, the Russians did not respond, which may be why Yohannes refused to meet 
with Aschinov in 1886; Rollins, ‘Imperial Russia’, p.435; Crummey, ‘Initiatives’, pp.433-44.   
491 ‘Crispi... makes no secret of his hatred of Russia and of his intense desire to hinder her approach to (the 
Mediterranean)’; FO45/576, Kennedy - Salisbury, 2 October 1887. 
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1885) was to ‘reunite’ the ‘Black Christians’ of Abyssinia with the Mother church of 
Russia. In his view, the Catholic Italians were the enemy of the Orthodox Abyssinians 
and, therefore, of these hopes, and his views outlived him to become part of the tapestry 
of Russian hopes - openly feared and hindered by Italy - for expansion and glory in 
Africa. As one Russian newspaper wrote, 
 
                       For some time we have had no news from Aschinov’s 
                       expedition (but) we are certain no calamity befell them 
                       since if it were so, the Italian press would have crowed 
                       victory.492  
                    
So, by 1888 there was already a good deal of animosity between Russia and Italy. What 
made it worse was the good relations that existed before, during and after it (despite the 
Sagallo incident) between the French and Russians, not only in Europe but in Africa. In 
1897 the Italian Charge d’Affairs in St. Petersburg intercepted a letter from another 
Russian adventurer in Abyssinia, Count Nikolai Leontiev, stating that 
 
                  The French have a firm foothold in Ethiopia. We are trying to 
                                                 
492 Petersburskie Viedomosti, 18 November 1889, quoted in Jesman, Russians, pp.98-9. It must be 
remembered that the Italians had opposed Russian expansion into the Balkans, generally since 1861 but 
particularly after 1878, when fears of Russian domination over an enormous Bulgaria loomed large in their 
psyche. In 1887 Crispi ordered all Italian diplomats to thwart Russian attempts to dislodge Ferdinand of 
Saxe-Coburg from the Bulgarian throne, a position in which he was supported by Bismarck. Later, in 1889, 
he attempted to form an anti-Russian alliance with Rumanian, Bulgaria and Serbia as an impediment to an 
evolving Franco-Russian rapprochement. When, in 1887 Svet, a semi-official organ of the Russian church, 
praised the martial qualities of the Abyssinians and suggested that they could be trained to a pitch of 
perfection by Russia, Crispi alerted all Italians in the Red Sea to look out for a Russian fleet. Then 
Aschinov arrived; Jesman, ibid., pp. 99-100. See also Lowe & Marzari, Italian, pp. 51-53, and Duggan, 
Francesco Crispi, pp.498-505 & passim. Uspensky’s thoughts heavily influenced French missionaries to 
Abyssinia; Jesman, op.cit., pp. 135-6. 
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                  help them. Our influence is constantly growing there... The  
                  Italians... have not learned the lesson we administered them. I am 
                  preparing them some jolly surprises (which will) give the Italians 
                  a good dose of admirable lessons.493  
              
Though this letter was written well after the Massawa incident, it did not come out of the 
blue but reflected a situation and collection of attitudes, ad hoc alliances and rivalries that 
had become well-established by 1888. By then, thanks to Crispi’s intemperate behaviour, 
Italy had practically alienated all of her friends. She had come perilously close to war 
with France and continued at intervals to do so, alarming her German ally with the threat 
of a pan-European war.494 She had vexed Austria with her irredentism495 and wearied 
Britain with her fumbling attempts at Empire-building and her manifest inability to carry 
her own weight as a strategic partner in the Mediterranean alliance. The appearance of 
the Russians in what Crispi regarded as Italian turf probably tipped him over the edge. 
      Russia was, of course, growing ever closer to France, which country had wrought 
terrible destruction, especially in the South, to the Italian economy as a result of a ruinous 
tariff war. France was also suspected by Crispi of plotting with Austria to reinstate the 
                                                 
493 Quoted in Jesman, Russian, pp.114-15. 
494 Both Britain and Germany were worried about Italy in terms of a sudden outbreak of war with France, 
though each country was affected differently by the possibility. ‘... disquiet felt in London at Crispi’s 
(Francophobia during 1888)’ made Bismarck ‘... eager to ensure British support for the Italians (and for the 
Alliance as a whole should war break out); but it was precisely this prospect of being dragged into a war 
against France on behalf of Crispi’s ambitions which reinforced (the British desire to keep relations with 
both Germany and Italy on an uncommitted basis)’; Kennedy, Anglo-German, p.197.  
495 Bismarck was keen to renew the Triple Alliance of February 1887 since it would reassure Italy of 
British and German support and ‘... persuade the Austrians to look somewhat less suspiciously upon their 
Italian allies’; Kennedy, ibid., p.189; However, by summer of 1888 Austria was suspicious of both Italy 
and Germany, since both Powers seemed to be more concerned with ‘... discussing the internal affairs of 
Austria’ and ‘condemning the pro-Slav and clerical policies of the Taafe government’ than with trying to 
address the problems of Italian irredentism, which by this time were becoming ‘.. quite a serious problem in 
Austro-Italian relations’; Bridge, Sadowa, pp.177-78. 
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Papal territories to the Vatican, which would bisect the fledgling Italian state and undo all 
the hard (and largely unsuccessful) work of unifying North and South. The fact that 
Crispi had escalated the tariff war (which had its origins in the Depretis years) cut no ice 
with him, as did the fact that only he saw a Franco-Papal-Austrian conspiracy where none 
existed. And, by a strange irony of history, France was officially the Guardian of the 
Greeks (amongst others) in Massawa.  
      Crispi affected to look down upon the Greeks, but in fact he was in all likelihood 
riven with jealousy of them. After all, they had freed themselves from Ottoman tyranny 
decades before Italy became a nation-state, and had taken Greek lands back from the 
Turks while Italy remained impotent in the face of continued Austrian possession of  
ethnic Italian territories.496 Whatever its faults, Greece had a united identity and a 
coherent polity. And it was prosperous;497 Greek merchants ruled the Mediterranean. 
Greeks held considerable sway in the Ottoman Empire, and had a fast friendship with 
mighty Russia. The Italian economy, struggling with strictures beyond its control as well 
as with trying to support a small but unsustainable Empire, lurched from one crisis to 
another. The country itself barely held together, and nobody took it seriously. Added to 
this, Russia was, like Greece, an Orthodox country. As (so it was incorrectly believed) 
was Abyssinia, a country which stubbornly refused to show any signs of acting as the 
                                                 
496 In the four decades until 1897, Greece saw its territory grow by 35% after the integration of the Ionian 
Islands (1864) and Thessaly and Epirus (1881). Her population had doubled (from about 1.1 million in 
1862 to around 2.5 million in 1896); Dritsas, op.cit., p30. 
497In the 30 years to 1897, Greek commerce increased in value from over 83 million  to nearly 200 million 
drachma, and its exports and associated revenues increased six-fold; during 1873-96 the Greek economy 
developed while those of the rest of Europe were in recession; Dritsas, ibid., pp.30-31. See also, inter alia, 
Cohen & Federico, Italian Economy; Crafts N.F.R., ‘Economic Growth in France and Britain, 1830-1910: 
A Review of the Evidence’, Journal of Economic History, 44: 1 (March 1984), pp.49-67; Fieldhouse, 
Economics, pp.11-37; Kennedy, Anglo-German, pp.41-50 & 291-305; Mathias P., The First Industrial 
Nation: An Economic History of Britain, 1700-1914 (London: Methuen & Co., 1969), pp.395-404, and 
Schulze M-S., ‘The Machine-Building Industry and Austria’s Great Depression after 1873’, Economic 
History Review, 50: 2 (May 1997), pp.282-304, for comparative figures and developments in other parts of 
Europe. 
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Protectorate that Italy so longed for it to be.498 Crispi probably perceived an unholy, 
multifaceted alliance, France and Greece uniting to ruin the already-parlous Italian 
economy, and the three Orthodox nations conspiring to eject the Italians from the Red 
Sea, with the Russians poised to arrive in hordes to replace them.499 No wonder, then, 
that Crispi’s pent-up rage, combined with his desire for a cassus belli against France, 
exploded when prodded a little too far by the miniscule issue of taxes unpaid by a handful 
of Greek shopkeepers in Massawa.  
      Crispi was not a man governed by logic or foresight. The fact that there was no 
Orthodox Abyssinian-Greek-Russian conspiracy on the one hand and no Austrian-
French-Papal conspiracy on the other (and, crucially, no evidence for either) made no 
difference to his actions. The Massawa crisis brought Europe closer to a ‘War-in-sight’500 
situation than has heretofore been recognized. Not surprisingly, it frayed Salisbury’s 
nerves,501 and brought the end of the Anglo-Italian friendship one, very sizeable, step 
closer. 
    
                                                 
498 See Caulk, Jaws, pp. 153-211: also C. Giglio, ‘Article 17 of the Treaty of Uccialli’, Journal of African 
History, 6: 2 (1965), pp. 221-231; S. Rubenson, ‘The Protectorate Paragraph of the Wichale Treaty’, 
Journal of African History, 5: 2 (1964), pp. 234-83; and S. Rubenson, ‘Professor Giglio, Antonelli and 
Article XVII of the Treaty of Wichale’, Journal of African History, 7: 3 (1966), pp.445-457. 
499 A rumour in March 1888 of a “rapprochement” between Russia and Greece caused a stir in Rome; 
FO45/601, Kennedy - Salisbury, 29 March 1888. Thus, it is not unreasonable to suppose, as Jesman 
suggests, that ‘All through 1887 and 1888 Crispi was haunted by visions of Cossacks arriving in Ethiopia 
and establishing a firm Russian foothold there’; Jesman, Russian, p. 101. 
500 Otte, Foreign Office, p.96; the term is used in reference to the 1874 crisis over the Suez Canal share 
purchase, but can equally well be used here. 
501 In the aftermath of the crisis Kennedy was told by Brin - ‘one of the most astute members of (Crispi’s 
government)’ - that the recent arrival of a British squadron at Genoa had provoked ‘an immense impression 
in Italy, which still (believes England would protect her) from French attack’. Kennedy responded by 
saying that he ‘knew nothing (of these naval movements apart from reports in the newspapers) but that Italy 
had best not count on the assistance of Britain for the defence of her coasts’; CAB37/22/46, ‘Italian views 
on the Attitude of Great Britain in the Event of a Franco-Italian War’, Kennedy - Salisbury, 12 December 
1888 (my italics). Given the terms of the Mediterranean agreements, this was a significant indication that 
Britain no longer felt able to regard Italy as a significant asset or ally. It also indicated that Salisbury had 
not forgotten Crispi’s attempt to strong-arm him into displaying aggressive intent to France when, with 
misgivings but the best of intentions, he sent the Channel Fleet to Genoa in January 1888. 
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                                                               3 
 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Slavery, Massawa, Spheres of 
Influence and Trade - an Italian Perspective 
 
Introduction 
As we have seen, opinion from all angles in the Red Sea was generally anti-Italian. Their 
ongoing friction with France, which reverberated throughout Europe; their ambivalent 
attitude and disruptive, untrustworthy behaviour towards their British allies; their 
abrasive attitude toward, and violent conflicts with, Abyssinia; their harsh victimization 
of the minority nationals who depended upon the diplomatic protection of other Powers, 
and their divisive behaviour and contemptuous attitude towards the Turkish and Egyptian 
suzerains of the territories they had arrogated to themselves, all meant that Italy was a 
Power with no fast friends in the Red Sea but a plethora of foes. They were even 
suspected of deliberately introducing Rinderpest to Abyssinia in 1885, in order to 
devastate opposition, though there is no direct evidence that this was the case.502 
                                                 
502 “Ethiopian tradition” had it that the Italians deliberately innoculated their own cattle with the deadly 
disease, and that “Italian armies marched down the Nile with rinderpest in their baggage”. It seems likely 
that the Italians did introduce the disease into the Horn of Africa sometime between 1885 and 1887 - from 
where it spread across Africa within two years, causing widespread famine - but inadvertently, by bringing 
infected cattle from India (where the disease was endemic) into Somalia. Given that, as we saw in Chapter 
1, the British berated the Italians for using too much local cattle and thereby threatening Aden’s supply of 
fresh meat, it would seem highly unlikely that the Italians would deliberately devastate Abyssinian cattle, 
since they relied on it for their own sustenance. True to form, the French blamed the British for the 
outbreak: Rowe J.A. & Hodnebo K., ‘Rinderpest in the Sudan 1888-1890: The Mystery of the Missing 
Panzootic’, Sudanic Africa, Vol.5 (1994), pp.149-78, and Weiss H., ‘”Dying Cattle”: Some Remarks on the 
Impact of Cattle Epizootics in the Central Sudan during the Nineteenth century’, African Economic History 
No.26 (1998); pp.173-99. See also Ofcansky T.P., ‘The 1889-1897 Rinderpest Epidemic and the Rise of 
British and German Colonialism in Eastern and Southern Africa’, Journal of African Studies Vol 8:1 
(1981), pp.31-39, for the effects of the disease and its indirect assistance to the colonizing Powers.  
However, it is worth noting that famine in Sudan and Abyssinia during the 1887-1897 period was caused as 
much by a shortage of grain as of cattle, though this was because cattle were needed to irrigate and plough 
the fields (Ahmad A.H., ‘Peasant Conditions in Gojjam During the Great Famine, 1888-1892’, Journal of 
Ethiopian Studies Vol.20 (November 1987); pp.1-18) and because rinderpest was followed by a locust 
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However, there were good, sometimes complex, reasons for some of their actions, at least 
from their point of view. We have seen some of these reasons in Chapter 2; in Chapter 3, 
we will examine the local situation of the Italians in their nascent African Empire; and 
how their growing predicament as an isolated, poor and weak Power led to their further 
estranging their British allies; the erosion of their influence over the natives of the region, 
and the increasingly desperate state of their financial ability to maintain even the 
semblance of an Empire in Africa. We will conclude with a brief examination of the 
theories of the causation of Empires in the late nineteenth century, and how these might 
relate to Italy’s activities in this area. 
       
                            Part 1. Slavery: the Universal Curse 
‘Slavery had always existed in the... Muslim and Ethiopian worlds... the original impetus 
of Mehemet Ali’s government... had been the vast and unsatisfied demand for slaves in 
Egypt itself and throughout the Ottoman Empire...’.503  
      The first Italian foothold on the Red Sea, Assab, was of very little use. Isolated and 
reachable only by boat, none of the traditional trade routes went near it,504 and it proved 
impossible to open up new routes to make it commercially viable - those attempting to 
open new caravan routes to Assab from south-eastern Tigray during the early 1880s were 
                                                                                                                                                 
plague - see Theobald, Mahdiya, p.173. Kitchener, the great critic of Italian morals, played a large part in 
this shortage - see below, pp.. 
503 d’Avray, Lords, pp.141-42. Mehemet’s comment to his commander in the Sudan during the conquest 
was “You are aware that the end of all our effort is to produce negroes”; and see Chapter 1. 
504 The trade routes of this region had been established for millennia and were chiefly governed by factors 
such as accessibility for camels and water supply, as well as shifting patterns of trade and power; see G. 
Dahl & A. Hjort-Af-Ornas, ‘Precolonial Beja: A Periphery at the Crossroads’, Nordic Jouirnal of African 
Studies, 15:4: 2006, pp. un-numbered. 
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killed by the Afars,505 so its main function, apart from its original purpose as a coaling 
station, eventually became that of a penal colony.506 Massawa was a much better prospect 
- developed since the sixteenth century for trade first by the Ottomans and, later, as a key 
site for Egyptian expansion, it was part of the ages-old trade-route connecting it with 
Keren, Kassala and Suakin,507 and well-prepared by 1885 for becoming the focus of 
Italian attempts to expand trade into the Abyssinian and Sudanese hinterlands.508  
      But it lay in lands inhabited by the Habab tribe who, like their neighbours the 
Hadendowa, the Halenga and the Beni-Amer, were nomadic Muslims and traditional 
slave-traders. Not only that, but the Habab were highly sympathetic to the Mahdists, so 
that Harrison Smith, sent by Baring in 1886 to observe matters in Massawa, observed that 
the Habab were being duplicitous, and that the Italians played a dangerous game in 
negotiating with them for a potential alliance, since all their potential trade routes would 
run through their lands.509 Yet the Italians were in a precarious position; their finances 
were uncertain and their military presence minute;510 if they alienated the Habab they 
                                                 
505 Caulk, Jaws, p.24. The Afars are co-terminous with the Danakil. The Sultanates of Tajourra, Raheita 
and Aussa were Afar territories; J. Stokes, Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East, 
(New York: Facts on File, 2009), pp.7-8. 
506 d’Avray, op.cit., p. 171. d’Avray points out (p.32) that all the caravan routes ‘made a great circle round 
the Sahel: they all lay on rivers...’ Assab was nowhere near a river. 
507 Ibid., p.16. 
508 ‘Massawa was a hub in a trading network for ivory, gold, pearls, slaves, ostrich feathers and civet. 
Caravan trade reached not only the Ethiopian highlands but across Sudan towards western Africa. Via boat, 
goods crossed... to India, Arabia and the Middle East’; Jonas, Adwa, p.36. ‘(By 1883) the population had 
probably doubled in number. It was planned to be, and became, the focal point for the increase in trade 
which developed during (the Khedival years) and the... well-equipped jumping-off place for (ambitious 
trading projects in all directions)...’; d’Avray, op.cit., p.77. It was also the only feasible access to the Red 
Sea trade routes for land-locked Abyssinia, and the potential conduit for British trade from the Red Sea to 
the Abyssinian interior; Arnold, Magdala, pp.21-25 & passim. 
509 d’Avray, Lords, pp.113 & 116. 
510 As noted in Chapter 1, the chaotic nature of Italy’s political and economic background boded ill for 
expensive foreign adventures. The Italian economy, partly from the costs of the Risorgimento but also due 
to factors such as, inter alia, the North-South imbalance, a chaotic banking system, poor internal transport, 
lack of natural resources (particularly coal - the essential fuel during the Age of Steam, it existed in Italy 
only in small quantities of poor quality, and was very expensive to import; British imported coal cost twice 
as much as it cost in Britain) and dependence on exports for revenue, was running on a massive deficit 
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could bring the wrath of the Mahdists down on their heads, but if they became too 
friendly with them they could attract the hostile attentions of the Abyssinians. 
      For instance, on 7 October 1885 the Italians signed a treaty of protection with the 
Habab (for the protection of the Habab, not of the Italians). Ras Alula reacted with fury to 
this. On 28 October 1885 Colonel Saletta, the Italian commander in Massawa, anxiously 
replied to Alula’s outburst by saying that he thought the Habab leader was a friend of the 
Abyssinians, and that ‘I believe I proved to you my friendship to Ethiopia which is 
Christian like Italy’, after which the Italians stopped supplying food to the Habab. 
Harrison Smith511 reported in January 1886 that the result of this was that ‘... though there 
(still exists) a feeling of friendship between (the Italians and the Habab), there is no 
longer any active commercial intercourse.’ The Habab themselves were caught between 
the Abyssinians on one side and the Mahdists on the other, so that Harrison Smith 
reported that their leader had sent presents of obeisance to Alula, ‘accompanied by a 
request that he would not punish (the Habab) for joining the Mahdist cause (because their 
chief) still professes allegiance to Abyssinia, but is prevented from openly declaring it by 
the proximity... of the rebel tribes of Eastern Sudan’.512 Not surprisingly, the treaty was 
allowed to lapse. 
                                                                                                                                                 
throughout the 1880s: Cohen & Federico, Growth, pp. 54-55 & 70-86; Mack Smith, Italy, pp. 148-70.  See 
also Clementi F. Gallegati M. & Gallegati M., ‘Growth and Cycles of the Italian Economy since 1861: The 
New Evidence’, Italian Economic Journal 1: 1 (March 2015), Malanima P. & Zamagni V., ‘150 years of 
the Italian economy, 1861-2011’, Italian Economic Journal 1: 1 (March 2015); pp. 1-20 and Varta M. 
‘Italian export capacity in the long term perspective (1861-2009): a tortuous path to stay in place’, Journal 
of Modern Italian Studies 15:1(January 2010); pp. 133-56). In addition, the toehold in Massawa was not big 
enough to accommodate a large enough military force to cope with pressures on their presence there - ‘... 
the Italians controlled less than four square miles – a fifth of the area of Manhattan’ with, at first, a force of 
less than a thousand men (Jonas, Adwa, pp.39-40). 
511 Agent sent by Baring to Massawa in 1886 to report on situation in Italian areas; d’Avray, Lords, p.113. 
512 d’Avray, op.cit., pp.111-17. 
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      This gave the Italians some respite from Abyssinian hostility, leading to the brief 
‘honeymoon’ period (see Chapter 2), but then exposed them to attack from dissident 
Habab, who by February 1886 were driving the Italians out of their more isolated 
outposts and raiding right up to the walls of Massawa. Harrison Smith, in May 1886, 
opined that  
 
               It is unlikely that the (Moslem) sheiks of the coast tribes will sever  
               themselves from Abyssinia to join the Italians, but even should they  
               do so, the Italians would not be in a position to (defend them)  
               against the Abyssinians, except at an enormous cost in life and  
               money quite incommensurate with the value of the object sought.513  
 
The Hadendowa, too, could be difficult - during the 1840s, when the Turks controlled 
Kassala, they ‘did not... pay tribute and it was considered inadvisable by the authorities... 
to make a punitive expedition against them’; diverting the waters upon which they 
depended eventually brought them to pay taxes, but it was a laborious and time-
consuming exercise.514 They were a ‘plucky and determined tribe’ who adopted the 
Mahdist cause early on and, led by Osman Digna and armed only with spears and swords, 
                                                 
513 Harrison  Smith to Baring, 20th May 1886; d’Avray, Lords, p.117. Portal states that most of Eritrea was 
‘given over to murder and brigandage (which) almost put a stop to all trade’, and that the lands around the 
Italian positions were ‘infested by wandering bands of brigands and evil-disposed Arab tribes’; G. H. 
Portal, My Mission to Abyssinia (London: E. Arnold, 1892), pp.28-34. Reid (in Frontiers, pp.77-79) claims 
that the Italians encouraged such a state of affairs, ‘winking’ at it as ‘war by other means’ against the 
Abyssinians, ‘as it was clearly in their interests to encourage such lawlessness, particularly in respect to 
caravans carrying firearms to Yohannes’. It is very far from clear that this is the case; such brigandage 
threatened their communications with the outside World and had the potential to bring the wrath of 
Yohannes down upon their heads if they were perceived as being part of its cause. Such Clausewitzian 
strategy was beyond their means, and not worth the risks. 
514 My italics. Fleming G.J., ‘Kassala’, Sudan Notes and Records Vol.5, No.2 (1922); pp. 65-77. See also 
Dahl &  Hjort-af-Ornas, ‘Precolonial Beja’, pp. un-numbered. 
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twice annihilated  well-equipped Egyptian-Sudanese forces near Suakin in October and 
November 1883.515 Lest it be thought that these victories were due mainly to Anglo-
Egyptian parsimony, note that in 1834, at the height of Egyptian power under Mehmet 
Ali, an Egyptian army under Khurshid Pasha (Governor-General of Sudan since 1833) 
which tried to penetrate the area was annihilated by the Hadendowa (the Habab, in 
contrast, became gradually and peacefully Islamized by the Egyptians from the 1820s 
onwards in order to facilitate their traffic with Massawa).516 The Hadendowa were at 
odds with the Halenga, another fractious Arabic tribe in the region and friendly with the 
Beni-Amer but not ‘particularly friendly with (the Hadendowa, to whom they seem 
never) to have submitted’, causing further headaches in administering the region.517 Then, 
in 1887, the Shoans occupied Harrar, and between 1887 and 1889 Menelik was 
preoccupied with both this and intra-Abyssinian power struggles between the Negus 
Negast and his vassals; both factors tended to distract him from drawing closer to the 
Italians and thus making them potentially more isolated than before.518  
      In addition to this, there were periodic intimations that the Abyssinians and Mahdists 
might at some point come to an anti-European understanding, or even a formal alliance. 
Though this was a threat to Britain as well, it would have been particularly hazardous for 
                                                 
515 M. Shibeika, British Policy in the Sudan 1882-1902,  (Oxford: University Press, 1952), pp.182-87; In 
the November attack, a mere 150 Hadendowa attacked a British-led Egyptian force of 500 men and routed 
them. Capt. Montcrieff, R.N., the British Consul at Suakin, was among those killed. Next day, 5th 
November, Hicks Pasha and his force were annihilated; Theobald, Mahdiya, pp. 65-66.  
516 Abir M., ‘The Origins of the Egyptian -Ethiopian Border Problems in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal 
of African History, 8: 3 (1967), pp.443-61. 
517 Fleming, op.cit., pp.65-67.   See Appendix 5 for a more detailed examination of the racial mix of the 
Horn.                                                                                                     
518 R.A. Caulk, ‘The Occupation of Harrar: January 1887’, Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 9: 2 (July 1971), 
pp. 1-20. For a masterful description of the complexities of ethnic, racial, tribal and feudal loyalties and 
political conflicts in this region, especially Abyssinia, see Reid, Frontiers, particularly pp. 66-112. 
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the Italians, who did not have the hinterland of Egypt and Sudan to fall back on.519 This 
threat became acute after the death of Yohannes in battle against the Mahdists in March 
1889. Though Menelik, with whom the Italians were still on good terms, became the new 
Negus Negast, the power-base of Abyssinia subsequently shifted South from the Tigray 
of Yohannes to Menelik’s Shoa, leaving the Italians relatively isolated from his 
immediate support and thus more exposed to the Mahdists and their unpredictable 
allies.520  
      Thus, overall the Italians faced a delicate balancing act, surrounded by usually pro-
Mahdist Moslem tribes, any one of which might at any moment bring the wrath of the 
Abyssinians or Mahdists down upon their outnumbered heads, and among whom slavery 
was a quotidian norm. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that slavery was, to them, a 
secondary consideration; ‘... to pursue (its abolition) was (as Saletta remarked) 
“sufficiently delicate for it not to be raised inopportunely at this stage” - a stage when 
(the Habab, particularly) might, if pressed on unpleasant topics, seek other allies.’521 
      This did not encompass the entire Italian view of slavery, however; as in other 
European countries, it faced passionate Italian opposition. One of the side-effects of the 
                                                 
519 There is evidence that the Mahdists and Abyssinians were making diplomatic contacts with each other 
with a view to forming an alliance against the European Powers as early as September 1888 (Caulk, 
‘Yohannes IV’, p.31), despite being at war during 1887-89, particularly after Kitchener’s series of victories  
and after Adowa in 1896; see also G.N. Sanderson, ‘Contributions from African Sources to the History of 
European Competition in the Upper Valley of the Nile’, The Journal of African History, 3: 1 (1962), pp. 
69-90, and Holt, Mahdiya, pp. 196-98 & 208-10. See also Reid, op.cit., pp. 58-60,for an account of the 
relatively relaxed relations between Moslems and Christians in Sudan-Abyssinia during the decades 
preceding the Mahdiya; though attitudes had hardened by then, it is still possible that channels of 
communication were open enough to facilitate meaningful dialogue between the two sides, especially as the 
Abyssinians felt that the Western Powers were showing no interest in supporting their Christian brothers 
against the Moslem hordes surrounding them and, in the case of Italy, were actively conniving with them to 
undermine Abyssinian power and prestige (Reid, op.cit., pp. 78-81). 
520 Caulk, in ‘Yohannes IV’, p.23, points out that the shift in the locus of power south from Tigray to Shoa 
opened the field for Italian expansion in Eritrea and towards Sudan, but this supposed advantage cannot be 
taken as outweighing the increased danger of a Mahdist expansion into a Northern Abyssinia weakened by 
years of famine and war, and which would have engulfed the Italians. 
521 d’Avray, op.cit., p.142. 
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deep schism between Church and State in Italy (see Chapter 1) was that the Vatican 
removed its Propaganda Fide organization (the church organ responsible for 
proselytisation abroad) to France in 1884, thus depriving the Italian State of any formal 
church support for efforts to colonise Africa. However, a group of Catholic intellectuals, 
dissatisfied with this lack of church support for efforts to bring enlightenment to Africa, 
formed the Associazone nazionale in March 1887, which was designed expressly to co-
operate with the State in, inter alia, christianising Africa.522  One of its main platforms 
was a strident opposition to slavery in the Red Sea, a position it shared with some secular 
Italians in Eritrea, and resulted in vigorous and positive efforts to free slaves (often 
Muslim Oromo who, from 1887, were settled in Assab, the nucleus for freed slaves, 
before being sent back to their communities to proselytize Christianity).523 These efforts 
at emancipation were far from perfect; Italian missionaries frequently failed to 
understand the complexities of Eritrean and other Abyssinian society and were often 
accused of institutional and racist bias against indigenous catholic Africans and Jews,524 
                                                 
522 Full title Associazone nazionale per soccorrere i Missionari cattolici italiani all’Estero (National 
Association for the Protection of Catholic Italian Missionaries Abroad). This organisation was also 
involved in addressing issues such as the severe socio-economic disparities within Italy itself and was not 
exclusively concerned with Africa; Dirar U., ‘Church-State relations in colonial Eritrea: missionaries and 
the development of colonial strategies (1869-1911)’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, Vol.8:3; pp. 391-
410. However, Italian church activity in Africa predated by decades the Associazone nazionale. As early as 
1837 the young monk, later Chevalier, Sapeto (of Esploratore fame - see Chapter 1), had ventured into 
Abyssinia as a missionary, and in 1846 Cardinal Massaia began missionary work in South-Western 
Abyssinia (Sbacchi A., ‘The Archives of the Consolata Mission and the Formation of the Italian Empire, 
1913-1943’, History in Africa Vol.25 (1998); pp.319-40), as a result of which Pope Gregory XVI created 
the Apostolic Vicariate of Central Africa, aimed not only at proselytizing and support of European 
nationals but also at opposing slavery. From 1872 the Verona Fathers, authorized by Propaganda Fide, 
took over the work of the Central African Viciarate, which covered south and central Sudan as well as 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Egypt; Ewald J., ‘The Archives of the Verona Fathers’, History in Africa Vol.7 
(1980); pp. 343-46. 
523 For the historical background to the Oromo (a.k.a. Galla), see Stokes, Encyclopedia, pp. 515-17, and 
Appendix 5. For their resistance to all outside oppressors, including the Christian Abyssinians, see Birru L., 
‘Abyssinian Colonialism as the Genesis of the crisis in the Horn: Oromo resistance (1855-1913)’, 
Northeast African Studies, vol.2/3: number 3/1(1980-81/1981), pp. 93-98. 
524 See R. Gray, Black Christians and White Missionaries (Newhaven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1990), 
cited in Dirar, ibid., p.400. 
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while after 1894 an agreement between the Italian Government and the Vatican led to 
Propaganda Fide becoming involved in missionary activities in Italian Africa, to the 
detriment of Franco-Italian relations.525 But the very existence, however flawed, of such 
efforts and organizations indicates that the Italians, quite as much as the British, were far 
from indifferent to slavery.  
      Furthermore, Gordon had appointed Romolo Gessi as Governor of Bahr-al-Ghazal in 
large part because of his fervent opposition to slavery.526 And there is direct evidence that 
other Italians on the spot were keen to join the crusade against slavery. 
       But in the context of the place and time, it was a hopeless task. As Tenente 
(Lieutenant) Pavoni (appointed Italian envoy to the Habab in July 1891, who fervently 
opposed slavery) pointed out, the chief problem was the absence of European supervision 
of the coasts. For instance, the British had, north of Ras Kasar, set up a Corps of Police; 
but it was supervised by Egyptian officials, who were usually relatives of the very same 
local chiefs responsible for the slave trade -  
                
               Everyone... was in it, from the Egyptian Resident downwards.  
               They were all so badly paid, they had to get a living as best they  
               could... the officials of the Suakin region, including the Resident, 
               took part in raids on tribes dependent on the Italian Government  
              (and) from Trinkitat to Ras Kasar, the surveillance... is almost nil  
              (since it) almost completely lacks a European element... 
               The measures taken by the British have (resulted in the slavers using)  
                                                 
525 One result of which was the expulsion from Eritrea in 1895 of all French Lazarist Fathers by Italian 
Capuchins, which didn’t help Franco-Italian relations; Dirar, op.cit., p.399. 
526 Theobald, Mahdiya, p .23. 
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               our coastline... both because it is more extensive (and) less capable of  
               being supervised... and because by reason of the vast terrain... they are  
               less easily surprised...527 
 
So it seems that the British criticisms of the Italian lack of interest in stopping the slave 
trade were somewhat misplaced, to say the least, as their own actions seem to have 
facilitated it in areas under Italian control which were impossible to police.  
 
      British criticism of Italian indifference to slavery smacks, on further examination, of 
hypocrisy. The Italians weren’t alone in having such inadequate resources on the ground 
that they had to rely on local agents who were inimical to their best efforts to extinguish 
slavery. The French had identical experiences, during their efforts to pacify and colonise  
North Africa during the latter decades of the nineteenth century.528 And the British, who 
regarded themselves as the moral arbiters in matters such as the crusade against slavery, 
what did they do? We have seen that London refused to pay any part of Egypt’s expenses 
in pacifying Sudan or suppressing the Mahdia. Instead, they contented themselves that 
                                                 
527 On a similar occasion (in 1892), Pavoni tried to arrest a group of Rashaida for slaving, but ‘no sooner... 
had they got word of my tour... than they took off... in a great hurry’; pursing them, he found their boats on 
the coast, but failed to stop the slavers from escaping, lamenting that though ‘... such flagrant 
contraventions should not go unpunished... I had no means of stopping (them) from sailing...’; ibid, pp. 
215-19. 
528The French, like the British and Italians, had their share of people earnestly trying to stop the slave trade. 
In April 1886, Hunter reported to Aden that M. Lagarde, the Commandant of Obokh, had made himself 
‘extremely unpopular with the Danakil who... attempted his life because he objected to the (slave trade) at 
Tajourra’, and that ‘This co-operation... deserves acknowledgment on the part of (HMG)’; IO L/PS/9/56, 
Hunter - Political Resident, Aden, 19 April 1886.  The White Father Charles Guerin, appointed Bishop of 
the Sahara in 1901, together with the ascetic missionary Charles Foucald, railed against slavery, but to no 
avail - ‘It is through an order of General Risbourg, confirmed by Colonel Billet, that slavery is allowed to 
continue’; letter from Guerin to Foucald, quoted in F. Fleming, The Sword and the Cross (London: Faber & 
Faber, 2004), p. 147. As with the other colonial powers, ‘They had limited forces, long supply lines, and as 
to slavery, had to accept Tuareg and Moor institutions France had long condemned’; M.A. Klein, ‘Slavery 
and French Rule in the Sahara’, Slavery and Abolition Vol.19:2 (1998); pp. 73-90 (p.74). 
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the appointment of a handful of Europeans, either directly or via Cairo, as governors of 
the vastness of Egypt and Sudan would solve the issue.529 The Europeans involved in 
administering these areas, in all of which slavery had existed since time immemorial and 
was an integral part of the social system as well as the economy,530 had to rely on local 
personnel to administer the alien rules imposed upon them. And what views did the 
British men-on-the-spot have of these local subordinates? Gordon  
 
                    ... arrived at the policy of employing any European he could  
                    (find) after he (formed the) opinion that  no reforms or progress...  
                    especially in the suppression of the slave trade, could be effected 
                    with Turkish, Egyptian, or Sudanese officials.531 
   
The irreducible fact was that ‘... slavery was an institution permitted by Islam, and 
appointment of (Christians) to suppress (it) aroused the religious resentment of the 
populace generally’, while such measures ‘... diminished the prestige of the Egyptian 
officials and of the khedival government in the eyes of the Sudanese, while at the same 
                                                 
529 Khedive Ismail was keen to appear modern and keenly opposed to slavery in European eyes, leading to 
the conclusion of the Anglo-Egyptian Slave-Trade Convention of August 1877, which effectively  
committed him, and Egypt, to the total banning of the slave trade in Egypt (with immediate effect, together 
with the banning of the holding of domestic slaves within six years) and in Sudan (by 1889). To facilitate 
this aim he appointed Europeans (many of whom were dedicated to anti-slavery) to important Government 
positions, e.g., Gordon as Governor of Equatoria in 1873, Werner Munziger (a Swiss) as Governor of 
Keren and Massawa in 1875 and Emin Pasha - real name Eduard Schnitzer, a German - to succeed Gordon 
in Equatoria in 1878, after Gordon was made Governor-General of all  Sudan in February 1877. When 
Gordon took over Sudan  an Austrian (Rudolph Slatin) was appointed Inspector of taxes in 1879, a German 
(Giegler) became Inspector of telegraphs, and two Italians - Romolo Gessi and Giacomo Messadaglia - 
were appointed by Gordon to govern Bahr al-Ghazal and Darfur respectively during the late 1870s; Holt, 
Mahdist State, pp. 29-32; Theobald, Mahdiya, pp.21-24. See also Caulk , Jaws, pp.17-19, and Hochschild, 
Leopold, pp. 96-98; Baer G., ‘Slavery in Nineteenth century Egypt’, Journal of African History, Vol.8:3 
(1967); pp. 417-41. 
530 See Sharkey H.J., ‘Luxury, Status, and the Importance of Slavery in the Nineteenth and early-Twentieth 
Century Northern Sudan’, Northeast African Studies, Vol.1: Number 2-3, 1994 (New Series); pp.187-206. 
531 Shibeika, Sudan, p.33.  
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time it aroused the jealousy of the Egyptians and their dislike of an onerous policy 
backed by (European and British) public opinion’.532 Furthermore, ‘The Egyptians did 
not regard the primitive black (of Sudan) as a human being at all... Even under British 
rule there (were) appalling cases of cruelty and tyranny (by Egyptian officials) 
temporarily free from British supervision’.533  To quote Moore-Harrell: ‘... despite 
specific orders from Cairo to stop the slave trade (in Sudan), Musa Hamdi Pasha 
(Governor-General of Sudan, 1862-65)... encouraged and supported it. He even provided 
slave traders with regular army troops for their raids, to the profit of all concerned’.534 
And, as Theobald points out, ‘Service in the Sudan was hated, and was regarded as a 
punishment (by Egyptian officials); consequently, only the worst types of officials were 
to be found there’.535 Baring opined that  
 
                 It is a mighty difficult thing to govern a Moslem country without 
                 the force necessary to give weight to (Europeans)... There is no  
                 capable Moslem... If they are not allowed to govern according to  
                 their own rude methods... they cannot govern at all.536  
                                                 
532 Holt, Mahdist State, pp. 26-27. As Alpers points out, this symbiosis between slavery and local economy 
was not confined to Sudan, but affected the whole of Africa. As one Somali of the Benadir coast 
commented as late as 1903, ‘We can do nothing without our slaves’; see  E.A. Alpers, ‘Muqdisho in the 
Nineteenth Century: A Regional Perspective’, Journal of African History, 24: 4 (1983), pp. 441-459 (p. 
452).  
533 Logan R.W., ‘The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, a Problem in International Relations’, The Journal of Negro 
History Vol.16:4 (October 1931), pp. 371-81 (p.372). 
534 A. Moore-Harrell, ‘Decline in European Trade in the Sudan from the mid-Ninenteenth Century’, Middle 
Eastern Studies, 39: 3 (July 2003), pp. 65-80, (pp. 70-71). 
535 Mahdiya, p.26. 
536 Baring to Salisbury, 11th December 1891, quoted in Marlowe, Cromer in Egypt, p. 155. Baring had an 
exalted idea of what the British Empire could have been, comparing the success of the Roman Empire with 
the failings of the British by pointing out that the Romans practised a kind of inclusivity of subject peoples 
that was absent from all modern European Empires; he was aware that without a respect for subject peoples 
the Empire would be unable to fulfil its self-appointed moral objectives, such as the abolition of slavery; 
Chamberlain M.E., ‘Lord Cromer’s “Ancient and Modern Imperialism”: A Proconsular View of Empire’, 
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Sir Alfred Milner537 stated that ‘... the native ruling class (of Egypt, and thus by extension 
of Sudan) was vicious and incapable’, guilty of ‘...a disregard not only of every economic 
but of every moral principle’, and lacking either ‘moral fibre’ or ‘... the capacity to keep 
things straight’. Anyone who demurred in even the slightest regard from this view, such 
as Sir Francis Wingate, was pilloried as an imbecile.538 
      Yet the British contented themselves with allowing territories under their control to 
be run by these Moslem539 degenerates who would, quite obviously, carry on with their 
ancient traditions unless stopped by force of arms - which Britain would not, and Egypt 
could not, finance. Why did the British expect the Italians - who had far less resources - 
to be any better?          
      There is now plenty of evidence that the British, for all their moral posturings, were 
no better than any other European colonial power when it came to the issue of slavery or 
                                                                                                                                                 
Journal of British Studies Vol.12:1 (November 1972); pp. 11-85. See also C.A. Hagerman, Muse of 
Empire? Classical Education, the Classical Tradition and British Attitudes to Empire, 1757-1902 
(University of Toronto, 2005 - PhD Thesis). 
537 Sir Alfred Milner (1854-1925), inter alia, Under-Secretary, for Finance in Egypt 1889-92; quoted in 
Cain P.J., ‘Character and imperialism: The british(sic) financial administration of Egypt, 1878-1914’, 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol.34:2; pp. 177-200 (pp. 183, 185 & 186). 
538 Sir Francis Reginald Wingate (1861-1953), D.M.I (Egypt) 1889-1899, Governor-General of Sudan 
1899-1916. Though frequently more far-sighted than his contemporaries regarding the future course of 
political developments in Egypt and Sudan, Wingate frequently clashed with his superiors such as Sir 
Eldon Gorst, who succeeded Cromer as Governor of Egypt in 1907 and who wrote articles such as ‘The 
Oriental Character’ (Anglo-Saxon Review: A Quarterly Miscellany:2: (June 1899)), extolling the intrinsic 
superiority of Christian civilization and British Character over that of  The Oriental: Pugh R.J.M., Wingate 
Pasha: The Life of Sir Francis Reginald Wingate 1861-1953 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., 2011), 
pp.107 & passim. Such views were general at the time: Mr. De Lisle, (MP, Leicestershire) opined that ’... 
men who have experience of the dark races (as have I)... (know) that they are incapable of self-
government...’; Hansard, 3, HC, 4 February 1887, v.310 cc.656-735. 
539 Baring may have been dismayed to find that it was not only Muslims who profited from the slave trade; 
as M. Afifi notes (in ‘The State and Church in Nineteenth Century Egypt’, Die Welt des Islams, 39: 3 
(1999), pp.273-88, (p.285)), ‘... the rulers of Ethiopia would send complaints to the administration in Egypt 
against some Copts in Aswan for their role in the slave trade’. Hunter despairingly noted, regarding the 
Egyptian presence on the Somali coast in 1884, that ‘There is not even the excuse that the slave trade has 
been stopped for it flourishes amazingly... effective interference has been impossible as the Egyptian 
territories are (too vast to police). To pretend that Egypt has done aught but overawe the tribes for the 
purposes of extortion is absurd. What use is either life or property when it is all at the mercy of a Pasha?’; 
Hunter - Secretary of State for India, 4 August 1884, IO L/PS/9/55.  
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the welfare of their subjects.540 It was Kitchener who, in 1890, circumvented the official 
Anglo-Egyptian policy of allowing grain to be imported through Suakin to the famine-
stricken tribes of Northern Sudan541, and enforced a blockade of food supplies to the 
interior, on the grounds that such import would spread cholera from the Arabian 
peninsula to Sudan. Though this had the desired effect of breaking up a Mahdist camp in 
Hadendowa territory and causing the Hadendowa ‘... to see the necessity of keeping on 
good terms with the Government’, one wonders what effect it must have had on those 
innocent parties not involved in the fighting. Such action is reminiscent of Stalin’s 
deliberate enforcement of famine in Ukraine during the early 1930s,542 and hardly 
invokes the image of an Empire superior in moral tone to those of its neighbours.543 And, 
to cap it all, slavery continued in Sudan under the noses, and with the connivance, of the 
Anglo-Egyptian administration well into the twentieth century.544 
                                                 
540 Weiss H., ‘The Illegal Trade in Slaves from German North Cameroon to British North Nigeria’, African 
Economic History, Vol.28 (2000); pp.141-97; Morton F., ‘Slave Trading in the Western Transvaal after the 
Sand River Convention’, African Economic History, Vol. 20 (1992); pp.99-118; Goodridge R.A.,‘The Issue 
of Slavery in the Establishment of British Rule in North Cameroun to 1927’, African Economic History, 
Vol.22 (1994); pp. 19-36; and Christelow A., ‘Slavery in Kano, 1913-1914: Evidence from the Judicial 
records’, African Economic History, Vol.14 (1985); pp. 57-74. 
541 Government policy was that food should be imported to tribes who were not wholly committed to the 
Mahdists in an attempt to erode support for the Mahdia. 
542 See, inter alia, Oleskiw S., The agony of a nation: the great man-made famine in Ukraine, 1932-33 
(London: The National Committee to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Artificial Famine in 
Ukraine 1932-1933; 1983); and Stark R., ‘Holodomor, Famine in Ukraine, 1932-1933: A Crime against 
Humanity or Genocide?’, Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies, 10: 1 (January 2010), pp.20-30. 
543 Holt, Mahdist State, pp.171-72: quote from Kitchener’s minute of September 21, 1890. See also Serels 
S., ‘Famines of War: The Red Sea Grain Market and Famine in Eritrean Sudan, 1889-1891’, Northeast 
African Studies, Vol.12:1 (2012); pp.73-94. Serels also opines that the infected cattle, blamed on the 
Italians, may have come from Jeddah, not India. 
544 ‘The new Anglo-Egyptian rulers of (twentieth century) Sudan formally undertook the abolition of the 
slave trade... However... The downfall of the Mahdist state... left its successor with the problem of 
reconciling (abolition) with a chronic shortage of labour. The (authorities) decried slavery... but 
simultaneously upheld and even enforced the continuation of domestic slavery’; Spaulding J., ‘The 
Business of Slavery in the Central Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1910-1930’, African Economic History Vol.17 
(1988); pp. 23-44 (p.26). See also Hargey T., ‘Festina Lente: Slavery Policy and Practice in the Anglo-
Egyptian Sudan’, Slavery and Abolition Vol.19:2 (1998); pp. 250-72. It seems that this use of indigineous, 
or other handy local, forces in the absence of an adequate Imperial presence is a constant in history: 
Roadnight R. (in ’ “Sleeping with the Enemy”: Britain, Japanese troops and the Netherlands East Indies, 
1945-46’, History Vol.87 (2002): 286; pp.245-68) describes the use of Japanese POWs by the British as 
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                Part 2. Spheres of Influence; an impossible situation 
.       
The Great Powers generally, in their dealings with each other regarding the division and 
imposition of influence upon newly-acquired territory in  “uncivilized” areas of the 
globe, tended to apply the Westphalian model of procedure - that is, they attempted to 
carve up areas under their control into tidy, well-defined areas that mimicked the orderly 
division of the nation-states from which they came.545 While this model of behaviour may 
have been fine for areas in Europe where recognized nationalities were sedentary and 
settled into fairly well-defined areas (such as Italy and Greece), it was wildly 
inappropriate for areas such as Northern Sudan and its surrounding territories, where 
much of the population lived nomadic lifestyles, regarded themselves as members of 
clans or tribes rather than of nations, and had no concept of, or use for, strictly delineated 
national borders. It was this insistence among the European occupiers of the Red Sea 
littoral and its hinterlands that rigid borders should be recognized, delineated and 
enforced, that caused them so much trouble when it came to exacting tribute, taxes or 
recognition of sovereignty from the itinerant and distinctly un-Westphalian-minded 
inhabitants of the region. It also disrupted well-established trade routes across the whole 
                                                                                                                                                 
police to guard against their erstwhile native allies, while after the Torch landings of 1943 Ernie Pyle, the 
US reporter, tried but failed to alert the home front to the allied use of pro-Nazi Vichy police against the 
indigenous Arabs in Tunisia; Tobin J., Ernie Pyle’s War: America’s Eye-Witness to World War 2 
(Lawrence: Kansas University Press, 1996), p.70.  
545 The ‘Westphalian Model’ is commonly thought to have derived from the peace of Westphalia of 1648, 
from which, following the end of the Thirty Years War, the nation-states of modern Europe ultimately 
sprang, and may be said to be ‘... an account of the presumed basic units of the international system and the 
patterns of behaviour they exhibit (wherein) the emphasis is likely to fall upon the idea of the existence of 
territorial states and (a resultant) balance of power (implying an existence and presumption of ) 
sovereignty, equality and non-intervention (among such states, leading to a) collective effort... to create or 
impose an international system and to regulate membership of that system’; P.M.R. Stirk, ‘The 
Westphalian model and sovereign equality’, Review of International Studies, 38: (2012), pp. 641-60 
(p.641). See also A. Osiander, ‘Sovereignty, International Relations and the Westphalian Myth’, 
International Organization, 55 (2011), pp.251-878, and R. Jackson, The Global Covenant (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 385 & 398. 
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of the Horn from the Indian Ocean to the Nile, upon which the autochthonous inhabitants 
had depended for generations, whether nomadic or not.546 
      There were, thus, sound reasons for urgent Italian requests to be allowed to control 
the coast as far North as Ras Kasar, rather than just up to Kitchener’s suggestion of Ras 
Harb, since the lands of the Habab extended from the Massawa district up to Ras Kasar. 
Any attempted enforcement of Ras Harb as the Northern limit of Italian sovereignty 
would have bisected the territory of the Habab and other tribes, and make it impossible 
for the Italians to gain any traction with them.  
      The advance of the Mahdists and the reluctance of the British to move very far out of 
Suakin meant that tribes friendly to the Anglo-Egyptians who had not initially fallen 
under the Mahdist spell had, by September 1884, become discouraged by lack of British 
support and come to terms with Osman Digna, so that by January 1886, as Baring 
reported to Salisbury, ‘All of the coast north and south of Suakin is in possession of 
hostile tribes, except Agig.’547  The tribes concerned - including the Beni-Amer, the 
Hadendowa and, especially, the Habab - inhabited the lands up to Ras Kasar. After the 
defeat at Dogali in January 1887, which severely damaged Italian prestige among the 
tribes, the Italians became fearful that Suakin would usurp their authority over the Habab. 
As Gene wrote to Robilant, 
 
               (information received) confirms... firstly that (Suakin) confirms  
                                                 
546 A rich trade in goods as diverse as livestock, pelts, coffee, gold, copper, salt, ivory and honey existed 
from early times all across the Horn, but with the imposition of colonial, “Westphalian” borders east of the 
Nile ‘...colonial governments (saw such heretofore legitimate traders as) nothing but ‘outlaws’ or 
‘porchers’(sic)... It was one of the contentious issues in Anglo-Ethiopian relations (and) throughout the 
successive administrations of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan... indigenous cross-border trade which was out of 
government control was regulated and suppressed’; Kurimoto, ‘Trade Relations’, pp.61-63. 
547 Baring to Salisbury, 24th January 1886; d’Avray, Lords, p.114.  
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               continued relations with Abyssinia (and secondly that) they are  
               making every effort to attract within their orbit (the tribes nearest  
                Suakin and Massawa... (the Sheikh of the Habab is seeking to)  
                ingratiate himself with... Kitchener... The policy of (Suakin) is...  
               logical and consistent with (its) interests, but unfortunately  
              dangerous and opposed to ours... 
                      With the roads into Abyssinia closed to our commerce,  
              there remains only the passage (via) the Habab... If (the)  
              Habab should fall under the influence of (Suakin) that road  
              would be totally closed to us (and leave) Massawa... isolated  
              and shut off from all communication.548 
 
It was thus essential that the coast up to Ras Kasar come under Italian jurisdiction, since 
if Baring’s plans to re-establish Anglo-Egyptian authority over the coastal regions down 
to Ras Harb succeeded,549 the Habab would likely reject all Italian authority and leave 
Massawa isolated.550 
                                                 
548 Gene to Robilant, 7 February 1887; ibid., pp.120-121. The Italians, in their dealings with the Habab and 
their numerous intra-tribal sub-divisions, were hopelessly out of their depth. For instance, in 1887 General 
Saletta elected to pay a “generous stipend” of 50 Maria Theresa dollars per month to Ficak Bumnet, whom 
Saletta had recognized as the head of the Ad-Temeriam (a clan of the Habab), in order to keep open the 
Lebca Road, a main route to Massawa that ran between the Habab to the north and the Ad-Temeriam to the 
south, and a strategic artery in the event of any campaign against the Abyssinians. Unfortunately for 
Saletta, he was the only one who recognized Ficak as the clan head; none of the clan did. Later, General 
Baldiserra recognized Mohamed Sucar, the real head of the clan, as the clan leader; however, he declined to 
pay Sucar a stipend, though he allowed that of Ficak to continue, to the detriment of Italian finances and 
credibility. Later, unable to agree on how best to handle the Habab, the Italians fell to squabbling among 
themselves; d’Avray, op.cit., pp. 23 & 200-03. 
549 Letter of 6 May, 1887, from De Martino, the Italian Consul-General in Cairo, to Depretis; d’Avray, 
op.cit., p.135. 
550 Ibid., pp.102-21. On 17 January 1887, Robilant wrote to De Martino, that ‘... to place the Italian frontier 
a little to the north of Ras Harb... leaves outside our sphere of influence the whole of the tribe of the Habab, 
and cannot be considered as practical or serious (since it would lead to) tribes, today discontented, 
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Trade and Finance – the destruction of a dream. 
Despite the grandiose dreams of Carlo De Amezaga and his confederates that a great 
cornucopia of wealth would result from the Italian acquisition of Assab, as we have seen 
it proved useless for the purposes of trade.551 And Massawa too, also turned out to face 
enormous problems in terms of how the Italians could exploit its great promise. Its trade 
with the interior was, as we have seen, severely hampered by the complexities of local 
tribal and strategic factors. To make matters worse, the money spent on maintaining 
Massawa far outstripped its income, not least because of the profligacy of the Italian 
authorities.  
      Capitano Boari, appointed to examine the issue of appropriate tribute, pointed out 
how little the ‘spendthrift’ Italian government was getting for its expenditure – 
 
             A holy man... previously received 285 francs; he now gets from  
             us 550... without ever having rendered any service... From the  
             Egyptians, (the Habab leader) received 70 Dollars monthly; the...  
             500 Dollars a month which General Saletta (allotted) in 1887, was  
             given in expectation (of services rendered but not delivered)...  
             (Other chiefs) had had nothing from the Egyptians; now (we) pay  
             them 4,200 francs a year... (other tribesmen) had paid 5,818 to the  
                                                                                                                                                 
tomorrow riotous, and (ultimately) docile instruments in the hands of either the Dervishes or the 
Abyssinians’ (Ibid., p.122). As d’Avray points out (p.121), ‘The hand of Kitchener indeed hung heavy over 
the hopes and fears of the Italians’.  
551 The Italian paper Opinione conceded that the Suez Canal had been a ‘great disappointment’ for Italian 
trade. ‘Trade with Asia has proved to be a great delusion (re) silk and rice (as Italian produce has 
consistently been undercut in price and quality by competing imports from Africa and the Far East)... All 
Italy has gained is the minute and questionable possession of Assab’; 23 May 1882, in FO45/454. 
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             Egyptians; now (we) pay them 4,200 francs...552 
 
In 1889, a Mr.Hogg, of the British Consular service on the Somali coast, conducted a tour 
of Italian possessions on the Red Sea coast. Treated to an ‘... exceedingly kind and 
cordial reception... by General Baldissera’ on his arrival at Massawa, he proceeded to 
note the financials of each post he visited. Assab ‘does little or no export trade... it costs 
90,000 francs p.a. and the revenue is about 1,000’; at Massawa ‘There is not much trade... 
Italian goods cannot compete due to the expense of import from Europe... Total expenses 
20 million francs, revenue 1.2 million’, on top of which the naval expenses of Massawa 
were 4 million francs p.a., while the chief of the Habab gets 6,000 francs p.a., ‘others 
less’.553 
      Clearly, Italian finances on the Red Sea were parlous and irresponsibly run. It speaks 
volumes that they only managed to build one short stretch of railway in all the time they 
occupied Eritrea until 1896 - a 27km. long stretch from Massawa to Sahati. In an age 
when the Napier expedition of 1867554 had displayed the potential of the railway as a 
strategic tool, and all the other Great Powers colonizing Africa were planning continent-
                                                 
552 Ibid., pp.191-93 - many more such examples are given by d’Avray. A franc was roughly the equivalent 
of 1/25 of a pound sterling; G. Anderson, Hansard, 3, HC, 29 March 1881, v.260 cc.558-78. 
553 IO L/PS/9/57, Hogg - Secretary of State for India, 11 February 1889. In 1884, Hunter had reported that 
no vessels had entered Assab for two years, and that the only trade done there was providing stores to 
Italian ships when they visited; IO L/PS/9/55, Hunter - Secretary of State for India (London), 2 June 1884. 
As Moore-Harrell (‘Decline’, p.70) pointed out, Sudan produced the finest cotton in the world, so how 
could overpriced, inferior Italian fabrics compete as imports to Africa, and this at a time when textile 
production remained the mainstay of Italian industry (Mrazkova, ‘Colonial’, p.197)? To give some idea of 
comparative figures, in 1846-48 Sudan exported goods valued at 41,684 sterling to Tripoli, 59,440-worth in 
1862 and, in 1873, 73000-worth in Ostrich and Ivory products alone; figures reached a peak of between 
125,000 and 4 million in 1875, collapsing after the start of the Mahdiya in 1884; C.W. Newbury, ‘North 
African and Western Sudan Trade in the Nineteenth Century: A Re-Evaluation’, Journal of African Studies, 
7: 2 (1966), pp.233-46. 
554 Pakenham, Scramble, pp.470-71. See also N. Rodgers, ‘The Abyssinian Expedition of 1867-1868: 
Disraeli’s imperialism or James Murray’s war?’, The Historical Journal, 27: 1 (1984), pp.129-149, and 
R.A. Caulk, ‘Firearms and Princely Power in Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of African 
History, 12: 4 (1972), pp. 614-17. 
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wide railways to facilitate trade and Imperialism, Italy remained too poor to pay for more 
than this one tiny stretch of rail. Intelligent use of such an innovation would, probably 
more than any other, have enabled the Italians to more effectively control their Eritrean 
territories, given their shortage of manpower and resources, had they been able to afford 
it; but the money was never forthcoming, from either government or business interests.555 
      This was a contributory reason as to why Italian attempts to exact tribute from those 
tribes in their sphere of influence failed, and the same could be said of their attempts to 
stop slavery - there simply weren’t enough Italians available to do the job, so it got 
delegated to tribal entities who had no interest in anything but lining their own pockets. 
In itself, it was fairly normal procedure for Imperial powers to delegate such activities to 
local potentates. As Miran points out, the Italians were inspired by French attitudes to 
Islam in their African colonies - Italian approaches to African Imperialism sought to 
construct legitimacy and authority by co-opting Muslim leaders and Islamic institutions. 
This ‘pact’ was articulated by, inter alia, payment of monthly stipends to Muslim 
community leaders and functionaries.556 However, this system didn’t work for the Italians 
because of the nature of the ‘functionaries’ they enlisted. The leaders of the Habab - and 
of the Rashaida, an Arabic tribe557 - pillaged their own people and every other clan and 
                                                 
555 Though railways were built elsewhere in Italian Africa between 1888 and 1940, they only totalled 1,556 
kms., of which nearly half was the Djibouti - Addis Ababa line, built by the French. The other Powers 
constructed 71,000 kms. in the same period; S. Maggi, ‘The Railways of Italian Africa: Economic, Social 
and Strategic Features’, Journal of Transport History, 18: 1 (March 1997), pp.54-71, and Ram, Anglo-
Ethiopian, pp.160-223. However, it is worth noting that railways were expensive; the Napier expedition 
cost 9 million pounds, nearly twice the cost of the estimated 5 million (Blake, Disraeli, pp.495-96), which 
might explain why a cash-strapped Italy didn’t build more. 
556 Miran J., ‘Endowing Property and Edifying Power in the Red Sea Ports: Waqf, Arab Migrant 
Entrepreneurs, and Urban Authority in Massawa, 1860s-1880s’, International Journal of African Historical 
Studies, 42:2:2009: pp.151-78. 
557 The Rashaida came from Arabia with Napier in 1867 and stayed on (see note 15, above). They were ‘... 
a nuisance, and disturbers of the lives of all the tribes from (Suakin) southwards’, frequently fighting the 
Hadendowa and the Habab and being responsible for much of the slave-trading that the Italians were 
powerless to stop; d’Avray, Lords, pp.212-20. And see Appendix 5. 
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tribe that they could overpower, ostensibly to pay tribute to the Italians but in fact to 
enrich themselves.558 When the Italians tried to collect their dues, they usually failed - for 
instance, an attempt in the late 1880s to make the Rashaida pay at least some of the 
tribute due them foundered when, on being approached by Capitano Noe, they ran off to 
the North, leaving a small group to take their animals and mingle unidentifiably with the 
Habab.559 The Italians tried, but failed, to get the elusive and nomadic tribes to settle in 
one place and become agriculturalists (and thus more easily taxable), but failed.560 
Whether or not the Italians were unusually bad at picking the right people to represent 
them, or (more likely) were simply too understaffed to stamp their authority where it was 
needed,561 the results of their policy were abysmal and ruinously expensive. 
     Thus, the Italian propensity towards skewing customs duties in their favour, and their 
ferocity in trying to exact every last penny from those, such as the Indian and Greek 
traders of Massawa, who couldn’t run away, though undoubtedly misguided and overly 
rapacious, can at least be understood a little more, while the keenness of native tribes to 
flee from the Italian to the Anglo-Egyptian sphere can be interpreted as an action - at 
least in part - to escape, not just the Italians themselves, but also those whom they 
fruitlessly employed to collect their dues. 
                                                 
558 For instance, for a detailed account of how the Habab chieftains gained and allotted money, see 
d’Avray, Lords, p.233. 
559 The Rashaida had, after quarrelling violently with the Habab and the Hadendowa during the 1870s, 
settled near  Tokar following the Mahdist occupation and offered their submission to Usman Digna, but 
after quarrelling with the Mahdists too they raided them, stole a thousand of their camels, and fled to 
Massawa, where they sought Italian protection and offered submission to General Orero. Thus, not only did 
they not pay tribute due, but they risked bringing the Mahdists down on the Italians; ibid., pp. 212 -13. 
560 Ibid., pp.169-70. 
561 This situation did not suddenly appear with the Italians; it had existed from time immemorial. ‘... neither 
Ethiopian or Muslim ever accepted that the Habab were independent. Nevertheless, they (behaved as if they 
were, and) neither of the putative suzerains found it easy to enforce his claim; nor to extract the tribute 
(demanded). The (Habab) knew that by a mixture of procrastination, of lying, of fast moving... out of sight 
of the tax-gatherer, it was not difficult to wear down the tribute collectors...’; d’Avray, ibid, pp.30-31. The 
difference was that neither the Turks nor the Abyssinians depended solely on the Habab, whereas the 
Italians effectively did. See Appendix 5 for a brief description of the Peoples of the Horn. 
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Theories of Empire: Why did the Italians bother? 
We saw in the introduction some of the theories behind the creation of European empires 
in the nineteenth century. How do they measure up as explanations for Italy’s attempts at 
Imperialism? The Marxist view can be dispensed with immediately - Italy had no capital 
to export (unless one counts Labour as Capital, and with nowhere in North East Africa 
for Labour to go and nothing for it to do had it gone there, the question becomes 
redundant; what export of Labour there was from Italy went to North America, Australia 
and other parts of Europe). It is worth noting, however, that during the latter part of the 
nineteenth century  
 
             ... it seems undeniable that growing competition for established  
             markets... coupled with the (prolonged ) downturn in the value of  
             exports during the last thirty years of the century, stimulated most  
             industrialized countries to look for new markets elsewhere, (generating)  
             greater interest than ever before in (the) little known regions of Africa  
             and Asia (whose) economic possibilities were commonly overestimated 
             precisely because they were impossible to calculate.562 
 
As Oliver and Sanderson no doubt correctly note, ‘Without this development of 
economically motivated interest (in Africa during the Great Depression), the full-blooded 
scramble of the 1880s and 1890s is indeed hardly conceivable’.563 In Britain the export of 
capital was lower during the 1875-1894 period than it had been for the preceding (1855-
                                                 
562 Fieldhouse, Economics, p. 35.  
563 G.N. Sanderson, The European Partition of Africa: Origins and Dynamics, in Oliver & Sanderson, 
Cambridge, pp. 96-153 (p. 105). 
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1875) or succeeding (1894-1914) periods;564 for Italy, already far behind almost every 
other European country in economic development, the situation during the Great 
Depression (1875-1896) was far worse. Indeed, ‘Italy was barely a minor contributor to 
(technological progress during the nineteenth century, and her economic) performance 
was poor, ranking eleventh out of the fifteen more advanced countries in 1890-92...’.565 
And certainly Italy was probably the most prone of all the Great Powers to over-estimate 
the potential wealth to be found in Africa, probably because her hopes were the most 
desperate. But this does not alter the fact that Italy, with no capital to export, cannot be 
shoe-horned into the Marxist model, even if Britain can. 
      Nor can Seeley’s idea cannot be applied to Italy because the integration that 
characterized Britain in no way resembled the situation, perpetually verging on chaos and 
disintegration, that prevailed in Italy throughout our period. Those involved in Italian 
enterprise in the Red Sea cannot be said to represent Schumpeter’s atavistic Upper 
Classes, except insofar as they appeared as officers in the army and navy, as that class in 
Italy was mainly concerned, where it expressed any atavism at all, with hostility to either 
France or Austria. Italians in the Red Sea who could conceivably be designated as Upper 
Class, such as Antonelli and Sapeto, were more concerned with the possibilities of 
trading than with conquest. Those, such as Maffei and Mancini, who came from the 
Upper echelons but who stayed at home, showed au fond only a half-hearted and 
lukewarm interest in Imperialism, and when they tried, in the early years, to partake in 
the activity - such as when Gladstone invited them to join in the occupation of Egypt - 
fumbled it.  
                                                 
564 Mathias, First, pp. 399-400 
565 Cohen & Federico, Growth, p.51. Only in silk reeling did Italy lead the world, and then only because her 
two main competitors, China and Japan, were even more economically backward than she was (ibid, p.51). 
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      It is eminently possible that Schumpeter’s thesis (along with a lot of accompanying 
Marxist ideology) can, in fact, be turned on its head. As Fieldhouse puts it,  
 
            Colonies provided (at a time of dangerously explosive international  
            crises) a safety valve not, as Ferry said in 1890, for surplus   
            manufacturers, but for the enterprise and bellicosity of the jingoists and  
            traditional fighting castes. Frenchmen could regain the self-respect lost 
            at Sedan by fighting in (Africa and Indo-China), far from the Germans  
            and with little but their own lives at stake. Italy, too weak to compete in  
            Europe, could strike impressive postures in North Africa.... Politically 
            ambitious soldiers (Kitchener? Gordon?) could be kept far from the 
            centres of power...566 
 
      There is, however, a case to be made for Hobson’s, and Robinson and Gallagher’s, 
ideas. The shipping magnates of Liguria and arms manufacturers, and those who 
provided the means for implementing colonization, such as the Pirelli company, did have 
a vested interest in colonial expansion in the Red Sea and did their best to get it going, as 
did ‘men-on-the-spot’ such as the Bienenfeld-Rolphs. And, once the men-on-the-spot 
started to make an impact (such as by importing contraband munitions, thus incurring the 
wrath of the French and British) the Italian government found itself having to take an 
interest. 
                                                 
566 Fieldhouse, Economics, p.67. My parentheses and  italics. For Cain and Hopkins’ theory, see the 
previous three paragraphs. 
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      Allied to these theories is what Fieldhouse terms the “Peripheral Explanation of 
Imperialism”; that is, that Imperialism of the type indulged in by all the Powers of Europe 
was not the fruit of carefully-thought-out strategies emanating from the metropolitan 
hubs of Empire, but resulted from ad hoc events at the extremities of European 
colonization - in other words, ‘... the tendency of existing European possessions to 
expand into their environment... irrespective of the needs or wishes of the imperial 
power’567.  
      This was partly due to the fact that actions on the fringes of Empire were, in general 
terms, not initiated by politicians at the metropolitan hub of Empire but by individuals or 
commercial undertakings. As  Porter remarks, ‘Even when the flow of information was 
speeded by... telegraphs,568 the fundamental bureaucratic problem remained the 
continuous adjustment of (local conditions, which were dealt with by) the men on the 
spot, principally the Governors, Proconsuls and Viceroys who operated at the key point 
of interaction between directives from London and pressures generated by conditions on 
the periphery’.569 In the British Empire, ‘(during) the nineteenth century (London) 
preferred... to devolve (administrative) responsibility upon private concerns (including) 
the partition of Africa had been, wherever possible, left to private companies’.570  As 
Fieldhouse notes, this process was not exclusively British; ‘... German East Africa 
(originated) from) a small group of German colonial enthusiasts who (upon their own 
                                                 
567D.K. Fieldhouse, p. 80. What Salisbury referred to as ‘Informal Empire’ - see, inter alia, Roberts, 
Salisbury, pp.528-29, and D. McLean, ‘Finance and “Informal Empire” before the First World War’, 
Economic History Review (Second Series) XXIX:1976; pp. 291-305.     
568 For instance, the laying of the Red Sea cable in 1870 brought Whitehall into much faster communication 
than had been possible before; Roberts, Salisbury, p. 138. See also P.M. Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable 
Communications and Strategy 1870-1914’, English Historical Review 86: 341 (October 1971), pp. 728-
752. 
569 P. Burroughs, Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire, in Porter, Oxford, pp.170-97 (p.176). 
570 Ibid., p.352. 
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initiative promoted trade) with African chiefs in an area regarded by (Britain) as within 
the dominions of... Zanzibar’.571 
      However, France found that, as the result of a punitive expedition to curb piracy, it 
had acquired a nascent and unwanted colony when it occupied Algeria in the 1830s, to 
the dismay of many who wished to ‘... hasten in every way the moment that would free 
France from a burden which she could not and would not support’, though ‘To the 
government’s dismay, its North African territory continued to expand’, in this case 
mainly because of the French army’s atavistic urge to push ever deeper into ‘hostile’ 
territory.572  
      Similarly, the Perak war of 1857, brought on in the Malay Peninsula by ambitious 
local officials, unwontedly extended the British frontier in the tropics - ‘Lord Caernarvon 
accepted it reluctantly as the unwelcome fruit of the activities of men-on- the-spot.573  
      As Kennedy asserts, ‘The blunt fact was that Imperial expansion... was not simply a 
force which could be turned on and off by statesmen at the turn of a tap. Neither 
Bismarck nor Salisbury ... were personally enthusiastic about the ownership of various 
Pacific islands (but) other, politically important groups were...’.574  In some cases - 
Russia, for instance - trade most definitely followed the flag as a matter of government 
policy.575 But in most cases, as Hyam observed, things happened because ‘there is a small 
but vital gap between what a really ambitious officer on the spot could do and what his 
metropolitan masters dared to veto’, which led to ’“The Proconsular Phenomenon”, 
                                                 
571 Fieldhouse, Economic, p.375. 
572 Fleming, Sword, pp. 4 -7. What would now be termed ‘Mission Creep’. 
573 B. Knox, ‘The Earl of Caernarvon, empire(sic), and imperialism(sic), 1855-90’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History 26: 2 (1998); pp. 48-66. 
574 Kennedy, Anglo-German, p.198. 
575 Kochan L. The Making of Modern Russia (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962 - Pelican edition 1977), p.177-
78. 
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whereby the man on the spot felt himself less of a subordinate in a great empire than a 
ruler of an empire of his own’.576 
       Most of the time, this suited the government at the metropolitan hub. Salisbury 
believed that ‘... the maximum amount of leeway should be accorded to the man on the 
spot’.577 But sometimes it meant that ‘Britain’s leaders... were “pulled in” (by) the 
ambitious aggressiveness of certain “men on the spot”’,578 since, almost by definition, 
frontier territories ‘attracted adventurers, idealists and the very impoverished...’.579 Acts 
of individual initiative could result from any number of reasons or events - ‘... frontier 
insecurity... the need for more customs-revenues from nearby ports... the ambitions or 
ideals of individual administrators, soldiers, missionaries... temporarily employed there... 
most colonial officials came to see local problems with local rather than metropolitan 
eyes, responding chameleon-like to the sub-imperialism of the frontier, whatever the 
established policy of the imperial government’.580  
      Most of the evidence from Africa during 1870-90 points to the men-on-the-spot being 
the primary engines of change, and this fact was widely recognised even at the time. In 
March 1884, the German Carl Peters founded the Gesellschaft fur deutsche Kolonisation 
(GfdK) in order to fund the establishment of German colonies in Africa. For the next 
twelve years or so he tried, usually without government sanction, to establish German 
                                                 
576 Cited in J. Beynon , ‘Overlords of Empire? British “Proconsular Imperialism” in Comparative 
Perspective’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 19: 2 (1991); pp.164-202. 
577 Roberts, Salisbury, p.213. As Beaver confirms, ‘...matters were still very much in the hands of the 
people on the spot’; Beaver, Under, p.217. 
578 For example Cecil John Rhodes (1853 - 1902), who made a fortune in diamonds and gold in South 
Africa during 1870-87, and went on to found the British South Africa Company in 1889 before becoming 
Premier of Cape Colony  during 1890 -96. Before being unseated after his promotion of the failed Jameson 
Raid, he had formulated plans for a Cape-to-Cairo railway and ideas for a worldwide expansion of the 
British Empire; see Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 354-56 & 375-92, and K. Narizny, The Political Economy of 
Grand Strategy (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007) p. 193. 
579 Ben-Ghiat & Fuller, Italian Colonialism, p.5. 
580 Fieldhouse, Economics, pp.80-81; my italics. See also Gallagher & Robinson, Imperialism, and Darwin,  
Territorial, pp.614-642;  :  
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colonies, first in Portuguese Angola, then in East Africa near Zanzibar. Though 
instrumental in founding German East Africa, his career was later mired in disgrace and 
by 1897 he was ignominiously found guilty of murder and dismissed from German 
service. It is not true, as Pakenham would have it, that ‘... Bismarck stood four-square 
behind (Peters)’.581 It is true, however, that Peters, while he appeared to be succeeding in 
his aims, was used by Bismarck as a counterweight to British attempts to stop German 
expansion in East Africa.582 Similarly, the activities of the Denhardt brothers led to a 
German protectorate being established over Witu and Lamu, this time with the backing of 
German warships.583 Peters, the Denhardts and others acted purely as individuals, though 
it is significant that, during the period of success in the late 1880s they, particularly 
Peters, received the hearty approbation of the German parliament and people. Had Peters 
not made fatal mistakes he no doubt would have been held up as a paragon of German 
Imperialism; as it was, his fall from grace led to his being disowned.584 Less well-known, 
probably because of their failure, a group of German adventurers from the German East 
Africa Society585 attempted, between March and October1886, to establish a German 
presence on the Mijjertain coast (between Berbera and Marsheikh, i.e. the tip of the 
Horn); though they initially succeeded in agreeing a trade deal with the local Sultan, 
                                                 
581 Pakenham, Scramble, p. 284. See also C.M. Peter, ‘Imperialism and Export of Capital: A Survey of 
Foreign Private Investments in Tanzania During the German Colonial Period’, Journal of Asian and 
African Studies, XXV: 3-4 (1990), pp. 197-212. 
582 In 1884 he received three Royal Charters giving official German backing to treaties concluded by him 
with local Chieftains in the mainland opposite Zanzibar, and by the end of 1885 had received another eight 
- a classic case of the flag following trade.E. de Groot, ‘Great Britain and Germany in Zanzibar: Consul 
Holmwood’s Papers, 1886-1887’, Journal of Modern History, 25: 2 (June 1953), pp. 120-138 (p.121). 
583 Ibid., pp. 122-23; Cecil, Marquis III, pp.227-31. 
584 See H.P. Meritt, ‘Bismarck and the German Interest in East Africa, 1884-1885’, The Historical Journal, 
21: 1 (March 1978), pp.97-116; M. Reuss, ‘The Disgrace and Fall of Carl Peters: Morality, Politics and 
Staatsrason in the Time of Wilhelm II’, Central European History, 14: 2 (June 1981), pp.110-41. 
585 The Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft, or DOAG, set up in 1885 and run as a quasi-government 
agency for East Africa until 1888, when a local revolt led to the government taking over its functions; 
Reuss, ibid., p.114. 
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attempts to impose sovereign rights failed ignominiously (despite the arrival of a German 
warship) and nearly got them all killed, forcing them to return home.586  
      Sir William Mackinnon’s private attempts to use his huge maritime interests to 
further British interests in East Africa, including his support of a British attack on the 
maritime slave trade in 1872, an attempt to lease the mainland territories of the Sultan of 
Zanzibar in 1877-78 and the founding of the ill-fated Imperial British East Africa 
Company in 1884 are well-documented.587 Similarly with Rhodes and Goldie for Britain 
in Southern and West Africa, and Thomson and Etienne for France in French West 
Africa.588 (Mackinnon was, as we shall see, involved later with Italian attempts to 
establish a presence on the Benadir coast). 
      Perhaps most amusing of all was the instance of a French official who bought a 
stretch of Red Sea coast from local Sultans in an area that came under the British sphere 
of influence. The French official admitted that the purchase, and associated Treaty with 
the Sultans, had been made on his own initiative and had not yet been ratified by the 
French government, but that such ratification was “of little consequence” as the French 
had had a Treaty with local Chieftains since 1862. It was of even less consequence than 
he realized, for it turned out that he had bought the land not from its owners, but from a 
group of  natives from Zeila who had dressed up as Sultans and who were known to be 
                                                 
586 L/PS/9/55, Hunter - Political Resident, Aden, letters dated 27 March, 4 April and 1 June 1886; C.W.H. 
Sealy, Somali Coast Agency & Consulate, Memorandum, 13 September 1886, and Political Resident, Aden 
- Council at Bombay, 4 October 1886. Hatzfelt, when questioned about the matter, denied all knowledge, 
probably truthfully. The Somalis of the Mijjertain coast were extremely dangerous for outsiders to trifle 
with and were adept at manipulating would-be colonists or commercial adventurers, if they didn’t kill them 
first; N.W.S. Smith, ‘The Machinations of the Majerteen Sultans: Somali pirates of the late nineteenth 
century?’, Journal of East African Studies, 9: 1 (2015), pp.20-34. 
587 See, inter alia, J.F. Munro, ‘Shipping Subsidies and Railway Guarantees: William Mackinnon, Eastern 
Africa and the Indian Ocean, 1860-93’, Journal of African History, 28: 2 (1987), pp.209-30, and 
Pakenham, Scramble, pp.342-43 &427-29. 
588 See, inter alia, A.E. Atmore, Africa on the Eve of Partition, pp. 10-95 (p.50), and Sanderson, Partition, 
p.102 & passim, in Oliver & Sanderson, Cambridge. 
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‘... the least reputable representatives of their class (what the French called “Portefoix”, 
or coolies) in town’.589  
      The point of all these examples is that none of them were instigated with 
Metropolitan government sanction, or sometimes even knowledge. Salisbury was 
insouciant about such activities, provided they didn’t bring Britain into conflict with 
other Powers. For instance, Dufferin reported to Salisbury in March 1890, when 
commenting on the Italian gunboat shelling the Mahdists near Suakin, that 
 
            Of course, it is possible that the Italian officers on the spot may be 
            occasionally disposed to adopt a more forward policy than is intended 
            or authorized (by Rome), as we sometimes find to be the case with 
            (the Russians) on the Indian frontier...590 
 
and again, in July 1890, that 
 
              I have no doubt that the Italian authorities on the spot are doing 
              everything they can to extend Italian influence among the Arab tribes        
              (around) Keren (and elsewhere), for this is the invariable inclination 
              of all frontier authorities when placed in contact with uncivilized 
              tribes.591  
 
                                                 
589 IO L/PS/9/55, Captain S. King, Agent & Vice-Consul, Zeila - Hogg, Political Resident, Aden (undated, 
but probably c. January - September 1885). The “French Official” may have been the Governor of Obokh. 
590 Dufferin to Salisbury, 6th March 1890, IOR/20/A/1173. My italics. 
591 Dufferin to Salisbury, 22nd July 1890, IOR/20/A/1173. My italics.  
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Baring held similar views: 
 
            I... greatly doubt if the local authorities at Massowah are kept  
            under effective control from Rome or Rome informed of all that 
            goes on. But the Italian government will belie all experience of  
            all other nations if... they do not extend their territory in the  
            direction where their real... interests are presumed to lie...592 
 
However, there is evidence that Italian activity of this sort did come to acquire 
government support, direction and encouragement, albeit of a covert sort, from some time 
after 1882. 
 
                   Part 3 - Italy and Zanzibar: Trade follows the Flag        
 
Firstly, there is the circumstantial evidence. In Spring 1882 the Italians fluffed the chance 
to join Britain in the occupation of Egypt, a move which, if taken up, would have 
effectively given them Carte Blanche to do, within reason, whatever they wanted in the 
Red Sea littoral and hinterland, provided they kept away from the Nile. Yet how different 
the situation was a mere five years later, when the Anglo-French decision in April 1887 
to blockade the Red Sea coast from Suakin to Massawa was followed only a few days 
after by the Italian announcement that Italy was going to join the blockade and effectively 
take it over from Massawa to Ras Kasar (i.e. half the distance of the coast under 
                                                 
592 FO170/432/219, Baring-Salisbury, 15th March 1890, in Lowe, Reluctant II, pp.68-69. 
 168
blockade), when the British, especially Kitchener, felt it should go no farther North than 
Ras Harb. 
      This announcement was very similar - too similar to be a coincidence - to an event 
that occurred around a year later on the Benadir coast (what later became Italian 
Somaliland), where the Italians were also trying to establish a foothold, and where 
concrete evidence for their Imperial intentions manifested itself from their first stirrings 
of interest in the region. 
        In the 1870s and 1880’s Sir William MacKinnon was, as we have seen, active in 
promoting British interests in eastern Africa. In 1878 he nearly concluded an agreement 
with the Sultan of Zanzibar to lease 500,000 square miles of territory he believed 
belonged to the Sultan, an area which would have stretched to the Great Lakes and the 
borders of the Congo basin.  
      The extent of the Sultan’s actual possessions was a matter of debate. He ‘... claimed a 
doubtful sovereignty over the mainland opposite... The strip of territory (which he 
actually ruled) on the mainland of Africa, though it extended along some 6,000 miles of 
coast, did not average more than ten miles in width.’593 Furthermore, ‘The coastline and 
interior... were the home of Somali tribes whose deference to Zanzibari sovereignty 
outside of the ports was perfunctory and whose hostility to European intruders was well-
known’.594 Mackinnon’s plan was therefore built on sand, but only fell through because 
Salisbury refused to give him official backing.595  
                                                 
593 Cecil, Marquis III, pp. 227-28; J.F. Gjerso, ‘The Scramble for East Africa: British Motives 
Reconsidered, 1884-95’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 43: 5 (2015), pp. 831-860 (p. 
836). 
594 J.S. Galbraith, ‘Italy, the British East Africa Company and the Benadir Coast, 1888-1893’, Journal of 
Modern History, 42: 4 (December 1970), pp. 549-563 (p.551). 
595 ibid., p.550. 
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      One of the main reasons for this was German activity in the Sultan’s putative 
domains. Bismarck was not overly keen on having Germany accumulate East African 
possessions, but he was prepared to back those German interests that did want to develop 
commerce in these reputedly rich areas. Salisbury did not wish to antagonize Bismarck 
since he still needed German backing against France over Egypt, so agreements over 
spheres of interest were settled upon during the 1880s, and finally formalized in the 
Heligoland Treaty of 1890.596 
     The eventual result was a division of the Sultan’s vast but largely imaginary mainland 
possessions between British and German spheres of influence, divided by a line running 
west from between the coastal ports of Mombasa and Pangani. ‘... the guiding principle 
of this demarcation was a partition of the caravan routes to Uganda; the route reaching 
the coast at Mombasa was placed on the English, that terminating at Pangani on the 
German, side.’597 The southern half went to Germany and the northern to Britain. 
      The British presence was embodied in Mackinnon’s British East Africa Company, 
which in May 1887 was granted a concession by the Sultan over a portion of his domain 
on the mainland and, crucially, over Kismayu and the coast around it. 
      Crucially, because since 1884 the Italians had been intent upon gaining a foothold in 
the Sultan’s territories. On 2 December 1884, Negri, the Italian delegate at the Berlin 
Conference, wrote to Mancini in Rome that he had heard that the brave explorer Cecchi 
had departed for the Congo via the East African coast, and that he believed that Cecchi 
had a great opportunity and duty to serve Italy by exploring the Somali coast, especially 
                                                 
596 Lowe, Reluctant I, pp.121-22. Of course, Bismarck was also in need of Salisbury’s support over the 
Triple Alliance via the Mediterranean Agreements, but Salisbury was so focused on Egypt and Sudan that 
Bismarck was able to use bluster to get his way over East Africa; de Groot, Zanzibar, p. 136. 
597 FO 84/2258 TNA. Sir Percy Anderson, Memorandum, 13 September 1892. 
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the mouth and course of the Juba river. The expedition would show whether or not the 
Juba was navigable; if it was, Negri hoped that others would follow Cecchi, as the river’s 
mouth would be a good site for a colony. Negri concluded by saying that, if that 
particular location was not ideal, then maybe others better suited might be located in the 
vicinity.598 
      There is no pussyfooting about here in the pretence that only a trading post is sought; 
clearly, at least some Italians - specifically those in government - were already intent 
upon establishing a colony in Africa. In fact, during 1883 the idea had been mooted of 
Italy gaining a foothold in New Guinea, though it was rapidly recognized that the 
likelihood of either Granville or the government of Queensland allowing this to happen 
was pretty remote, and the idea was quietly dropped.599 The Berlin Conference can’t be 
blamed, as it was by Lowe and Marzari, for these Imperial dreams. That had only just got 
going (it commenced on 15 November, a bare two weeks before Negri’s letter, and didn’t 
wind up until 26 February 1885). And Negri’s letter was not an isolated instance of 
vainglorious wool-gathering. A week later, Mancini replied to Negri, saying that his letter 
had been of particular interest and had already attracted the attention of the government, 
and would be given more mature consideration.600  
      This mature consideration resulted in Brin,601 the Minister for the Navy, sending 
instructions to the commander of the Italian warship Garibaldi, which was about to start 
the second leg of a round-the-world cruise, to divert to Zanzibar on the East African leg 
                                                 
598 Negri - Mancini, 2 December 1884, in L’Italia in Africa, Volume II, Oceano Indiano Tomo II (II/II), 
p.3. 
599 Mancini - Nigra (London), 5 July 1883, DDI 2/XV, p. 602. 
600 Mancini - Negri, 8 December 1884, ibid. 
601 Benedetto Brin (1833 - 1898), Naval Minister 1876-78, 1884-91 and 1896-98; Minister for Foreign 
Affairs under Giulitti, 1892-93.  
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of the journey, assess the political situation there, and to cultivate the friendship of Sultan 
Barghash,602 who was under the protection of the British603 and whose forces controlled 
large amounts of the adjacent African coast. It was essential, Brin wrote, to get precise 
information regarding the extent of the Sultan’s effective domain, the nature of the 
reputedly excellent anchorage at Kismayu to the North, and also, if possible, to find out 
whether the Juba was navigable and its mouth a good site for a colonial settlement, since 
it was only 10 miles away from Kismayu.604 
      The results of the Garibaldi’s visit must have been encouraging, for by 2 April 1885 
Mancini had confirmed to Brin that Cecchi was to proceed directly to the Juba on the 
Agostino Barbarigo, with 4,000 thalers to try and obtain cession of territory to Italy from 
the Sultan.605 
      Italian ambitions might have been crushed in East Africa since Britain, France (which 
was interested in pushing east from the Congo basin into the lands beyond the Great 
Lakes) 606 and Germany, in jostling for position, threatened to push them out altogether. 
Zanzibar was the hub of a network of caravan trade routes to the Lakes and elsewhere 
                                                 
602 Sayyid Barghash bin Said Al-Busaid (1830-1888), Sultan of Zanzibar 1870- March 1888 
603 Britain had concluded anti-slavery treaties with Zanzibar in 1845 and 1873 and used it as the base for its 
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Mancini’s to Cecchi of 30 March 1885 instructs him to restrict his activities to ascertaining the possibility 
of the Juba serving as a purely commercial post. However, by 2 April Cecchi had been authorized to obtain 
territory if possible from the Sultan, so clearly the Italians had the bit between their teeth. All letters in 
Oceano Indiano II/II,  pp. 10-14. 
606 Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 252-53, 283 & 287-89; Roberts, Railway, pp.407-10, and Kanya-Forstner, 
Anglo-French, pp.639-44. 
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inland from the Indian Ocean,607 and the Lakes were believed to be rich in resources, as 
well as having friendly natives and a healthy regional climate, especially in the highlands 
around mounts Kenya and Kilimanjaro.608 It was also on the strategic sea route from 
India to Southern Africa, and thus of great importance to Britain.609 The likelihood of 
Italy being able to get in between the Powers and take a slice of the strategically and 
economically important Benadir coast seemed distant.  
      Cecchi cabled Mancini in a state of great excitement on 29 April 1885, saying that the 
Germans had occupied a large slice of the Sultan’s territory, that the Sultan was very 
angry about it and appealing to Britain for support but not expecting much help from that 
quarter, and that consequently he was manifesting a desire for the friendship of Italy. 
When Cecchi raised with the Sultan the notion of an Italian occupation of Juba in return 
for Italian help, the Sultan was evasive, and Cecchi asked Mancini to try and ascertain 
what views Britain had on the matter, pending a decision from the Sultan.610  
      For all of the next month Mancini tergiversated, asking Cecchi to clarify exactly how 
much territory the Sultan actually owned, how useable the Juba would be, and telling 
Cecchi to settle for a commercial treaty if matters remained cloudy - for all the world as 
if he was stalling, waiting for events to overtake any decision he might have to make.611 
One can almost sense Cecchi’s frustration at Mancini’s dithering.612 
                                                 
607 ‘If you play the flute at Zanzibar, everybody as far as the lakes dances’; an Arab proverb, quoted in de 
Groot, Zanzibar, p.121. 
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      However, for once the Italians were in luck. Sir John Kirk,613 the British Consul in 
Zanzibar, aware that the untrammelled ambitions of Britain and Germany might lead to 
the dissection of the Sultan’s domain, the anti-slavery policy of which he had been 
assiduously and successfully cultivating for years,614 assisted Cecchi to negotiate a 
commercial treaty with the Sultan, which was signed on 28 May 1885. Kirk was unaware 
of Cecchi’s ulterior motives.615  
      It was some while before the Italians succeeded in obtaining formal cession of any 
part of the Benadir coast. Between Cecchi’s success of May 1885 and October 1888 they 
tried flattery and bluster on the Sultan to gain a territorial concession, but succeeded only 
in alienating him and annoying both British and German governments.616 But once again, 
luck was with them. MacKinnon remained the face of British interests in the region, and 
in May 1887 the Sultan granted a concession to the British East Africa Company which 
gave it control over his territory in the British sphere between the Umba river in the south 
                                                                                                                                                 
King of Italy) to Sultan accrediting me. Further delay will compromise outcome’; Cecchi - Mancini, 23 
May 1885, ibid. Mancini confirmed, in a letter dated 25 May 1885, that such a telegram had been sent. 
613 Sir John Kirk (1832-1922) joined Livingstone’s expedition to central Africa during 1858-64 and in 1870 
was appointed acting British Consul to Zanzibar, becoming full Consul in 1881. He was instrumental in 
consolidating Britain’s influence with the Sultan, and of helping to stabilize and expand Zanzibar’s 
economic and political position in the face of mounting pressure from colonizing Powers; C. Lloyd, The 
Navy and the Slave Trade: the Suppression of the African Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century (London: 
Frank Cass, 1968), pp. 264-68. 
614 ‘In 1873, Great Britain (in its war on the slave trade)... had compelled the Sultan to a treaty under which 
all sea-borne traffic in slaves was forbidden in his ports... the task of saving the treaty from becoming a 
dead letter (due to local opposition) devolved upon (Kirk)... an enthusiast in the cause... in his ceaseless 
pursuit of (this objective) he inevitably achieved a dominating control over the Sultan’s government’; 
Cecil, Marquis III, p.228. 
615 Galbraith, Benadir, p. 551. Two days before, Mancini had cabled Cecchi confirming that it would be a 
good idea to try and gain the confidence and friendship of the Sultan, and thereby extract some form of 
territorial concession, subject to the approval of the Italian government; Mancini - Cecchi, 26 May 1885, 
Oceano Indiano II/II, p.23. One can only guess how relieved Cecchi must have been that Mancini had 
finally committed to a decision. Cecchi, had offered Barghash an equal division of revenues from Kismayu 
in return for a cession of the port; Barghash had asked Cecchi for a formal request for this arrangement, but 
Cecchi never made it as he suspected that it would be turned down (Galbraith, op.cit., p.551). 
616 Galbraith, op.cit., pp. 551-56. 
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and the port of Kipini in the North, with an option to lease Kismayu and the coast to 
about 60 miles north of it.  
      By a happy chance Catalani, in London, and Mackinnon struck up a friendship which 
gave the Italians a sort of entrée into affairs from which they had previously been 
excluded, and between August 1888 and September 1889 Mackinnon managed to 
negotiate a deal whereby Kismayu and the navigation rights to the Juba river were shared 
jointly between Mackinnon’s company and the Kingdom of Italy, while the Italians were 
granted control of the northern ports of the Benadir coast.617 
      This all stemmed from the Italian government’s approval of Cecchi’s expedition in 
December 1884 - proof positive that from this date the Italian government was directly 
involved in colonial activity. Thereafter, not only did Mancini take positive steps to send 
Cecchi there and have an Italian ship diverted to reconnoitre the area, but he acceded to 
Cecchi’s request to have the King of Italy send a telegram accrediting him as the Italian 
representative to Zanzibar. Even though by the time Cecchi received his Royal telegram 
Massawa had been occupied for three months, the Imperial process indisputably started 
in December 1884, three months before the Occupation of Massawa and possibly even 
before that occupation had been approved, or maybe even thought of. 
      Why, then, was Mancini so nervous? Possibly it was because he was afraid of 
offending Britain. Many Italians, including Mancini, clearly believed (or allowed 
themselves to believe) that Britain had wanted them to take Massawa.  And, in taking 
both Assab and Massawa, they had been able to take advantage of the divisions of power 
in the Red Sea in order to enable their actions. But in Zanzibar, which was effectively a 
                                                 
617 For the full story of the anfractuous route by which the Italians managed to gain control of the Benadir 
Coast see Galbraith, op. cit., pp. 551-60. 
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British protectorate, the story was different. There was no such confusion of power there, 
so that the Italians might find themselves in conflict not just with Britain but with a 
newly-arrived Germany too, whose presence had been sanctioned by Britain - could they 
afford to alienate both their major allies? Then again, there was the possibility that the 
Egyptians or Turks might yet take Massawa back by force, or that it might fall to the 
Mahdists, or even the Abyssinians. What if they were evicted from Massawa by any of 
the above and from Benadir by Britain or Germany? And even if they managed to hold 
on to both places, could they afford it in financial and material terms? They had elected 
not to join Britain in Egypt in 1882 because of the cost - their financial situation was no 
better now. 
      Nevertheless, they went ahead. They tried to keep the Benadir operation secret, as 
they had tried to keep Operation Messina secret and as they had succeeded in so doing 
with the Massawa operation. Though their men-on-the-spot in the Red Sea undoubtedly 
took advantage of the opportunities that resulted, the Italian decision to press on with 
colonizing activity in Benadir came entirely from the government. It is not too much of a 
stretch, then, to make the tentative assumption that, behind all the Italian men-on-the-spot 
activity in the Red Sea and its hinterland, there was the guiding and authorizing hand of 
the Italian government. 
      Certainly the situation became much more high-profile in Benadir, as it did in the Red 
Sea, once Crispi came to power and embarked upon his naked and ambitious plans for 
expansion in Africa. He planned to move in from the Benadir coast inland towards the 
Great Lakes, by which route he could link up with Abyssinia. If Abyssinia became the 
hoped-for client state, the Italians had the prospect of having an unbroken belt of territory 
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from the Benadir coast and up through Abyssinia to the Red Sea, thus giving them 
control of practically the whole of the Horn of Africa and its contiguous territories.618 
      Typically, the Italians managed to antagonize everyone in pursuit of their aims.  
Barghash, initially approached by Cecchi in 1885, had acceded to a commercial 
arrangement but not a territorial one of the type sought by the Italians. In May 1888 
Cecchi tried again with the new Sultan, Khalifa.619 He also refused the territorial 
concession. At this the Italians manufactured an ‘insult’ by the Sultan to the King of 
Italy, and Crispi demanded the unconditional cession of Kismayu as reparation; a 
demand, Crispi proclaimed, that was supported by Britain.620 
      At this, Salisbury intervened. Catalani reported to Crispi in June 1888 that Salisbury - 
ever a master of understatement - was ‘uneasy’ about Italian activity in Zanzibar, 
embodied in the arrival of two Italian warships, because he did not understand what the 
Italians were up to, and felt that their activity was aggravating the ‘great agitation’ 
becoming apparent in the Sultanate. Worse than this, Salisbury said, was a rumour that 
Britain was covertly helping Italy in her unsettling endeavours. This, Salisbury 
emphasized, was, as Catalani and Crispi very well knew, totally unfounded. Salisbury did 
not (he assured Catalani) mind in the least if the Italians wanted to establish a presence 
there, but would they please not turn the country upside down in so doing? Turmoil 
would only further undermine the Sultan’s prestige with his people, which had already 
suffered because of British and German intrusions, cause problems for the substantial 
                                                 
618 Galbraith, Benadir, p. 551. This was no idle pipe-dream; during the whole of the nineteenth century, 
there was a thriving trade in slaves and ivory facilitated by the Zanzibari trade routes of the Benadir coast. 
Most of the ivory came through southern Abyssinia while the slaves went on to create a robust East African 
agricultural economy based on plantation slavery; Alpers, ‘Muqdisho’, pp.448-450. If the Italians had 
managed to establish a hegemony over this economically thriving nexus, their dreams of wealth based upon 
control of Abyssinia might well have come true. 
619 Khalilfa bin Said Al-Busaid (1852-90), Sultan March 1888 – February 1890. 
620 Galbraith, Benadir, p.552. My italics. 
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number of Europeans already there (mainly missionaries), and give opportunity for the 
French to profit from any disarray. Catalani assured Salisbury that he was in Crispi’s 
prayers, and that Crispi would do everything within his power to oblige him.621  
      Catalani’s patently false assurances were futile. A result was that Britain sent naval 
reinforcements to Zanzibar to bolster the Sultan. In July 1888, Filonardi,622 the acting 
Italian agent in Zanzibar, reported to Crispi that the arrival of the Italian warships had 
done little more for Italy than provoke rumours among Zanzibar’s expatriate population 
about Italian intentions, while the British had sent four warships, whose purpose was 
obvious - to support the Sultan with a vengeance (oltranzo) and keep the Italians in line -  
and which made the possibility of establishing any Italian-Zanzibari rapprochement 
difficult.623 Both Salisbury and Bismarck told Italy that Zanzibar was under their joint 
protection, and that they would not allow Italy to use force against the Sultan. Crispi 
huffed and puffed, but not even the presence of his warships made any impact upon the 
Anglo-German front.624 
                                                 
621 Catalani - Crispi, 5 June 1888, Oceano Indiano II/II, pp. 86-87. The matter raised very little attention in 
Britain. The Earl of Rosebery asked Salisbury for information regarding the ‘unfortunate difficulty’ of the 
argument between the Italian Consul and the Sultan. Salisbury replied that he knew little more than one 
could read in the papers, that the Italians were demanding the promised cession of Kismayu as 
compensation for the insult to the Italian King, and that the Sultan denied either insulting the King or ever 
promising to cede Kismayu to the Italians. At that the matter rested; Hansard, HL, 3, 7 June 1888, v.326 
cc.1314-15. 
622 Vincenzo Filonardi (1853-1916), soldier and Italian Consul at Zanzibar from 1890, and characterised by 
Herbert Bismarck as “a dirty little jew grocer” about whom “one could not believe a word he said” 
(although he was an officer of the Italian army - another example of the esteem in which the Italians were 
held by the Germans); Galbraith, Benadir, p.551.  
623 FIlonardi-Crispi, 18 July 1888, DDI 2/XXII, p.91. 
624 Ten days after Filonardi’s communication of 18 July (above), Cecchi (who had been away) cabled 
Crispi saying that the British agent was co-operating with the Italians over getting Kismayu ceded to Italy, 
but his assumption, upon whatever it was based, was clearly false (Cecchi-Crispi, 28 July 1888, DDI 
2/XXII, p.109). Only the intercession of Mackinnon, as a result of Catalani’s requests to him to help dig 
Italy out of an impossible diplomatic muddle worthy of a Gilbert and Sullivan Operetta, led eventually to 
the Benadir ports being signed over to the British East Africa Company, and thereafter to Italy, in 1893; 
Galbraith, op.cit., pp. 556-563. 
 178
      However, a grand opportunity for the Italians to establish a firm position there came 
two months later. For several years they had observed what appeared to be severe friction 
between the British and Germans in their East African protectorates, which in itself might 
conceivably have led to Britain asking for Italian assistance.625 Then, in August 1888, a 
rebellion of the coastal population erupted in the German sphere.626  
      Cecchi saw this as a golden opportunity for Italian advancement. Clearly no lover of 
Britain, he wrote to Crispi that the Italian position vis-à-vis the Sultan would be greatly 
improved (especially with the presence of the two Italian warships to intimidate him) if 
Italy could get a tacit understanding with Germany and impede British activity wherever 
possible, as the British, however much they pleaded neutrality, always obstinately 
supported the Sultan. Although, of course, an open collision with Britain was to be 
avoided, the more difficulty Britain experienced, the greater the chance of Italian 
advancement. In all the confusion, it should be possible for Italy to send an expeditionary 
force, under cover of a scientific or commercial venture, to form alliances with local 
Chieftains outside of the Sultan’s control and thus obtain a foothold. There were, he 
wrote, three essential conditions for the success of such a venture: firstly, the ability to 
forestall any British sleight-of-hand (colpo di mano) which might threaten Italian 
                                                 
625 Roberts, in Salisbury, makes much of Anglo-German friction in various parts of the globe, such as Fiji 
and New Guinea (pp. 523-25) and de Groot, in Zanzibar, describes Anglo-German friction in East Africa in 
great detail. This latter, however, was not as serious as might have appeared from the outside; most of the 
friction resulted from the hostility of Arendt, the German Consul-General in East Africa, for his British 
opposite number, F.W. Holmwood. Anglo-German trading companies were successfully set up during the 
1880-90 period, and the division of spheres was more or less settled in autumn 1886, when Peters spent 
time with Mackinnon at his Scottish estate at Balinakill and the two of them laid the basis for the Anglo-
German Agreements of that year. The alacrity with which both Powers teamed up to defeat the 1888 
rebellion indicates that what differences existed were largely superficial; see Peter, Tanzania, pp. 208-09, 
and Gjerso, Reconsidered, pp. 837-38.. 
626 ‘In East Africa (resistance to German colonialism) was (early, long drawn out and fierce). Three 
successive revolts (the Bushiri uprising of August 1888-November 1890, the Hehe war of 1891-98 and the 
Maji-Maji insurrection of 1905-06) led to heavy German losses...’; R. Cornevin, The Germans in Africa 
before 1918, in Gann & Duignan, Colonialism, pp.383-419 (p.405). 
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prospects of success; secondly, to ensure a method of covering any Italian actions with a 
character sufficiently deceitful (doppio carattere) to allow them to deal with any 
diplomatic difficulties that might arise from their actions; and, thirdly, to undertake any 
invasive actions in a place or places where no significant third party interests were 
involved, such as Isola di Pemba.627 
      Nothing came of Cecchi’s proposals, except to provoke the comments that “Italy is 
playing a strange game at Zanzibar” (Kirk) and that the Italian manouevres were ‘quite 
unaccountable’ (Salisbury).628 However, Crispi was clearly emboldened by Cecchi’s 
ideas. In December 1888 the Italians, despite British warnings against such action, joined 
in the Anglo-German blockade of the region ‘... to underscore her presence as an East 
African power...’629 
      This move was almost identical to the Italians unilaterally announcing their intention 
to blockade the Sudanese coast between Massawa and Ras Kasar a year earlier. The 
hesitancy of the early years, of a nervous Mancini and of a government uncertain of its 
ability to really be a Great Power, had gone. They were attuned to the world and actions 
of the established Great Powers and, though they were usually unsuccessful in their 
endeavours, this no longer stopped them from trying their luck. 
      The events in Zanzibar in August 1888 coincided with those of the Massawa Crisis. 
Was there any connection? Were the Italians deliberately using one crisis to cover their 
actions in the other? It seems unlikely, if only because, while the unfolding of events in 
Massawa were probably the result of Crispi’s urge to provoke war with France, the native 
                                                 
627 Cecchi - Crispi, 19 August 1888, in Oceano Indiano II/II, p. 125. Pemba island is part of the Zanzibar 
archipelago, defined as comprising Zanzibar, Pemba, Lamu and Mafia (Gjerso, Scramble, p. 837). 
628 Both quoted in Galbraith, Benadir, p.554. 
629 Galbraith, ibid., p.557. 
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rebellion in the coastal regions of the Zanzibar Sultanate was sudden, and quite beyond 
the gift of the Italians to control. While the Italians were guiding events in Massawa, in 
Zanzibar they were reacting to them, and Cecchi’s suggestions to Crispi were not taken 
up, probably because everything there happened too suddenly; only in December did 
Crispi invite himself to join the blockade of Zanzibar as an unwanted guest of the British 
and Germans. 
            However, Cecchi’s proposals of August 1888 were of a piece with what went 
before, and were merely a continuation of the policy which he had been given to 
implement from December 1884. The hand of Italian Imperialism was clear from the start 
in Zanzibar. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that, in the Red Sea and Sudan, Crispi 
merely amplified the Imperialism started by Mancini at Zanzibar in 1884. The change in 
behaviour from Mancini’s nervous fumblings to Crispi’s strident bluster was a change 
only in emphasis, not practice. Would there really have been two different policies for the 
two parts of Africa in which Italy had interests? Even if there had been, would the 
prospect of linking up their meagre possessions in Benadir and the Red Sea, to create a 
vast Empire engulfing most of North-East Africa, not have inevitably created a single 
policy?  
       Of course, the Russians also had a deliberate policy of territorial expansion, not only 
in Central Asia but in Africa too. While the early efforts of those such as Aschinov were 
not officially supported, Leontiev’s later ones were, at least semi-officially by the 
Orthodox church, which had been heavily influenced by Uspensky’s thoughts and which 
was very keen to support expansion wherever the Russians could find a foothold, 
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especially in an area like the Horn where there was (apparently) a ready-made Christian 
ally to support their efforts.630  
      The difference was that the Russians made no secret of their ambitions, or the means 
by which they meant to achieve them. The Italians, however, seem on examination also 
to have had a concerted Imperial policy, directed from Rome, but one which at the time 
was hidden under the dissimulation of being the result of the random, wild activities of 
their men-on-the-spot rather than the fruit of a declared Imperial policy.  
      The net result of this, from the British point of view, was to make them appear 
untrustworthy. Rivalry with France and Germany in Africa and elsewhere, and 
(particularly) with Russia in the East was, to a great extent for Britain, a visible given, a 
known quantity (not for nothing was it called “The Great Game”); with Italy, it was too 
often a case of her saying one thing and doing another, and at the expense of the alliance 
that she claimed to value so highly.   
 
Conclusion: Sympathy for the Devil - How the Italians Couldn’t Win. 
For over a thousand years, from the end of the Roman Empire to the fall of Napoleon, 
Italy was at best a colourful patchwork of little Ruritanias, at worst a plaything of 
Emperors. Still only a quasi-nation-state by 1861, suddenly, with no warning or 
preparation, she woke up one morning in 1870 and found she was a Great Power. Pace 
Kingsley Amis, Greatness was thrust upon her before she could get out of the way. 
      Goaded from within and without by imagined memories of Ancient Rome, with no 
more resources than an Ottoman Balkan province and riven by internal strife that 
                                                 
630 See Chapter 2 for details of Russian plans for expansion in Africa, and Jesman, Russians, pp.61-126.. 
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threatened to tear her apart, she was expected to behave like a Great Power but mocked 
when she tried to be one. With only toeholds on the Red Sea and Benadir coasts, she did 
her small best to keep up with the Imperial Joneses. 
      Yet disaster beset her every step. In her frantic efforts to befriend Britain, her only 
friend in the region, she found that her diplomatic activities, meant to draw her close to 
Britain, instead just made her distrusted. Lack of any kind of relevant experience or - for 
want of a better term - a sensible business plan led to her hopelessly mismanaging 
attempts to run her slender possessions at anything even approaching a profit, making her 
the object of hatred when she tried to make up the loss by pressurizing captive inhabitants 
into paying too much tax. Snobbery and nepotism in her incompetently-led army led to 
one military disaster after another, and at the hands of mere black natives at that, making 
her wonder if she really was a nation of Men, or of curs.631 Grandiose predictions of the 
wealth that would stream into her poverty-stricken homeland from the imagined 
cornucopia of the Red Sea proved illusory, and commercial projects based upon those 
illusions crumbled into dust. 
      No matter what she did was wrong. She was criticised for not really trying to stop the 
slave-trade in areas she tried to control when, in fact, she was doing the best she could, 
but was hampered by the policies of  Britain, which merely displaced the activities of 
slavers in Anglo-Egyptian territories into her own. She was blamed for not trying hard 
                                                 
631 Defeats at the hands of the Abyssinians led Italians to wonder if they suffered from a fundamental lack 
of aggressiveness necessary to a Great Power, whether they were au fond “half-hearted and sluggish” and 
guilty of  “indolence and passivity”, so that some at least began to idolize the heroic Abyssinians who were 
their polar opposites and threw their inadequacies into sharp relief; S.C. Bruner, ‘Conflicting obituaries: the 
Abyssinian ‘outlaw’ Debeb as treacherous bandit and romantic hero in late nineteenth-century Italian 
imagination’, Modern Italy, 19: 4 (2014), pp. 415-19 (p. 411). For an examination of the inversions of logic 
and other intellectual acrobatics required for the Italians to justify their Imperial activities, especially in the 
face of repeated defeats and reverses, see M. Coburn, ‘’The Argument is Reversible’: Tropological 
Revision in the Colonial Debate after the Battle at Dogali’, Italian Studies, 69: 3 (November 2014), pp. 
340-56. 
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enough to fight the Mahdists; when she sent ships to shell them from the Red Sea, she 
was damned for upsetting the locals.  
            Clearly, Italy was no longer a favoured ally at any level of British society. 632 
Yet Gladstone and Granville had given her the impression that she could act more or less 
as she liked in the Red Sea, and Salisbury in his turn was often impenetrable to the point 
of inscrutability on the matter. The result was that she often angered British statesmen 
without meaning to.  
      Certainly, her behaviour was oftentimes not that of a loyal ally, particularly in the 
Red Sea, where the activities of her men-on-the-spot ran directly at variance with her 
expressed policy of supporting Britain (probably the result of covert direction from 
Rome). Italians such as De Amezaga, the Bienenfeld-Rolphs and Cecchi were 
demonstrably anti-British. Pro-British diplomats such as Catalani and Maffei sometimes 
spoke as friends of Britain but acted otherwise. 
                                                 
632 Punch magazine pilloried the Italians in terms worthy of a Bismarck:  
‘Italy! ... Rome unhealthy... may (it) be seen without contracting its fever... Genoa - and may the view wash 
away the recollection of Italian uncleanliness.... Naples - and may it not become necessary, owing to 
epidemics, to die there...Mosquitoes at Venice...  and dirty Italians!’ J.A. Hammerton (ed), Mr. Punch on 
the Continong, (London: The Educational Book Co. Ltd. - undated, but probably published around 1890-
1900), pp.98, 188 & 190. Mr. Punch excoriates all Europe in this book, but the Italians seem to be 
apostrophised particularly as dirty and dishonourable; again, it is curious that references to epidemics, 
especially cholera, are prominent, but were not in 1885 deemed worthy of a conference in the European 
country most prone to it.  
      However, there was a long cultural antecedent, predating the political events of the 1880s, underlying 
British contempt for, and distrust of, Italians. From at least 1764, with the publication of Walpole’s The 
Castle of Otranto,  Roman Catholics in general, and the Italians in particular, had been figured as the 
villains, fools and ne’er-do-wells of British Theatre and Literature, a situation exacerbated by association 
with the perpetual “Irish problem” (see, for instance, Farquhar’s The Beaux’ Stratagem of 1707 for the 
Irishman-as-idiot, Maturin’s Melmoth the Wanderer of 1820 for Roman Catholic barbarity and Collins’ The 
Woman in White of 1859 for the Italian as either buffoon or Incarnation of Evil) and the ability to foster 
negative transnational stereotypes created during the nineteenth century by increased levels of European 
literacy (see Kaelble, Industrialisation), and the subsequent rapid expansion of Europe’s publishing 
industry; K. Bollen & R. Ingelbien, ‘An Intertext that Counts? Dracula, the Woman in White, and Victorian 
Imaginations of the Foreign Other’, English Studies, 90: 4 (August 2009), pp.403-20; and N. Whelehan, 
‘Revolting Peasants: Southern Italy, Ireland and Cartoons in Comparative Perspective, 1860-1882’, 
International Review of Social History, 60: 1 (April 2015), pp.1-35. 
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      But wasn’t this true of all countries? The Italians were not contractually bound to be 
pro-British to the point of abnegating the interests of their own country. Catalani and 
Maffei were pro-British when they could be, but were first and foremost servants of their 
own country and bound to put Italian interests before those of Britain. And for every 
Cecchi, Bienenfeld-Rolph and De Amezaga, there was a Kitchener, a Gordon and a 
Tenterden. Much of the friction between the two countries dated from Crispi’s 
appearance. It is conspicuous from India Office records, which were often stuffed with 
anti-Italian documents during 1887-1891, that complaints against them practically 
stopped literally overnight in February 1891, when Crispi fell and was replaced by di 
Rudini, whose priority was to rescue Italy from her ruinous and futile Empire-building. 
      Unfortunately, by then, most of the damage had been done. Italy was, after the 
Massawa crisis, no longer regarded at any level as a trustworthy or useful ally of Britain. 
The inevitable result of this was that she no longer tried to behave like one. 






















                                                  CONCLUSION 
 
 
Britain’s view of the Italians had changed out of all recognition between 1861 and 1888.  
      As with the Greeks, the exalted fantasies of the intelligensia did not survive contact 
with reality. In 1864 British ships escorted Garibaldi to Italy. By 1885 the Italians were  
granted permission to lay telegraph cables from Italy to Assab via Perim, but not from 
Massawa to Suez, so little were they trusted.633 By 1890 the situation was so bad that the 
Mahdists were regarded as being preferable to the Italians in Sudan. Salisbury wrote to 
Baring that 
 
           (If the Mahdists) were to vanish, what would happen to the valley of the  
            Nile?... (the Italians) profit by the troubles of others... (they) would be  
           happy to be  master of the (Nile Valley), to which (they told you) the title  
           of Egypt has lapsed... we must reconsider our... friendships as far as Egypt  
           is concerned... Italy is the most formidable enemy that Egypt has... to fear. If  
           that is so the Dervishes are rendering us a service in keeping Italy out...634 
 
                                                 
633 FO45/540, Nigra-Foreign Office (London), 26 February 1885 and FO45/541, Lumley-Nigra, 12 
November 1885. This resulted in Catalani complaining to the Foreign Office that, because of a lack of 
direct communications from Massawa to Suez, Italian officers in Cairo invited to observe manouevres in 
India were unable to find out whether they were supposed to go to Suez or Aden to meet their ship for 
Bombay. The Italians were coolly informed that arrangements had already been made for the officers to 
embark at Suez, so no fuss was necessary; FO45/541, Salisbury-Catalani, 27 November 1885. 
634 Salisbury to Baring 21st November 1890, in Lowe, Reluctant II, pp.69-70. Baring concurred with this 
view; ‘... I have no hesitation in saying that I should prefer to see the Dervishes in possession of Kassala 
and Khartoum rather than that those places be held by the Italians... since so long as the Dervishes hold 
(those places) the (Anglo-Egyptian authorities)... can choose (their) time for a forward movement. But if 
once the Italians are in possession the case is very different’. Baring to Salisbury, 15th March 1890, in 
Lowe, ibid., pp.68-69. See also Sanderson, England, pp.94-98. 
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      To an extent, one can see why this was the case. The Italians had, despite promises to 
the contrary, effectively annexed Assab in 1882, knowing that this would disturb a 
Britain grappling with the situation in Egypt. In 1883 they had made noises about 
establishing a colony in New Guinea, and in 1884 had moved to colonise the Benadir 
coast, at the expense of Britain’s influence and at a time when the Germans were 
challenging Britain’s authority there. In 1885 they occupied Massawa, knowing that such 
a move could be implemented with impunity due to the inextricable tangle of authority in 
the Red Sea, and despite the problems that it would cause Britain, Egypt and the Porte. 
And from the beginning of the Mahdiya they had flouted rules, agreed both by 
themselves and the other Powers regarding the import of dangerous contraband, as if the 
Mahdists didn’t exist. Admittedly, the picture painted in the Red Sea of them at this time 
was composed by British officials with a pronounced anti-Italian attitude, who seemed to 
discount, in the face of Italian behaviour, the actions of the French, who were also 
perfectly willing to bend the rules when it suited them. But the view from London was 
increasingly coherent with that in the Red Sea.635 Whatever assurances Maffei, Catalani 
et al gave during these years, Italian actions made them worthless. 
      Why, then, the mismatch between Italian words and actions towards their British 
allies? Clearly, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the Italians were first and foremost an 
independent country, and thus most likely - especially in an era of Imperial growth 
promising to rescue Italy from the mire of poverty - to look to their own interests before 
                                                 
635 An exception proving the rule was Colonel Slade, British military attaché to Rome. Dufferin reported to 
Salisbury a conversation, wherein Slade was ‘persistently friendly towards Italy (and believed that) Crispi 
would be the last person... to take steps unfriendly towards England’, while he ‘...believed all (Italian) 
declarations about (Kitchener being hostile to Italy)’ (IOR/20/A/1173, Dufferin-Salisbury, 12 November 
1890). But even  Slade later changed his mind, when he came to realize that ‘The military necessities of the 
(Italian) occupation of Kassala were all a myth...’; see Dufferin to Salisbury, 8th November, in F.O. 
78/4325/192, quoted in Lowe & Marzari, Italian, pp.59 & 426. 
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anything else. In their right and entitlement to do this, Gladstone and Salisbury were both 
in perfect agreement, and no doubt they expected, and were prepared to indulge, a certain 
amount of turbulence every so often. However, the consistency of Italian perfidy seems 
almost conspiratorial. There can only really be two reasons for this. 
      Firstly, the concerted Italian plan to build an Empire come what may. In an era when  
European countries were jostling for position in Africa, conflicts were inevitable. Italy 
thus found herself in a dilemma; how to compete successfully for power in Africa 
without alienating the British. The fact of the matter is that they couldn’t. Conflict was 
going to arise, especially with someone as heedless of the consequences as Crispi running 
the country. The best that could be done by the Catalanis and Robilants was to try and 
smooth the path and hope things would all come right.  
      But they never did. Between the Massawa crisis in 1888 and the fall of Crispi in 
1891, the Italian drive to gain territory in Sudan - particularly Kassala, which the British 
regarded as essential to their strategic interests - alienated Britain to such an extent that it 
became impossible for the Italians to regain British trust. By 1890, as evidenced by 
Salisbury’s letter to Baring noted above, they had effectively turned themselves into an 
enemy. Things improved temporarily while di Rudini636 was in power, but by then most 
of the damage was done, and after Crispi returned to power in 1893 Anglo-Italian friction 
and hostility resumed its previous level. 
      Secondly, it seems likely that the Italians made a fundamental error about the 
relationship between Wealth and Empire. As we have seen, they were convinced that 
gaining an Empire would make them rich. However, it is possible that they had inverted 
                                                 
636 Antonio Starabba, Marchese di Rudini (1839 -1908), Italian Premier February 1891 - May 1892. 
Succeeded by Giuseppe Giolitti, Premier May 1892 - December 1893, when Crispi returned to power. 
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things. They may have assumed that Britain, France and Germany became wealthy 
because of their Empires. In truth, they were already wealthy due to their success in 
creating integrated economies which allowed the growth of industrial and financial 
strength sufficient to underwrite expansion overseas. The Italians had attempted, with a 
shambolic economy and a state perpetually on the edge of disintegration, to generate 
wealth via trade in the Red Sea, and it hadn’t worked. They probably assumed, then, that 
making an Empire would do the trick. In other words, they inverted the Marxist model; 
not having capital to export, they tried to make Trade follow the Flag. And if it cost them 
their friendship with Britain, then so be it. 
      The irony of the situation is that, if Britain and Italy had not developed such a mutual 
distrust by 1891, they might have been able to come to a satisfactory accommodation 
over their respective rights and claims, especially in the Sudan. We have seen that Baring 
and Salisbury agreed that it was better to have the Mahdists than the Italians in the Sudan. 
But Robilant, in his letters to Gene, had expressed the desirability of an alliance with the 
Mahdists which would have actually aligned British and Italian interests.637 An Italian 
understanding with the Mahdists would have at once secured the Western flank of the 
Italians, bolstered their standing with the tribes, and helped to keep the Mahdists in situ, 
where the British wanted them anyway. Such a move, if made in concert with Britain, 
would have made both parties the winners, by reinforcing the standing of both British and 
Italian prestige with the tribes; by making the tribes feel more secure knowing that the 
Italians, backed by their British allies, could exert pressure against both the Mahdists and 
the Abyssinians in their interests; and, by showing a united front to both Mahdists and 
                                                 
637 Letter quoted in d’Avray, Lords, p.123 
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Abyssinians, making life easier for both parties and removing issues of fractured loyalty 
among the tribes who effectively controlled the lands between Abyssinia and Sudan. 
      But it never happened, and was doomed to remain nothing more than Robilant’s pipe-
dream. Instead, Anglo-Italian relations continued to deteriorate to the point at which, by 



















APPENDIX 1.  Britain and the Continent Powers: British military power, Anglo-French 
relations and the Chimera of the Franco-Russian Threat. 
 
Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, Britain’s ability to wage war in Europe 
appeared to decline until her military power was thought to be negligible, both at home 
and on the continent. As Morris pointed out, by 1870 ‘... the general impression among 
foreign officers is that we literally have no army at all.’638 
      This was a periodic cause for alarm among the British electorate, whenever an 
“invasion alarm” swept the country, as it did every few years, and usually stimulated by 
fear of a French invasion. However, there were two factors to consider; the actual 
strength and nature of the British forces, and actual relations with France as opposed to 
the hysterical version whipped up by the press whenever circulation started to drop. 
     Regarding the first factor, it is worth noting that the smallness of Britain’s land forces 
was nothing new and was more usual than not. When involved in operations in Europe, 
the British army always fought as part of a coalition, as in the wars of the Spanish and 
Austrian successions (1701-14 and 1740-48 respectively) and the Seven Years war 
(1756-63). At the end of the eighteenth century ‘His Sardinian majesty could boast an 
army equal in size to that of George 1.’639 One of the reasons for this was the long-
standing British political, economic and social aversion to a large standing army; by 
1793, after ten years of reduction in military capacity following the American wars and 
only a few months before war broke out with revolutionary France, Pitt had reduced the 
                                                 
638 J. Morris, Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire (London: Faber & Faber, 1968 – 1979 Penguin 
edition), p.409. 
639 R. Holmes, Redcoat: The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket (London: HarperCollins, 
2001), p.13. 
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military establishment to a mere 13,000 as, in any future continental war, ‘Pitt (supposed) 
that (Britain’s) role in Europe would be that of paymaster’ to Britain’s allies (Austria, 
Prussia, Sardinia, Hesse-Cassel, Spain and Naples)... The dislike of the standing army 
made Englishmen distrust expansion of the armed forces (while) the idea of 
conscription... was beyond imagination’640  
     This could lead to occasional embarrassment, as in the Crimean war, 1854-56. There, 
Britain had struggled to raise a task-force worthy of the name, and at the height of the 
conflict could field only a quarter of the numbers sent by France.641 And, in an age when 
the European Powers were consolidating into nation-states, industrializing fast and using 
conscription without scruple, it meant that traditional British methods of intervening in 
European wars had become impractical and obsolete. By 1880, developments in the 
military effectiveness of all the major continental powers, and the implied cost in terms 
of both money and manpower, had made it politically and financially impossible for 
Britain to countenance the idea of military intervention in any major European war. 
Following the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866, the major European powers 
introduced conscription, following the Prussian model, which enabled them to field 
armies of up to a million men. In 1869, though the British military establishment 
(including Yeomanry, Volunteers and other reservists, and troops stationed abroad) 
                                                 
640 J.S. Watson, The Reign of George III 1760-1815 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1960), pp.362-65. Resistance to 
conscription was a fixed feature of the British political psyche, lasting even through the dark years of the 
World Wars; see F.M. Leventhal, The Last Dissenter: H.N. Brailsford and his World (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1985), p.135; C.L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940 (London: Methuen & Co., 1955), pp.640 
& 651; L.C.B. Seaman, Post-Victorian Britain 1902-1951 (London: Methuen & Co., 1966), p. 93; and 
A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965 - 1977 edition), pp. 52-55. 
641 C. Barnett, Britain and her Army (London: Cassell & Co., 1970), pp.281-312. See also C. Hibbert, The 
Destruction of Lord Raglan: A Tragedy of the Crimean War 1854-55 (London: Longmans, 1961), and 
Sweetman J., ‘Military Transport in the Crimean War 1854-56’, English Historical Review, Vol.88: 746  
( January 1973), pp.81-91.  
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totaled a theoretical 300,000, the regular military establishment in Britain was 89,000, 
with conscription a political impossibility.642 
      Thus, there might have been good grounds for a British fear of invasion from the 
continent, especially from France. However, the second factor is the reality of Anglo-
French relations from 1815 onwards.  
      Throughout the nineteenth century, fears persisted that France could still resume her 
role as the ancient and traditional enemy of England, especially when combined with 
concerns about waxing French and waning British naval power, such as during 1859 and 
1888-89.643. France was ‘The arch-enemy... the chief hope of the Jacobite plotters’, 
whose rivalry with Britain frequently threw the country ‘into a panic’ over possible 
invasion .644  ‘There was widespread agreement that France was Britain’s natural 
adversary... Indeed, some British politicians welcomed the French Revolution... because 
it did lasting damage to French military potential (a factor of which was) a long-retained 
latent fear of a Jacobite revival with French bayonets at its back.’645 In 1880 the Duke of 
Cambridge gave an appreciation of British military strength which showed that the Home 
                                                 
642 (Shannon, Crisis, pp. 83-86). Lowe (Reluctant I, p.104) gives a figure of 280,000, with 100,000 of these 
tied up abroad, leaving about 180,000 at home, of which half were reservists - what Kennedy referred to as 
“Sunday Soldiers”, who would have been an unknown quantity in the event of a full-scale mobilization (P. 
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976) p.294). Bourne takes a 
divergent view, saying that ‘Great Britain was by no means a contemptible power on land’ and pointing out 
that Britain maintained an active army of between 123,000 in 1819 and 187,000 in 1880, with active and 
reserve forces of well over half a million during the Crimean War (Bourne, Victorian,  pp.5-7). But even he 
admits that, after 1870, all the Continental Powers outstripped Britain; by the end of the Boer war British 
active and reserve forces, though numbering by then about a million, were outnumbered by Austria (with 2 
million), France (3 million) and Germany (4 million), either under arms or ready to become so at short 
notice. 
643 Lowe, Reluctant I, p.5; Kennedy, Rise and Fall, pp.172-78. Dissenting voices, such as that of Lord 
George Hamilton (First Lord of the Admiralty, 1886-92), tended to get lost in the hysteria; CAB37/22/44, 
10 November 1888. See also W. Beaver, Under Every Leaf: How Britain played the Greater Game from 
Afghanistan to Africa (London: Biteback, 2012), p.209. 
644; B. Williams, The Whig Supremacy 1714-1760 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), pp.166-68 & 351 
passim. 
645 Holmes, Redcoat, pp.49-58. 
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establishment was effectively at less than half its paper strength, ‘... a matter of grave 
concern’646 Successive cabinet notes continued to highlight this concern throughout the 
decade, especially at times of heightened international tensions. During the Fashoda 
crisis, notwithstanding French naval weakness as mentioned above,  Sir Garnet Wolseley, 
then Adjutant-General, opined that ‘... so long as the Navy was as weak as it was... and 
the condition of our coast defences... unsatisfactory’ he dared not affirm that the army 
was sufficiently prepared to guarantee the safety of London from invasion.647 
Brackenbury (an astute observer), in a Memorandum of 8 June 1888, wrote that estimates 
‘...that France might land... 150,000 men (on British shores) within three weeks of our 
losing command of the Channel is within the mark, and is correct in every detail’.648  
      However, the truth was considerably less gloomy. Throughout the nineteenth century, 
following the defeat of Napoleon, British relations with France649 steadily improved until, 
in 1904, the Entente Cordiale - a term probably first used by Palmerston in 1830 to 
characterize the growing convergence of British and French interests in Europe650 - 
formalized the Anglo-French alignment, whereby France finally recognized British 
predominance over Egypt in return for a British acknowledgement of France’s special 
                                                 
646 CAB37/3/41, Memorandum, Strength of the British Army, 30/7/1880. 
647 Hansard, 11 May 1888, quoted in  Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1931. 4 vols), Vol IV, pp.183-84. 
648CAB37/21/15. See also CAB37/22/32, Salisbury Memorandum, 6 November 1888, for a similarly doom-
laden view. 
649 Active Anglo-French co-operation was evident as early as the 1840s. See D. McLean, ‘The Greek 
Revolution and the Anglo-French Entente 1843-34’, English Historical Review 96: 379 (Jan 1983), pp.117-
29; R. Golicz, ‘Napoleon III, Lord Palmerston and the Entente Cordial’, History Today 50:12 (December 
2000), pp 10-18; A.B. Cunningham, ‘Peel, Aberdeen and the Entente Cordiale’, Bulletin of the Institute of 
Historical Researc , 30 (November 1957), pp 189-206; C.I. Hamilton, ‘Anglo-French Sea Power and the 
Declaration of Paris’, International History Review 4: 2 (1982), pp.166-90; and D. Brown, ‘Palmerston and 
Anglo-French Relations, 1846-1865’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 17: 4 (2006), pp.675-692. 
650 Bourne, op.cit., pp.29-30. Though, when the French started work on the Suez Canal in 1859, Palmerston 
was suspicious, ‘as he was inclined to distrust French motives in most situations. To his mind... (the Canal) 
might threaten the route to, and hence the security of, India’: Byrne, ‘Foreign Policy’, p.386. And see 
Marlowe, Cromer, pp. 7-8. 
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position in Morocco.651 There were occasional problems; both countries were burgeoning 
Imperial powers throughout the century, and sometimes came into conflict over territorial 
disputes, especially in Africa. The British occupation of Egypt in 1882 had infuriated 
France, and led to a prolonged French effort  ‘… to winkle the British out of Egypt by 
getting in from the Congo at the Sudanese back door’,652 culminating in their coming to 
the brink of war at Fashoda in 1898.653 However, as Taylor says, the fact of Britain and 
France being Imperial powers ‘... did not necessarily make them enemies; it often made 
them partners.’ It was generally when France was contemplating expansion in Europe 
that tensions between the two countries arose; when she was quiescent in Europe, 
relations were generally harmonious.654  
      However, another of the factors that caused anxiety in Britain was the spectre of a 
Franco-Russian alliance that would put a stranglehold on British access to the far east via 
the Mediterranean. 
       
                                                 
651 Shannon, Crisis, pp. 342-43; Ensor, England, pp. 366-69; Pakenham, Scramble, pp. 694-97; A.J.P. 
Taylor, ‘British Policy in Morocco, 1886-1902’, English Historical Review 66:260: July 1951: pp. 342-74. 
652 Shannon, Heroic, p.528.  
653 Where, as Lord Dufferin said in 1901, “France tried to drag a cobweb across our path in the valley of the 
Nile” - quoted in R.F. Ball, ‘Education in Egypt’, The Nineteenth Century and After 52: 307 (September 
1902), pp. 412-20. See also Barthorp, Blood Red, pp.171-73; M.E. Chamberlain, The Scramble for Africa 
(Burnt Hill; Longman, 1974), pp.83-85; A.S. Kanya-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study 
in French Military Imperialism (Cambridge: University Press, 1969), pp.244-48; V.G. Kiernan, European 
Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815-1960 (London: Fontana, 1982), p.79; Pakenham, Scramble, 
pp.456-533 & pp.535-54. As Bismarck put it, “Egypt... is like the spinal cord of the Empire, which 
connects the backbone with the brain”; quoted in W.L. Langer, European Alliances and Allignments, 1871-
1890 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931- 2nd edition, 1966), p.256. 
654 Minor disputes over places such as Pacific islands were dwarfed by co-operation in Syria, China and 
Mexico; Taylor, Struggle, pp. 284-85. Fashoda was less a crisis than the final recognition of the delineation 
of Anglo-French spheres of influence in Africa. 
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      Between 1830 and 1912 France effectively conquered most of North Africa apart 
from Egypt, occupying Algeria in 1830-31, Tunisia in 1880-81 and Morocco in  1912,655 
giving her, with the naval base at Toulon, the potential to block British access to Egypt 
and the Suez canal. As long as the Turks remained friendly and maintained control of the 
Levant and the approaches to the Black Sea, the Russians alone could not seriously 
threaten British supremacy in the Mediterranean. However, the growing alignment of 
French and Russian interests, culminating in the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891, raised 
the spectre of a situation in which Britain could be simultaneously menaced by invasion 
from France while having her main route to India cut off by a strong French naval 
presence in the Mediterranean, with the possibility of a loss of Turkish control of the 
Black Sea straits to Russia, and a direct Russian threat of overland invasion of India from 
central asia through Afghanistan.656 
      But, again, the spectre of an invincible Franco-Russian naval pincer movement 
crushing the Royal Navy was largely chimerical. In 1895 the British Military Attache in 
Paris “pointed with relief to the French failure to collect in nine months enough transport 
(for) 15,000 men to Madagascar, (which) seemed to rule out any possibility of a French 
                                                 
655 Ayubi N.N., Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1995), pp. 88-89. 
656 Bourne, Foreign Policy, pp.123-78; Lowe, Salisbury, pp.54-90; Lowe, Reluctant, (vol.1), pp.8-9; 
Taylor, Struggle, pp.334-36 & 338-39. ‘A Russian threat (to India) had materialized ... by the time of 
Salisbury’s first spell as Secretary of State for India (July 1866-March 1867, by which time) the Russian 
conquest of central Asia was well under way... Revolt against British rule in India in 1857 had encouraged 
Russian hopes that even a manifest capacity to move against India would threaten the British position there 
sufficiently to deter any renewed attack on Russia through the Straits and the Black Sea’; D. Gillard, 
‘Salisbury’, in K.M. Wilson (ed), British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: From Crimean to First 
World War (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp.125-26. 
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invasion”657. As Kennedy notes, “The French Navy, impressive on paper, suffered from 
constant political interference and strategical controversy...”658.  
      The Russian Navy was in an even worse condition. “...The ships (built) in Russian 
naval yards were (obsolescent in design) and fitted with guns and armour that were 
already outdated. The sailors, recruited... largely from the (rural, uneducated and 
untrained) peasant class and limited to six months sea-going training a year... possessed 
none of the mechanical aptitude of the (industrialized Western) bluejackets; and since the 
departure of sail, science had become as important as seamanship”.659  Further, “Even if 
the two powers had fought jointly against Britain, the situation would have been far 
brighter (than imagined in Britain at the time)... the ‘enemy’ had virtually no experience 
of combined fleet operations, language and signalling difficulties were great, and neither 
dared to concentrate more resources on their navies while the attitudes of Austria, Italy 
and especially Germany were so problematical”.660  These shortcomings were graphically 
illustrated during the Fashoda crisis of 1898, when the French navy was revealed to be 
impotent in the face of British power,661 while in 1904-05 the catastrophe that befell the 
Russian Navy against the Japanese at Port Arthur and Tsu-Shima showed how useless 
that service would have been against the Royal Navy.662  
                                                 
657 Quoted in Kiernan V.G., European Empires from Conquest to Collapse, 1815-1960 (London: Fontana, 
1982) p.127), while of those 15000 men, over 6000 died from disease (Cobban A., A History of Modern 
France, 3 vols. (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1965) vol. 3, p.93). 
658 Kennedy, Rise and Fall, p.179. 
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Hough, The Fleet 
 197
      Nevertheless, such threats were taken extremely seriously at the time, sometimes 
leaving Britain with one last weapon in her armoury, one empty, but well-developed over 
time -  that of bluff.      
      Grenville says that ‘Bluff played no part in the conduct of Salisbury’s diplomacy’663  
but, as Roberts points out, ‘He was one of the first people to appreciate quite the extent to 
which militarily the British Empire was a gigantic bluff’.664 He had observed under 
Disraeli that ‘Russian troops almost certainly would have entered Constantinople (prior 
to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin) but for British threats, even though (they) contained a large 
element of bluff.’665 Sometimes the bluff was called - ‘British impotence in the face of 
(Russian action in Poland in 1861 and the Prussian attack on Demark in 1864 indicated) 
the extent to which British objectives had been achieved in the past by prestige and... a 
good deal of bluff. (Such rebuffs) to British prestige (were) obvious and 
disconcerting...’666 And, as Sir Charles Dilke pointed out in 1878, Britain had then found 
herself in danger of going to war ‘merely for the establishment of... “prestige”, a word 
only existing in the French language’, and, furthermore, a word derived from the Latin 








                                                 
663 J.A.S. Grenville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth Century (London: 
Athlone Press, 1964), p.17. 
664Roberts, Salisbury, p.178.  
665 quoted in R. Blake, Disraeli (London: Methuen & Co., 1966 (1969 University Paperbacks edition)), 
p.651. 
666 M. Byrne, ‘Foreign Policy 1815-1870’, in M. Scott-Baumann (ed), Years of Expansion: Britain 1815-
1914 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995), p.189. 
667 quoted in J.M. Roberts, Europe 1880-1945 (London: Longman, 1967 - 2nd ed., 1989), p. 93. 
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APPENDIX 2.  The Russian Bear and India. 
 
 
After her defeat in the Crimea, Russia had turned her expansionist attentions eastwards. 
Between 1856 and 1884, Russia absorbed much of the previously independent territories 
that had lain between Russia and British India (Tashkent and Bokhara by 1866, Khiva in 
1873 and Merv in 1884), placing her in a potentially advantageous position should she 
wish to invade India668. Simultaneously, Russian influence and prestige had, despite her 
defeat in the Crimea, grown in the East at the expense of Britain, so that there was by the 
mid-1880s ‘…the production of intrigues and rebellions among the natives of 
India…disaffection towards the English Raj, and the crumbling away of our resources 
before Russia has struck a blow against our frontier’.669 
      Though the British military presence in India was nearly doubled between 1884 and 
1894 -  from 40,000 to 70,000670 - the worry remained, despite British military 
intelligence to the contrary671, that a concerted Russian advance would be unstoppable.672 
                                                 
668 Lowe, Reluctant, (vol.1), pp.75-76. 
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(London: Biteback Publishing, 2012), pp.161-96. 
672 What Salisbury (according to Roberts) referred to as “Mervousness” (though Langer accredits the quote 
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publicly maintained a distain for the idea of a serious Russian threat to India. Roberts, Salisbury, pp. 84, 
145, 213 & 400; for Canning, see Macris J.R. & Kelly S. (eds), Imperial Crossroads: The Great Powers 
and the Persian Gulf  (Naval Institute Press: Annapolis, 2012), p.35, and Woodward, Age, pp. 417 & 423-
25. Lord Ripon (Viceroy of India 1880-84) echoed the views of Lord Hartington (Secretary for War 
December 1882-June 1885) that Russia was no threat to India -  ‘I have no dislike and no fear of Russia... I 
(cannot believe) that (the Russians) can seriously (wish) to acquire a vast territory like India (which is 
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Russian bellicosity did not help - ‘British concerns were highlighted when Ronald 
Thomson, the British Charge d’affaires in Tehran, obtained (Russian plans, drawn up by 
Dmitri Miliutin, the Russian war minister) for Persia and Afghanistan (which) began with 
a condemnation of Britain, the “Despot of the Seas,” and called for an “advance towards 
the enemy” that would show “the patience of Russia is exhausted,” and that she is “ready 
to... stretch her hand towards India.”673 Combined with fears that Russian activity in the 
Balkans, such as that demonstrated during the Bulgarian crises of 1878-79 and 1885-
86,674 would destabilize Turkey and even lead to her losing control of the Black Sea 
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‘(The Russians) have a wholesome fear of English power in those quarters’ (Loftus to Granville, 16 
October 1872), while Sir Henry Elliot (ambassador at Constantinople 1863-77) held that the Russians 
would ‘(draw) in their horns... nine times out of ten when firmly met’ (Elliot to Russell, 27 November 
1878). However, this did not stop the Russians expanding anyway; after they occupied Khiva in 1873 
Loftus changed his mind, and as the years wore on into the 1880s the Foreign Office took the Russian 
threat ever more seriously, as did Salisbury, despite his flippancy over “Mervousness”, in his private 
moments; Otte, Foreign Office, pp.45, 77, 78 & 126. 
673 Thomson to Salisbury, 26th April 1876, quoted in Macris & Kelly, Crossroads, p.39. See also Langer, 
European Alliances, pp.309-18, for a detailed exposition of Russian strategy regarding Afghanistan and 
India following the Merv and Pendjeh incidents. However, such sabre-rattling was often empty; diplomatic 
communications usually showed that cool heads dominated real communications between governments.  
Giers (the Russian foreign minister) made it clear that Russia had no objection to a British presence in 
Afghanistan, to her occupation of Kandahar or even of her occupation of Heart, provided that Britain 
extend a reciprocal recognition of Russian rights elsewhere in Persia and Afghanistan; CAB37/10/29, 
Memorandum on ‘The Central Asian Question’, 4 April 1883. 
674 Bourne, Foreign Policy, pp.145-46. 
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straits, such concerns dominated a great part of British strategic policy-making between 












































APPENDIX 3.  The Greco-Russian Symbiosis and its effect upon European stability and 
British political opinion. 
 
 
As Dakin says, by the nineteenth century, for both Greece and Italy “freedom” was a 
priori simply a matter of throwing off a foreign yoke.675 However, Greece’s achievement 
of freedom in 1831 became, like Italy’s in 1870, the catalyst for a revival of Imperial 
dreams. The Megali Idea of a new Hellenic Empire incorporating all the lands of the 
Byzantine Empire, and with the pinnacle of its achievement being the seizure of 
Constantinople, was born with the national uprising in 1821.676 Once independence was 
achieved, Greek irredentists677 proved tireless in their efforts to wrest Byzantium from 
the hands of the Turks.678 The Italians, of course, had had similar experiences of tyranny 
but, although theoretically a Power, did not represent a threat to the stability of Europe in 
the same way as the Greeks. 
                                                 
675 Dakin, op. cit., p.44. 
676 Finefrock M.M., ‘Ataturk, Lloyd George and the Megali Idea: Cause and Consequence of the Greek 
Plan to Seize Constantinople from the Allies, June-August 1922’, The Journal of Modern History Vol. 
52:No. 1: On Demand Supplement (March 1980); pp. D1047-D1066. 
677 Defined as ‘... the national drive to free from Turkish rule all those whom the Greeks claimed to be their 
brethren...’: Koliopoulos J.S., ‘Greece and the Balkans: A Historical Perspective’, Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, Vol. 2: 3 (September 2003); pp. 25-38 (quote from p.27). However, as Koliopoulos 
continues, the methods by which the Greeks tried to wrest Greek territory from the Ottomans itself 
darkened their cause in the eyes of the world: ‘Irredentism provided the necessary ideology to justify raids 
across the (Turkish) frontier which as a rule were plundering raids... This ‘patriotic’ lawlessness... 
undermined reforming and modernizing efforts in the region, and exercised a regressive influence on... the 
emerging nation-state... liberation wars became... self-defeating ventures and gave patriotism a suspect and 
sinister outlook.’  
      Further, there were, as with the later claims of the Italians to a Neo-Roman Empire, inherent 
contradictions to the Idea - ‘If Greece was the legitimate heir (to the Byzantine Empire, which nobody 
could define precisely) then it had to expand in all directions... On what basis were these claims to be 
advanced? Linguistic, religious or the vague notion of ‘national feelings’? (What if groups claiming to be 
Greek) constituted a minority?’: Andreopoulos, op.cit., p.951. 
678 ‘Greece’s successful struggle (against) Turkey (showed) that an Ancient nation could be resurrected 
(and, in the case of Orthodox Greece) gave rise to... “muscular Christianity”’, Leoussi a. & Aberbach D., 
‘Hellenism and Jewish Nationalism: ambivalence and its ancient roots’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 25: 
5 (2002); pp. 755-77 (quote from p.755). However, ‘What made this nationalism tremendously appealing 
was its vagueness, its invocation of (mystical notions - Byzantium) and its presentation as the panacea for 
all the evils and shortcomings that beset the Greek state’; Andreopoulos, op,cit., p.952. 
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      Firstly, the Greeks had fought a long and ferocious campaign against the Turks and 
beaten them in full-scale war (albeit with substantial allied help).679 Secondly, many of 
the Greek territories that remained within the Ottoman Empire, such as Cyprus and Crete, 
were easily accessible from the Greek mainland, and by the 1840s the Greeks had built 
up a formidable maritime presence which enabled them to access such territories and 
ferment unrest.680 Thirdly, there were large Greek communities spread liberally around 
all the territories of the Ottoman Empire, constituting what might be regarded as a “fifth 
column” for the Megali Idea.681 And fourthly, the Greeks were plainly prepared to act as 
                                                 
679 ‘The Greeks, disorganized and prone to infighting, often came near to complete defeat’ (Frary, ‘Russian 
Consuls’, p.48), and ‘According to Anglo-Hellenic legend, it was the (Anglo-French naval action at) 
Navarino which saved the revolution from extinction... Yet in fact it was Russian land power... against 
Turkey in 1828-29... which ensured that a self-standing Greek polity finally emerged’; Holland R., 
‘Patterns of Anglo-Hellenism: A ‘Colonial’ Connection?’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 
36: 3 (September 2003); pp.383-396 (quote from p.385). 
680 ‘Greek merchantmen (were capable and well-armed even before independence)... ships of forty guns 
were not unknown, and Greek trade with the Levant grew apace’; Barratt, op.cit., p.109.  
      Greeks had for centuries played a large part in commercial, cultural and political life throughout the 
Ottoman Empire. By the nineteenth century they were pre-eminent in many areas - ‘After (the Napoleonic 
Wars) the shipping trade of the Eastern Mediterranean, and especially that from the Levant to Italy, fell into 
the hands of Greek merchants because their freights were cheaper... (Chios, a Greek island off the 
Anatolian coast) was said to have been the most autonomous of the Ottoman territories and... became the 
most commercial of all Greek communities’; Chapman S., Merchant Enterprise in Britain from the 
Industrial Revolution to World War 1 (Cambridge: University Press, 2008), pp.153-54. ‘From (the start of 
the Napoleonic Wars) Greeks were already participating on a large scale in the international trade of 
Izmir... often co-ordinating their efforts with their kinsmen abroad (and ) predominating in all areas of 
trade...’; Gondicas D. & Issani C.(eds), Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism (Princeton: Darwin 
Press, 1999) p.18. They also dominated Ottoman finances in Constantinople and elsewhere, at a time when 
the Turks were both unwilling and unable to control it themselves; I.P. Inoglou, ‘Ethnic minority groups in 
international banking: Greek Diaspora bankers of Constantinople and Ottoman state finances, c.1840-81’, 
Financial History Review, 9: (2002), pp.125-46. And in Massawa ‘Greek-owned cafes dominated... even 
after the consolidation of Italian rule...’ (Jonas, Adwa, p.29). In 1884 Sir Charles Dilke noted that ‘...the 
Greeks of Soudan are not European Greeks and have been there for generations. There are a great many of 
them... and they don’t want to leave’; Hansard, HC 3, 14 February 1884, v284 cc 896-979. 
      An interesting vignette from 1892 illustrates the ubiquity of the Greeks in the Ottoman territories. In 
January of that year an English traveller, Walter Harris, tried to go from Aden into Yemen. Knowing the 
difficulty of such an enterprise, he disguised himself as a Greek merchant since “... Englishmen are 
regarded with greater suspicion (in Ottoman territories) than other foreign travellers”, while a Greek would 
raise no suspicions. His disguise failed and he was bundled back into Aden by the Turks. He received no 
sympathy from Salisbury: FO78/4414, Clare-Ford (HMG Ambassador to Constantinople) - Salisbury, 16 
May 1892. See also J. Canton, ‘Imperial Eyes: Imperial Spies - British Travel and Espionage in Southern 
Arabia, 1891-1946’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 37: 4 (December 2009), pp.537-554. 
681 Since the absorption of South-Eastern Europe and the Levant into the Ottoman Empire after 1453, the 
Orthodox Church, based in Constantinople, became the social, spiritual and ideological centre of all the 
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a cat’s paw for Russian mischief-making in the Ottoman regions. Whether or not the 
Russians wanted them to act in such a way depended on the whims of the Czar at any 
given time. Catherine II, after about 1790, made her “Great Project” the destruction of the 
Ottoman Empire, hence the Orlov expedition and similar ventures; Alexander I followed 
suit sporadically during 1806-12, and Nicholas I flirted with it during 1844-54 (though 
the rest of the time these monarchs perceived the value of a stable Porte).682 As Sir Henry 
Elliot observed in 1867, the Russians used ‘every kind of intriguing Greek, of all classes 
and characters’, to stir up discontent in the Ottoman Empire.683  
      From the abortive Orlov Expedition of 1769684 there had been strong ties between 
Russia and the Greeks, reinforced by the frequent state of war between Russia and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Christian subjects of the Porte. Inevitably, given its location, the character of the Great Church became 
overwhelmingly Greek, maintaining the propagation of Christianity via the Greek language and liturgy, 
which frequently caused resentment in Ottoman non-Greek Christian areas, such as Bulgaria. However, in 
the nineteenth century this made the Church an ideal vehicle with which to propagate the intellectual and 
ideological ideas aimed at the political application of the Megali Idea. This programme politicized diverse 
and physically isolated Greek communities, not just in Greater Greece, but in all the areas where Greeks 
had settled and prospered (Ottoman Europe 2.25 million, Turkey 1.35 million, and Asia Minor and 
elsewhere 1.2 million. These figures, compiled - in greater detail than given here - by Synvet and quoted in 
Andreopoulos, op.cit., p.952, apply to 1878 and mean that there were less than one-third the number of 
Greeks in their Kingdom than there were in the non-liberated territories. However, Andreopoulos 
recommends these figures be treated “with some caution”).  
      Ironically, the  liberal reforms of the Ottoman Tanzimat period (1839-76) made the situation worse for 
the Porte and more fertile for the propagants of the Megali Idea by allowing a resurgence of Hellenic 
identity among the Sultan’s Greek subjects, so that by the 1880s the Idea was presenting a real threat to the 
very fabric of the Ottoman Empire: see Finkel, Osman, pp. 440-48; Kassiotis I.K., ‘From the “Refledging” 
to the “Illumination of the Nation”: Aspects of Political Ideology in the Great Church under Ottoman 
Domination’, Balkan Studies Vol. 40: 1 (January 1999), pp.41-55; Kitromilides P.M., ‘The Dialectic of 
Intolerance: Ideological Divisions and Ethnic Conflict’, Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, 6: 4 (Winter 
1979), pp. 5-30, and ‘Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.26: 1 
(January 1990), pp.3-17; Kofos E., ‘Patriarch Joachim III (1878-1884) and the Irredentist Policy of the 
Greek  State’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol.4: 2 (October 1886), pp.107-20. 
682 Rollins, ‘Imperial Russia’, pp. 432-51. 
683 Elliot to Stanley, 20 October 1868; Otte, Foreign Office, p.45. 
684 Count Alexsei Orlov, brother of a lover of Catherine II (1762-96), headed an expedition to the 
Peleponnese in order to inspire, with grandiose promises of Russian support, a mass uprising against the 
Turks. Orlov, amazed by the timidity of the Greeks (who were themselves dismayed with Orlov’s small 
and poorly-equipped force), was about as successful as Bonnie Prince Charlie in his efforts to raise the 
country against the Hanoverians, and saw similar results; Frary, ‘Russian’, pp.21-22; Kostantasas D.J., 
‘Christian Elites of the Peleponnese and the Ottoman State, 1715-1821’, European History Quarterly, 43: 4 
(2013), pp.628-56 (p.635). 
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Turkey from the early eighteenth century onwards.685 The Balkan (i.e. effectively Greek) 
Orthodox church had turned away from the Latin church of the West and, looking East, 
naturally aligned itself with the Russian church. This religious commonality gave the 
Russians the perfect moral platform from which to destabilize the Ottomans and to 
interfere in European affairs when it suited them.686 If it was ‘... hard, even in Peter’s 
time, to separate religious sympathy from pure opportunism where other Orthodox 
peoples... were concerned’, it was always easy for the Russians to find ‘... a convenient 
and permanent excuse for aggressive intervention ‘on behalf of Orthodox citizens of the 
Porte’’.687 
                                                 
685 ‘Russia’s frequent wars against the (Turks - 1711, 1737-39, 1768-74, 1787-92, 1806-12) not only 
accelerated (Ottoman) decline but also contributed to Greek resistance...’; Prousis, op.cit., p.263. Under 
Peter the Great (1696-1725), the emergence of Orthodox Russia as a major European Power had a decisive 
and lasting effect on Balkan affairs, exposing Ottoman military weakness, facilitating the commercial 
expansion of the Greek diaspora in the Levant (see – below), putting her at the helm of the Orthodox world 
and providing moral legitimacy for a renaissance of Greek cultural and political aspirations. Peter, like his 
successors, exploited Orthodoxy as it suited him, but this only led to a strengthening of Russian ties with 
the Balkan peoples, whatever the motives behind their actions; Frary, op.cit., pp.29-23; Kostantasas, op.cit., 
pp. 628-56 . 
686 Greco-Russian cross-pollination began long before Peter. ‘From 1453 (until the Philhellenism of the 
nineteenth century) the Greeks, as a contemporary reality, meant little to the (English, French or Germans). 
But for the Russians Greece never became merely a name... without connection with an actual and 
changing world’, since the Russians could credibly trace significant contact with Greece back to the days of 
Byzantium. Sophia Paleologus, niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, married Ivan III of Muscovy. 
Theophanes the Greek, a fourteenth century fresco painter who trained Andrej Rublev (c.1360-1420), one 
of the earliest and greatest Russian Icon painters, and Maksim Grek, a sixteenth century divine (a sort of 
Greek Thomas Aquinas) both chose to leave Greece for Russia rather than the Latin West (though regarded 
as the first intellectual in Rus’ when he arrived there at the beginning of the sixteenth century, Grek - 
originally Mikhail Trivolis, of Greek and Italian extraction - was persecuted and imprisoned, and only 
canonized after his death; a fact that Russian Hellenists were not keen to reveal; Likhachev D.S., ‘On the 
Russian Intelligensia’, Russian Social Science Review 36: 2 (March 1995), pp.83-95). Contacts such as 
these ensured an early and lasting devotion among Russians for Greece; ‘It was to Greece that Catherine 
turned her gaze, dreaming Imperial Byzantine dreams for her grandson Constantine’. Among the Orthodox 
Christians of the Ottoman domains, “... the Catholic Church of Rome, not the unbelieving Turk, was the 
principal enemy” and was widely believed to have been responsible for the fall of the Byzantine Empire in 
1453; this belief, combined with the reforms of the Tanzimat era, allowed the churches of Russia and the 
Balkans full rein to integrate with and embrace each other; Barratt, ‘Notice’, pp.60-62. 
687 Ibid., pp.61-63. The Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, 1774, gave the Czar or Czarina ‘... the right of making 
representations on behalf of the Greek Christians of Turkey and of  “speaking in favour of the Rumanian 
principalities”, which furnished pretexts for constant interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman 
dominions’; Miller W., ‘Europe and the Ottoman Power before the Nineteenth Century’, English Historical 
Review, 16: 63 (July 1901), pp. 452-71 (p. 456). 
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      Then there were strong commercial ties between Russia and Greece which long 
predated Greek independence. Since 1453 Greeks had spread throughout Russia; the 
largest influx came during the reign of Catherine II, much of it from the Ionian 
Islands,688and most of the immigrant Greeks settled around the Black Sea and the Sea of 
Azov. By the mid-nineteenth century Greek maritime trade and industry was well-
developed in the Mediterranean, especially since much of it enjoyed the protection of the 
Russian flag.689 Much of the Russian export trade went through the ports of the Black 
Sea, making the Greeks who lived there (and controlled most of the trade) very rich.690 
And these Russo-Greeks remained devoted to their Patria; in the century prior to 1821 
the intellectual revival known as the Greek Enlightenment, or Diafotismos  
(the brains behind the muscle of the Megali Idea) was diffused throughout the Greek-
speaking world by ideas, books, papers and journals of the sort already popular in the 
West. And they were spread by the merchants of the diaspora.691 
     Finally, Philhellenism among the Russian intelligentsia achieved a level almost of 
fanaticism, based not upon faux-nostalgic, woolly idealism as in the West, but upon 
direct, constant and close contact. Throughout the Ottoman Balkans and Mediterranean, 
employment of Greeks at consular posts had become a special Russian tradition.  
Talented Greeks were trained in Russia and returned to the Balkans as accredited Russian 
                                                 
688The Ionian Islands were a Russo-Turkish protectorate during 1797-1815; Barratt, ‘Notice’, p.109, and 
Minoglou I.P. & Louri H, ‘Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks in the Black Sea and Greece, 1870-1917’, 
Journal of European Economic History, 26: 1 (Spring 1997), pp.69-104 (p.76).   
689 Barratt, op.cit., p.109. 
690 Especially Odessa and the Sea of Azov ; Minoglou & Louri, op.cit., pp.74-77. See also Harlaftis G., 
‘Economic and Social Development of the Port Cities of the Sea of Azov and the Greeks in the Long 
Nineteenth Century: An Introduction’, International Journal of Maritime History, 22: 1 (2010), pp.239-40, 
and ‘Trade and Shipping in the Nineteenth-Century Sea of Azov’, pp.241-51. 
691 ‘... the greatest financial contribution to contemporary Greek letters was by diaspora merchants (and) “... 
the pathways of Greek commerce” were also ”the transport routes of the Greek books”’, while the  
revolution of 1821 was set in motion by the activity of the Filiki Etairia (Society of Friends), established in 
1814 in Odessa by three Greek diaspora merchants; Kostantasas, op.cit., pp.628-29.  
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officials, from where they provided nuanced insights into local matters not available to 
Western outsiders, reinforced Russian Philhellenism by tending to accentuate the Greek 
view of affairs, and combined pride in their ancestry with loyalty to their Russian 
masters.692 After the achievement of independence the Greek body politic developed, in 
addition to Russsophile elements, pro-British and pro-French factions, but Russian 
influence remained supreme, resulting in Greek conspiracies to unseat the Monarch (Otto 
of Bavaria 1835-62, who tried unsuccessfully to harmonise the three main factions) - 
conspiracies which eventually succeeded.693 
 
      In terms of the British attitude to Greek aspirations, support for the Greek revolt - less 
so in Europe but particularly in Britain - wilted quickly from its initial blaze of 
enthusiasm in 1821. There were numerous reasons for this. In Britain, general opinion 
was divided on whether the Greeks were au fond every bit as bad as their Turkish 
oppressors in their conduct of war;694 commercial interests were unsure whether a free 
                                                 
692 ‘Promoting Russian interests and ambitions proved satisfying to these Greeks, who spoke in the name of 
the tsar... As prominent representatives of Orthodox Christianity, Russian consuls’...Orthodox sentiments 
were extremely important in a society where religion (was a primary factor)... Common Orthodoxy meant 
common culture, and (the Russian) practice of employing Greeks reinforced the image of Russia as the 
ultimate liberator and the great benefactor’; Frary, ‘Russian Consuls’, p.47.  
      Following independence in 1832 a large number of Ottoman Greeks left the Empire to settle in the new 
Greece; however, they often found it a dispiriting experience, towns such as Istanbul, Thessalonika and 
Izmir being much more sophisticated than Athens, and many subsequently returned to their Ottoman 
homes; Finkel, Osman, p.487. Interestingly, despite the close ties between Russia and Greece, a 
conversation between Lord Derby and M. Gennadius (the Greek Charge d’Affairs) showed that the Greeks, 
following the Treaty of San Stephano of March 1887, viewed with apprehension the extension of Balkan 
Slav power at the expense of Greece, and would, given the choice, have preferred to be ruled by the Turks 
than Slavs of any race; Hansard, 3, HL, 29 July 1878, v242 cc 527-612. 
693 Otto was deposed by a military coup backed by strong public support; he was succeeded by George I 
(1863-1913), who spent much of his reign walking a tightrope between not antagonizing the Powers and 
not getting drawn by the Russians into a war against Turkey. See Marangou-Drygianniaki S., ‘Orthodoxy 
and Russian Policy towards Greece in the 19th century: the Philorthodox Society’s Conspiracy (1830-
1840)’, Balkan Studies, 41: 1 (January 2000), pp.27-42; and Markopoulos G.J., ‘King George I and the 
Expansion of Greece, 1875-1881’, Balkan Studies, 9: 1 (January 1968), pp.21-40. 
694 ‘During the first year of the war the nature of the fighting... tended to retard the growth of Philhellenism 
in England. (It was ) not an organized war by one... government against another, but... outbursts... under 
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Greece would open up new markets for British exports or instead just potentiate an 
already substantial Greek maritime commercial competition;695 while political opinion 
tended toward the view that a newly-independent Greece was likely to see Ottoman 
power attenuated and replaced with Russian influence, with a resultant destabilization of 
the European balance of power.696 European support for the insurrection was particularly 
strong in those countries, such as Germany697 and Poland,698 that had recent experience of 
oppression by domestic or foreign tyrants, and in France, where Philhellenism was at 
least the equal of that anywhere else in Europe;699 but all grew weary of the issue by the 
                                                                                                                                                 
various Klephts (bandit chieftains in the mountainous regions of Greece, who became symbols of Greek 
resistance only because of their opposition to the Turks) against... isolated Turkish (civilians or isolated 
garrisons, so that, according to the usually pro-Greek Morning Chronicle) “It is mostly unarmed persons 
who are sacrificed... the (Turk) and the Greek vie with each other in cruelty” ’: Penn V., ‘Philhellenism in 
England’, Slavonic and East European Review, January 1935: 14; pp 363-71 (p.365). ‘... In April (1821), 
Liberals in London and Paris had been regaled by the news of the massacres of all Turks on (the islands of 
Spetzai, Psara and Ydra)’ while the wholesale massacre of  Turks in the Morea region horrified the world; 
Barratt G.R., ‘Notice sur L’insurrection des Grecs contre L’Empire Ottoman: A Russian View of the Greek 
War of Independence’, Balkan Studies, January 1973: 14; pp.47-115 (p. 111). Even the great Scottish 
Historian and Philhellene George Finlay, whose devotion to all things Greek was lifelong, was not immune 
during these years to becoming, at least for a time, a ‘mishellene’: see Potter L., ‘British Philhellenism and 
the Historiography of Greece: A Case Study of George Finlay (1799-1875)’, The Historical Review/La 
Revue Historique, 1 (2004); pp.183-206. 
695 As Barratt remarks, ‘It is unquestionably true... that English commerce had felt the impact of Greek 
competition both in Constantinople and in the Levant generally since 1812 - true also that many 
English(men felt) that ‘a fleet the less in Europe (is) a victory the more for Great Britain’’; Barratt, op.cit., 
p.112.   
696 Penn, op.cit., pp.367-68. Under Wellington (Prime Minister January 1828-November 1830), “Britain’s 
Greek policy merely drifted... but before long (he) was not only publicly regretting Navarino, he was also 
talking in menacing terms about Britains’ obligations to her ‘ancient ally’, Turkey... ‘All I want’ (he wrote 
in October 1829) ‘is to get out of the Greek affair without loss of honour and without inconvenient risk to 
the safety of the Ionian Islands’... (He) was resigned to the prospect of (an) autonomous Greek state, but 
both he (and) the philhellene Earl of Aberdeen (Foreign Secretary June 1828-November 1830)... believed it 
would fall under Russian influence and (thus) wished to restrict its boundaries as much as possible”; 
Bourne, Foreign Policy, pp.22-23. 
697 See Foster C., ‘Summing up ‘German Philhellenism’’, Publications of the English Goethe Society, 83: 3 
(2013), pp. 208-13, and Penn, ‘Europe’, p.638. 
698 Mavroudis E., ‘Philhellenism in Poland during the Greek Revolution 1821-1828’, Balkan Studies, 32: 1 
(January, 1991); pp.19-21. 
699 ‘... in France the claims of Greece to the gratitude of the cultured were more prominent. There the 
papers and magazines are evidence of the increasing interest in the study of classical Greek and the 
presence of Greek scholars, such as Korais, enlarged the scope for these studies to include modern Greece... 
French travelers and literateurs... published accounts of the country, translated its songs and legends; and 
after the outbreak of war French poets, historians and dramatists popularized her cause’; Penn, op.cit., 
pp.638 & 648. French support for Greece had later, practical, ramifications - see below. 
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end and, in Penn’s words, greeted the end of having to support the insurgents with “a sigh 
of relief”.700 
      All except the Russians, whose enthusiastic Philhellenism was consistent from the 
eighteenth century onwards, and whose ardent support for the Greeks was, as we have 
seen, to have totally unforeseen consequences for the actors in the Red Sea drama of the 
1880s.701 
      All these factors made a powerful, independent Greece an unpalatable prospect from 
the British government’s standpoint. Finlay himself remarked that Liverpool’s ministry 
responded to the Greek revolt ‘with more aversion than any other Christian government 
in Europe’.702 It was ironic, then, that grudging British assistance in creating the free 
Greek state encouraged just what all British statesmen wanted to avoid - stimulation of 
the Megali Idea. 
                                                 
700 A Philhellene Corps, made up of hundreds of men from almost every European country, was founded in 
Greece in 1822, and further contingents from various countries followed them. But all were regarded by the 
Greeks as a nuisance. There was no regular Greek army for them to join, only bands of brigands less 
interested in the liberation of Greece than in opportunities for pillage. Neither the Klephts - who wanted 
little more than an extension of customary law, a weak army and a decentralized, ineffective executive 
which would leave intact their local power and prerogatives - nor the Greek government welcomed the 
presence of foreigners who might challenge their authority or introduce an element of idealism into the 
struggle. Soon the volunteers were ragged and starving, with no support offered by the Greeks, money sent 
out for their sustenance mysteriously “disappearing”, and supplies sent to them from Europe deliberately 
withheld by the Greek government. By 1826 Wellington, passing through Germany, ‘... found that there 
was no (longer any feeling for the Greeks), since they were considered to have (behaved) with great cruelty 
towards those who had gone to their assistance’. There was a revival of interest after the fall of Missolonghi 
and Byron’s death in 1826, but overall the legacy of the effort to aid Greece among those who risked 
everything to do so was one of great bitterness and disillusion; Penn, op.cit., pp.644-58. For the special 
place of Brigandage in Greek nationalist activity, see Andreopoulos G., ‘State and Irredentism: Some 
Reflexions on the Case of Greece’, The Historical Journal, Vol.24: 4 (1981), pp.949-59; Prousis T., ‘The 
Greeks of Russia and the Greek Awakening, 1774-1821’, Balkan Studies, 28: 2 (January 1987), pp.259-80; 
and Tzanelli R., ‘Haunted by the “Enemy” Within: Brigandage, Vlachian/Albanian Greekness, Turkish 
“Contamination”, and Narratives of Greek Nationhood in the Dilessi/Marathon Affair (1870)’, Journal of 
Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 20: 1 (May 2002); pp.47-74. 
701 See, for instance, Frary L.J., ‘Russian Consuls and the Greek War of Independence (1821-1831)’, 
Mediterranean Historical Review, Vol. 28: No. 1: pp. 46-65; Frary L.J., Russia and the Making of Modern 
Greek Identity, 1821-44 (Oxford: OUP, 2015), pp. 18-22; and particularly Bitis A., ‘The Russian Army’s 
Use of Balkan Irregulars during the 1828-1829 Russo-Turkish War’, Jahrbucher fur Geschichte 
Osteuropas, 50: 4 (2002); pp. 537-57. 
702 Holland, op.cit., p.385. 
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The London Treaty of 7 May 1832 produced an independent Greece, after ineffectual 
efforts to keep it as an autonomous region of the Ottoman Empire had failed.703 Britain 
had been especially keen to keep Greece as part of the Ottoman domains, as it feared that 
an independent Greece would fall under the sway of Russia; when independence proved 
inevitable, Britain ensured that the new kingdom was kept as small as possible. However, 
this did not satisfy the Greeks. Much of Greece proper was excluded from the new 
kingdom.704 As Tzanelli says, that, and the fact that the Powers had taken it upon 
themselves to decide who would be King, meant that... (Greece) was deemed by... 
Patriots to have become  
 
              ‘... a plaything kingdom... an arena for the diplomatic struggles  
              of its protectors... Inevitably, many Greeks began to dream  
              of a bigger and truly independent state, which would include... 
              the “unredeemed” territories (including) the umbilical cord  
              of Byzantium, Constantinople’.705  
 
                                                 
703 Wellington’s trip through Germany in 1826 (see note 14 above) had been part of a journey to St. 
Petersburg, aimed at reaching an accommodation with Russia, by which Greece would become an 
autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire rather than a fully independent country. The other Powers 
were reluctant to become involved, but ultimately France acceded to a treaty, signed in London on 6 July 
1827, with Britain and Russia that pledged action against the Turks if a ceasefire with the Greeks was not 
concluded rapidly. Events ran out of control, resulting in the defeat of the Turks and Egyptians at sea by 
Anglo-French naval action at Navarino and on land, six months later, by the Russians. After this there was 
no question of Greece remaining part of the Ottoman domain, and eventually the London treaty finally 
established the Greek kingdom: Woodward, Age, pp.206-11; Bourne, Foreign Policy, pp.20-25 (and see 
note 12 above); Hionidis P., ‘The Drawbacks of Philhellenism in Mid-Victorian Britain: The Case of the 
Philhellenic Committee of 1863’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, 30: 2 (October 2012): pp.191-213. 
704 The frontier of the kingdom ran East-West between the gulfs of Volo and Arta and included only the 
southernmost part of mainland Greece (Attica) and the Peleponnese; all of Thessaly, Epirus and Macedonia 
remained Ottoman; Woodward, Age, p.210; Holland, op.cit., pp.385-86. 
705 Tzanelli, op.cit., p.48.  
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For the next fifty years the Greeks pursued the Megali Idea by all means possible, and the 
British, by and large, resisted their efforts. This accounts for the frosty relations and 
frictions between both countries between 1832 and 1888 (despite Anglo-Italian ups-and-
downs, there were no “Don Pacificos” with Italy) and the fact that Anglo-Philhellenism 
never really recovered from the disillusionments of the 1821-28 period.706 
      But Reid also touches upon a more metaphysical reason for Anglo-Greek coolness. 
British and European Classical preference, from the Renaissance up to the mid-Victorian 
period, was for Greek rather than Roman language and culture; Britain, in the essentially 
pre-Imperial Age (i.e. before about 1880), identified with the (perceived) liberal values of 
democratic Athens and its representatives, such as Socrates and Plato. Gladstone, no 
great believer in Imperialism, was an enthusiast for the Greek Classics. But after about 
1880 Britain was on course to become the major Imperial Power in the world. Cromer, 
                                                 
706 ‘The incompatible policies of Greece and Britain towards Turkey led, in 1850, to the blockade of the 
Greek ports by the British fleet, and during the Crimean war, to the occupation of Athens by French and 
British troops... Above all... the ideological stance behind British responses to events in (Europe) explains 
the limited appeal of the Greek cause to the British public... developments in the Greek kingdom failed to 
cause any public excitement in the way that the Polish revolution of 1863 or Garibaldi’s visit to England in 
1864 managed to do; there were no large meetings in London, no public demonstrations... and no fund 
raising... One reason for this... is that the natural agents of the Greek cause in Britain, the Greeks who 
resided in the country, were (very poor agitators). They had different priorities... from those of  Italian and 
Polish refugees who advocated (their national struggles)... their commercial success required and implied a 
degree of respectability, and a reputation incompatible with public exposure on controversial issues... they 
did not touch upon... subjects that could throw into relief the divergent approaches of the Greek and British 
governments on the Eastern Question’; Hionidis, ‘Drawbacks’, pp.207-08.  
      Friction between Britain and Greece was a constant throughout the rest of the century. Even Gladstone, 
with his ‘... somewhat misconceived Philhellenic reputation’ reacted, when Palmerston ceded the Ionian 
Islands to Greece in 1863,  more in a spirit of damaging Turkey than aiding Greece (see Shannon, Heroic, 
p.190, and Magnus, Gladstone, p.156), while a further blocklade of the coast of Eastern Greece and the 
Gulf of Corinth was deemed necessary in 1886-7 to stop yet another Greek attack on Turkey; Lord 
Rosebery, Hansard, 10 May 1886 v305 cc 546-50, and see Langer, European, p.365. 
      Despite the political situation, Greece maintained very close commercial ties to Britain. Most of its 
currants - her major export, accounting for 62% of all exports in 1893 - went to Britain, and most of her 
industrial imports came from there; Dritsas M., ‘Monetary Modernisation in Greece: Bimetallism or the 




self-educated in both Greek and Roman classics, made favourable comparison between 
the British and Roman Empires, both  pre-eminent in their time, largely because the 
Romans better assimilated their subject populations than had the Greeks, much as he 
wished for a British assimilation of Indian and Egyptian subjects to Victoria’s Empire; 
and because he regarded the Classical Greeks as being unfitted for Imperial rule due to 
their contamination by liberal/democratic ideals (while the real Greeks he encountered in 
Egypt he distained as ‘low-class’ usurers or liquor salesmen).707 The same could be said 
about other representatives of British Imperialism, such as Curzon, Milner  and Gorst, 
among whom comparing England and Rome was ‘... an exercise which was a la mode in 























                                                 
707. Reid D.M., ‘Cromer and the Classics: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Greco-Roman Past in Modern 
Egypt’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32: 1 (January 1996), pp. 1-29. 
708 Hopkins, ‘Africa’, p.368. 
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APPENDIX 4.  Background to Egypt  
 
Muhammed (or Mehemet) Ali (d.1849), an Albanian serving in the Turkish forces sent 
by the Sultan to drive the French out of Egypt after their defeat by Nelson in 1798, took 
power in Egypt in 1805 and over the next 15 years made her into something resembling a 
modern state on the European model, introducing education, roads, manufacturing and, 
above all, cotton(which created much of Egypt’s subsequent wealth.709 ‘There was no 
field that his ambition and genius did not touch’710 As Pasha of Egypt, he began the 
conquest of Sudan in 1820, in search of vast riches - since Classical times it had been 
believed that Sudan held bottomless reserves of gold and minerals711 - enough natives to 
furnish him with an army loyal to himself, and the potential to dominate the Red Sea (and 
thus the Holy Places of Hejaz, the control of which would allow him to rival the Sultan as 
the primary power in Islam). Though the promise of the Sudan proved a mirage - few 
black Sudanese survived the journey North to Egypt and gold deposits proved 
disappointing712 - Ali’s power grew until by 1830 he held Syria and threatened to topple 
the Porte. Concern about his seemingly unstoppable rise to power was what led Britain to 
annex Aden in 1839 and neutralise Egyptian control of the Red Sea. In 1840 Palmerston 
formulated the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia, which came 
into being to defend the OttomanEmpire against Egyptian power, to force Ali to return 
Syria to the Sultan, and to pay him tribute as a vassal. In return he received the hereditary 
                                                 
709 Ward et al., Cambridge Modern History, p.429. 
710 A.B. Theobald, The Mahdiya: A History of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1881-1899 (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1951), p.6. 
711 A. Moore-Harell, ‘Decline in European Trade in the Sudan from the mid-Nineteenth century’, Middle 
Eastern Studies, 39: 3 (July 2003), pp.65-80 
712 M. Shibeika, British Policy in the Sudan 1882-1902 (Oxford: University Press, 1952), pp. 9-10. 
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right to govern Egypt, which right remained with his descendants until 1952. Many 
regard him as the Father of Modern Egypt.713  
      Muhammed Ali was succeeded by Abbas (1849-54), and Sa’id (1854-63), who 
continued Ali’s efforts to modernize Egypt, liberalizing the economy, encouraging 
foreign investment and making possible the building of the Suez Canal. Ismail (1863-80) 
continued Ali and Sa’id’s work, making great strides in modernizing Egypt (e.g. during 
his reign the number of state schools rose from 197 to 4,817) and drawing in vast 
amounts of foreign investment. ‘Isma’il... was bringing back to Egypt a vigour... largely 
lost since the death of Mehemet Ali (and) achieved the logical extension to the Empire 
building of Egypt in the Sudan (started by Mehemet Ali in the 1820s)... (His) ambitions 
encompassed the bringing of Ethiopia itself into the Egyptian Empire’; so much so that 
Verdi’s Aida (an Italian opera celebrating an ancient Egyptian victory over the invading 
Abyssinians) was commissioned by Isma’il, and first performed in Cairo on 24th 
December 1871.714 ‘Isma’il modeled his vision of Egypt on the European powers... he 
rebuilt Cairo on the model of Paris...’715Such was his success in these early years that he 
obtained the title Khedive from the Sultan, which meant that he was effectively 
transformed from a Viceroy to an independent Monarch, and was entitled to complete 
independence in all internal administrative, judicial and legislative affairs.716 Only his 
financial profligacy, combined with his being further weakened by having to support the 
                                                 
713 J.C. Anene & G. Brown (eds), Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Thomas 
Nelson & Sons, 1966), pp. 164-72; Fisher, Middle East, pp.279-86; C.W. Hallberg, The Suez Canal:Its 
History and Diplomatic Importance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931 - Octagon ed., 1973), 
pp.69-100. 
714 d’Avray Lords, p. 67. 
715 Jonas, Battle, pp. 34-35 
716 However, it is interesting that judicial independence brought its own problems - the Egyptian legal code 
was based on the Code Napoleon, and by the turn of the next century French was dying out as a medium of 
education in the Egyptian schools set up by Isma’il - see Ball, Education, p. 416 
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Turks against the Russians in 1877 (30,000 Egyptian troops fought for Turkey against the 
Russians during 1877-78)717 and then his defeat by the Abyssinians at Gura in 1879, led 
to his undoing in 1880.718  
 
However, there was much dismay in Britain at the embroiling of Britain in Egyptian 
affairs - Randolf Churchill opined that “the British people had been systematically 
deceived into thinking that Arabi had led a military rebellion. Yet it was clear that ‘he 
was the leader of a nation, the exponent of a nation’s woes, and that the (rebellion) was 
the desperate struggle of a race.’719 Baring expressed similar sentiments in response to 
questions asked by Granville and Northbrook; in a memorandum written on 18 
September 1882, he wrote that he was “strongly opposed to the establishment of a 
Protectorate”, since “(Whatever Urabi’s faults) I do not see what the Egyptians, 
considered as a nation, have done to forfeit their rights to self-government... there is 
nothing in the area of fiscal reform that can’t be done by the Egyptians themselves.”720 
But, as Ensor says (in England, pp. 84-85), “The Gladstone Cabinet had followed events 
without understanding them. They had never wanted to occupy Egypt”, but were now 
embedded there for the foreseeable future. Hopkins points out that, long before 1882 
Egypt was regarded as being crucial to the British position as an Imperial power, and a 
forward policy was regarded as essential because the route to India could not be 
guaranteed by an unjust and, above all, incompetent khedive. Once occupation had taken 
                                                 
717 Langer, European Alliances, p.263. 
718 Anene & Brown, Africa, 172-74; Finkel, Osman, pp. 413-446; Fisher, Middle East, pp. 286-90; 
Hallberg, Suez Canal, pp.114-58; E. Rogan, The Arabs: A History (London: Penguin, 2009) pp. 75-133. 
719 Quoted in Brendon, Decline, p.168. 
720 Quoted in R. Owen, Lord Cromer: Victorian Imperialist, Edwardian Proconsul, (Oxford: Clarendon), 
p.177. 
 215
place, however, it became essential to win over both the Great Powers and the Great 
British Public to a policy which left Gladstone standing, intellectually speaking, on his 
head, as the strategy of “rescue and retire” turned inevitably into one of rescue and 
reside.721 As Lady Gwendolen Cecil commented, ‘Never was the opposition between 
intention and action more complete than when, within two years of the Midlothian 
crusade for peace, its preacher became involved in such a record of blood-stained 
adventure’.722  
      The impossibility of pulling out of a place once it had been occupied was well 
recognized - Major Hunter, Consul-General of the Somali Coast, noted in 1884 that the 
occupation of the trading port of Berbera  would be possible with ‘... a hundred native 
infantry... but I fear that if we require such a show of force now, it may be difficult 
hereafter to withdraw.... and we might be committed to a policy of continuous 
occupation, (which is) beyond the scope of the intentions of government’.723 
 









                                                 
721 A.G. Hopkins, ‘The Victorians in Africa: A Reconsideration of the Occupation of Egypt, 1882’, Journal 
of African History 27 (1986); pp. 363-91, and see also Porter, Oxford, pp.653-64. 
722 Cecil, Marquis, III, p.92. 
723 IO L/PS/55, Hunter - Chief Secretary, Bombay, 9 August 1884. 
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APPENDIX 5.  Britain, Russia, Abyssinia and the peoples of the Horn.  
 
 
Abyssinia had existed as an independent region from medieval times, and (apart from a 
few pockets of territory held by the Egyptians along the Red Sea coast and in the North-
West, and periodic but unsuccessful invasions by Arabic and Portuguese expeditions)724 
had never been colonized by an outside power. For generations, the ‘fury of Islam’ swept 
all before it in the Middle East and Red Sea, but ‘The highlands of Ethiopia remained 
independent, isolated and Christian’725, while Menelik II himself wrote that “Ethiopia... 
has been for fourteen centuries a Christian land in a sea of pagans”.726 It is worth noting 
however that, during 1521-43, most of Ethiopia was overrun by Moslem conquerors, and 
the Christian Kingdom was only saved by the intervention of a Portuguese expeditionary  
force.727 
       The key to the survival of an independent Christian Abyssinia was due in no small  
 
part to the centrality of Christianity to all aspects of life there: ‘The Ethiopian Church is 
not simply a colourful adjunct to Ethiopian life, it is an essential part of it. In the 
countryside, the church permeates all facets of human existence to an extent unknown in 
Europe since medieval times’.728  However, the very success of this defensive strategy 
put the Abyssinians at a disadvantage when it came to dealing with Europeans intent on 
exploring, exploiting or colonizing North-East Africa, due, inter alia, to ‘.... internal 
                                                 
724 See H.G. Marcus, A History of Ethiopia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994 (2002 edition),) 
pp. 1-30. 
725 C.V. Wedgwood, The Spoils of Time: A History of the World from Earliest Times to the Sixteenth 
Century (London: Collins, 1984 - Phoenix edition, 2000), p.207; J.C. Anene & G.N. Brown, Africa in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Ibadan: University Press & London: Thomas Nelson & Sons Ltd., 
1966), pp.87-89. 
726 circular letter to all chief Monarchs of Europe, quoted in d’Avray, Lords, p.29. 
727 Anene & Brown, Africa, pp.87-88 
728 P.B. Henze, Ethiopian Journeys (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1977), p.34; see also d’Avray, Lords, pp. 
47-8. 
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social and cultural opposition (to relations with outsiders); the lack of (access) to the sea: 
the lack of manipulable material interests: and Ethiopian ignorance of Europe... As a 
result, Ethiopian diplomacy found itself heavily dependent on the very foreigners with 
whom it sought to establish relations... The Ethiopians appreciated the dangers of their 
dependence and generally maintained a posture of coolness and suspicion, which some 
observers (interpreted) as disinterest...’, which could explain the difficulty experienced by 
both Abyssinians and Europeans trying to establish diplomatic and commercial links with 
each other during the nineteenth century.729 As Portal730, who was there, observed, ‘For 
centuries the Abyssinians had kept their religion intact, when (all around them) had 
succumbed to Islam...  (but) in the course of their long struggle, Abyssinia has become 
cut off from the rest of the world...’, which did not make for ease of communications 
when they began to be opened up.731 
      Until the twentieth century, Abyssinia never achieved the cohesion and political unity 
that typified the “Nation-State” of contemporary Europe. It remained a collection of 
feudatory kingdoms, each ruled by a separate potentate, or Negus (King) but theoretically 
united under the Negus Negast (King of Kings). One reason for this was that Abyssinia’s 
‘... borders were spheres of raids and counter-raids, rather than lines of demarcation. This 
created a situation in which (borderlands) served as a basis for centrifugal elements’, 
leading individual regions and kingdoms to pull away from the centre rather than 
                                                 
729 D. Crummey, ‘Initiatives and Objectives in Ethio-European relations 1827-1862’, Journal of African 
History 15:3 (1974); pp. 433-44 (quotes from pp. 434-46). See also Crummey’s ‘Tewdoros as Reformer 
and Moderniser’, Journal of African History 10:3 (1969); pp. 457-69. 
730 Sir Gerald Herbert Portal (1858-1894), Secretary to Baring at Cairo 1882-1888, Consul-General to 
Zanzibar and East Africa 1889-92. During October-December 1887 he led an unsuccessful mission to 
Abyssinia to try and establish a peace treaty between Italy and Abyssinia. 
731 G.H. Portal, My Mission to Abyssinia (London: E. Arnold, 1892), p.81.  
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gravitate towards it.732 It was roughly analogous to the Holy Roman Empire, theoretically 
united under one Emperor but in fact a group of autonomous kingdoms often at odds with 
one another. The principal Kingdoms, or Provinces, of Abyssinia included Bogos, to the 
North of Massawa (occupied in large part by the Egyptians, who Yohannes never quite 
managed to evict and who held on to Massawa until 1885); Tigray; Gojjam, in central 
Abyssinia; and Shoa, the most southerly of the main kingdoms of Abyssinia proper and 
the home and power-base of Menelik II (King of Shoa 1865-89 and Negus 1889-1913). 
There were many other regions such as Ogaden (to the East, bordering Somalia) Sidamo 
and Kaffa (in the south, near Uganda), and Wollega (bordering Sudan in the South-West) 
which were only notionally part of Abyssinia, frequently being inhabited by tribes that 
owned no allegiance to any Negus and who allied with, or fought against, the Abyssinian 
potentates of the nearby kingdoms as they pleased or found themselves forced to do. The 
campaign against the Italians during the1887-1896 period helped to attenuate underlying 
disunities, but did not entirely eradicate them; ‘resentments in the north would linger 
(after Adowa); Tigray was unhappy to be ruled by a Shoan (Menelik)...’733  
 
      By 1880 the Negus Negast was Yohannes IV (Emperor 1872-89), formerly governor 
of the Northern province of Tigray. During1875-76 Yohannes ousted the incumbent 
Egyptians from much of Ethiopia, though they remained in control of Keren (which 
                                                 
732 Erlich, ‘Alula’, p.267. For how this situation still has resonance for contemporary North-East Africa, see 
also R. Reid, ‘The Challenge of the Past: The Quest for Historical Legitimacy in Independent Eritrea’, 
History in Africa Vol.28 (2001); pp.239-72, and J. Sorensen, who points out that ‘... Italian colonization... 
unified Eritrea, transforming the area’s social and economic character and defining it as a distinct unit in 
1889’; ‘History and Identity in the Horn of Africa’, Dialectical Anthropology Vol.17:3 (1992); pp.272-52 
(p.231). 
733 Jonas, Battle, pp. 9-57 & 319-320; Oliver & Sanderson, Cambridge, pp. 36 & 645-
665;  
 Caulk, Between, pp.13-34 & passim.  
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dominated the caravan routes between Massawa and Sudan)734 and most of the seaboard, 
where they obstructed the external trade of Ethiopia via the Red Sea.735    In 1865 
Menelik II became King of Shoa, to the South of Tigray, and set himself up as a rival to 
Yohannes.736 Though neither Britain nor France had shown much interest in any kind of 
relations with Abyssinia before 1880, during the 1860-70s Menelik sought diplomatic 
and economic links with both France and Britain, and a military alliance against 
Yohannes with Egypt, but without success in either enterprise.737 Meanwhile, Yohannes 
consolidated his power from the North and East into Central Ethiopia, hemming Menelik 
into Shoa.  
      At the beginning of the nineteenth century Britain approached Abyssinia with a view 
to opening up a new market for British trade, appointing a Consul in 1848 and concluding 
a commercial treaty. However, the Abyssinians, as a Christian power surrounded by 
Moslems, were more interested in a military alliance, two Christian powers versus Islam, 
not realizing that such an approach had no appeal to Britain, which had good trading and 
political relations with most of the Moslem countries surrounding Abyssinia. By 1868 
Lord Stanley, the British Foreign Secretary, was able to say in the House of Commons 
that “We can do without Abyssinia and (they) must learn to do without us”.738  
                                                 
734 Caulk, Jaws, p.16. 
735 Oliver & Sanderson, Cambridge, p.643. 
736 Ibid., pp.644-47. 
737 Caulk, Jaws, pp.14-18. 
738 Ram, Anglo-Ethiopian, pp.1-2 & 15; French interest was, at this time, largely confined to missionary 
activities, though as time passed the French presence displaced that of the British - ‘... until the mid-
nineteenth century Arabic (was the main language employed by the Abyssinians to communicate with 
foreigners, but)... Later, especially during Menelik’s time, (French replaced Arabic as the lingua franca of 
diplomacy). English did not become popular in Ethiopia until the beginning of (the twentieth century)’; 
K.V. Ram, ‘Diplomatic Practices of Ethiopia in the Nineteenth Century’, Transafrican Journal of History 
Vol.15 (1986); p.127-43. The dismissive attitude of the British towards the Abyssinians led to difficulties 
later on when French influence became paramount in Abyssinia and Britain, Italy and Egypt all needed 
Abyssinian help during the Mahdiya (so that by 1896 Sir John Ardagh, the D.M.I., could say that ”All the 
Europeans in Abyssinia with the exception of a few Russians and Italian prisoners, are now Frenchmen”; 
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      Then the Mahdiya came along. 
 
The Mahdiya: Britain calls on Abyssinia. 
 
Meanwhile, Gladstone was becoming concerned not only about the deepening 
entanglement of Britain in Egypt following the occupation of 1882,739 but also, with the 
sudden rise of the Mahdiya, about being sucked into, and being unable to get out of, the 
Sudan. The massacre of Hicks Pasha’s expedition in November 1883 made it clear that, 
as things stood, Anglo-Egyptian forces could not hold the Sudan and that ‘…the whole 
bloated apparatus of Egyptian Empire would have to be… withdrawn’740. 
      The Mahdi (al-Mahdi Muhammed Ibn Abdullah) was a Messianic figure ‘claiming 
divine guidance (in restoring) right government to the Muslim community at a time of 
great social crisis’.741 Led by the Mahdi in Darfur (West Sudan) and Usman Digma in 
Kordofan (East Sudan), the Mahdists achieved a series of victories over the Egyptians 
from 1881 to 1885, notably the defeat and massacre of the Hicks expedition of November 
1883742 and the fall of Khartoum and the death of Gordon in January 1885. Usman Digna 
gained several victories over Anglo-Egyptian forces based in Suakin - which was only 
                                                                                                                                                 
quoted in A. Marsden, ‘Salisbury and the Italians in 1896’, The Journal of Modern History Vol.40:1 
(March 1968); pp.91-117 (p.99). 
739 Granville’s circular to the Powers of 3rd January 1883 stated that “... (HMG) are desirous of 
withdrawing... as soon as the state of (Egypt)... will admit of it” (quoted in Theobald, Mahdiya, p.50). 
However, as Langer pointed out, the British issued at least 66 such declarations  between 1882 to 1922, 
each one sincere and each impossible to carry out; Langer, European Alliances, p.281. 
740 Shannon, Gladstone, p.326. And see Appendix 4. 
741 Owen, Cromer, p.188 
742 For the full story of the Hicks disaster, see Theobald, Mahdiya, pp.48-66 
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saved from falling to him by the arrival of British reinforcements - and took Tokar in 
1884, where he became Emir.743.,  
      As Shibeika says, ‘(three important characteristics) of the Sudanese... which were not 
(even slightly) changed by sixty years of Egyptian (rule were that they were) more 
susceptible to the appeal of the saint than to that of the learned man in matters of religion; 
(that for a Sudanese) to be accused of cowardice (would) cause him to sink very low in 
his society; (and that) the Sudanese loathed nothing more than the payment of taxes (as 
almost nothing was repaid to him in the form of social services or even protection), the 
more so when it was so excessive, as it really was under the Turco-Egyptian 
administration, and when the methods of exaction were so cruel.., as those used by the 
bash-buzuks’.744 ‘The (Egyptian conquest  of  1874) led to resistance (from the Sudanese 
population), who found ... they had exchanged a light and intermittent suzerainty of the 
Fur sultan for the detested encroachment of a tax-collecting bureaucracy. To the (nomads 
of Sudan), the Mahdi’s call (to) ‘Kill Turks and stop paying taxes’ (transformed these) 
easy-going Muslims into the unlikely shock-troops of a puritan revolution’.745 General 
Dormer was moved to mentioned the conspicuous “bravery of Soudanese regiments” in 
the Mahdist campaign (‘The Situation at Suakin’, 7 December 1888’, CAB37/22/43). 
This explains the phenomenal success of the Mahdiya.746. 
                                                 
743 d’Avray, Lords, pp. 93 & 100. Classic examples, if any were needed, of the problems that could arise 
from a division of power, and the refusal of an interested party to take responsibility for its actions, or lack 
of them, or to adequately finance its already bankrupt client state; Holt, Mahdist, pp. 47-65 & 73-94; Ram, 
Anglo-Ethiopian, pp. 48-49. On the financial situation regarding Egyptian efforts to defend its Red Sea 
territories against the Abyssinians prior to the Mahdia, see Ram, ibid., pp. 46-47; for the same issues 
following the Hicks disaster, including the threat to Egypt itself, see Owen, op.cit., pp.187-88 & 202-210 
744M. Shibeika, British Policy in the Sudan 1882-1902, (Oxford: University Press, 1952), pp.7-8.   
745 Oliver & Sanderson, Cambridge, p. 611. 
746For an interesting analysis of the views of subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire to both Turks and 
Egyptians, and the way in which, in places such as Sudan, the two became blurred into one, see U.W. 
Haarman, ‘Ideology, History, Identity and Alterity: The Arab Image of the Turks from Abbasids to Modern 
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      Its devastating effect on the Egyptian presence in Sudan meant that Britain needed 
Abyssinian help. Admiral Hewitt747 was dispatched to Abyssinia to conclude a treaty 
with Yohannes by which the Abyssinians would assist the Anglo-Egyptian effort to make 
an orderly withdrawal from Sudan. The Hewitt Treaty was concluded in June 1884, and 
was the only treaty ever signed by Yohannes IV with foreign powers.748 It provided, inter 
alia, that Yohannes would apply pressure to the Mahdists to facilitate the withdrawal of 
Egyptian troops from imperilled positions.749 Britain, in return, recognized the 
Abyssinian claim to Bogos (a region in North-West Abyssinia bordering on Sudan and 
prior to 1882 largely occupied by the Egyptians), and promised to ensure that Massawa 
was open to Abyssinia for trade; the Abyssinians also understood it to mean that, 
although Massawa should remain an Egyptian possession, it would allow them to occupy 
it in the event of an Egyptian withdrawal, thus giving them an outlet to the Red Sea.750 
      However, the Abyssinian “understanding” of who should possess Massawa, in the 
event of an Egyptian evacuation, was put to the test a mere six months after the Hewett 
Treaty came into effect and before its pro-Egyptian terms had been completed. On 5 
February 1885, the Italians occupied Massawa. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Egypt’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 20:2 (May 1988): pp. 175-96. The peoples of 
Southern Sudan and Western Ethiopia used the term “Turuk” to mean‘foreigners of a lighter skin’, and is a 
legacy of Turco-Egyptian rule, the word ‘Turuk’ being derived from the word ‘Turk’; E. Kurimoto, ‘Trade 
Relations between Western Ethiopia and the Nile Valley during the Nineteenth century’, Journal of 
Ethiopian Studies, 28: 1 (June 1995), pp.53-68.  
747). 
748. 
749 The last remaining Egyptian garrison was evacuated from Dunqula on June 18th 1885 by Sir Redvers 
Buller; Serels, Starvation, p.13. 
750 Jonas, Battle, pp. 34-39; Ram, Anglo-Ethiopian, p.49. See also R. Caulk,, ‘Yohannes IV, the Mahdists, 
and the colonial partition of north-east Africa’, Transafrican Journal of History 1: 2 (July 1971); pp. 23ff. 
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The Russian Connection 
Though Russians had been probing and appearing in or around Africa since the 1400s, 
the first Russians to appear in the vicinity of Abyssinia were (apart from a merchant in 
the sixteenth century, one Athanasius Nikitin, who visited the Somali coast in the 1570s) 
explorers such as E.P. Kovalevski, who led an expedition to Sudan in search of gold 
during 1847-48, and N.N. Mikluko-Maklay, who made a reconnaissance of the Red Sea 
coast in 1869.  
      In 1886 Nikolai Ivanovich Aschinov, a Cossack who had been involved in an 
unsuccessful attempt during 1883 to turn parts of the Black Sea coast into a Cossack 
enclave, led an expedition into Abyssinia, arriving in Asmara in January 1886. He had 
gone there (financed by British agents, who paid him to smuggle arms into Afghanistan 
but whom he double-crossed) as, having gone to Constantinople after fleeing the Black 
Sea debacle in 1884, he had met with Circassians recently arrived from Egypt, who told 
him of a fabulous kingdom in Abyssinia, inhabited by ancient Christians who would 
welcome fellow Christians from Russia. He was received by Ras Alula in Asmara but 
refused an audience with Yohannes, since he was not an accredited representative of the 
Russian authorities or church. He returned to Russia but was unable to obtain official 
sanction for a return to Abyssinia since, due to his activities, the Italians, French and 
British had begun making “enquiries” about Russian intentions in the area,751 and Giers, 
the Russian foreign minister, did not want to upset them further. Nothing daunted, he 
returned again in 1889, this time leading the first “serious” expedition, a small (150) 
group of Cossacks, with whom he attempted to establish a colony (“New Moscow”) at 
Sagallo, in the Bay of Tajourra. One of this party was a Russian Archimandrite, Vasilii 
                                                 
751 P.R. Rollins, ‘Imperial Russia’s African Colony’, The Russian Review, 27: 4 (October 1968), pp.432-51. 
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Ivanovich Paisii, who wished to establish links with the Ethiopian church on behalf of the 
Russian Holy Synod. These half-starved, ragged unfortunates who were evicted by the 
French a few weeks after their arrival, in mid-February 1889.  
The Italians had encountered Aschinov before. As a representative of several Italian (and 
one Russian) exploratory and commercial enterprises, he had visited Massawa from 
Egypt in 1885 and quarreled with the Italian governor over the eviction of the Egyptians, 
before departing to stay with Alula, the avowed foe of the Italians. They had thus been 
concerned for months about the Aschinov enterprise, and reports about the impending 
expedition had caused great alarm in Rome, including a formal protest to the Austrians, 




The Peoples of the Horn: Some brief notes. 
 
There seemed to be some confusion in the ethnic origins of some of these peoples - not 
surprisingly, as their ethnicity is highly complex. For instance, the umbrella term Beja 
incorporates numerous tribes, mainly of autocthonous Funj extraction, including the 
Bisharin, Abdada (not to be confused with the Habab), Hadendowa and Beni-Amer (both 
identified as Funj peoples, though there is evidence that the Beni-Amer are a hybrid of 
Arabic and Funj stock). Fleming defines them all as Arabic settlers from the Arabian 
Peninsula; according to him, the Halenga came from Southern Arabia in the AD 1300s, 
while the Hadendowa came from the Hedjaz, date unknown. However, more specialized 
                                                 




research has shown that his conclusions were sometimes inaccurate. While the Rashayida 
Arabs were Arabic-speaking Bedu of the Arabian peninsula whose first appearance in 
North-East Africa is well-documented as part of the Napier expedition of 1867753 , the 
Halenga presence in Sudan/Eritrea goes as far back as AD 700, when they fled Arabia 
during the Khalifate of Abdul Malik Ibn Marwan, AD 685-705.754 While the origins of 
the Habab are shrouded in mystery (they are thought to have arrived in Africa sometime 
between AD 1200-1500 from Akilli Kazai - location unknown - “at the Muslim 
conquest”755, the Beni-Amer claim to have been a Funj people who originated in the  
coastal region of the Red Sea, though other authorities say they came from Arabia “a 
thousand years ago”; they are likely a cross between Arabic and African ethnicities756 
The migration, and resultant interbreeding, of Arabs to the Funj domains of Sudan 
appears to have occurred during the 16-18th centuries, during the peak period of the Funj 
Sultanate of Sennar757.  Most importantly of all, however, the Hadendowa were most 
definitely not an Arabic people. The famous “Fuzzie-Wuzzy” of Kipling’s eponymous 
poem, they were a Funj people, the only natives to ever break a British Square (Osman 
                                                 
753 see W.C. Young, ‘The Rashayida Arabs vs. the State: The Impact of European Colonisation on a Small-
Scale Society in Sudan and Eritrea’, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History, 9: 2 (Fall 2008), pp. un-
numbered. 
754 Sheikh Jaafar Ali, Nazir of the Halenga, ‘Notes on the Halenga Tribe’, Sudan Notes and Records, 8 
(1925); pp. 180-184. 
755O.G. S. Crawford, ‘The Habab Tribe’, Sudan Notes and Records, 36: 2 (December 1955); pp.183-87. 
756 Anon, ‘The Beni-Amer Country’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record 
of Geography, 14: 8 (August 1892); pp. 546-550, and Stokes, op.cit., p.234 
757 P.M. Holt, ‘Egypt, the Funj and Darfur’, in J.D. Fage & R.Oliver, Cambridge History of Africa, vol.4 
(Cambridge: University Press, 1975), pp. 14-57, and G. Talhami, ‘The Muslim African Experience’, Arab 
Studies Quarterly, 4: 1/2 The Islamic Alternative (Spring 1982), pp. 17-33. For the definition and origins of 
the Funj, see P.M. Holt, ‘Funj Origins: A Critique and New Evidence’, Journal of African History, 4 : 1 
(1963), pp.39-55, and J. Spaulding, ‘The Funj: A Reconsideration’, Journal of African History, 13: 1 
(1972), pp.39-53; for information on the Beja, see Hjort-af-Ornas, op.cit., and A.L. Palmisano, ‘Ethnicity: 
The Beja as Representation’, Ethizitat und Gesellschaft, Occasional papers no.29 (Berlin: Verlag das 
arabische Buch, 1991 
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Digna was a Hadendowa) and, after Omdurman, the recipient of the British army’s 
deepest respect - 
 
 
‘So ‘ere’s to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your ‘ome in the Soudan: You’re a pore  
















                                            
 
 227
APPENDIX 6.  Italy: Social, Economic and Political Background 
 
 
The Italy of 1887 was still far from being a properly united Kingdom. Though the 
country had been theoretically united into a Nation-State in 1870, in practice it was riven 
by strong economic and political undercurrents and tensions. As Makki says, the Italian 
state of 1870 had no precedent for a single administration later than ancient Rome.758 
      ‘To begin with, only about two per cent of the population spoke Italian. The great 
majority spoke dialects… unintelligible outside their local area. ‘Italian’ itself was simply 
the local dialect of Tuscany… The King usually spoke Piedmontese’.759 Further, the mass 
                                                 
758 F. Makki, ‘Imperial Fantasies, Colonial Realities: Contesting Power and Culture in Italian Eritrea’, 
South Atlantic Quarterly 107 (2008); pp. 735-54, (p.740). 
759 M. Robson, Italy: Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1945 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1992), p.16. ‘In 
most of Italy Italian, like Latin, was a dead language, used occasionally for literary purposes by the 
intellectual elite’; Clark, Modern Italy, pp. 34-35. See also F. Barbagallo, ‘Italy: the idea and the reality of 
the nation’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies 6:3 (2001), pp. 388-401, for a propagation (derived from 
historians such as Candeloro, Bonelli and Romanelli) of this idea, and Makki (op.cit., p.741) for a 
description of this idea that puts flesh on its bones - apart from the 2.5 % of Italians who spoke Italian, the 
rest talked in idioms “so varied that the (Italian) schoolmasters sent... to Sicily in the 1860s were mistaken 
for Englishmen”, and Italian soldiers could not understand their officers. However, Hearder makes the 
point that Italian was the written and often spoken lingua franca of the intelligentsia, especially in the 
North, and had been for centuries, while the 98% of the Italian population that apparently didn’t speak 
Italian actually spoke dialects of it (much as the inhabitants of, say, Yorkshire and Scotland spoke dialects 
of English), while Bismarck, despite his rude comments, went to great lengths to make an ally of Italy; H. 
Hearder, ‘Whose Identity? Italy and the Italians’, History Today Vol.44:11(November 1994), pp.37-44. 
       In support of Hearder’s view, Crankshaw notes that  Bismarck’s desire to have Italy in the German 
camp during the 1880s was nothing new; during the early 1860s, he had sought to have Italy as an ally 
against Austria in the coming Austro-Prussian war, in order to have Austria weakened by having to fight on 
two fronts; E. Crankshaw, The Fall of the House of Habsburg (London: Longmans, 1963 (Sphere ed. 
1970)), p.217, while Charmley states that Bismarck had encouraged France to take Tunis in 1881, not just 
because it would distract them from Franco-German issues, but because it would infuriate the Italians and 
drive them into the German camp, where he wanted them (J. Charmley, Splendid Isolation? Britain and the 
Balance of Power 1874-1914 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1999), p.182). However, this interpretation of 
German aims is open to question. As Langer points out, the value of Italy to German interests was 
debatable to say the least, as Bismarck had no respect for either Italian strength or her trustworthiness as an 
ally - ‘In the Tunis question... it is (clear) that he worked almost exclusively with France in view. He had 
too low an opinion of the Italians to care very much what they did or where they stood (and supported 
France because he) desired to (compensate her ) for the losses of 1870-71... He was convinced that the 
Italians were pursuing a double-edged policy, that they were thoroughly unreliable, and that any agreement 
made with them would be (met) only if it suited their interests’ (Langer, European Alliances, pp.225-26).  
      However, it is undeniable that both the French and Germans were envious of Italian success in 
expanding their presence abroad via “indirect colonialism” (i.e., emigration supported by the maintenance 
of Italian cultural pride and identity in countries such as America) and sought (largely unsuccessfully) to 
emulate them - see M.I. Choate, ‘From territorial to ethnographic colonies and back again: the politics of 
 228
of the Italian population had played little part in the Risorgimento. Northern Italy had 
been won for the new state by Piedmont (heavily assisted by foreign military and 
diplomatic aid),760 while the South had been conquered by Garibaldi’s Red Shirts (mainly 
students, intellectuals and independent craftsmen). ‘No more than ten (of the Thousand) 
were from Piedmont, and they (i.e. the Thousand) included foreigners and a large number 
of lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, engineers and landowners. Few of them were ordinary 
folk’.761 No-one in power consulted or involved the great majority in the destiny of the 
new country, and the victory of 1870 did nothing to encourage the masses to participate 
in the political life of the new state. In 1870 over 70% of Italy was illiterate. Between 
1870 and 1882 the entitlement to vote went only to men who were over 25, literate, and 
able to pay 40 lire per annum in taxes. This meant that the parliamentary electorate stood 
at 500 in 1870 and 622,000 in 1880, i.e. about 2% of the total population.762 ‘Therefore it 
was scarcely surprising that the majority of Italians found it difficult to identify with the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Italian expansionism, 1890-1912’, Modern Italy 8:1 (2003), pp.65-75, and C. Dewhirst, ‘Colonising 
Italians: Italian Imperialism and Agricultural “Colonies” in Australia, 1881-1914’, Journal of Imperial and 
Commonwealth History, Vol.44:1 (2016); pp. 23-47.  
760 Robson, op.cit., p.16; R. Bosworth., Italy, the Least of the Great Powers: Italian Foreign Policy before 
the First World War (Cambridge: University Press, 1979), p.1. 
761; U. Eco, The Prague Cemetery (Milan: Bompieri, 2010 (2012 Vintage edn)) p. 135; Robson, op.cit, 
p.16. Oreste Baratieri, later Commander of the Italian forces at Adowa, was among them; d’Avray, Lords, 
p. 219. 
762 Clark, Modern Italy, pp.64-65; Robson, Italy, p.16. Illiteracy declined throughout Europe during the 19th 
Century, but national variations were marked. In England, Scandinavia and Germany rates of illiteracy had 
sunk, throughout the second half of the century, to minimal levels; however, by 1900 it still ran at about 
50% in Italy, despite efforts to alleviate matters (for instance, free primary education was introduced under 
Depretis, but little finance was provided to pay for it, while truancy rates were as high as 80% in the South 
where children were needed to work - Robson, Italy, pp.22-23). In Italy, during 1880-1920, regional 
disparities in education became much worse, i.e. during industrialization, while the deprivation of the 
already poverty-stricken areas of Mezzogiorno, Sardinia and Sicily became both relatively and actually 
worse than before 1880; H. Kaelble, Industrialisation and Social Inequality in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(Heidelberg: Berg, 1986; Trans., Leamington Spa), pp.26-30 & 88-98. See also D. Cooper, ‘Gladstone Part 
I: From Tory to Liberal’, in Scott-Baumann, Years, pp. 263-65 & 353-55; A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero & S. 
Leathes, The Cambridge Modern History: Vol. XII, The Latest Age (Cambridge: University Press, 1910), 
pp. 57-59; and D. Read, Edwardian England 1901-1915: Society and Politics (London: Harrap, 1972), pp. 
58, 70, 81 & 156-60, for comparable developments in English education. 
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new state and throw off the legacy of… internal division and localism’.763 The Italian 
historian Luigi Blanchi summed up the situation: ‘The patriotism of the Italians is like 
that of the ancient Greeks, and is the love of a single town, not of a country; it is the 
feeling of a tribe, not of a nation’.764 
      Then there was the North-South divide. The South, including Sardinia and Sicily, was 
(with the exception of Naples) underdeveloped and bereft of industrialization, and 
stricken with poverty, lawlessness and violence, with land degraded by deforestation, 
erosion and the neglect of absentee landlords.765 ‘Not surprisingly, the peasants of 
Southern Italy… were in a constant state of ferment and revolt in the nineteenth 
century’.766 The North, on the other hand, was, relative to the South, prosperous and 
industrializing fast, particularly in Milan, Turin and the Alpine valleys. It regarded itself 
as much more sophisticated than the South; the chaos and desolation of the South 
‘contributed greatly to the North Italian belief that Southerners were a separate and 
inferior race’.767  
                                                 
763 Robson, Italy, p.16. Full universal male suffrage was not achieved by Italy until 1913; E. Dal Lago, 
‘”States of Rebellion”: Civil War, Rural Unrest, and the Agrarian Question in the American South and the 
Italian Mezzogiorno, 1861-1865’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 47: 2 (April 2005), pp. 403-
432 (p. 406). 
764 Quoted in ibid., p.16. 
765 Joll, Europe, p.8.  
766 The conventional view is that legislative attempts to improve matters during the 1870-80s by re-
allocating land from the aristocracy and haute bourgeoisie to landless and small-holding peasants failed, 
since their inability to meet subsequent tax demands led to the land being re-distributed back to its previous 
owners.  Clark, Modern Italy, pp.16-17 & 69-80. However, more recent research has shown that the picture 
of feckless and rapacious southern landlords versus hapless peasants was not as simple as previously 
thought. While, undoubtedly, there were landlords who regarded their status and possessions as ‘a source of 
power and... not as a productive asset’, there was also an increased incidence of land reclamation and a 
great surge of citrus and vine cultivation in Sicily and Southern Italy during the 1850-80 period, with 
peasants and landowners providing labour and capital by mutual agreement; see J. Cohen & G. Federico, 
The Growth of the Italian Economy, 1820-1960 (Cambridge: University Press, 2001), pp.30-45. 
767 Clarke, op.cit., pp.69-70. These problems continue to bedevil Italy to this day - see C. Triglia, ‘North 
and South in the Current Crisis’, Journal of Modern Italian Studies Vol.19:4 (August 2014); pp.404-11.  
It did not help that ‘The Piedmontese (prior to 1870) profited from Turin being the seat of government; 
they also possessed the unconcealed favour of the King.’; Mack Smith, Italy, p.65. 
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The South had its own resentments against the North as well - ‘After 1860 regional 
resentment of Piedmont served (to fuel)... resistance to central authority... (an anarchist 
leader, Francesco Merlino, noted in 1889) that the popularity of anarchism... was mainly 
due to) regional hatred for Piedmont. The government, he wrote, treated (the South) like 
a conquered province. It and Sicily were Italy’s two Irelands’.768  
      There is a colourful example of southern Italian contempt for the North in the Foreign 
Office papers from 1882. In Messina, on the 600th anniversary of the Sicilian Vespers, a 
crowd of 15,000, stirred up by a demagogue called Bensaja, rioted and pulled down the 
Italian flag; shouting “Viva Garibaldi” and “Abasso il Giuccio” (“Down with the 
Donkey” - i.e. the King, Umberto I), scooped up “an old man who was exceedingly 
drunk” and paraded him about as a surrogate King. No-one was hurt and the good-
humoured riot fizzled peacefully out, though the event in turn ignited a rather less good-
humoured commotion in Palermo.769 Geopolitically, too, Italy was far from a unified 
entity.770 Notwithstanding the entrenched  localism inherent in the Italian polity and the 
exclusion of the vast majority of the population from parliamentary activity, the creation 
of a proto-Italian state in 1861 - at this stage really only an extension of Cavour’s 
Piedmont-Sardinia771 - had not included the Papal States, or those parts of Northern Italy 
(Venetia, Trieste and Tyrol) still occupied by Austria.772  
                                                 
768 J.A. Thayer, ‘Risorgimento Achievement and Post-Risorgimento Problems’, in A.W. Salomone (ed.), 
Italy from Risorgimento to Fascism: An Enquiry into the Origins of the Totalitarian State (Newton Abbot: 
David & Charles, 1970), pp. 93-94. 
769 FO45/636, Paget - Granville, 21 March 1882. And see note 112 above. 
770 For a comprehensive background to Italian nation-building see Barbagallo, ‘Idea and Reality’, pp. 338-
401. 
771 C. Duggan, ‘Nation-building in 19th-century Italy: The case of Francesco Crispi’, History Today Vol.52: 
2 (February 2002), pp.9-15; Mack Smith, Italy, pp. 61-69.  
772 Taylor, Struggle, pp.99-100. 
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After the liberation of Rome in 1870, and the subsequent acquisition of the Papal 
territories, the Papacy became a major problem to the Italian state. Angered by the loss of 
its territories to the Italian state, it refused to allow Catholics to take part in Italian 
parliamentary elections, thus putting many Italians in a moral dilemma, as well as 
worrying the Italian authorities that either the Pope was intriguing against the Italian state 
with other Catholic Powers (i.e. France and Austria), or that those same Catholic Powers 
might intervene to restore Rome to the Pope.773 This led to ‘a permanent state of tension’ 
between the Vatican and the Italian government which was unresolved by 1896.774   Even 
the defeats of Italian arms in Abyssinia were used by the Papacy to try and undermine the 
Italian State. Following the battle of Amba Alage (December 1895), the Vatican censured 
clergy who made patriotic comments about Italians who had “died for their country”, 
because such remarks were seen as validating the Italian state and, by implication, 
sanctioning the seizure of the Papal territories. In March 1896 the Vatican rejoiced  at the 
defeat of the ‘Satanic’ Italian  armies which, at Adowa, paid ‘... the wages of a divine 
vendetta’.775 Four months after Adowa, the Vatican publicly equated Italian attempts to 
grab land in Africa with the theft of territory from the Papacy, and accused the Italian 
government of being riddled with freemasons who wanted to crush Africa’s only 
Christian state. It also launched a campaign, independent of the efforts of the Italian 
                                                 
773 Papal edicts in 1871, 1874, 1881 and 1886 effectively barred Italian Catholics from either voting in or 
standing as candidates in parliamentary elections. Clark, Modern Italy, pp.84-85; Joll, Europe, p.7; Lowe & 
Marzari, Italian, p.12.  
774 Lowe & Marzari ibid., p.11-12. See also S.W. Halperin, ‘Italian Anticlericalism, 1871-1914’, The 
Journal of Modern History 19:1(May 1947); pp.18-34.  
775 Bosworth, Least, p.24 
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government, to obtain the release of Italian POWs by using its connections with the 
Coptic church in Abyssinia.776  
      Anger went both ways in Italy - anti-Papal feelings ran high amongst large sections of 
the general populace, especially the radicals, as evidenced by anti-Papal riots during July 
1881 during which stones were thrown at the coffin of Pope Pius IX. Threats to blow up 
the Vatican led Pope Leo XIII to seriously plan leaving Rome and going into exile.777 
There was a brief truce between church and state when they joined in mourning the loss 
of Italian lives and prestige at Dogali in January 1887,778 but it didn’t last. Then were 
political factors and movements that transcended regionalism. Republican sentiment and 
activity remained strong throughout Italy, as those who saw themselves as the successors 
of Mazzini779 sought to bring down the Monarchy, while Garibaldi780 remained active as 
the idol and sometime leader of the Radicals who themselves had split from, and moved 
to the Left of, the Republicans.781 Add to this volatile mix a strong dose of Anarchism, 
                                                 
776 For the full story of this curious episode in Italo-Papal relations, see R. Jonas, The Battle of Adowa: 
African Victory in the Age of Empire (Harvard: Belknap Press, 2011), pp. 307-10, and Langer, European 
Alliances, pp. 231-247, for a particularly good analysis of the effects of the Italo-Papal schism upon Italy’s 
internal political situation, and her relations with the rest of Europe subsequent to it. 
777 Langer, European Alliances, pp. 231-32. However, some observers suspected that these riots, especially 
those aimed at the coffin of Pius IX, had been engineered by the Papacy to discredit the Italian state, as the 
coffin-moving  had been done at night, under conditions of great secrecy, and any riot resulting must have 
been due to a deliberate leak; FO45/430, Paget - Granville, July 13 1881. 
778 A. Triulzi, ‘Adwa: From Monument to Document’, Modern Italy, 8: 1 (2008), pp.95-108 (p.102), and R. 
Battaglia, La Prima Guerra d’Africa, (Torino: Einaudi, 1958) p.242. 
779 Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-72), foremost republican of the Risorgimento.  
780 Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-82), early follower of Mazzini and military and political adventurer central to 
the success of the Risorgimento. 
781 Clark, Modern Italy, pp.78-81. ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ in Italian politics at this time were fluid distinctions; in 
terms of foreign policy during and after the Risorgimento, the Right (‘Destra’) were advocates of the old 
liberalism who placed good relations with France at a premium. The Left (‘Sinistra’) condemned the 
Right’s allegiance to France but could not align itself with any other country and thus tended towards 
isolationism. The advent of the Third republic in France threw these distinctions into disarray (the Destra 
had predicated its pro-French stance upon the assumption that France was a Monarchy), and account for the 
opportunistic nature - or ‘Machiavellianism’ - that appeared to characterise Italian relations with other 
countries and which led to Italy being regarded with great mistrust by the Powers in the years following 
1870; I. Scott, ‘The making of the Triple Alliance in 1882’, East European Quarterly, XII:  4 (Winter 
1978), pp.399-423 (pp.400-01). And see below, p. 37 and note 147. 
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which flourished throughout Italy after Bakunin’s appearance in Naples in 1865 and was 
reinforced by the transient successes of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Spanish 
Republican Revolution of 1873,782 and all the components were present for an explosion 
which had the potential to destroy the young state (as indeed, not dissimilar tensions 
sundered the United States in 1862).783 As d’Azeglio said, the Risorgimento had made 
Italy, but it had not made Italians.784 
 
Depretis was almost single-handedly responsible for holding the country together until 
his death in August 1887. The Depretis method of government by incorporating all 
shades of opinion into a moderate consensus785 became known as Trasformismo.  Prior to 
the Depretis years, national politics had been dominated by Northern Italians. However, 
much as Tito, a Croat, ensured the stability of a united Yugoslavia by ensuring the 
presence of Serbs in important government positions after 1945,786 Depretis sought to 
draw the South into the reality of a united Italy by appointing Southerners to government 
                                                 
782 Ibid., pp.73-75. 
783 For a study of the remarkable similarities between Italy and the United States in this respect, see Dal 
Lago, ‘States’, pp. 403-432. 
784 Massimo Taparelli, Marquis d’Azeglio (1796-1866), artist, writer and Prime Minister of Piedmont, 
1849-52. A curious comment from a man who did not favour the incorporation of the South or the Papal 
States in a united Italy; Mack Smith, Italy, p.32. 
785 Not unlike that of Lord Liverpool, who had ‘learned how to deal with men; his tact and patience, his 
own modesty and common sense kept his party together’ (E.L.  Woodward, The Age of Reform 1815-1870 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1938), p.51) and who in 1812, following the assassination of Perceval, ‘came back as 
the indispensable co-ordinator of a cabinet of national effort’; Watson, Reign, p.500. Liverpool, like 
Depretis,  had also to take “extremists” such as Sidmouth into the government.  
      Apropos Liverpool, Donovan  & Newell point out that Trasformismo/Transformism was nothing new, 
or unique to Italy, but was rather a function of the development of the industrialising, post-Napoleonic 
European Liberal state and can be defined as ‘... the rapprochement of democratic liberals with 
conservative liberals as more radical forces appeared on the left’, and that a comparative analysis of 
Mediterranean politics was identified by Kurth as being common, in “transformismal” terms, to Italy, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. They also identify the transformation process as being traceable in a British 
context to the troubled reign of James II and the ‘Glorious Revolution’; M. Donovan & J.L. Newell, 
‘Centrism in Italian Politics’, Modern Italy, 13: 4 (2008), pp. 381-397 (pp. 385-87). 
786 See, for example, T. Butcher, The Trigger: Hunting the Assassin who Brought the World to War 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 2014), pp.114-22, and M. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan 
War (New York: Penguin, 1992 - 3rd ed. 1996), pp.13 & 249. 
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posts;787 so much so that trasformismo changed the social basis of the Italian leadership 
from the traditional Northerners to those of the South,788 and in doing so sowed the seeds 
of its own destruction. This was because trasformismo, by its nature a mechanism of 
compromise and avoidance of extremes, did not ultimately sit well with Italy’s image of 
herself as a Great Power. In reality, trasformismo functioned by a form of cronyism; 
‘during (his) years of opposition, Depretis had become accustomed to seek allies 
indiscriminately, and to promise too much to too many. His chief strength lay in Southern 
Italy, where political life had always been unhealthy, where men had learned their 
politics in the school of conspiracy…’,789 so that he became used to using graft to get the 
people he wanted, and putting them where he wanted them. Political appointments went 
to those who toed the line;’… elections were fixed… deputies corrupt… the issues of 
political debate were few, became fewer’790 so that by 1887 Depretis had ‘created an 
electoral machine which… hardly ever failed to register the desired result’,791 but which 
was perceived by many as being bereft of any higher principle. By the time of his death, 
Italy was ripe for a more adventurous leader. 
                                                 
787 Mack  Smith, Italy, pp. 109-10. However, a purely “party-based” analysis of Italian politics ignores the 
importance of the Monarchy as a stabilizing focus for all non-Republican factions within the cauldron of 
Italian domestic politics. As Brice points out, ‘...If we take the four fundamental... characteristics proposed 
by La Palombara and Weiner to define a political party, it would be difficult to find an Italian (party) before 
(1900) which met these criteria, and... there was no liberal ‘Party’ in the proper sense of the term... The 
difficult relationship between the Italian ruling class and the concept of the political party (is typified by 
Crispi, a) supporter of pluralism, an admirer of the English system, and heir to the liberal-democratic 
tradition (but) reluctant to (countenance) parties which could be written off as municipal or corporate 
idiosyncrasies, and in that sense overshadowed by the confidence in the State and the national-popular 
monarchy that unified the country’s parties’; C. Brice, ‘Monarchy and Nation in Italy at the End of the 
Nineteenth Century: A Unique form of Politicization?’, European History Quarterly, 43: 1 (2013), pp. 53-
72 (pp.56-57). My italics. 
788 Lowe & Marzari, op.cit, p.10. For an excellent examination of the North-South dichotomy regarding all 
aspects of the Italian polity, see Chabod, Statecraft, pp.147-72. 
789 Mack Smith, op.cit, pp.109-110. 
790 Clark, Modern Italy, pp. 63-64. 
791 Mack Smith, op.cit., p.110. But see notes 134 & 137 above regarding the difficulties inherent in 
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